December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Mighty morphing power cypherpunks
by Rick Busdiecker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: jamesd(a)netcom.com (James A. Donald) Date: Fri, 2 Dec 1994 17:13:28 -0800 (PST) My point was that if some of the autonag messages go astray, or are deliberately misled, who cares? I suspect that LD would love to play around with this feature. Spoof a letter from someone and you can make the cypherpunks send that person some hate mail. Basically, I just think it's a mistake. I think that annotating a message as it passes through cypherpunks -- such as cypherpunks(a)hks.net does -- is a fine idea. However, I think that adding new ways for attackers to make privacy advocates look bad isn't a great idea. The proposed system is for everyone, not just pseudonyms. If I meant pseudonyms, I would have said pseudonyms, not nyms. I understood that and followed the same convention. I'm not worried about pseudonyms -- they land in the bit bucket somewhere. I'm more concerned about spoofed real addresses. Rick

1 0

The Emperor's New Brain (fwd)
by lmccarth＠freya.cs.umass.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Sincere apologies if someone's sent this to the list before.... Forwarded message: > This comes to you courtesy of Del's friend Joe Levy: > > Would you all mind distributing this as much as possible? I, and every > net-surfer who is concerned about her/his rights, are trying to stop Big > Brother from taking over, and need all the help we can get. There may be more > serious letters later on. For now, just enjoy a slightly ridiculous one. All > the best, and don't get struck by flying pygmies, as always. > Forever, > Joe > > > The Emperor's New Brain > by Blimix (Joe Levy) > > (With apologies to Hans Christian Anderson.) > > Once upon a time, there was an Emperor. He had been voted > into office fairly easily, because he had managed to impress people > with his brain. But once he realized that the job demanded more, > he said, "My brain is too small!" So he had posters hung on every > blank wall in the kingdom, proclaiming the need for skilled neural > surgeons/tailors to weave him a new, better, bigger brain. "Soon," > he thought, "I will have a good brain and will be able to govern my > empire properly, and all the people will love me, and I'll be so > cool that there'll be chicks hanging around me all the time... > Maybe I'll even get a car, or put up the bestest BBS in the > world..." and so on. What he didn't know what that he was saying > all of this out loud, and that a small band of rogues had been > shadowing him for the duration of his monologue. When the Emperor > had left to pursue other activities, due to the rather self- > exciting nature of his mostly derailed train of thought, the rogues > spoke amongst themselves. > "Will you listen to that, mate?" commented NSA. "The poor > chap really hasn't got a clue!" > "Yeah, let's put him out of our misery," remarked FBI. > "Be quiet, will you?" said CIA. "You dolt, don't you see the > prospects here? We can rule this place. NSA and NIST have the > plan. Where is NIST, anyway?" > "He'll be along, shortly. He had some business with that > hotshot DES. Chopped half of DES's - thing - off, he did. Ugly > business," replied NSA. > > * * * > > "Sire, there are some important-looking men to see you," said > the page. > The Emperor jumped. "What?!? Oh! Okay, I'll be down > shortly. Um, you didn't... see anything... did you?" > "No, Sire," the page replied immediately. > The Emperor left to wash his hand. > > * * * > > "You mean you can weave a tremendous brain for me if I just > bring you all the doors, window blinds and roofs in the kingdom, > using your Clippers?" > "Yeah, but there's also the matter of payment," said CIA. > NSA spoke. "We understand that you have, in the castle > vaults, a supply of magical potions of growth. Those will do > nicely." > "But those are the only ones in the kingdom! We have saved > them since the days of my great-great-great-great-grandmother, > what's-her-name!" > FBI stood to his full, rather impressive height, and looked > down at the suddenly small-feeling Emperor. "This is what's best > for the kingdom, isn't it? You need a brain, and we need the > potions. Do you really want to argue?" > "Uh... of course not." was the meek response. > "Good. Now that that's settled-" began NSA. > "But what if the peasants want to keep their roofs and doors > and blinds?" interrupted the Emperor. > NSA confidently replied, "They won't. We'll make sure that > they know it's all for the common good. Besides, those things are > only needed to conceal things. People who have nothing to hide > have no cause to resent this, do they? Besides, if against all > likelihood, our idea is rejected by the public, we can simply put > everything that we took away back again. And don't think for a > moment that we would be looking into the houses of innocents. No, > we can help you take