December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

v2.6 for the rest of us
by Paul K. Strong 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jeff Barber wrote: >While creating a 2.6-like version from 2.3a seems a worthy goal, this >supporting argument is flawed. The original PGP was written in the USA >and, never having received the proper export approvals, must have been >"illegally exported." Isn't Phil Zimmerman being "investigated" by a >grand jury for this even now? So, it would seem to me that a bulletin >board carrying any version of PGP holds illegally exported software (wrt >US law). How does 2.3a differ from 2.6 in this respect? Ok, you got me there! My supporting argument is indeed flawed. However, I would say that most people _regard_ v2.3a as a legal version outside the USA and so are willing to carry it on their systems; and at this time I believe nothing concrete to the contrary has been proved. Versions 2.5 and 2.6 however are obviously illegal exports, and I think that it is the fact that people think of one as legal and the other as illegal that makes the difference, and therefore we who are outside the USA need our own version to be brought up to date. I have, at this time, been informed of two separate people working on a new version that is compatible with 2.6, based on 2.3a code. Maybe everyone working on (or who know of people working on) such developments could post information regarding what exactly they are changing/upgrading/doing to 2.3a to make an 'international' v2.6. What do others think of everyone 'putting their cards on the table' to enable other knowledgeable cypherpunks to help and suggest things? Am I jumping the gun? Should we just let MIT's v2.6 reach an FTP site somewhere outside of the USA and let it slowly (and cautiously) get distributed to a small community of cypherpunks leaving the rest incompatible? All of those inside the USA, *PLEASE* get involved with this. It _is_ important! Thankyou for listening. ***************************************************************************** * Paul Strong Fidonet: 2:254/438 (weekly mail check) * * * * pauls(a)dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk Finger for PGP v2.3a public key * *****************************************************************************

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Email Stalking on CNN
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The idiot box behind me is making noise about Headline News' lead story for the evening, Email Stalking. The woman involved states she'll never use email again. Seems to me her arguments are moot, as cypherpunks has already developed the technology to solve this problem. Anyone volunteer to be a spokesperson for rebuttal? -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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Re: (fwd) Re: NSA Helped Yeltsin Foil 1991 Coup
by baum＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> If the story is >true, it means that the NSA can break some classes of conventional >cryptosystems very fast -- fast enough to be of use in this case, for >instance. Well, you are assuming that the coup plotters, who seem to be a fairly incompetent bunch of conspirators, were using high security communications, etc. Though, if they weren't, it still might point out intelligence gather abilities (as opposed to code breaking abilities). ************************************************** * Allen J. Baum tel. (408)974-3385 * * Apple Computer, MS/305-3B * * 1 Infinite Loop * * Cupertino, CA 95014 baum(a)apple.com * **************************************************

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MacPGP
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

New MacPGP Unicorn asked about the new MacPGP. Unicorn should ask Tim May, who has had a copy for three days now. Or Eric Hollander who has had it 5 days. Or Eric Hughes who's had it two days. Who the fuck do I have to send this thing to to get it released and mentioned? I'm done. They've got it, well the source at least. The program, MacPGP2.3aV1.1 has been out for months.

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Re: MacPGP
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-> Unicorn asked about the new MacPGP. Unicorn should ask Tim May, who has had a copy for three days now. Or Eric Hollander who has had it 5 days. Or Eric Hughes who's had it two days. Who the fuck do I have to send this thing to to get it released and mentioned? I'm done. They've got it, well the source at least. The program, MacPGP2.3aV1.1 has been out for months. <- I too have had a copy for quite some time, closely isolated in a closed partition. I just wanted to know that it was indeed now sourced.... -uni- (Dark)

