December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

No Subject
by solovay＠math.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric writes: Yeah, the internet technology is changing. ATM is coming. Query: What's ATM? --Bob Solovay

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Detweiler blocking
by analyst＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I must admit to a certain amount of amazement to the almost universal consensus I have seen in this forum regarding censoring Detweiler's (or whomever's) Usenet postings. I believe in the remailer concept and I believe in fighting the authoritarian traceability standard that the Internet is designed around. As Xenon and others have mentioned, there are numerous ways for anyone to get around any kind of source-level filtering you might care to implement, and thus as remailer operators heading down this path, you will be put in the position of the proverbial dutch boy with a finger in the dike. The type of privacy that most of us as cypherpunks think is important and are trying to provide will necessarily leave us open to attacks such as Detweiler's. But I think privacy is more important than one more off-topic post in a random newsgroup. And if someone receives mail they don't like or don't appreciate--delete it! This medium of electronic communication is not nearly as dangerous as the current postal system, which allows you to send real mailbombs--and the postal system does NOT require return addresses. Who are these uptight schmucks writing to root and postmaster about Detweiler posts? Why on earth have they been allowed to get away with it! This is ridiculous. I think this is the battle that we must fight. The digital convergence is happening now, and unfortunately with the current authoritarian Internet model, Clipper/Capstone/Tesserae and all that nonsense--things arent't looking good for our side. Therefore, I think even more we have to stand on principle to fight this thing. (and yes, I fully intend to have my remailer running soon--I'm not just talking). Someone could send me mail now containing kiddy porn (most likely a postal inspector--they seem to be the only markey for the stuff) with no return address--should I write to the root(a)whitehouse.org as the ultimate arbiter since the postal service has delivered me this mail? If someone delivers mail through my remailer (which will ONLY support PGP encrypted mail) how am I responsible? Benjamin ---------------------------------------------------------------------- analyst(a)netcom.com mail pgp-public-keys(a)io.com for PGP key

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Re: CERT/Whitehouse/Clipper link - smoking gun...
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

By God, I knew there was something fishy about that latest CERT release (the one that referred to things that happened last November and didn't actually say anything new, but somehow managed to hit the *WORLD* press extensively within 24 hours)... It's stuff that's been happening *since* last November. I'm quite certain that the attacks were continuing until (at the very least) shortly before the announcement. PS The statement is also false: digital signatures would have no effect on network sniffing attacks; but it's just more FUD to strengthen the Whitehouse hand in a release that was buried in a flood of releases that day on Clipper. No, you're wrong. A challenge/response login architecture based on digital signatures would have eliminated the attack. And digital signatures -- unlike most other technologies for one-time passwords -- do not require that any secret information be kept on the host. There are practical difficulties, such as entering in 160 bits of information, but for host-to-host logins, that isn't much of a problem.

