December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: NSA and competence
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "Perry E. Metzger" ...They have plenty of money, and EXTREMELY smart people. ........ That, and the concrete evidence that they are probably twenty years ahead of us, leads me to believe that it is stupid to underestimate them. .............................................. They sure make some BIG mistakes, though, don't they? And they didn't cover up the Clipper mistakes very well at all. And they're not seeing the economical relationships regarding exports very well. Do you suppose that maybe this is intentional? Blanc

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Re: Bandwidth According to Seabrook
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>Date: Wed, 29 Jun 1994 00:04:10 -0700 (PDT) >>From: Brian Beker <beker(a)netcom.com> >> >>The New Yorker's John Seabrook on the Charlie Rose show tonight: >> >> "...bandwidth, which is basically the width of the wire >> coming into your home..." >> > >Finally an explanation I can understand. I was very happy to read this. I plan to spend my lunch hour increasing the bandwidth of my network connection by wrapping the cable in electrical tape. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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US Chauvanism -- hurting us
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The announcement calling for calls to Moakley includes the following explanatory blurb: >Why is there a restriction on exporting products with technology >in them? > >For many years the United States was a leading researcher in >cryptography. High quality cryptographic technology was available only >within the United States. The US government thought that if they did >not let this technology be exported, foreign individuals would not be able >to obtain it and use it against us (by keeping US intelligence agencies >>from eavesdropping on their communications) > >Since then, cryptography research has been published in international >journals. Companies have been created throughout the world who >export cryptographic technology from countries that do not have >these restrictions. You can now buy the same, high-quality cryptographic >technology from many international firms. Although the marketplace >has changed, the regulations have not. This is inaccurate chauvanism and is hurting our cause. The US (and especially the NSA) wanted to believe it was the leader in cryptography. The NSA wanted to believe, and probably still believes, that the only cryptography worthy of the name is what they produce. Everything else is mere toys. The only crypto the US produces is therefore theirs and therefore all crypto leaving the US needs to be controlled. To the contrary, Switzerland has long been a producer of very good, commercial crypto. The US military even bought crypto devices from Switzerland during WW-II, if I remember Kahn correctly. Over the years, different countries have taken the lead (since it's usually tied to individuals and to national export and mfg laws). In the 4000 year history of cryptography, private citizens of various countries have been making, using and distributing their own strong cryptography, without concern for government controls. The US and the NSA might want to believe they're all that important, but in fact they're not and never have been (except possibly for a momentary period starting in about 1950 -- a period during which the US was #1 in *everything*, since the rest of the world had been bombed back to subsistence level). Crypto is not a US product and *never has been*, wishful thinking by the NSA notwithstanding. Strong crypto has always been dual source and dual use, except during those periods when civilians had it and the gov't didn't. Strong crypto outside the government and outside the USA is far from something new. If we concede that point to the proponents of export controls and of Clipper, we have lost a major battle. - Carl

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Arguing Crypto: The Engineering Approach
by kentborg＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Who knows how well it plays, but my faxed letter to Moakley on crupto export took a different approach from my usual privacy tirades. I tried to (calmly) argue that we need strong cryptography for fundamental engineering reasons. Data is so damn flexible. This is both good and bad. The bad is that data can be capricious and flighty. If our physical world were to allow objects to appear out of no where and disappear again, transmorgraphy beyond recognition, or become massively duplicated in unknown locations, we would find it disconcerting--to say the least. We would go to considerable lengths to keep physical objects reassuringly in one place. In fact, with some physical objects that often do carpiciously vanish, we go to inconvienient extremes in hopes we can prevent the vanishing. Look at some of the anti-theft devices people will put on their cars. There are good engineering approaches which can force data to behave itself. Many of them involve cryptography. Our government's restrictions on crypto limit our ability to build reliable computer systmems. We need strong crypto for basic engineering reasons. Note, my fax to Moakley was phrased (and spelled?) considerably different from this posting. I am still wondering how best to make this argument. Something I want to avoid is too strong a reliance on "pulling rank": "We are professionals, we need these tools to do our jobs, don't try to understand the reasons.". Just using words like "engineering" smacks of that enough, let's leave it at that. One thing I like about this approach is that is avoids the kneejerk positions the word "privacy" prompts. -kb, the Kent who tries to sound reasonable -- Kent Borg +1 (617) 776-6899 kentborg(a)world.std.com kentborg(a)aol.com Proud to claim 29:45 hours of TV viewing so far in 1994!

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RE: Wanted: hardware random strm
by ScottB4599＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Found this on sci.crypt. Wasn't there a thread concerning something like this not too long ago? >Subject: Wanted: hardware random stream >generator with RS-232 output >From: mleech(a)bnr.ca (Marcus Leech) >Date: 28 Jun 1994 13:44:03 GMT >Message-ID: <2up9f3$eb2(a)bcars6a8.bnr.ca> > >I'm looking for a hardware random-number/random-stream generator that > provides an RS-232 output. What I'm think of is something like this: > > > noise-source---->amplifier----->1-bit quantizer---->RS-232 driver. > >Does anyone produce such a thing, and how much is it? >-- >Marcus Leech |Any opinions expressed are mine. |+1 613 763 >9145 >VE3MDL | and not those of my employer |+1 613 567 >5484 >mleech(a)bnr.ca | Scott Bourne ScottB4599(a)aol.com Cyph1(a)aol.com

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(Fwd) Hi-tech, Schmi-tech -- Pass the toner cartridge
by whitaker＠dpair.csd.sgi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- Forwarded mail from "Michael/Miguel Sanchez" <miguel@boytoy> --Boundary-2478430-0-0 X-Orcl-Content-Type: message/rfc822 Received: 28 Jun 1994 14:26:28 Sent: 28 Jun 1994 14:25:13 From:"Amy Coppola" <ACOPPOLA> To: Jokers Subject: Hi-tech, Schmi-tech -- Pass the toner cartridge A judge admonished the police in Radnor, Pa., for pretending a Xerox copy machine was a lie detector. Officials had placed a metal colander on the head of a suspect and attached the colander to the copier with metal wires. In the copy machine was a typewritten message: "He's lying." Each time investigators received answers they didn't like, they pushed the copy button and out popped the message, "He's lying." Apparently convinced the machine was accurate, the suspect confessed. --Boundary-2478430-0-0-- --- End of forwarded mail from Edie Cheng <echeng(a)us.oracle.com> -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Miguel (Michael) J. Sanchez "There's always room for jello." miguel(a)csd.sgi.com SGI, Customer Services Engineering (CSE) Cage #64 --- End of forwarded mail from "Michael/Miguel Sanchez" <miguel@boytoy> -- Russell Earl Whitaker whitaker(a)csd.sgi.com Silicon Graphics Inc. Technical Assistance Center / Centre D'Assistance Technique / Tekunikaru Ashisutansu Sentaa Mountain View CA (415) 390-2250 ================================================================ #include <std_disclaimer.h>

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PC Expo summary!!