care of your subjects. They will look up to > us as kindly Big Brothers." > "I'm quite capable of taking care of the kingdom myself," > asserted the Emperor. > "Nonsense," CIA remarked. "We're the ones building you this > brain, right?" > "Right," the Emperor acquiesced, though he wasn't quite sure > that the conclusion followed logically from this. He felt there > was something slightly wrong, but since he could not tell what, he > decided not to risk making a fool of himself. > "Then we can begin!" roared FBI. > > * * * > > At the scoundrels' insistence, the Emperor ordered every > construction worker in the kingdom to work on the dismantling of > the houses, using their new Clippers. Thus did the infrastructure > suffer, as roads crumbled, and prices rose, while the economy began > a slow but accelerating collapse. Just inside the castle, a ragged > collection of peasants met with the Emperor. > "Why are your goons doing this to us?" cried one woman. "I > can't get to work anymore!" > And old man spoke up. "Without a roof, we can't keep the > rains off of us! My whole family has pneumonia!" Several others > shouted their agreement. > "I was willing to sacrifice for the kingdom," lamented a > former merchant. "I willingly gave them all of my wood, and put up > paper instead. They ripped it down! And they didn't even use it! > They just said I couldn't have anything covering me." > "I'm sure there are perfectly reasonable explanations for all > of this." > Suddenly four towering figures entered, and herded the > peasants outside. "There's no such thing as rain! Stop > complaining!" A few families were trampled during the confusion, > but no one noticed. > > * * * > > It was only a week later that the smoke was first seen. > Behind the castle, the tremendous stockpiles of collected wood were > being burned. > "My kingdom is collapsing!" cried the Emperor. > "And we know why!" exclaimed FBI. "There are secret societies > of witches that oppose us. But our spies, KGB and Mccarthy, have > been rooting them out. That is what the fires are for." > "But you're burning the wood that you said you would save!" > "SO WHAT?!?!?!?" > "Okay, as long as you put it that way. What about my brain?" > This caught FBI by surprise, for he had completely forgotten > about the deal. Luckily, CIA happened to be in the room, and > glibly replied, "The chemical reactions going on right now are the > final processes in the construction of the brain." > "Oh, goody." The prospect of the new brain cheered up the > Emperor, and he forgot about his dying kingdom. > > * * * > > Witch-burnings were becoming common. The rogues, now grown to > immense size, regularly reached into houses, plucking out the > occupants, and placed them on the huge bonfires. The first ones > taken, of course, were the poor peasants who had originally spoken > up. Then, anyone who had a brain was considered a potential > threat, and made into a scapegoat. > "What did this woman do that makes you believe she's a witch?" > the Emperor asked. > FBI replied, "She turned me into a n-" > "Shut up," said NSA. "We discovered a rumor about strange > activities going on in her house. We checked it out, and surely > enough, we found this." He triumphantly held up a rather well- > executed painting of a swan launching itself into flight from an > alpine lake. > "What is its relevance to witchcraft?" > NSA began, "First, the canvas can be used to shield her from > sight, so she obviously has something to hide. Also, the drawing > itself is obviously a dangerous example of freedom propaganda. As > we all know, freedom cannot be tolerated. We also intercepted this > letter from her to her band. It proves that she and the twenty > other people named here are witches." > Working her mouth free of the gag, the woman cried, "I didn't > write that! It's not even in my hand-" FBI cut off her protest by > flinging her into the blazing conflagration. > > * * * > > NSA congratulated his friends. "Well, lads, we've made a > killing. Besides having the power to do whatever we want to > whomever we want, our Clippers are selling like wildfire, since > they're the only product that anyone is allowed to buy now. Can > you believe we actually managed to convince people that those > things are useful?" They all laughed heartily at this. "It's > probably time to invite the Emperor back into the castle." > At their call, his Excellency dutifully entered. "We finished > your brain last night, and implanted it while you were sleeping in > the stables," claimed CIA. "It is indeed huge, and, being made > from pure energy (released by the burning wood), weighs virtually > nothing. We fashioned it in such a way that only a person without > personal problems can see it, so that you may judge this > characteristic in people with ease." > FBI held up a mirror to facilitate the Emperor's viewing of > his new brain. "How do you like it?" > Though he saw nothing but his own reflection, he said, "It is > a good