December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: COCOM is dead (Was: PGP in Australia)
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Joe writes: > > There are no restrictions on importing crypto into Australia, there are > > some on export (hardware only) due to COCOM. > > I thought COCOM was dead as of last March or thereabouts. > Did a replacement committee ever get formed? I was surprised not to see any discussion of this on the net, by my newspaper had found its way into the recycle bin before I got around to typing in the article or seeing if the Times or Wall St. Journal had an article with genuine details. What I remember seeing was that COCOM was disbanded, but the member governments were going to maintain the rules for a while on their own until they're sure the Commies are really gone and not just hiding under the bed somewhere and there aren't any other convenient enemies on the horizon. So it's a good start, but doesn't change any laws directly. On the other hand, with countries like Germany and Colombia legalizing or decriminalizing marijuana, who knows? Bill

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Re: Regulatory Arbitrage
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric writes: > Regulatory arbitrage is an Important concept, as well as a great phrase. > The writer is square in the middle of the mainstream in the business > world, and note how effortlessly he speaks of avoiding governments and > playing them off against each other. I'm not surprised, though my perspective has perhaps been enhanced by growing up in the land of the Delaware Corporation - part of the advantage of Delaware was that corporate taxes were low, but additionally the regulatory climate was friendly and there was almost 200 years of corporate relationships with the local government, so most disputes could be expected to be resolved reasonably fairly. It seems that business, like the net, regards censorship and other interference as damage, and routes around it.... > Arbitrage of regulation almost always leads to equalization, although > the time scales are much longer. When equalization happens, it's > almost never that the advantage decreases for the destination buyer. No surprise here - as transportation and communication improve, it becomes easier for buyers to buy things anywhere, from anyone, and the pool of available suppliers increases. And buyers are stuck with their local regulatory stupidity, but they can shop around for sellers with less stupid regulations. Meanwhile, the leverage of sellers with government-supported monopoly markets is decreased, because their local markets are less captive, and foreign markets aren't forced to buy from them; it becomes increasingly to their advantage to leverage on their current size to outcompete external competition while decreasing instead of increasing regulations on their businesses. Sometimes the only way to level the playing field is to get rid of the walls you built around it.... Bill

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Re: Remailer Chaining Security?
by nobody＠cyberspace.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I don't have the disk space to use PGP or to keep logs. Feel free to use me...

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RE: Remailer Chaining Security?
by usura＠vox.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

nobody(a)shell.portal.com writes: : What level of security is achieved by the practice of "chaining" : messages through various "anonymous remailers"? To find out your "real" identity, those who want to find out need to have cooperation of all remailer involved. If one link cannot/doesnot cooperate the chain is broken and so your ID remains hidden. : Do these servers not keeps logs by which a post could be traced back : through the chain to the source? If there is a REAL level of security : afforded, then the question arises "how much is enough"? My remailers keep no sendlogs, and they are out-side US jurisdiction. Only anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl has a database to match the allocated ID to an email adress. remail & remailer do not keep logs at all. My remailers also support PGP and changing Subjects, you can send a PGPencrypted message to VoX and it will be decypted, if the recipiant has a PGPpubKEY in my KEYring [with matching adress] mail send to him/her will also be encrypted using that KEY. If you want more info send a msg to HELP(a)vox.hacktic.nl But remember it is up to you to decide whether you trust the remail operator or not. Sending mail in a chain of remailers who support PGP will give the following : remailer 1 : recieves an ecnrypted message, the system decrypts and gives a R-R-To: remailer 2 + an "new" encrypted msg. Only remailer 1 could know the real ID of the sender but he doesnot know the contents of the remailed msg. remailer 2 : receives an encrypted message from remailer 1, the system decrypts and gives a R-R-To: remailer 3 + an "new" encrpted message. Remailer 2 only could find out that the message came from remailer 1 the real ID an contents of the message is being kept secret for remailer 2. remailer 3 : reciever an encrypted message from remailer 2, the system decrypts and gives an R-R-To: the recipiant and the decrypted message. Remailer 3 only could find out what the contents and the recipiant are, the originator will be kept hidden. Note that the encrypted messages are "enveloped" in the previous encrypted message. [The msg to rem 1 is encrypted and contains the encrypted mesg for rem 2, which does contain the encrypted message for rem 3] Regz, -- Exit! Stage Left. Alex de Joode <usura(a)vox.hacktic.nl>