by rarachel＠photon.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

i PC EXPO Perhaps one of the great lessons to be learned from this is that you should not rely on others to always be there to help you in your endeavors, even if they are cypherpunks and have already volunteered. Out of all the cypherpunk folks who have "volunteered," to help out at PC Expo precisely zero came through. Like having assholes, everyone also had an excuse. Still this was my idea and as such I refuse to give it up without trying. In light of this blatant rats-fleeing-the-ship syndrome, a great load of kudos goes to my friend Sal, who although not a cypherpunk, and although short on time, and although he is the CIO of his company, and although I did not run into him at the pre- arranged place, did show up and did distribute diskettes as promissed. I would strongly suggest that you send him "Thank you" notes as he is not on the cypherpunks list, but helped enourmosly. His address is denaro09(a)darwin.poly.edu. Also much thanks to Tung Ming Wong whose email address I don't have. He also helped out even though he knew nothing about Clipper, Digital Telephony, the NSA, or the Cypherpunks. Now as with all disasters, the blame is partially my own. I should have kept a whip on you guys and made sure you'd come. :-) But I am at a greater fault (more on this later.) Now before you accuse me of being lazy, let me remind you that I have taken a great deal of time out of my schedule to even go to PC Expo. Luckily my boss wasn't able to say "no" because he was too busy in meetings the day before, and even if he did say "No" I'd rather give up my job than give up my principles. As a result of my endeavors, I hope that I have at least set forth an example for the rest of you, and that you will do well to sacrifice some time and money on disks and distribution at Comdex, Software Developer's Expo, or whatever expo. And make copies out to others as well. With the exception of Sal, Tung, Greg Broiles (sent 25 disks for this project!), Dave Mandl, Perry Metzger, and Susan Fullar, I am pretty disappointed in you guys. Dave and Perry weren't directly involved in this project, but their Feb 17 speech which I taped and had Sue transcribe (not a cypherpunk) was the centerpiece of the articles. (I want to add an extra load of thanx to Perry for not showing up to do a speech for my crypto class as since he didn't I had to get over my crowd-shyness and did a killer, informative speech.) I did the hard work for you already. I've set the precedent, I've built the disk, I've written the software. Yes, I wrote software, even while pressed for time, I wrote a professional looking installer program, a file lister program, and a menu program, all of which are mousable, and have windows, buttons, menus, and all the other neat features of modern software. The disk looks and feels fairly professional. With the correct style of label the disk looks like its a free demo from some company, when in actuality it is free software. Now if it sounds like I'm congradulating myself and patting my own shoulders, it's because I am! Also, all of the above software is "freeware" and as such is copyable. So if you'd like to get your greedy little hands on it, and use it to make a fortune, feel free. There are no restrictions on use other than that you send me free copies of any package you include my 'wares in. Although on the surface this may indicate a "failure" it was actually a far greater blessing in disguise. I didn't need much help, and it turned out I didn't have to do much work. I still believe that between Sal and myself, we made a little, albeit important grass-roots dent in Clipper's armor (not that it wasn't already dented and as well built and solid as swiss cheese.) I was supposed to meet Sal infront a diner near PC Expo at 9:00am. Borland's Marketting engine decided to give me a call and make an offer I couldn't refuse. The woman wouldn't get off the phone even after I told her, "Yes, put it on my Visa Card, I gotta run!" So I wound up at the meeting place at 10:14AM, with Sal already departed. Luckily, as I got out of the subway station I ran into an old buddy of mine, Tung. He tagged along the whole day and helped out quite a bit. I gave him some diskettes to take home, and gave some out to a few of his friends we ran into. Not a biggie there. However as I was in line waiting to get my badge holder, I noticed an arrow pointing up to the fourth level with the words "Press Resource Office" imprinted! What luck! I dragged Tung with me and started hounding the press. I gave out about ten or so disks to the press dudes. It seems that I did well to pick male press folk as when I approached a femme reporter with disk in hand, she loudly yelped "No, no!" as if I was carrying a bomb.... But all the other reporters took it in with great interest. I caught the eye of Ephraim Schwartz, and he gave me his card so now I have a press contact for cypherpunk info. After deciding that I had depleted a fifth of my diskette supply on the media, and well knowing that the media did plenty of Clipper stories I decided to hand some out to the exhibitors. I hit MacAffe and a couple of other companies... anything with "security" on their products list. Then, the biggest most fortuitus slop of luck decided to land on top of me. WIRED was there. And to my joy, the just dumped about a thousand or so magazines on a table, and didn't have anyone watching it. Just freebies for all to take. Sniffing out the territory, I spread about five diskettes on the table next to the magazines and retreated while keeping an eye out. Within two seconds they were all consumed! What luck! I came back about two or three times, and by the time I had realized it, all my PC Expo cypherpunk diskettes were gone. Wired turned out to be a good target because those familiar with WIRED, even in passing are far more of the type to be interested in crypto software than the average Joes. Let this be a good lesson for the future my droogs! When the next Expo arrives, be it PC Expo, Unix Expo, or whatever, pick an empty table, or a table which isn't being watched too closely and deposit your eggs there. The cookoo's egg deposit method worked VERY well for me. Even if the Wired table had been watched, the disks I placed there vanished so quickly, it would be unlikely that the "watcher" would catch on fast enough to stop the majority of the disks from being distributed. And if he "confiscated" them, he'd be likely to have a look for himself anyway, which is the point! But mind you, don't get caught. If you do, you might get kicked out of the Expo, but even so, in that case you hit the folks entering and leaving the Expo and give them disks directly. We can't be stopped. Clipper WILL BE STOPPED. Having finished my job I enjoyed the rest of the day. Meanwhile Sal, (good thing I didn't run into him or we'd probably not have hit as diverse a crowed as we did) hit the fourth level near where the press people were. He didn't have it in mind to give out disks to the press. Good thing as I had done that already. Instead he gave out disks to all sorts of PC USER GROUPS! Most of which promissed to distribute/carry the disk as part of their catalog!!!!! One of the groups he targeted was cyberqueers and he rightfully did so. Being straight didn't stop him from realizing that this group would be very likely to value their privacy. He also handed out some diskettes to the exhibitors. Between the two of us, we threw out about 80-90 diskettes. With the press, this number would remain the same, but the added noise will help a bit. With the users group, this number of diskettes will likely reach the thousands within six months, a few hundred within a month. With the users which picked up the freebies from the Wired table, they will probably give out some copies. I'd guess on the average that half of them would make copies for their friends (using software piracy as a model. here, though this of course is freely copyable.) I unfortunatly found out (here comes the blame part!) that the installation script I had written had a typo in it. Now this is no ordinary typo mind you, but a severe and fairly fatal one. The installer script that I have given out won't install any of the articles! Ugh! I wish I caught it before the fact, >BUT< I had spent all Sunday from 12:30PM to 1:00am (yes, that is twelve and a half hours,) writing the software, and from 4:30am on Monday to about 1:00pm putting the script and selecting the articles for the disk. Now mind you I do have a full time job and I did risk being fired for coming in four hours late, and taking off a whole day for PC Expo! So before you start with the flames, fuck off right now as you did almost nothing to help. For those who don't notice the missing articles, they weren't interested anyway. For those who do, I hope some of them are technically oriented enough, or know someone who is technically oriented enough to type in: C: CD CRYPTO MD ARTICLES A:ARTICLES Which will run the self extracting LHA articles archive. For those who have email availble to them, can email either me, or Sal, or the list and I will tell'em how to get at the articles. Unfortunatly most of the punch of the disk was in the articles... But no use crying over what's done... I'll just make sure that I'll be ready next year. Anyone who wants a copy of this disk should let me know and I'll send'em a disk image (made using the DIM Disk IMage archiver program which I've also written.) Guys, please get out there and start making a difference. Being keyboard cryptographers and keyboard politicians won't help our cause at all! I've lost about twenty hours of sleep overall on this project, a day and a halffrom work, the price of printing labels, cost of diskettes, etc. A small sacrifice, and a really big effect in the long run. So come on, join in.