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REAL WORLD ENCRYPTION
by Sandy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Sadly, I think the following topic is the real crux of most people's objections to the deployment of digital banks on the Internet. NIGHT OF THE LIVING G-MEN--Some of you have opined that the Federales will never give us a license and/or will go after us once we are in business. First, we will not have our license, charter, offices or personnel in the USA. We will locate our operations only where are services are protected by the local authorities. Second, there is no law forbidding Americans--or nationals of most western countries--from doing business with foreign banks. We and our clients will be in compliance with all relevant laws. Third, even if the powers-that-be don't like what we are doing, there is very little they can do about it. They haven't invaded Cayman, Hongkong or the Isle of Man because of their banking operations, I seriously doubt they will do so on our account. For those who will only settle for *absolute safety*, I am sorry to say, no such thing exists in the real world. All benefits entail some risks. Not creating and using digital banking, however, may be the riskiest thing we can do. S a n d y Those who profess to favor freedom, and yet deprecate agitation, are men who want crops without plowing up the ground, they want rain without thunder and lightening. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters. --Frederick Douglass P.S. Send UNencrypted e-mail to "sandfort(a)crl.com" and PGP encrypted e-mail to "ssandfort(a)attmail.com". ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLWUO8k5ULTXct1IzAQHdSwQAg1fuo5A5Zqst21WkyWKilbqnuHG1C2KA lweB33dLftuu19xzQrJDyfvvZuhS1RzzXao6kDdKkYHEC4L4rwtQXaERWa0mXWU9 E/zfrXXTPoyOD3asCrg15vCrHyfWqaYRPO6lMDXzux8FdeCGuh900azqFH7fkaSn GJhPnLwZgqs= =AU5a -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Repression and technology
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Libertarions and c*punks are the first to take advantage of new communication technologies. Until the authorities catch on, that is... When authorities grow aware of the power of technology for Control, Surveillance and Big Brother Watching, they behave repressively, whether in the US, or China: Reuters news clip from The Asian Age: BEIJING, Feb 16: Police have cracked into China's largest group of ham-radio hackers and sent three ringleaders to labour camp for "creating chaos in the airwaves," the official China Business Times said on Wednesday. The group, dubbed "Radio Air Salon" ands based in Henan province, surfed through radio channels interrupting regular broadcasts with their own conversations and illegally listening in on restricted frequencies, the newspaper said. "The use of technical equipment to create chaos in the airwaves and _interfere with social order_ is a new type of illegal activity," the newspaper said. It said police caught 61 members of the group, which had efectively taken over 27 radio channels. "At present they are all being punished, with three of the backbone elements undergoing _RE-EDUCATION THROUGH LABOUR_," the newspaper said. - ------- Well, perhaps the NSA won't euphemistically "re-educate you through labour," but... - ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "What is civilisation rishab(a)doe.ernet.in, rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in but a ribonucleic Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 hangover?" H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA - ----------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLWO6/vw/vM8w8hLZAQHc0AP+Pxc6gT0iPncP07YgDIJXNZOkJU/3lFe3 Wz84eRO9UlY3W049obyZCUdaw/sMmaB++1jRvRmha7Ozdl4OjeeJEW8LbfqjqRzY uTrAz1S0ntIcJAX6Bkf9/wP2RlmLbVMWTPKqBsthpS9h5U3Rk+FZt2sQEASofeoz KyFrb4nfmr8= =jbq+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Digital Money
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would like to take issue with the recently expressed opinion that digital cash is not money, but merely a mechanism for communicating transactions. What does it mean to mint money? In the traditional sense, it means to issue something only you can produce, and guarantee that it will be accepted for some sort of goods and services. In the case of paper money, this takes the form of a printed document which is moderately difficult to forge, and which can be exchanged for goods and services of various kinds. Since the issuing agency, usually a government, is presumed to exercise prudent financial management to prevent the currency's value from decreasing, and is likely to be around for a long time, such cash can be hoarded with little risk. In making the transition from paper cash to digital cash, only one thing changes. It is now the information which represents the money, not the document itself. Since such information can be easily replicated, spent banknotes must be carefully documented and the issuing institution must allow each banknote to be spent exactly once. Cryptographic signatures and authenticity verification provide excellent protection against forgery. But these differences are minor ones. Banknotes which have been communicated to you through a secure channel, and whose contents have not been disclosed to any third party, should be for all practical purposes identical to cash. Digital banknotes issued by a national government should be just as good as physical banknotes printed by a national government. Most of the objections to using digital cash for other than immediate transactions stems from issues related to trust in the issuing institution. One would certainly have less faith in a newly formed digital bank operated through a string of anonymous remailers than one would have in digital currency issued by Citibank or Chase Manhattan. But given an issuing institution of unquestionable trust, there should be no significant difference between digital cash and real cash, and storing it for indefinite amounts of time on a floppy in your pocket should be completely risk-free. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.3a Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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Re: NY Times Fears C'punks
by brains＠male.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >In <199409031519.LAA23930(a)pipe1.pipeline.com>, jya(a)pipeline.com passes >along a New York Times article. Yep, they're sounding scared. I >saw definite pleading of the government's case in there. They left out >pedophiles, but they got terrorists, drug dealers and nuclear weapons >smugglers. > >Was it just me, or did the tone get a little more frantic when they >started talking about crypto? If you, then me, too :-\ > >And what are they really saying in that closing paragraph? > >> Big Brother is dead. The only serious likelihood of his resurrection >> lies in reaction to the chaos and disintegration that an era of Little >> Brothers might bring. > >Is this the NYT being out of touch, or are they just showing off their >tentaclehood? To me, that reads like a threat against those who oppose >the Government Private Agenda. My vote is out of touch - with a threat tossed in for good measure. FWIW, I sent them a nice (hah!) reply, poking holes in some of their premises. Likely won't do any good, but made me feel better. Dave Merriman - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints. Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender. PGP preferred. Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to *love* Big Brother.