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CYBERSPACE IS BY NAT
by bmorris＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com ZZ> Something which is as legalistically demented as ITAR not allowing ZZ> PGP EXE to be exported but which does allow the source and detailed ZZ> format changes to be exported! ZZ> Ah, but it doesn't. Not in any online and useful format. Submitting Hmmm, I thought the MIT FTP site had the source and file formats available for anyone to download, regardless of geographical location. * RM 1.4 B0037 *

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Re: Remailer Chaining Security?
by ghio＠cmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

nobody(a)shell.portal.com wrote >>> | What level of security is achieved by the practice of "chaining" | | messages through various "anonymous remailers"? Do these servers | | not keeps logs by which a post could be traced back through the | | chain to the source? If there is a REAL level of security | | afforded, then the question arises "how much is enough"? | Yes. If you use only one remailer, and that remailer keeps logs, then it makes it trivial for the remailer operator to find out who sent the message. If you chain remailers, then it makes it more difficult to trace it back, but the first remailer can see the source and destination, which means someone could find out if they looked. However, if you chain and use PGP, it requires the cooperation of all remailer operators involved. If someone really tried to get a lot of remailer operators to cooperate in tracing a message, someone's going to make a stink about it. Now there is the traffic analysis problem, and the time-correlation problem. This can be solved by using the slower (UUCP) remailers. "How much is enough" is something you must decide for yourself. BTW: Which remailers keep logs? Mine does... I think Chael Hall and Hal Finney do. And catalyst doesn't (or didn't awhile ago). What about the rest?

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Re: Remailer Chaining Security? [LONG]
by usura＠vox.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