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Feb 11 Transcript (LONG)
by rarachel＠photon.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FEB 17 CYPHERPUNKS TRANSCRIPT Crypto-anarchy: How new developments in cryptography, digitial anonymity, and untraceable digital cash will make the State a thing of the past. [an anarchist's forum.] With cypherpunks Dave Mandl and Perry Metzger. Thursday Feb 17,1994 7:30pm, NYC. Copyright (C) 1994, cypherpunks(a)toad.com All Rights Reserved. This article may be redistributed provided that the article and this copyright notice remain intact. This article may not under any circumstances be sold or redistributed for compensation of any kind. MODERATOR: In any event, again this is part of a monthly series we've been doing for -- close to twenty years now. The announcements of our March forum, which is (inaudible) with people like Judith Molina and Hannah Resnikoff from the theater, Richard Kostelanetz and (inaudible) and such -- announcements are on the table back there, some information about the book club you might be interested in, and our mailing list. Sign up for our mailing list and you will never get off it again. Unless you send us a contribution and become a life member. Then we take you off right away. We have lots of -- certainly lots of anarchist literature for sale in the back. Please feel free to peruse and spend a lot of money. At some point, usually after the speakers finish, we get into questions and discussion. We're going to pass a donation box around. We've got the door locked so you can't sneak out. Just to let you know in advance, the suggested donation is $5, more if you can, less if you can't. MALE: Much more if you can. MODERATOR: Right. Let's see. Here we have some souvenir flyers. Anyone who gives more, they can get a souvenir copy or have their program tonight autographed by the speakers. Let's see. Before I introduce them, a couple of sort of "for your information" announcements. Let's see. All right. One, old friend and book club participant Bruce Caton does a regular series of radical walking tours. Next one is Saturday, March 12th, 1:00 p.m. in Chelsea. I have the material. If anyone is interested in the literature, take one back. This Saturday, 2:00 p.m., we're going to be having a first gathering of anarchists in the lower Hudson Valley, Westchester-Rockland area. And yes, there are anarchists in the Westchester-Rockland area. You're looking at one. Anyone who's interested, see me in the back. I can give you the details of when and where and so on. Coming up in April is the Socialist Scholars Conference, April 1st through 3rd. Despite the name, anarchists do participate in this thing. We've had anarchist panels in the past, and we'll probably have both anarchist panels and literature tables at the event so, again, see us if you're interested. So -- without further ado, our subject tonight is Crypto-Anarchy, and for those of you who saw the original flyer that's the Scandinavian version for the Olympics Kripto-Onarchy. And our speakers tonight are Cypherpunks Perry Metzger, long-time cryptographer and lots of other stuff, and Dave Mandl, long-time book club member and Cypherpunk. So -- I'll let them take it away, and just enjoy it. * * * DAVE MANDL: I'm gonna start off with just sort of a general overview of some of the issues and techniques and stuff. Then Perry is going to -- if anyone is taping this, by the way, if anyone out there besides this guy is making an audio tape I'd appreciate it if you'd let me know afterwards, because I think people, some of them, might want to get copies from you eventually. Okay. I'm going to start off with just a -- sort of a general overview of what this stuff is all about. Then Perry is going to talk about some more specifics, and then we hope --hopefully we can get that over relatively quickly and then we can have a discussion, question and answer, whatever. But first Perry is going to say something. PERRY METZGER: Yeah. Just trying to get a sense of how much people know about this topic already. How many people here have any real knowledge about what Cryptography is? Just raise your hand. Okay. Call it about -- one quarter, one third maybe. No, less than a quarter. Okay. How many people here know what the National Security Agency does? And I don't mean just to the level of knowing what "National Security" might mean. So we're talking, again -- a couple more. Okay. How many people -- well, actually that already more or less says it. This should be interesting for you. Go on. DM: Okay. Perry and I are involved with a group called the Cypherpunks, which I'm sort of hesitant to say just because it's a very loose-knit group of people very -- anarchically constructed, and there are no official spokesmen or leaders or anything like that. Just mentioning it for informational purposes only, as they say on all those petitions and stuff. Cypherpunks is a pun obviously on Cyberpunk, with "Cypher" being a reference to codes and cyphers. More on that in a second. If the Cypherpunks have a particular philosophy, party line, approach, we generally refer to it as Crypto-Anarchy. Crypto-Anarchy is a term that was coined by Tim May, one of the founders of the group, Cypherpunks, and it's a reference to like Crypto-Fascist or Crypto-Authoritarian or whatever, and the pun being in -- "Crypto" because the core of what the Crypto-Anarchists or Cypherpunks do is cryptography. That's the basis of everything we're going to be talking about tonight, basically achieving anarchy or sort of working towards anarchy using cryptography and other things. So let me just briefly for the whatever -- twenty- seven percent of you who don't know what cryptography is, let me just give a brief explanation. MALE: Seventy-seven. DM: Seventy-seven. Sorry. Cryptography is -- I guess a dictionary definition would be the study -- the science of codes and cyphers. Hiding, encrypting, encoding information so that other people can't read it. Cryptography in one form or another has been around for probably thousands of years, probably more than that -- as long -- as far back as people had things they needed to hide. Let me just give you some really simple examples of what crypto- graphy might be. Let's say that we're planning on doing a bank job tomorrow (ridiculous) and I want to pass along to my friend over here the name of the guy who's going to be going in and opening the vault, who happens to be Perry, let's say. So I'm going to hand him a slip of paper with Perry's name on it, but I don't want to write "P-e-r-r-y" and give it to him because someone else may grab the piece of paper away or see it over his shoulder or something and then to the -- to the pokey with Perry. So what I might do is instead of writing "Perry" on a piece of paper maybe I'll scramble the letters up and write "Y-p-r-e-r" and he knows based on some previously agreed upon formula that I take this cryptic message here and move this letter here and move this letter here and lo and behold there it is --"Perry". And if anyone else intercepts it they just see a bunch of junk, and they don't know who it is that's gonna be opening the bank vault. Another way I might hide this information from enemy eyes would be to substitute the letters, so instead of writing "Perry" I might write "Xwssp" where X represents the letter P and W represents the letter E and so on, and again we have some previously agreed-up code or formula that says when you see X substitute P and so on, and again you put it together and there it is, "Perry". Okay. So that's the most basic kind of cryptography. In fact codes that simple haven't been used for probably many centuries, and -- especially in I guess the last forty years cryptography has made tremendous, tremendous leaps forward so now it's not just a matter of shifting letters around. If you look in Newsday, the newspaper, every day they have a little puzzle called the "Cryptoquote" where they have a quote by some famous guy and you have to figure out which letter is substituted for which. So that's baby stuff now basically. In the last forty years it's changed so that now it's not based on just jumbling letters around but it's based on higher mathematics -- extremely, extremely advanced, sophisticated mathematics, so sophisticated that the strongest -- the codes that are widely used today by like the government or even banks would require all the computer power in the world and more to crack. So cryptosystems have gotten much, much, much, much, much more sophisticated. So a couple of new developments that are of interest to us: Well, the main thing is this ultrastrong state-of-the-art cryptography has become available to the hoi polloi, people like us. With advances in computer technology, just a simple PC that a lot of you, maybe even most of you, have, in your bedroom, you can run software that does extremely sophisticated crypto- graphy, in fact so sophisticated that even the NSA, we think, can't break it. So military strength -- for obvious reasons, military strength is generally the name they use for the strongest cryptosystems in the world, because those are the ones that would be used by the President for the codes to the nuclear weapons or something like that. Perry and I are going to be giving those codes out a little later on in the evening. [LAUGHTER] Another thing which Perry is going to talking more about is the N.S.A., National Security Agency. That's the super tip-top-secret U.S. government agency that specializes in cryptography. For years they had a complete monopoly on cryptography. Well, not complete, but effectively a monopoly on cryptography. That's sort of changed now, or that has changed now, and like I said jerks like us have access to extremely powerful cryptography, which is a good thing. Okay. So what does this mean? Who cares? What do we need crypto- graphy