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Privacy at Dunkin Donuts
by Lile.Elam＠Eng.Sun.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wow, this is good to know... -lile ---------------------------------- : Date: Thu, 26 May 1994 20:28:22 -0400 : From: dartvax!coos.dartmouth.edu!mozart (Sting) : Subject: P: Scary... : : This is pretty scary, I think...I had to read it twice before I could accept : that it wasn't a joke... : : CONCORD, N.H. (AP) -- At some Dunkin' Donuts, the walls have : ears. : So the next time you settle down over coffee and a cruller to : trade gossip with a friend, keep in mind that hidden microphones : may be recording the dirt you dish. : Manager Tony Wright insists he's not being nosy. It's just : another way to increase security and keep employees on their toes, : he said. He would never listen to customer conversations, he said. : ``Do you think I would waste my time?'' said Wright, who manages : five Dunkin' Donuts in Concord. : Use of concealed recorders is widespread at fast-food : restaurants, convenience stores and other businesses, according to : one company that sells them. : But unlike anti-shoplifting mirrors and surveillance cameras : seen throughout retail America these days, hidden microphones are : news to most of the public, judging from interviews Thursday at two : microphone-equipped Dunkin' Donuts in New Hampshire's capital. : ``Knowing this, I would never have a conversation in here,'' : said customer Frank Bowser, a private investigator who was : discussing a case with a partner. ``I think the general public : would be in an uproar to know that every time they come in for a : cup of coffee and a doughnut they could be heard.'' : Other customers, including Nick and Thalia Hondrogen, said they : were more offended by cigarette smoke than listening devices. : Nonetheless, they were surprised. : ``It's like spying. It sounds like Nazism or the KGB. It's not : American,'' Hondrogen said. ``Many times you say things to close : friends you don't want overheard.'' : The systems also were news -- unwelcome, at that -- at Dunkin' : Donuts corporate headquarters in Randolph, Mass. : Any system powerful enough to record customers' conversations : would be ``highly inappropriate'' and a violation of company : policy, spokesman Bill Chiccarelli said. : Still, store owners are using them. Security systems dealer Jeff : Meuse told the Concord Monitor he has installed systems in 500 : Dunkin' Donuts in Massachusetts in the last five years; of those, : 300 had audio monitoring. : Shops that have the monitoring systems display small stickers on : their doors saying, ``Audio monitoring on the premises.'' : All but the loudest customers are safe with many systems. At one : Dunkin' Donuts, Wright demonstrated that a customer standing at the : counter below the single mike in the ceiling had to speak loudly : and distinctly to be heard above the din of coffee grinders, staff : and general restaurant noise. : The systems can be far more sophisticated, however. Lewis Weiss, : chief executive officer of Louroe Electronics Inc. of Van Nuys, : Calif., said his company's systems can pick up conversations within : 30 feet. : ``Unfortunately, this is going to be the future until we get to : the point where there is minimal crime in this country,'' Weiss : said. ``Until then, store owners are going to have to have these : devices to protect their employees and their customers.'' : The American Civil Liberties Union grudgingly accepts : surveillance cameras and audio equipment at store and restaurant : cash registers, providing customers and staff are notified. : ``We would prefer not to see them at all, but if and when it : does happen, we would strongly (want) there to be actual and : functional notification,'' ACLU spokesman Milind Shah said in New : York. ``Often a sign on the door is not enough.'' : Federal law requires stores to post signs informing customers : they might be monitored, and customers should take notice, Weiss : said. : ``There is no invasion of privacy in a public store like a : Circle K or a Dunkin' Donuts because you can't carry on a private : conversation there,'' he said. : ----- End Included Message -----

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PGP 2.6
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Paul "K." Strong <pauls(a)dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk> wrote: >However, I would say that most people _regard_ v2.3a as a legal version >outside the USA and so are willing to carry it on their systems; and at >this time I believe nothing concrete to the contrary has been proved. > >Versions 2.5 and 2.6 however are obviously illegal exports, and I think that >it is the fact that people think of one as legal and the other as illegal >that makes the difference, and therefore we who are outside the USA need our >own version to be brought up to date. There has never been a ruling declaring it illegal to export PGP. No one has ever been convicted of illegally exporting crypto. The ITAR restrictions also contain many exemptions, under which it could be legal to export PGP. Furthermore, If you didn't get your copy of PGP from the US then you haven't broken any laws. >I have, at this time, been informed of two separate people working on a new >version that is compatible with 2.6, based on 2.3a code. To what effect? >Maybe everyone working on (or who know of people working on) such >developments could post information regarding what exactly they are >changing/upgrading/doing to 2.3a to make an 'international' v2.6. Or maybe you could just keep on using PGP 2.3a and stop worrying about it. >All of those inside the USA, *PLEASE* get involved with this. It _is_ >important! Why? Just because PGP 2.6 exists, doesn't mean you have to use it! If people want to communicate with you, they will use 2.3a also...or fix their damn software. It's their problem, not ours, so let's make it their problem! Boycott MIT-PGP.