:But how does one go about chaining through the remailers? I tried this :and the message got lost. If indeed you can, does it just involve using :more than one (anon-to) line in the header? Note-1: [R-R-T: stands for Request-Remailing-To: ] Note-2: [You is in this doc abraxas(a)cyberspace.org, substitute that adress for own if you want to receive the test message yourself] First you should test only one remailer: you > remailer 1 > RRT- you This is what you send: -- TO: remailer(a)jpunix.com :: Request-Remailing-To: abraxas(a)cyberspace.org Test of remailer at jpunix.com ------------------------------------------------ This is what you receive: -- You will receive this message from jpunix.com From: remailer(a)jpunix.com To: abraxas(a)cyberspace.org Test of remailer at jpunix.com -- If this is succesful you add another remailer: you > remailer 2 > RRT- rem 2 >> RRT you This is what you send: --- TO: remailer(a)jpunix.com :: Request-Remailing-To: nobody(a)kaiwan.com :: Request-Remailing-To: abraxas(a)cyberspace.org Test of remailer at jpunix.com and RRT kaiwan.com ----------------------------------------------------- Remailer nobody(a)kaiwan.com will receive this message from remailer(a)jpunix.com ------ From: remailer(a)jpunix.com To: nobody(a)kaiwan.com :: Request-Remailing-To: abraxas(a)cyberspace.org Test of remailer at jpunix.com and RRT kaiwan.com ------ Because the message has the header pasting tokens [::] the remailer at kaiwan.com knows where to send it to. You will receive this message from kaiwan.com From: nobody(a)kaiwan.com To: abraxas(a)cyberspace.org Test of remailer at jpunix.com and RRT kaiwan.com --------------------------------------------------------- You can keep adding remailer this way, everytime you receive a test message back you add another remailer: if you stop receiving test messages, the last remailer added is most likely "down". You can check that by using that remailer directly. --------------------------------------------------------- The above is simple unencrypted remailing. If you want to have an encrypted chained remailing, you first have to "design" the chain. 1] send to jpunix.com there RRT kaiwan.com 2] at kaiwan.com RRT vox.hacktic.nl 3] at vox.hacktic.nl RRT abraxas(a)cyberspace.org First you make the 3rd stage: -- :: Request-Remailing-To: abraxas(a)cyberspace.org Test of PGP'ed remailing trough jpunix, kaiwan and vox. -- The above is encrypted whit the PGPpubKEY of VoX.hacktic.nl and will result in this: -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.6 for VoX Labz. hIwCWd90FI1WkT0BA/9I6ILVhl5ZpsgKgHye+ng9CokwzdW1pMgcd0ecigppAODe 53LlyVw/hl1ERYIzWW9W4vnuh7sLgu9XjxB515FtT5VSyZLZrhKIF7XtACga2On+ 1NmsecLTrgXYcc4k0Y+l66Hs06z92yhFvjXruDBS2Pame0VDtgZo+4aPntioDaYA AABJsVIWRaJkCib+uek9Pr6GqFP7lwaMqq8XFnFxY42h3Wn3c5DikrzmwKGK5xVs hmiZnEhJgXvR7jS2cNNOk/geG4SnUqvMTzpq6w== =b0bT -----END PGP MESSAGE----- -- Then you than proceed to the 2nd stage the message wich has to leave kaiwan.com: :: Encrypted: PGP -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.6 for VoX Labz. hIwCWd90FI1WkT0BA/9I6ILVhl5ZpsgKgHye+ng9CokwzdW1pMgcd0ecigppAODe 53LlyVw/hl1ERYIzWW9W4vnuh7sLgu9XjxB515FtT5VSyZLZrhKIF7XtACga2On+ 1NmsecLTrgXYcc4k0Y+l66Hs06z92yhFvjXruDBS2Pame0VDtgZo+4aPntioDaYA AABJsVIWRaJkCib+uek9Pr6GqFP7lwaMqq8XFnFxY42h3Wn3c5DikrzmwKGK5xVs hmiZnEhJgXvR7jS2cNNOk/geG4SnUqvMTzpq6w== =b0bT -----END PGP MESSAGE----- But kaiwan.com has to know where to send it to, so the 2nd stage msg is: :: Request-Remailing-To: remail(a)vox.hacktic.nl :: Encrypted: PGP -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.6 for VoX Labz. hIwCWd90FI1WkT0BA/9I6ILVhl5ZpsgKgHye+ng9CokwzdW1pMgcd0ecigppAODe 53LlyVw/hl1ERYIzWW9W4vnuh7sLgu9XjxB515FtT5VSyZLZrhKIF7XtACga2On+ 1NmsecLTrgXYcc4k0Y+l66Hs06z92yhFvjXruDBS2Pame0VDtgZo+4aPntioDaYA AABJsVIWRaJkCib+uek9Pr6GqFP7lwaMqq8XFnFxY42h3Wn3c5DikrzmwKGK5xVs hmiZnEhJgXvR7jS2cNNOk/geG4SnUqvMTzpq6w== =b0bT -----END PGP MESSAGE----- The above is then encrypted whit the PGPpubKEY of kaiwan.com: -- Stage 1: This new encrypted message gets the headers for jpunix to remail: :: Request-Remailing-To: nobody(a)kaiwan.com :: Encrypted: PGP -----BEGIN PGG MESSAGE----- and the PGP encrypted message from stage 2 -----END PGP MESSAGE----- --- Stage 0: the message you send to jpunix.com is the encrypted message [with the PGPpubKEY of jpunix.com] of stage 1 plus a Encrypted: PGP header. To: remail(a)jpunix.com :: Encrypted: PGP -----BEGIN PGG MESSAGE----- and the PGP encrypted message from stage 1 -----END PGP MESSAGE----- -- Exit! Stage Left. Alex de Joode <usura(a)vox.hacktic.nl>