for? Who gives a damn? Well, I'll tell you. There are a whole bunch of different things you can do now with this extremely strong cryptography, and I usually just arbitrarily for no parti- cular reason; just to make it easier I usually split it up into two different categories: defensive applications of cryptography, and offensive applications. Let's start with the defensive stuff, or passive as opposed to active. First of all, more and more -- a lot of you probably know this. Some of you haven't really seen it yet maybe. Everything's moving more and more into digital form, and moving to the Net. We're probably going to be throwing the term "the Net" around a lot. People say the Net they're usually referring to the Internet, which you probably have heard, most of you, because it's plastered all over magazines every day now. The Internet basically in a nutshell is a massive international network of computers that is --basically is totally anarchic. It spans the whole world, probably just about every country at this point? PM: No, but every industrialized country at this point. DM: A whole shitload of countries. And over the Net, using these amorphous connections to computers around the world, you can send information almost instantaneously anywhere in the world at the push of a button. That also means that as time goes by more and more of your personal information let's say is going to be stored on the Net and stored in electronic form. So it's -- we're still at the very, very early stages of this happening and it's a really important time because first of all while before this infra- structure is fully developed the government wants to sort of slip by certain laws. The Net, as I said, is still basically anarchic, and the govern- ment doesn't like that, and while we're still at square one they want to slip in laws that will restrict this ultimate freedom of movement that people have on the Net. Okay. Let me get into some of these applications. First of all, electronic mail. Over time -- I mean you'll still be sending mail in envelopes to your friends, but more and more mail will be sent over the Net. E-Mail. Electronic Mail. Electronic mail is completely insecure. I don't mean it has an inferiority complex. [LAUGHTER] I mean basically it's completely unprotected. So we -- a lot of you here probably use electronic mail every day. It's growing by leaps and bounds. If I send an electronic mail message to someone out here: "Hi. Meet me tomorrow night at 7:30." That message goes out over the Net. It may be passing through several other machines on the way from me to him, and it goes out in the clear as cryptographers would call it, meaning it's not encrypted. It's not protected in any way. Anyone who taps into the line, anyone who has the appropriate access to the computer system I'm using, can just pick it right out, read the text of the message I'm sending, no problem. That's that. That's not good, especially if I'm sending sensitive messages over the Net. So using cryptography -- this is the most obvious use of cryptography -- what you can do is take the message you're going to send, encrypt it so that it's scrambled and cannot be read by anyone except the person it's intended for, and then send it out. Someone intercepts the message, someone reads it, fine. Go ahead. Do whatever you want. It's a bunch of junk. You can't make sense of it unless you have the key. I guess I sort of skipped over that. In cryptography, it depends on keys, so ... PM: I'll get into that. DM: Okay. So basically if I send you a message that's encrypted and it's intended for you, you will have the key to read it. No one else will. And like I said, this stuff is basically uncrackable, unreadable by anyone, including the N.S.A. as far as we know. So -- you want to send E-mail to somebody, you encrypt it, send it out, that's it. That problem is solved. No one can read it. No one. There's another problem, however, and that's what cryptographers call traffic analysis. For example if the Chase Manhattan Bank on Seventh Avenue in Park Slope is knocked over every Monday evening and they see that every Monday afternoon an E-mail message passes from me to Perry even though they can't read it 'cause it's encrypted they may say, "Hmm. Something fishy's going on here. There's E-mail going from Dave to Perry every Monday. Ten minutes later the bank gets knocked over." So without actually being able to read my message, they still can sort of infer some information by using what's called traffic analysis, by the mere fact that mail is going from this person to that person. So you want to be able to hide that also if you can. The main technique that people have been using and talking about and developing to foil traffic analysis is something we can anony- mous remailers, which are like mail drops [OR MAIL FORWARDING SERVICES]. Most of you know what mail drops are. Any criminals in the audience? They're like the electronic -- the Net version of mail drops. The way an anonymous remailer would work is -- it might be out in Berkeley, California, let's say. There actually are a lot of them out in Berkeley. There's one in Finland that's really heavily used. I might take my E-mail message saying, "Perry. Chase Manhattan Bank. The usual. Seventh Avenue." Send it to this remailer in Berkeley with instructions to the remailer, which is an automatic machine -it's a computer program -- saying, "Take this message and forward it over to Perry Metzger." Okay. So now what happens? What's going out from me is an encrypted, that is completely unreadable message, out to Berkeley. A minute later, ten minutes later, an hour later however we set it up, a message goes from Berkeley over to Perry. Okay? So no one can read the mail because it's encrypted. No one can do traffic analysis because it's -- it's blurred. I can even -- without getting into too much painstaking detail I can bounce it off ten different remailers. I can send it to Berkeley, to Finland, to here, to there, to there, and then to Perry. No one looking at this -- where the mail is going can possibly figure out what's going on. Okay. That's number one. More applications for cryptography, more of these --what I'm calling defensive applications. Let's say you have people on the Net a lot of times asking embarrassing questions. Let's say --there are groups, there are discussion groups out there for -- to discuss sex or to discuss like -- you know people who were sexually abused when they were children, all kinds of stuff with all kinds of personal information. You don't necessarily want to send out E-mail saying, "Oh, you know, I've never slept with a woman. Can anyone tell me about, you know, how?" That's the kind of thing you see all the time and you don't necessarily want your name attached to that, so, again, you can -- you can use encryption to hide the contents of what you're sending out. You can bounce it off these remailers so no one is the wiser. Tim May mentioned this next one, actually. You can actually lead several lives. Let's say you're like a high government official. This is sort of unlikely. Let's say you work for the Defense Department or you're the Vice President or something like that but you actually have some -- or you're a fancy straight respected scientist but you have some bizarre views that you don't want your name to be tainted with. Let's say you're a fancy scientist and you have an interest in UFO's or crop circles or something like that. Using cryptography, anonymous remailers and all this stuff you can lead a double or triple life, and, you know, lead your straight, respected Nobel Prize life and at the same time discuss crop circles with some lunatics over in England. [LAUGHTER] And -- you see that all the time. You see people on the Net who use pseudonyms, and actually establish reputations under a particular pseudonym. There's someone in the Cypherpunks group --there have been several people in the Cypherpunks group -- there was a guy -- he used the name "The Wonderer" and he would ask -- you know, he was asking like very simple, basic questions, and for all we know he might have been -- it might have been Perry? And he was embarrassed to say, like "What's cryptography?" You know? [LAUGHTER] So he used this pseudonym, "The Wonderer." PM: You found me out. DM: I always suspected. You can't fool me. [LAUGHTER] DM: Okay. You might want to hide certain political activities. We're going to go over to the Federal Reserve and knock it over tomorrow. Whatever. What else? Purchases. Over time people will be making purchases over the Net. You may be buying and selling stuff over the Net. You don't want The Man or The Woman -- Janet Reno, I guess -- to know that you buy $300 worth of sex toys every month. Or you send out your credit card number over the Net to buy stuff and you don't want people grabbing your credit card number, which, as I said, is very easy to do. So, again, you can encrypt this stuff and that's the end of people being able to track these purchases or rip off your credit card number. All kinds of other personal information. Again, more and more of this stuff's going to be stored in electronic form. Medical records, credit history, stuff like that. If you use cryptography to send all the stuff around then you have a little bit less of a worry about people being able to just circulate it around freely. Okay, that's some of the basic -- what I'm calling the defensive stuff. Basically just, you know, protect your privacy because your privacy is going to be in more and more jeopardy as the Net grows, as Big Brother grows. Okay, but let's get on to the fun stuff. There's what I call offensive, not defensive, tactics, but more fun offensive stuff. For example: Whistle blowing. You may work for some government agency that's doing some particularly horrible thing and you want to blow the whistle on them. Or they ripped