brain. I like the laurels particularly. Let's hold a > parade, so that all may see The Emperor's New Brain!" > > * * * > > And so it was. The day came, and the broken people trudged > through the pitted streets to finally view the great result of > their even greater sacrifice. As they waited expectantly for the > parade train, they wondered, "Was the loss of our privacy and > freedom of thought worth a slightly more effective government?" > But they could do nothing more than wonder, for to speak thusly > would mean certain death. So, they mutely held their only > possessions, the Clippers, which had been the instruments of their > downfall. > A wave of excitement swept through the crowd, as the arrival > of the parade was heralded. All knew of the wondrous properties > that the Brain possessed, and were eager to see it for themselves. > As the crowd held its breath, the Emperor came into view. And no > one was surprised that they could not see the brain, because they > knew perfectly well that they had problems. But this could not be > admitted. Words of praise floated through the air. "How regal it > is!" "That brain is huge!" "I like the color scheme." "Now he'll > be able to solve all of our problems." > "That brain doesn't exist," said a junior programmer. > "Well, neither do we," said a philosopher. > "No, I mean it! There's no brain there!" the programmer > insisted. And gradually, the crowd became aware of the truth of > his words. > "The Emperor doesn't have a brain!" they all shouted. They > picked up fragments of concrete that had once been a sidewalk, and > started throwing them. Luckily for the Emperor, this behavior was > quelled when FBI stepped on the offending parties. > The survivors were too weak, due to lack of protection from > the elements, to fight back. And while the all-powerful villains > lived comfortably for the rest of their lives, a nation died. > > * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > "They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little > temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." - Benjamin > Franklin > > Don't let Clipper be YOUR downfall. Learn as much as you can, > than do whatever you can to educate others, and let your > representatives and senators know how you feel. Wired is a good > source of information. Read the April issue. Or gopher to > wired.com to see their database. Lazarus Long and I will be > putting up Clipper-dedicated databases of our own. (More > information to follow.) > > Y Gwir Yn Erbyn Byd, > Blimix > jl0637(a)rachel.albany.edu > > p.s. Please feel free to distribute this story at will. I merely > ask that you do not change or delete any part of it, from the title > line to this post-script. > - -- > Adam Lindsey Jacobs | "Thinking is the hardest work > bullfrog(a)jaflrn.morse.net | there is, which is probably the > Long Island, New York, U.S.A. | reason why so few engage in it." - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLuEm6SoZzwIn1bdtAQGeiwGAjvh39y5hWN9+zNUVHGz8W2KHkVIYsdvR MSzDCX+lV4LRH2gc0c5IXp9CypYJke8h =U7j5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: Brands excluded from digicash beta
by Alex Strasheim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Yes, it is granted that Digicash is in beta, and not polished. But > beta testing usually happens after all significant functionality is > present. The Digicash beta isn't moving real money, and that's a > significant functional deficit. Couldn't we make a similar argument against digital commerce systems in general? Most of the things I want to buy aren't available online, so what good are net based transactions? In a sense that's true, but at the same time it seems clear that eventually one or more systems with goods and services I want to buy (at prices I want to pay) will emerge. If I didn't believe that, I wouldn't be very interested in the topic. Unless Digicash has significant problems with banks or governments that I don't know about (always a possibility), the things I've heard about the beta test make me believe that a functional transaction system from that company will probably be released. > Who can say? It hasn't been released for real. Clearing and > settlement in a payments system are _most_ of the problem, not sugar > coating. FV is leveraging Visa for settlement, but Digicash currently > has nothing. I can understand why you'd need Visa's permission if you're going to be using a system that uses that credit card to process transactions. But if DigiCash feels their system is secure, what would stop them from just selling digital currency on their own? They could say that they'll sell e-dollars for $1, and buy them for $0.95. Assuming they keep the revenue from currency sales in something low risk and they committ to making a market, wouldn't that be enough to get things rolling? Individuals or banks all over the world could set up operations which convert e-currency to and from $US, working inside of the buy/sell