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Unicorn vs. tmp@netcom
by Cyber City 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Recently Black Unicorn posted that he had sued tmp@netcom, and settled out of court. A couple of messages followed which were supportive of his action. The text below is a rebuke to Unicorn. I post it in the hope that it will provide dimension to the debate. To Black Unicorn: Once upon a time, two strangers found a dog. Alice said, "That's my dog: I can clearly tell by its markings". Bob said, "No, I'm afraid you're mistaken. See his ears pick up when I call his name". And so the debate continued, until a third person, Sol, arrived. On hearing the pleadings of Bob and Alice, Sol told them, "Stand 10 meters apart and put the dog between you". Sol the scared the dog with a quick movement and a shout, and the dog ran to its true master. Likewise, when you were tested recently by net abuse, you went for relief to your master, the government. This is what distinguishes you from the rest of us. We might react against the abuse (or we might not), but I think that none of us - or at least a very few - would have gone to court for relief. "I spoke to a Federal Court of Appeals Judge who I have known for a number of years to try and poke some holes in the suit on substantive merits." Despite your protestation, "I also don't like to be a bully", it seems to me that your pursuit of this case was predicated on your ability to be a bully and an insider. Like your colleagues Cantor and Seigel, you emitted flamebait and then pretended offense at the inevitable flames. You taunted tmp@netcom about his illness, reminding him at least three times in one message to take his medicine. Nice behaviour for a person who supposedly believes in privacy. It seems to me that you sized up tmp@netcom as a person who could not fight back due to his illness, and then you provoked him in order to establish grounds for your suit. I believe that your case, which is apparently based upon testimony from your friends, could not have succeeded in court. But it didn't have to, did it? You only had to find someone who was ill, and then kick him while he was down. Was it Rousseau who said, "First, we kill all the lawyers"? The cost of a lawsuit in the U.S. today can easily be over $100,000. The cost of a contract murder is said to be $10,000-$50,000. Consider the economics. I think there is a role to be played by lawyers in the future of the net. The net does not like litigation, because it interferes with the free flow of information. But it does like protocols, which are seen to enhance the flow of information. Lawyers, by their training and practice, are especially good at formulating workable protocols. If we had a protocol governing the use of network resources by sick or abusive users, your conflict with tmp@netcom might not have transpired, or else a solution might have been easily achieved. Conflicts like this are resulting in conversion of newsgroups on Usenet to moderated groups - a very unfortunate trend in my opinion, as Usenet does not provide for the removal of moderators. Here is a proper outlet for legal talent, not in self-serving time-wasting resource-absorbing litigation. -- Alex Brock

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(fwd) Re: NSA Helped Yeltsin Foil 1991 Coup
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An interesting article by Seymour Hersh is cited below. It says that NSA had transcripts of the 1991 coup plotters (and presumably other Russian leaders) and that Bush passed these on to Yeltsin to warn him. If true, a serious compromise of NSA's listening capabilities. Also note the reference to how the coup plotters should've been using PGP. (Prediction: something along these lines will be added to the list of reasons why PGP is bad and Clipper is good..."We need to have Escrowed Coup Plotter Encryption so that we can examine the messages of coup plotters.") --Tim May From: guym@gamma1 (Guy MacArthur) Newsgroups: alt.cyberpunk Subject: Re: NSA Helped Yeltsin Foil 1991 Coup Date: 20 May 1994 01:45:54 GMT Organization: University of Arizona, CCIT Lines: 47 Distribution: world Message-ID: <2rh4oi$p2s(a)news.CCIT.Arizona.EDU> ben(a)il.us.swissbank.com (Ben Galewsky) writes: : There is an article on the front page of today's "Independent", a British : daily newspaper. The headline is "US Agents Helped Yeltsin Break Coup". : : It describes how Bush passed on transcripts of encrypted conversations : between the leaders of 1991's failed Soviet coup to Boris Yeltsin. : Apparently the NSA was not too happy that Bush broke their cover and : acknowledged that they could read all of the Soviet military's codes. : : The article reads: : "As soon as the coup started on 18 August, 1991, the NSA, : America's largest intelligence organization was able to decrypt : conversations between the coup's two leaders, Vladimir Kryuchkov, : chairman of the KGB, and Dmitri Yazov, the Defense minister, : taking place over a supposedly secure landline." : : It continues: : "The NSA's ability to decrypt what Soviet military commanders : -- and their successors -- said over their communications system : is probably the most significant intelligence achievement since : Britain broke Germany's Enigma codes during the second world : war." : : Bush decided to pass this info on to Yeltsin. It enabled him to know who : in the military supported the coup and who was against it. : : It finishes by saying that as a result of letting the russians know their : code has been broken "the US intelligence community may no longer be in a : position to have advance warning of momentous events inside Russia -- as : it had months before the coup that brought Yeltsin to power". : : This information came from Seymour Hersh. It will appear in a forthcoming : issue of "Atlantic Monthly" : : I guess the KGB should have been using something secure, like PGP, since : the NSA can't possibly break that ;-) : : At least we can be comforted that the NSA is not allowed to monitor the : domestic traffic. ;-) ;-) : : : Ben Galewsky : ----------------------------------------------------------- : My employer doesn't know I read this group. : They do know I'm posting, though. "Hi Neil!" : ----------------------------------------------------------- :