someone off or they did LSD experiments or something like that. You can use crypto- graphy, anonymous remailers, to blow the whistle on people. Anonymous transactions. Again, as more and more people are doing business over the Net you can conduct transactions with complete untraceability. Perry, I think, I hope, will be talking a little bit about digital cash. PM: I will. DM: Digital cash is another application of cryptography, where people can buy, sell, do banking on the Net without anyone knowing anything -- like an electronic Swiss bank account. People can buy and sell stuff from each other without even knowing who the parties are -- a drug deal, let's say, or whatever, and no one will know who either party is. Underground economy, that falls into the same category. Digital cash. Again, if all this stuff is encrypted then it's basically untraceable, untrappable by the government, the I.R.S., whomever. Sending illegal information. The safe example that Tim May used when I interviewed him on my radio show was, "RU-486?" Is that still illegal? Or what's the deal? TM: Yes. DM: So let's say you want to get information out to people on RU-486, the abortion pill, which is illegal in the U.S. Again, you can encrypt it, send it anywhere in the world, completely untraceable. Okay. That's basically it. What this means is -- and this is where the anarchy part comes in. Borders, national borders, are Swiss cheese. Basically as things move more and more over to electronic form, borders -- whether they like it or not, the governments -- territorial gangsters as a friend of mine calls them -- borders become Swiss cheese. They become completely irrelevant. At the push of a button you can send anything you want basically anywhere in the world. No one will know what you're sending, where you're sending it, nothing. There's a quote. There's a quote in a Cypherpunks article in "Whole Earth Review." You can hide encrypted information on a DAT, a music cassette or a digital audio tape, so, for example, Anyone carrying a single music cassette bought in a store could carry the entire computerized files of the Stealth Bomber and it would be completely and totally imperceptible. Nothing anyone can do about it. Again, basically what this does is sort of renders obsolete a lot of the laws, or most of the laws, or the whole basis for laws that are in place now. Borders can't be enforced, taxes can't be enforced, and so on and so on. You get the idea. So to cut to the chase, the main goals of crypto-anarchy, the main goals of the Cypherpunks, are: (1) to spread the use of strong cryptography. Everyone should use encryption. You should send all your E-mail encrypted. People say, "Why do I need to encrypt my E-mail? All I'm doing is saying, you know, meet me for lunch at 12:30. I don't need to encrypt it." The answer we usually give is most of the mail you send out isn't that secret either, but you wouldn't send it all on postcards. So sending your E-mail unencrypted is like sending all your mail on postcards. Encrypting your E-mail is like putting all your mail in envelopes. One further reason for that is, again, this traffic analysis thing. If you send all your mail out unencrypted, hundreds of pieces of E-mail a day, and then all of a sudden tomorrow at 5:00 p.m. you send out an encrypted piece of E-mail, people might get a little suspicious and look a little further into things. That's one reason that we promote the use of encryption all the time. If everything is encrypted-- if things are just flying all around the world, no one knows anything. Half of them may be, "Meet me for lunch at 12:30," and the other half may be, you know, "Let's make a drug deal," or whatever. So the more people use cryptography the more the lines get blurred and the more powerless the authorities become. There is a dark cloud which Perry is going to talk about in a second, that unfortunately -- I would prefer it if we could just stick to this stuff, but actually there have been developments recently mainly with some- thing called the Clipper Chip that is really, really, ugly and -- the Clipper Chip, and also the Digital Telephony Bill that -- sort of bring a dark cloud in over all this stuff. One thing I'm always talking about is how in the last few years anarchists or anarchist activists have sort of maybe been getting an inferiority complex, because it seems like the cops don't care about us that much anymore. As much as I don't want to be a martyr, you know that if the cops are tapping all your phones you at least know that you're probably doing something right. But I sort of get the impression lately a little bit that, you know, the cops just think "Fucking anarchists Who cares? They're not doing anything." Well, you can put those fears to rest, because this stuff is actually of great interest to the government, and the government is going to tremendous lengths to stifle this stuff. It definitely has the government's undivided attention, and I guess Perry is going to tell you more about that now. PM: All right. Now I was touching on this a little bit earlier, but -- this gives you a little bit of motivation, why this is so interesting. It's one thing to say that the government is interested in this, but does anyone -- I know that some people in the audience already know the answer to this, but do most of you -- if most of you are asking yourself what's the biggest and most secret agency that the United States government operates, you probably think the Central Intelligence Agency. MALE: National Reconnaissance Office. MALE: The Federal Reserve. PM: No. It is the not the N.R.O., either. The N.R.O. is bigger than the C.I.A., but it is not bigger than the N.S.A. MALE: Is DISCO more secret than the N.S.A.? PM: Pardon? MALE: DISCO? PM: DISCO? MALE: I guess it is. PM: It must be. The National Security Agency -- spends more money and has more employees than all of the other intelligence organizations the United States government operates combined. Okay? It spends over $30 billion a year only on signal intelligence operations (SIGINT). I'm about to get into what those are. This is something that the government cares about extremely passionately. They spend vast amounts of money on it. You should ask yourself why. Now what exactly is the business of the National Security Agency? The business of the National Security Agency is signals intelligence. Most people aren't aware of it, but signals intelligence is considered by most intelligence analysts to be the most important form of intelligence. Signals intelligence played incredibly important roles all through World War II. How many people here knew that the Battle of Midway was won entirely because of signals intelligence intercepts? Okay. A couple of people. MALE: Seven percent. PM: How many people in this audience knew that the Battle of the

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Feb 11 Transcript part 2
by rarachel＠photon.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Atlantic was largely not a complete disaster because of signals intelligence work? A few people know. What is signals intelligence? Why does the government care so much about this? Signals intelligence, put simply, is the busi- ness of reading other peoples' mail. That's it, most baldly. It's the interception of communications, whatever form those communications take. And it's a very, very big thing with the government. The National Security Agency basically has two jobs. One of them is to be this gigantic ear out there that listens to all the communications that it can unearth. Period. Now one of the problems is that lots of foreign governments don't like having all their communications listened to. I don't know why. [LAUGHTER] And lots of private individuals don't like having all their communications intercepted. So they tend to use cryptography. So one of the other big things that the National Security Agency spends billions of dollars a year on is research in code breaking -- how to break cryptographically protected messages. The other half of what the N.S.A. is try to keep foreign governments from doing the same thing to us. They're also in the business of developing codes and trying to protect the United States government and government contractors from having their communications intercepted. Naturally there's a small conflict here, because the people who spend their days trying to break other countries' codes and foreign companies' codes and American citizens' codes, they're not supposed to do that anymore. At the Congressional hearings in the Seventies they promised to stop doing that. Anyway, the people who spend their days monitoring, you know, cellular telephone calls in Moscow would prefer that the technology developed by the people who are developing ways to keep the United States government's communications secure not get into the hands of the people who are trying to make cellular telephone calls in Moscow, because they want to be able to listen to all of this stuff. So we've got this conflict between the two halves of the National Security Agency, and the side that wins is almost always the people that slurp up traffic. They never talk about any of the techniques they use, and they try to keep them as secret as possible. And until the early 1970s there was almost no private sector research on cryptography done in the world. The National Security Agency had a monopoly on information about cryptography, and to this day they never have said -- they still have a great reluctance to declassify things from the Second World War. Put it that way. By the way, the National Security Agency is truly huge. They have at least ninety thousand employees that we know of. They occupy the entire Ft. Meade military base just outside of Washington. It really is bigger than all the other intelligence agencies put together. It's of course an agency that's extremely