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Link
by Aggelos D. Keromitis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In soda.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks/applications/link there is a server for encrypted login on slip connections between Unix and amiga. Could the author please contact me ? I'm rewriting some of the code to make a simple telnetd with RSA/tripple DES encryption. My apologies to those with no interest to the subject, but Eric told me i could find the person i seek through the list (preferable answer by email). -Aggelos

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Re: Infomercial
by dmandl＠lehman.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I respectfully submit that this would be a BIG waste of money. TV time is not cheap, and since most infomercials are run by crackpots or scam artists (or that's the general view of 'em, in my opinion), this wouldn't buy us much at all. If people are interested in a media barrage, a big ad in a major newspaper would be money better spent (though I have my doubts about that, too). --Dave.

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[comp.dcom.telecom]: AT&T finally adds RSA
by paul＠poboy.b17c.ingr.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Note that AT&T is selling this puppy for $360 _per copy._ I bet some motivated developer could get the appropriate patent licenses and undercut them significantly. -Paul FOR MEDIA INQUIRIES: David Arneke, AT&T Secure Communications Systems 910 279-7680 (office) 910 273-5687 (home) !darneke (ATTMAIL) or david.arneke(a)att.com (Internet) AT&T ADDS RSA SECURITY TECHNOLOGY TO SECRETAGENT (TM) SOFTWARE GREENSBORO, North Carolina -- AT&T has added RSA security technology to its SecretAgent software in an upgrade that makes the program more versatile, easier to use and faster. Other major new capabilities in AT&T SecretAgent Version 3.0 include: -- User-transparent support of RSA and DSA public keys. Users can generate RSA keys or DSA keys and communicate signed and encrypted messages with other SecretAgent 3.0 users regardless of their choice of public key algorithms. -- Cross-platform compatibility among MS-DOS, Windows, Macintosh and various UNIX operating systems. Information secured on one operating system can be processed transparently on any of the others. -- Mail-enabled operation through the widely supported Vendor-Independent Messaging (VIM) interface. -- Significantly faster implementation of DES encryption and DSA signing and validation. Version 3.0 adds the RSA cryptosystem for digital signatures and key management to SecretAgent's capabilities, which already included DES encryption, the NIST Digital Sig- nature Algorithm (DSA) and the federal Secure Hash Standard (SHS) for data integrity. For encryption and DSA signatures, a variant of the Diffie-Hellman protocol is used for key exchange. "AT&T SecretAgent 3.0 Software gives users a more powerful array of capabilities in an extremely fast and efficient way," said William A. Franklin, software security products manager, AT&T Secure Communications Systems. With its unique combination of standards, SecretAgent 3.0 software provides solutions to the security requirements of a wide variety of business and government users. "Some customers require only one set of capabilities -- government users, for example, are required to use federal standards only," Franklin said. "Some businesses prefer RSA technology, but others need RSA for electronic data interchange with other commercial businesses and government standards for dealing with the government." Users can select either RSA, SHS and DES or DSA, SHS, DES and Diffie-Hellman for signing and encrypting. On reception, the program detects which security algorithms have been used so the recipient of a message doesn't have to be concerned about which technology the sender used. Mail-enabled operation also makes security user-friendly. Messages can be created, signed, encrypted and mailed all without leaving SecretAgent 3.0 software. Documents also can be signed, encrypted and transmitted as mail attachments. DES encryption is 50 percent faster than in the original version of AT&T SecretAgent Software. Digital signature speed is also improved. DSA signing and validation are performed in approximately 150 milliseconds each on a 486/33M Hz personal computer. AT&T SecretAgent Software was developed for AT&T by Information Security Corporation of Deerfield, Illinois. The program operates independently of word processing programs, enabling it to safeguard such diverse data as text files, spreadsheets and databases. SecretAgent 3.0 software encrypts and decrypts files for transmissions or storage, even files stored on a shared network hard disk. Single-copy suggested retail price is $329.95 for the DOS and Windows versions, $359.95 for the Mac version and $399.95 for the UNIX version. Volume discounts and site/enterprise licensing are available. Recommended PC configuration includes 640 KB RAM (256 KB required) and hard disk. The Windows version of SecretAgent 3.0 software will be available March 15. The DOS version will follow on April 1, the SPARCstation UNIX version on April 15 and the Mac version on May 1. A software upgrade to allow the program to accept the federal government's TESSERA PCMCIA card and DATAKEY Sig- naSURE smart card will be available April 1. A triple-DES software capability also will be available April 1. To order or to get more information, customers can call the AT&T Secure Communications Customer Service Center, 1 800 203-5563. ###### Product names are trademarks of their respective companies. -- Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG | "Let he who is without sin cast the first perobich(a)ingr.com | pointer." - Owen Harnett Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user- ask me how. Of course I don't speak for Intergraph.

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