spread set up by Digicash. On top of that, they'd get the interest income on the funds that back all the digital dollars, which would be a large source of income in addition to what they would make from the software. If there's someone I can go to who will give me cash for digital currency, I'll take digital currency as a payment for any goods and services I sell. If someone else will give me a check for the digicash, what does my banker have to say about it? == Alex Strasheim | finger astrashe(a)nyx.cs.du.edu alex(a)omaha.com | for my PGP 2.6.1. public key -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLuEn4REpP7+baaPtAQGSbwP/ccN3dvugcEgFg9lG6DuFw2JzdltDd63C 5ZkMiDMkbWly3i0d+TI5OGTFPoafjDaBRieaoCzsrjsZAWQDVrscjwrvCa38GQDD aTZa3AF9pEixhVWN0pFiDcUx7ByO92fFexA6POHnZOvTSNws9wqQ4b1vnaofWQNE k4s0ji7x3NE= =+8TT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

4 3

NYT on Insecure Phones
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The New York Times last Thursday had two pieces on telephones that may be of interest. One deals with cellular fraud in NYC, given entirely here: "Cellular Fraud in New York Cellular telephone fraud in New York City has become so rampant that a cellular service in Washington will temporarily block its customers from using their wireless phones when they travel in New York. Cellular One of Washington-Baltimore, owned by SBC Communications Inc., has sent its customers letters notifying them that it would block the service beginning on Thursday because it had compiled a huge backlog of phone numbers used in New York that appeared to be fraudulent. Company officials said they would resume service once they finished investigating each case, which they said would take three weeks. Cellular telephone fraud occurs when people use false identification numbers on their wireless telephones and make calls. The Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association said fraud costs had soared to about $1 billion a year. Cellular thieves typically use radio scanners to capture the identification numbers of legitimate cellular phones, which transmit the numbers each time they are used. These numbers are then written onto a computer chip inside an inactive phone, effectively 'cloning' the original." ------------------- End illegitimate fraud article Then, probably not coincidentally in this happy legitimate-fraud shopping season, there was a long consumer-oriented article the very same day, alors, about new cordless phones, including this info about security features against illegitimate fraud: "A new generation of digital cordless phones using a powerful 900 megahertz (MHz) frequency ... blocks thieves who scan the airwaves listening for credit card and Social Security numbers people innocently give over the phone. ... Cellular car phones and two-way radio car service conversations were constant unwanted companions with the standard cordless phones [but] with the 900 MHz phones, the interference was practically non-existent. ... The Cincinnati Microwave Escort 9020 Digital Spread Spectrum Cordless Telephone is one of the first models to feature spread-spectrum technology -- originally developed for the military and now being used for consumers -- that digitally scrambles voice communications before transmitting them. ... ... newer standard-frequency models are offering improved security. By using scrambling technology -- though not as sophisticated as digital spread spectrum -- they block out most eavesdroppers. Panasonic calls the feature Secure Guard; Motorola, Secure Clear, and Toshiba, Call Protect. It doesn't add much to the cost ($10 to $25) and is well worth the money, although the phone is not as secure as a digital one." [My first PGP sig, hooray] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLuECi4Sb9hQ07hCVAQHhEQQAjzA4HuMxdExsQiHz2T22MpD8Qe6OqjCG CILxx10lXlqYU9/4xtruZuKNd4dHqzKIqsFhLD1IdIHOwplCzigPW5LIs7HKJAJ8 NpfE/lJ3y/ASgk5P21ZPEFHFgzt0voIRIMlrURIgD07kh35XqfaKZ21Jq7yUCfnh g8eLZ8RkgG0= =qYtN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Date for 2048 bit Keys??
by werewolf＠io.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I saw an interesting thread in alt.security.pgp about when PGP v 2.6.2 will handle key sizes of up to 2048 bits. Someone speculated that it will take effect in the middle of the month (ie after Dec. 15 you type pgp -kg and it will give you four choices, the last one of up to 2048 bits). I wasn't aware that this feature was programmed into this version of PGP. I always thought that there was simply going to be another upgrade that would allow the larger key sizes. Can anyone shed some light on this??? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLuEzya+YbMzawbu5AQE/aQP8CU/02O4PoXEWBrHFIMNc80BJS9tp0PC2 ZrWXEJt20QEzE9d8BvO6LhlfcoC5/aYgtp73BsfHnl6favzqp64K+9R8LaHb+P5v 8NipeLi37bdtoZpNG6/0F/WrXABZir9Z22+HHsI3DWuxZtiKRlfl9QAdxl2sss0I N1tCc05dU3U= =LIkh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

Re: Date for 2048 bit Keys??