secretive, and until the 1970s they did not even admit that the N.S.A. existed. N.S.A. was said to stand for "No Such Agency." Something rather interesting happened, however, in the early Seventies, which is that a few computer scientists and mathematicians, specifically Whitfield Diffy, Ralph Merkel and Martin Helman, came up with the first major discovery in cryptography outside of the government sector in about fifty or sixty years, which was this notion called "public key cryptography." It's an idea that was so feared by the National Security Agency that they actually attempted to quash all open research and publication on the subject. They discovered that it was not possible to do so, much to their chagrin. This little thing called the First Amendment gets in the way. But to this day they attempt with every means possible that they can to try to deter research in the public sector. Now what was it that Diffy, Helman and Merkel came up with that they considered to be so dangerous? I have to explain a little bit more about cryptography than I like to in order to explain this. The reason it's more than I'd like to is because frankly unless you're really interested on an intimate level cryptography gets rather boring. It's like discussing the details of auto mechanics. It doesn't make for interesting talks. But I'll talk about it for a minute anyway. All modern cryptosystems have two components to them. There is an algorithm and there is a key. The algorithm is basically your recipe for saying how you're going to take your message in on one end, scramble it up and spit it out the other end. But the algorithm is not a complete recipe. It's missing a portion. That portion is the key. The idea is that by having this thing called a key, that's -- it's just like a key to a lock in a door. Thousands of people can own exactly the same model of Yale lock all over this city, but because each of them uses a different key on their lock two people who own the same brand of lock can't open each other's doors. Well, it's exactly the same idea. By separating out this small piece of information -- it's usually a large number these days -- two users of a system can -- different people can communicate using the same cryptographic system without being able to read each other's messages, and indeed one of the rules for designing cryptosystems is that the cryptosystem should only depend on the key for secrecy. You should be able to tell people exactly how you're encrypting things, but just not tell them what the key is. And they should be unable to decipher your traffic no matter how hard they try. Now most people know that -- you know, your ordinary door, you walk up to it, you unlock it, use a key, you lock it again, you use the same key. This is actually the way that most cryptosystems used to be before Diffy, Helman and Merkel. Now this causes a problem. Let's say that I want to communicate with Dave. Okay. Now we have to exchange a key securely. I can't just call him up on the phone and say, "Hey, Dave. This is the key we're going to use," because someone can be tapping the phone line. I have to actually go up to Dave, you know, hand him the key, and then go off -- or send a courier and then go off and later on communicate with it. But let's say that I want to then communicate with, say, you. I can't use the same key I'm using with Dave, because then you could read the traffic and I wouldn't necessarily want you to be able to read the traffic. So okay, now I have two sets of keys. Well, let's say I'm communicating with several hundred people regularly. Well, I have to exchange keys with all of them. This is an enormous pain in the ass. What Merkel, Helman and Diffy came up with was something called the public key concept. It's a really neat idea. Imagine for a moment -- imagine a mailbox for a moment that has a mail slot in it. Okay? And once something's been stuck in the mail slot it's inside the mailbox and the only way to open the mailbox is with this key. But anyone can stuff things into the mail slot. Anyone can put things in, but only the owner of the key to open the mailbox can get things out. The idea that they had was this. Let's say that we had cryptography systems in which there were two keys, two keys that cannot be determined from each other. I cannot figure out what one of the keys is based on what the other key is. One of the keys encrypts things: takes them, scrambles them up, makes them look like gibberish. You cannot, however, unscramble things with that key. You need the second key in order to descramble things. The scrambling key is the encryption key, or the public key. It's called a public key because I can give it away. I can put in the phonebook or in an ad in the New York Times or anywhere else I want, "this is my public key." Anyone on earth can use that, because you cannot determine from that key what the decryption or private key is, the key that I keep to myself, that I don't tell anyone, and which is the only way to read things that have been scrambled up with the public key. Now this is a real revolution. Now I can just give thousands of people the same key to send mail to me or to have phone conversations with me or what have you, and all I have to do is keep one key private and I'm secure. I no longer have any problem with key distribution. Now this might not sound terribly revolutionary, but consider that we live in the modern age and we've got lots of computers and computerized telephone systems and things like that. Because of public key cryptography -- and this is not practical without public key cryptography -- I can build a telephone system where, every pair of phones in the country have public keys associated with them and the public keys are published off somewhere and when you pick up the telephone and dial a number, your telephone asks a database somewhere what the public key is for the number I'm calling, finds it out and scrambles the entire telephone conver- sation using that public key. So instead of having to worry about and sweat over distributing keys to everyone I talk to, I can afford to encrypt my conver- sations with the corner store, or the pizza parlor that I'm calling to give an order to. I can encrypt absolutely everything. This wasn't practical before public key cryptography was invented. Public key cryptography makes cryptography really cheap and easy to use. This is something that the N.S.A. doesn't like, obviously, and that's why they tried to keep this information from being published to the point that N.S.A. officials who were apparently not acting under official orders sent letters to lots of publications telling them that if they published any information on this they'd be violating acts about the publication of classified information, and they tried to contend that all research in cryptography was born secret and that once you wrote a paper you couldn't read it again unless you had a security clearance. Unfortunately, as I mentioned, they were forced to back off of this. There were lots of reasons for this, one of which is that the courts didn't agree with them. One of them is that lots of the research goes on in foreign countries, which, believe it or not, are not run by the U.S. government, at least not all of them, not yet. But anyway, what happened was that in the early Seventies these people came up with this new concept. This spurred an interesting revolution, because suddenly lots of people in academia saw that there was interesting research to be done in cryptography and that they could do it outside of the N.S.A. Before the early 1970s all the cryptographers in the United States for the most part who had any degree of serious interest in the subject worked for the N.S.A. That was it. That was your only career path. Now there are thousands of people who work on cryptography in academia in this country and in countries around the world, and it's a real serious subject of study. There are conferences several times a year, people publish this stuff in the open literature. So there is now this thriving field of study, which the N.S.A. really doesn't like -- because as I mentioned, the people who are basically that big ear trying to listen to all the conversations around the world -- and by the way, when I say they try to, I really mean it. They've got listening posts all over the world to try to intercept every possible radio transmission, microwave-transmitted telephone call, every satellite-based communication, everything they can get they tap-- you know, cables going between foreign countries -- everything they can possibly do to listen to as many conversations as they can. MALE: Supposedly they monitor every overseas phone call in this country. PM: Yeah. Whether or not they actually do is a matter of speculation, but it's thought by many that they do. FEMALE: Well, they do sample. DM: We don't know what they do for sure. FEMALE: No, trust me. DM: Okay. FEMALE: So if you say, "Bomb the World Trade Center," they pick up on those words. DM: Possibly. Anyway -- while all of this was happening in the mid- Seventies and early Eighties with cryptography developing as a field of study, at the same time the computer revolution was happening. Now computers -- I know that everyone on earth by now has heard about -- has seen their People Magazine or Time Magazine or Schlock Magazine No. 525th article on the Information Superhighway, and the Internet and how wonderful it all is -- and you probably all want to fall over and gag when you hear any more hype from people who don't know what they're talking about. Well, I'm going to give you some more hype, but at least I do know what I'm talking about. The Internet is a really amazing thing. I can sit in my office in New York and I can collaborate with an- other person who's working in Australia and I can send mail to friends of mine that gets there instantaneously