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Annoucement for Australian Crypto Radio Documentary
by mgream＠acacia.itd.uts.edu.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Largely of interest to the Australian -- can we be counted on one hand ? :-) -- audience. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- *PRESS RELEASE* *PRESS RELEASE* *PRESS RELEASE* tales from the crypt =============================================== `There's nothing new about cryptography' ... Bill Caelli. ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) Radio National `Radio Eye -- Documentary Features' Sunday Night, June 12th 8:20pm ... presents ... ``TALES FROM THE CRYPT'' Rosie Cross <rx1(a)sydgate.apana.org.au> & Matthew Gream <M.Gream(a)uts.edu.au> (Mixed by John Jacobs) (Sounds by Rob Joyner Jnr) `Cryptography is a very political technology' says Phil Zimmermann, author of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), a computer software program to scramble and protect your most vital electronic messages. Complex algorithms such as those used in PGP now give individuals the ability to carry out conversations locked away from the prying eyes of the most determined Law Enforcement and National Security Agencies. Fearing a widespread loss of effectiveness, these agencies had their wishes granted last year with the US Governments release of the electronic `Clipper Chip'. This insidious device, to be planted in phones and facsimiles, may scramble voice and data between both ends of a connection, but contains a backdoor so these agencies can retain their surveillance edge. Despite assurances by the Government and proponents of the scheme such as leading cryptographer Dorothy Denning, the reaction has been clearly negative as evidenced by echos of dissent across cypherspace. These assurances are easily refuted by John Perry Barlow from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and Dave Banisar from the now Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC) [*], representing two of the most active groups opposing Clipper. Viewed from the Australian perspective, Jennifer Seberry describes the Clipper proposal as applying `an atomic bomb, where a drop of ointment is needed' and Trudi McIntosh describes a Government looking on `with interest'. To Roger Clarke, an Australian expert on privacy issues and new technologies, Clipper seems unlikely, but he warns about complacency in his assessment of the possible ramifications for individuals in electronic societies where systematic surveillance and mass matching could serve as a tool of the totalitarian state. In protecting ourselves from an Orwellian society, the need to extend the physical concepts of anonymity into the information world become of increasing importance. The work of David Chaum towards Digital Cash, and truly anonymous payment systems can steer the information superhighways past the military-industrial complex. In the end, the issue isn't about `cryptography', it's about fundamental rights to privacy and freedom from arbitrary intrusion by an increasingly hostile state. --- [*] Formally with Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQBVAgUBLfGDssFkzaa0vXnhAQFW4wH/Sa8KlS92O8plZO0nO1rnrXTF3IWMu7JD T8rVRLm8wunBzwt6DDGMzKPTMAMB/MOpjqISz+wFvKcV6UeyofLRiA== =WVKl -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQBNAi3xQ7gAAAECALAfA6WqWIqRBhvq6gKDVPKYAoEAO7Zr2C1/fYUOtTdxz7d6 uvmKRBzEV+Sys7Blf1ja4gioX46KwWTNprS9eeEABRO0JlRhbGVzIEZyb20gdGhl IENyeXB0IC0tIFJhZGlvIE5hdGlvbmFsiQCVAgUQLfFDy5lab34em41tAQF1ngQA u66CMVni7n5LRLqAISxYC9gWC7/AU9l8MYaYvR7D91OcAIzfyCGvJBGGEedSnURh q8mPSy43E1n4c0ihBhLlfvvU3ABFLqvCOwznkJjqWqC7XckJRZVJceaniGyf9KE1 scx1IgvpdjDPVvrLOifwEBbzctv8OU6QcB+2ejvKfQM= =dZMI -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -- Matthew Gream Consent Technologies Sydney, (02) 821-2043 M.Gream(a)uts.edu.au

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