by VAMAGUS＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- werewolf(a)io.org wrote: >I saw an interesting thread in alt.security.pgp about when PGP v 2.6.2 will >handle key sizes of up to 2048 bits. Someone speculated that it will take >effect in the middle of the month (ie after Dec. 15 you type pgp -kg and >it will give you four choices, the last one of up to 2048 bits). > >I wasn't aware that this feature was programmed into this version of PGP. I >always thought that there was simply going to be another upgrade that would >allow the larger key sizes. > >Can anyone shed some light on this??? You beat me to the post :( I tested this out earlier today. I changed the system clock and I got this: Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 1024/BEB3ED71 1994/09/18 J.L.Francois <vamagus(a)delphi.com> pub 2047/D9E1F2E9 1995/01/01 Francois, J.L <vamagus(a)delphi.com> It works but take a lot more time, obviously, to generate the key. ***************************Frenchie Sends********************************* * 1024/Key ID: BEB3ED71 J. Francois 2048/Key ID: D9E1F2E9 * * As soon as any man says of the affairs of the state * * "What does it matter to me?" the state may be given up for lost. * * J.J.Rousseau - The Social Contract * ********************Want to know more about PGP? Ask me!****************** -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLwYqJrbmxeO+s+1xAQFfuwP/SjLrZsCdyiNERSxUyoDYyjcwpXZHw9o5 LdDV//DHEhttFCbiND5pbza+1Uiw+SubmwHCuP3UCSER9WtFWDd4SV7GcD2YDDiL DFwVYynp4jLd9HvbA2eHgguZ5uNO7xBXWyBaDkMeFHDdB3oP7QuUDpJz4IDwm7xs 0KcgRYvaQdc= =8qoX -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Moto Secure Clear digital?
by Wes Felter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just got a second phone line, and decided that if I was going to get a 2-line phone it might as well be a good one, so I am considering a Motorola Secure Clear cordless 2-line phone with speakerphone. This will be quite an investment,so I was wondering whether the Secure Clear phones are digitally encrypted or merely scrambled using some analog method. Anybody know about this? How secure are these phones really? --Wes Wesley Felter wesf(a)unicycle.cs.tulane.edu I speak for no one. Trust no one. Cryptography is outlawed and only the outlaws care. When thinking is outlawed, maybe then somebody will care. When thinking is outlawed, only outlaws will be able to care. <sigh, depressing .sig>

3 2

Re: NYT on Insecure Phones
by cactus＠hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199412040246.VAA25360(a)pipe3.pipeline.com>, John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> wrote: > Cellular One of Washington-Baltimore, owned by SBC > Communications Inc., has sent its customers letters > notifying them that it would block the service beginning on > Thursday because it had compiled a huge backlog of phone > numbers used in New York that appeared to be fraudulent. It's worse than that! They will allow customers to use their service in NYC, I'm told by a customer of their's visiting this weekend, if they pay for the call with a credit card (IE, VISA, MC, etc) that they must *give* *an* *operator* *over* *the* *cellphone*. So to avoid their own exposure to fraud, they're requiring their customers to give credit card info over the cellphone. Thanks, guys. No pro-34s 'round here, nope. - -- Todd Masco | "Roam home to a dome, Where Georgian and Gothic once stood cactus(a)hks.net | Now chemical bonds alone guard our blond(e)s, cactus(a)bb.com | And even the plumbing looks good." - B Fuller - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLuFGUioZzwIn1bdtAQF98wGAiBKy9nk/SzN7Nb/8v/noLEZDJgRCZy71 pjyDqlAtjnnQ0KelgzqDPLr8LIXAo8Eq =+JzJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

3 2

Interoperability, one-use remailer tickets
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The remailers need a one-time reply mechanism. This would enable many other things, including "persistent" anonymous entities, without using broadcast techniques. The current remailers encourage hit-and-run anonymity, like the recent burst of anonymous nastiness, and discourage conversational anonymity and persistent anonymous entities. Sending a one-way message is easy and fairly secure. Creating a reply ticket is not very secure. The ticket can be replayed through the net to trace the path taken, and since the text following the ticket it sent in clear, it is easy to trace. The ticket can also be decrypted by coercion or hacking of the remailer machines. In general, there is enough persistent information available to trace any reply ticket. This is a bad thing. A one-shot reply ticket would be designed so that, after the ticket was used or a set time had passed, the ticket was no longer valid and the information needed to trace the path, partially stored in the remailers, was gone. One way to do this: each remailer has a list of secret (symmetric) keys. Each secret may have an expiration date. By some method (problem discussed later) the user and the remailer establish a shared secret, adding it to the list, while the remailer does not find out who the user is. The reply ticket