who happen to be in Finland -- or communicate with tens of thousands of people that I've never met. If it wasn't for the Internet, I never would have met Dave. In fact if it wasn't for the Internet the Cypherpunks Movement would never have started, because all the people involved in it found each other over the Net. Now in the future, whether you like it or not, the Net's going to be where you do your catalog shopping ... DM: Perry, I just have to mention. There are about 700 plus Cypherpunks today. I've met I think three of them in the flesh in a year and a half. PM: I've met more, but it's amazing how many people you get to know and be friends with and you've never seen. But you know, I -- in the future it's possible for many kinds of work to be done remotely thanks to these technologies. If you're a writer you don't need to be anywhere in particular, do you? I mean you can write your books in Fiji for all you care. And if you're a reporter, unless you're a beat reporter and you go out to interview the fireman at the fire or what have you, if you're someone who, say, covers wider issues you can do your business from almost anywhere that you've got a telephone and a computer. The Internet makes that an even bigger thing. In the future I'm probably going to be able to send a little message down to the pizza parlor around the corner and have a pizza delivered over the Internet. Everything you do is going to be done over the Net. MALE: Isn't it going to taste a little funny sucking through that wire? PM: Well, no. MALE: No worse than Domino's, I guess. PM: It tastes fine once you encrypt the pizza. Anyway -- the thing is that the Internet -- now when Dave said that the Internet is an anarchic thing, this is not a lie. This is literally the truth. The Internet has no central control, no central planning. It's operated basically on the premise of, "Okay. I've got a connection. Oh, you want to connect up? Okay. Connect up to me." There is no such thing as a central Internet management office. There is -- yes? Q: What's the Internet Naming Authority? PM: The I.A.N.A. is -- to the extent that there is any sort of central organization, that can be said to be it. But what do they do? They give out Internet numbers. If they stopped doing it, people would probably start routing in NBGP domains, you know, on their own and assigning their own numbers. It's not like you can exert control over the Net that way. But never mind. I don't want to... COMMENT: It fits most people's definition of God. The circle whose center is everywhere, whose circumfrence cannot be found. PM: The Net is organized basically without any -- the Net has no knowledge of what borders are. Okay? I can communicate with a machine in Finland as easily as I can communicate with a machine in New York. One of the results of this is that when people in one country are told, "Oh, you can't put this sort of information up on your computer," well, generally speaking someone in another country will offer to put the information up for them. And at that point the attempt to control the flow of information is completely meaningless. Does everyone know -- there's this court case now in Canada where the Canadian press has been forced not to say anything about the court case. Well, of course anyone who's in Canada and is connected to the Internet can read all the details that they want to. Borders are completely meaningless. The U.S. government has this interesting rule that you cannot export cryptographic software from the United States. I'll get into that more later. But one of the interesting results of this is that when people have built large packages -- large pieces of software that involve cryptography -- what they've generally done is to just specify how the cryptographic pieces have to fit in, and people in foreign countries have written a dozen or couple of dozen lines of computer software to implement those things and put them up on computers in Finland. For some reason putting this stuff up on computers in Finland is really popular. I don't know why. [LAUGHTER] Really, it is. The Network traffic between the United States and France is dwarfed by a factor of five compared to the traffic between the U.S. and Finland. It doesn't make any sense, but that's the way it is. But, you know, the Internet has changed the way many people who are computer professionals now live. For instance, the chairman of Autodesk, which is this very successful computer company, decided that he didn't like living in the U.S. So he moved to Switzerland, got an Internet connection and managed his company from then on from there. I think recently he decided he wanted to retire and hired another manager, but never mind; the point is that the Net really breaks down barriers to information. You can not restrict information to one country, you cannot keep information from flooding around the world almost instantaneously to any place that's on the Net. Everyone is on the Net. The Russians are on the Net. People in Singapore -- where the government of Singapore thinks that they're exerting control over what books can be sold in the country, I have news for them. Stuff going over the Net is far racier than anything that they think that they're censoring at the border. So here we have this wonderful Internet, and the problem with it is it's completely insecure. The way it's been built right now, anywhere I tap a line I get enormous amounts of traffic going by and it's all conveniently already computerized so I can use computers to listen in on it. If the N.S.A. wanted to build a computer system to watch all the electronic mail going between two countries, it would be nice, easy, feasible. There'd be no problem. This is a problem. Now the problem is of course easily solved with cryptography. If you encrypt all your communications, suddenly it's impossible to tap them. This is of course something that the National Security Agency doesn't like, so they try to do things like restricting the export of cryptographic software from the U.S. Well, I have news for you. Software is just information. Software is no different from any other kind of information, and if I put software up on the Net suddenly it's in every country in the world within hours. Mysterious how this happens. This has happened with cryptographic software several times. There's a fellow by the name of Phil Zimmerman who wrote a nice public key cryptography package called PGP, put it up on a machine in the United States. Well, wouldn't you know it -- available in Italy -- oh. By the way. Duncan has about ten copies of PGP for anyone who wants them. [LAUGHTER] We're having trouble controlling the distribution of cryptography software here. [LAUGHTER] Anyway. Sorry. Flying disks. Yes. But seriously, that's as easy as it is to get your hands on cryptography software these days. It's all over the Internet. People can download it from Finland, from Italy, from France and England. It's everywhere. And the N.S.A. doesn't like this, either. Now stepping back from that for a moment, I'll mention that we've talked about ordinary applications for cryptography up to now: how to keep your communications secret using cryptography. We touched earlier on the fact that you can do banking using crypto- graphy. Now why would this be particularly interesting? Well, this guy David Chaum, in Holland, came up with a system -- and I'll just ask you to take this on faith -- you can read a book like Bruce Schneider's book [Applied Cryptography] later if you like and figure out why this would be so -- but it is possible to construct a money transfer system in which it is guaranteed that all parties are anonymous and no parties have to trust each other. Now that's a really neat feature, isn't it? You don't have to trust the other parties, and you don't necessarily have to know who they are. Now remember that the Internet allows communications to go all over the world now. So let me give you the following little scenario. Let's say that I had a little pocket computer in my -- you have an Apple Newton, don't you? Is it with you? Let me hold that for a minute. Now I don't know if people are aware, but, you know, this is as small as computers have gotten and in fact this is large compared to the HP100. There's a very powerful computer here. It even has a communication link so it can talk to other computers. Right here. I can keep it with me. Let's say that I'm sitting in a cafe in the East Village, say, and I'm going to meet up with this guy who has promised to give me this contraband I've been really interested in -- nude pictures of Nancy Reagan. Okay? So he shows up in the cafe. You know, I've never seen the guy before. Never mind. I look at the pictures. Yes, I want them. We both get out our little computers, put them in front of each other. Each of us presses a button and suddenly I've paid him $10,000 which I've extracted from my offshore bank account over the Internet, handed to him and lord knows what he's done with it. He might have sent it for all I know to the same bank or to one on the other side of the world. No way to know. No way to trace it. Now U.S. banking law says that I can't do business with foreign banks inside the U.S., but it's very difficult in the presence of strong cryptography to know whether or not I am communicating with a foreign bank. Or to regulate the transport of money. If you're living in the underground economy and you're dealing with cash all the time it gets very cumbersome, you know? You're carrying around $10,000 in cash. It's a big wad of bills. Keeping cash in your home is inconvenient, moving cash around is inconvenient. It's dangerous. You can't get interest paid on your cash. So what you really want is offshore banking, but offshore banking has been inaccessible to people. Well, this might very well blow that wide open, and I'm certain that the I.R.S. and