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ANNOUNCE: June SF Bay Area physical meeting
by hughes＠ah.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ANNOUNCEMENT ------------ The June meeting will be held tommorrow, Saturday, June 11, at Silicon Graphics. This will be our second meeting at SGI. We're no longer at Cygnus; thanks again to John Gilmore for the use of Cygnus facilities. Thanks to Katy Kislitzin for arranging the use of SGI facilities. This month's meeting will be about "Keys and Key Distribution." Contributions are always welcomed; on-topic will have priority, but off-topic will be fine if we have time. This month's meeting will be mostly roundtable discussion. There will be no MBONE this month. Look for it next time. Date: Saturday, June 11, 1994 Time: 12:00 noon - 6:00 p.m. Place: Cafe Iris, Building 5 Silicon Graphics Mt. View, CA, USA Theme: "Keys and Key Distribution" Eric ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- DIRECTIONS: Silicon Graphics, Inc. Building 5 (SGI Cafeteria) 2025 North Shoreline Boulevard Mountain View, CA >From 101 take Shoreline East. This is towards Shoreline Amphitheatre. It's also "logical east", and points more north that east. (That is, it's east with respect to 101 North, which points west near the exit.) If you're coming in on 101 South, you'll cross over the bridge. Continue on Shoreline and go past a whole bunch of other SGI buildings. Turn right onto Steirlin Court at the big red metal sculpture. There will be even more SGI buildings surrounding you--take note of the building numbers. Go almost to the end of this street. Building 5 is on the right.

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Re: Crime and punishment in cyberspace - 3 of 3
by Patrick Juola 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Well, that's one view of rights. However, most attempts to base so > called natural rights (i.e. rights that are somehow intrinsic to human > existence) have been largely unsuccesful. It's a tough argument to make. > Seems to me the 'inalienable rights' that are mentioned in our founding charter carry this argument quite well. I suspect they also 'prove' them as well. Proof by declaration of self-evidence? ``We hold these truths to be self-evident.... that [all humans] are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights." If, for some reason, I claim that the right to liberty is *not* self-evident, it can be very difficult to convince me otherwise. This is one of the difficulties of natural-rights arguments; that they tend to assert certain rights (right to privacy, right to property, right to personal space, right to free speech, &c) axiomatically when they are often the subject of the discussion. Patrick

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Re: Regulatory Arbitrage
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excuse me while gush... As usual, Eric is right. [great discussion about how regulation only creates markets elsewhere...] Arguably (only arguably...) some economic regulation is good for us: like a *few* pharmaceutical and food regulations, maybe. Eric points out that internet commerce and e-money, e$ for short, reminds one of something that has been going on for a long time with another E$, this time Eurodollars. (Kind of like AOL, eh?) Eurodollars were invented to get around American tax and currency regulations, and those of other countries. You had all these American corporations funding themselves through subsidiaries in Carribbean countries like the Netherlands Antilles. (Any time you see "Companyname, N.V.", the "NV" is Dutch for "we funded this with offshore dollars" ;-). George Soros, who founded Quantum Fund, N.V., is evidently happy with the results of this knowlege. He recently made the fastest billion dollars in history pointing out the folly of the European currency exchange rate mechanism, much to the chagrin of the Bank of England and other central banks whose money he pocketed. I remember a Milton Friedman quote, something to the effect that regulations only benefit a market's producers, not its consumers. Current day Japan, states with barber and bartender "licences", and Smoot/Hawley America in the 1930's might be good examples of that. If there's a market for those goods/services elsewhere, people *will* buy there. With internet commerce and e$ ,"elsewhere" is everywhere... But we know that already, don't we? I can't wait until the rest of the information, or the software, or the intellectual services buying public figure that out. The only way to prevent that is to regulate economic commerce on the internet, which makes me shudder to think about. Although, if the paradigm holds, it won't make much difference. It'll be like stopping capitalism itself. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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