contains a series of nested hops, each encrypted with that remailer's secret plus all the others after it. When the ticket is used, the remailer decrypts one layer of the ticket to obtain the next hop. It then encrypts the message with that secret key. Now it forgets the secret key (poof!) and passes the message and remainder of the ticket on to the next remailer. The ticket is getting decrypted at each hop, and the message is getting encrypted. Thus there is nothing recognizable between hops, and the trail is burning up as the message propagates. At the terminal end, the recipient applies all of the secret keys in the proper order to decrypt the message. Of course, an additional end-to-end public-key encryption is also an option. The catch: how do we establish a shared secret with the remailer, without identifying ourselves to it? If the first remailer (the one the replyer sends the ticket to) is corrupt, and it knows who established the secret contained in the ticket, it knows the end-to-end path of the message. Solution 1: each remailer has a public key. To establish shared secrets with a series of remailers, you send a normally-chained and nested message, using each remailer's public key. Each remailer decrypts a layer, stores the secret contained for it, and passes the message on. The first few remailers may not get secrets; they are just there to anonymize the message. Problem: secret-establishing message is replayed, setting trail back up, then reply ticket is replayed. Solution: when a secret is used, it is one-way hashed, the hash stored, the secret forgotten. Secrets which have already been used will not be accepted the second time. When the used secrets list gets full, a new public/secret pair is generated and the old one is forgotten, preventing any more replays. Problem: remailers are coerced or hacked to decrypt a captured secret- establishing message, before the secret key is expired. Trail of a reply ticket can then be followed. Solution: no good one that I can think of. Solution 2: establish a shared secret by a simple, direct Diffie-Hellman exchange with the remailer. You send a public-piece in a message, remailer sends you a public-piece, both sides compute the secret. If the remailer is corrupt, it now knows who you are. This is a level-1 secret. Use the level-1 secret as a reply ticket to establish a secret with another remailer. Message goes through a remailer, to the target you want to establish a secret with. Target replies using the level-1 secret. This is a level-2 secret; two remailers have to be corrupt to trace this secret to you. If you want, use the level-2 secret for another exchange to create a level-3 secret, and so on until your comfort zone is reached. An automatic program sits around stockpiling secrets for you. Problem: high bandwidth. Does anyone know of a better way to establish a shared secret in an untraceable way? Both of these methods have their problems. Given a secure two-way messaging mechanism, persistent anonymous identities are established using a "pigeonhole service". This is a service, with a publicized address, that will accept public-key encrypted mail and store it in a "pigeonhole". The owner of the pigeonhole anonymously sends a request (with authentication) and a reply ticket. The pigeonhole service sends the owner his mail using the ticket. Anonymous users would need a client that could set up trails, create tickets, request mail from the pigeonhole, etc. One nice feature of the system is that non-anonymous users could talk to anonymous users without having a client. The anonymous message would be of the form: --- BEGIN REPLY TICKET (LEAVE AT HEAD OF REPLY) --- (Reply ticket ciphertext) --- END REPLY TICKET --- Message text The non-anonymous user could reply with any mail reader, send the message back to the remailer that sent it to him, and the message would be transported securely back to the anonymous user that sent it. For something complex like this, we need a language with a little more leverage than C provides. For this and other complex protocols, I've ported RSAREF 2.0 to Perl. The interface does not require you to recompile Perl. It uses a C daemon and pipes. It provides symmetric encryption, public-key encryption, digital signatures, hashing, DH exchange, and ASCII armor. The algorithms used are MD5, MD2, DES, DESX, triple-DES, RSA, and DH. It has a good (eval/die) exception handling mechanism, and a very thorough regression testing script. For reliability in a large remailer network, end-to-end reliability is better than point-to-point reliability. Messages should be m-of-n secret shared before transmission, and reassembled at the terminal end. For clientless reception, the terminal node remailer could do the reassembly and splitting of replies. Code for secret sharing is available, but most secret-sharing algorithms create shadows each the size of the message. This can be avoided: use an error correcting code to add enough information to the original so the message can be recreated with any m of n pieces. Break into pieces, encrypt each piece, and secret-share the key. Where can I get an error correction algorithm that can do this? You should be able to increase a file's size by 50% and then have any two of three pieces recreate it, for example. I want to add other algorithms to the Perl encryption package. The secret sharing, for one. A one-function call to gzip for compression. A blind signature if I could get patent permission (not from Chaum; how's Brands?) or perhaps just do it with a "research purposes only" disclaimer. Someone with Visual Basic experience could do a DOS/Windows VBX module to enable easy writing of PC clients for neat net-based servers written with the Perl encryption package. As Tim, Eric and others have pointed out, the problem of widespread, usable crypto is essentially the whole problem of interoperability across a network. Covering Unix for servers and Windows for clients would be a large step in the right direction. Mike

2 2

future entrapment
by alano＠teleport.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: Mklprc(a)aol.com >Date: Sun, 4 Dec 1994 09:26:11 -0500 >To: scottr(a)hevanet.com >Cc: alano(a)teleport.com, brew(a)mtek.com, GERICKS971(a)aol.com, > 74710.3505(a)compuserve.com, furseor1(a)hr.house.gov >Subject: future entrapment > >Something to think about...(fwd) > >Thought you all might be interested in this excerpt from CPSR list regarding >copyrights on the Net and especially how police can use the Web to set up >stings. > >mp > > >------------------------------ > >Date: Thu, 1 Dec 1994 07:45:31 -0800 >From: Charlie Stross <charless(a)sco.com> (by way of marsha-w(a)uiuc.edu >To: cpsr-global(a)cpsr.org > >Philosophically, I see most journalists as being filters. Some of us >read press releases, strip out the propaganda, and supply the results >(with interpretation) to the public. Some of us go and try to nail >down the story by poking around and asking questions. But ultimately >we rely on sensory input at some level -- and all we do is rearrange >it, comment on it (by referring to prior input), and punt it out again >at our readers. This is fundamentally an editorial process, and there >will be more need for it -- not less -- as the information deluge >gathers momentum. > >There's a huge problem on the net: how does copyright apply to a reference? >For example: I can't stitch a Far Side cartoon into my WWW home page. But >I _can_ embed an <IMG SRC= ...> directive in my page, pointing to a Far >Side cartoon that is _legitimately_ stored somewhere else on the net. When >you look at my page you will see the cartoon ... and will have a bit of a >headache when you stop to think about the copyright implications. > >The precise question of what constitutes a copyright violation runs >into a wall of mud as soon as you start asking questions about sources >and hyperlinks. For example, here's the kind of havoc you can wreak by >classifying all embedded link dereferences as deliberate actions. >Suppose I am a cop in some redneck area, and I want to nail someone >who uses the net locally. I could run a _very_ neat entrapment sting >to nail people for posession of kiddie porn: > >* establish a local WWW server hosting some useful information >* configure the server to record the IP addresses of people who > access it, and cross-reference them to obtain geographical > locations as registered with NIC. Feed this into a GIS and > track local accesses. >* have a list of people who I want to nail. >* filter all HTTP requests through a script that > - checks the list of victims > - if a request for a file comes in from one of the > targets, munge the outgoing web page to include > a <IMG SRC= ...> tag pointing to a foreign site > carrying images deemed pornographic in my jurisdiction > - ring the console bell > >As soon as someone on the hit list downloads a file, you have prima >facie evidence that they are probably in posession of some kiddie porn. >Instant search warrant time ... > >(And in case you were wondering, this is just a technology twist on top >of the recent Adult Action BBS case in Mississippi.) > >Basically, as far as I can see, conventional notions of copyright are >going to have to change -- because copying is no longer the only mechanism >for gaining posession of information. Our notions of intellectual property >may also have to change ... > > >-- Charlie > >(Who happens to write a column in Online World, and who can be found >most months in Computer Shopper and some months in PC PLUS -- all three >of them UK-based magazines unrelated to any US titles of the same name.) >------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >++M++++I++++C++++H++++A++++E++++L++++++P+++++E+++++A+++++R+++++C+++++E++++ >| mklprc(a)aol.com | Knowledge for the pupil -er- people. | >| mklprc(a)teleport.com | Give them a light and they'll | >| "annoying Xists since 1966" | follow it anywhere! -- Firesign | >+++Y+O+U'D++P+A+Y++T+O++K+N+O+W++W+H+A+T++Y+O+U++R+E+A+L+L+Y++T+H+I+N+K+++ > > > | "Encryption ROT13s your mind." | alano(a)teleport.com | |"Would you rather be tortured by the government | Disclaimer: | |forces or the people's liberation army?" -mklprc | Ignore the man | | -- PGP 2.6.2 key available on request -- | behind the keyboard.|

1 0