the N.S.A. dislike this possibility. Imagine what happens if half the population finds itself able to function in the underground economy with all the ease with which they can function in the above-ground economy right now. They've got their bank, they've got -- you know, they can make investments if they want. They can transfer money. Hell, it's more conven- ient. It's much more convenient than the way we do things right now, and I can clear and transact -- right now if I wanted to, say, a credit card transaction, you know, a merchant has to be set up to do a credit card transaction and it's really risky. Someone can steal the credit card numbers, etc. This is extremely secure, and I can exchange information with anyone and I can do it using ordinary equipment that I can buy off the shelf. That's another thing that I want to point out here. Every computer is dangerous to them. Every single computer in the world is an extremely high quality cypher machine if it has the right programs, and programs are really easy to copy. They're as free as air. They move very fast. I can throw one -- pretty inaccurately, but never mind. Anyway -- flying software, faster than the internet... [OVERLAPPING COMMENTS AND LAUGHTER] The people in Fort Meade, you know, at the N.S.A. --their offices are known as the Puzzle Palace to some people, largely because to a large extent what they do is they spend their days worrying about really intricate mathematical problems. And there's -- I suspect not much that makes the people in the Puzzle Palace more nervous than the notion that equipment that anyone in the world can buy for a couple of hundred dollars can make it impossible for them to tap some communications. It's incredibly cheap -- cryptography software is virtually free right now. Almost anyone can get software that's really good for free. And computers are cheap. And you can't keep the software from moving around. This is probably the stuff of their nightmares. You know, remember that their mission is to listen in on every- thing, and they're faced with the threat that they may be able to listen in on nothing. Compound that with the fact that then we have these science fiction scenarios of people able to conduct untraceable, unwatchable transactions without the I.R.S.'s all- seeing eye being able to detect it -- or FINCEN's. How many people here know what FINCEN is? I'm curious. Okay, we have two or three people who know what FINCEN is. Do you know what FINCEN is, sir? MALE: No, I don't. PM: FINCEN is the government agency that collects information on all of your large bank transfers and tries to note if you are engaging in a pattern of criminality with them. Right now it can only watch all of your transfers over $10,000, or things that are suspiciously close to $10,000. They would like to watch all of your bank transactions. This is all in the name of... Oh, by the way. Does everyone knows what the Four Horsemen of the modern governmental Apocalypse are? The excuses for virtually every civil rights reduction that's happened in the last few years. The Four Horsemen are: terrorists, drug dealers, pornographers and child molesters. Okay. Now all the time you're told, "But what if terrorists got their hands on cryptography technology?" By the way, the answer to this is that anyone who wants to get their hands on it -- let's put it this way. This book [Applied Cryptography] can be purchased in any bookstore. Explains everything about the state of the art in modern cryptography. Any of you who knew enough about computers could pick this book up and write software probably good enough that the government could not listen in on your communications. Trying to keep this stuff out of the hands of anyone is rather difficult. The horse is already long out of the barn.

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Feb 17 Transcript Part 3
by rarachel＠photon.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

But unfortunately, the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse are still there and the government is trying to use them as an excuse right now. How many people saw the articles on the front page of the New York Times about Clipper? Okay. A bunch of people have. How many people saw the front page article in the New York Times about the F.B.I. Digital Telephony Bill? Ah. Fewer people. I'll start with the F.B.I. Digital Telephony Bill, because it's much easier to understand. The F.B.I. is not satisfied with the fact that our phone system is not like the phone systems in Eastern Europe, and wants it to be that way. [Laughter] They want the capacity to be able to push a button in Washington at any time they like and tap any telephone in the country at will. That's basically it in a nutshell. They claim that they need this capability because modern digital telephone systems are becoming increasingly difficult to listen in on. Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility did an F.O.I.A. [Freedom Of Information Act] request on the F.B.I. and managed to get documents which said, "By the way, we know this is a lie but we're trying to get this bill through. So please lobby for it." In fact no one has ever found that they have any difficult tapping the existing telephone systems, but never mind that. They are saying that because of advances in technology they need the capacity to be able to sit in Washington, push a button and listen to any telephone conversation in the country at will. This is of course in order to stop the terrorists, drug dealers, pornographers and child molesters. If they can find some one who is all of those at once I am sure it will make their day. Anyway, at the same time the National Security Agency has been having these nightmares about cryptography so they've gotten the Clinton Administration to front for them on a really, really stupid idea. MALE: Ten copies of the Justice Department announcements, the five press releases from a week ago. PM: Okay. Well, basically what's happened -- maybe we'll pass these out in a minute -- is that this has been in the works for some time and people have been fighting it, and so many people have been fighting it that we thought it was dead, but it seems to have come back from the dead. The government wants you to use their cryptosystems. What they want is they want to give you a little cryptography box called "Clipper" that you can use, so that you don't have to complain that all of your communications are insecure. But Clipper has a built-in bugging feature in it, so that if the government wants to listen in on your communications they can do so. Isn't that special of them? And they expect that everyone in the country will want to use this. MALE: And each one's got a serial number. PM: Yes, yes. The way this basically works is that they store basically the equivalent of a master key to the cryptography system inside -- I'm trying to keep this from being too technical -- essentially every time you use the Clipper chip to communicate with something that also contains a Clipper chip, well, what it does is it includes information about the key you are using in the data stream that it sends to the other machine, and it's encrypted with an encryption key that is known to the government -- to keep everyone nice and honest. You know, we don't want to keep those terrorists, child molesters, pornographers, drug dealers from being able to encrypt things. (Ie: "We're your government. Trust us, we know what's good for you; but we don't trust you.") However, they say that this standard is voluntary. Now if you were a card-carrying terrorist would you use the government's cryptography system, especially if it's voluntary to use it? No. What you're probably going to do is go out and get yourself a decent cryptography system. Hell, if you're actually being armed by the Libyans they probably have nice KGB crypto equipment that they can hand to you. You don't have to worry about going to the store to buy your cryptography equipment. So in general the notion that they can impose this as a voluntary standard for encryption, which you're not compelled to use, is ludicrous, and almost everyone in the community thinks that what they're doing is preparing to try to ban all forms of encryption other than the ones that they specifically approve. So we've got these two interesting government movements right now, the one to make tapping all of your telephones easier and the one to make it easy to decrypt the communications on the telephones that they've made it very easy to tap. I thought that the Berlin Wall had fallen and the Stazi was out of business, but apparently they've all just moved to Washington. [Laughter] It's kind of annoying. But on the other hand, ignoring all of this, they're -- by the way, I'll mention that every industry group, groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, all the trade magazines, everyone on earth has come out saying this is a stupid idea. DM: The 700 Club did a ... PM: The 700 Club actually did a story about how evil the government's cryptography plan is. It's amazing. Everyone and their mother has come out against this, but it doesn't seem to matter. According to an article that's going to be published in next month's "Wired" several administration officials have admitted that this might be their Bay of Pigs, something really stupid that they inherited from the previous administration, which they did, which they're going to push forward anyway full steam ahead. MALE: So whose head's going to explode like a flying -- you know, in Dallas -- as a result of this thing? PM: I don't know. Well, anyway, so -- now ignoring what the government is trying to do to stop cryptography, I'll point out that all is not rosy with cryptography. You can encrypt your communications, you can try to be really careful about all of the dealings you do, and if you try to live, say, purely in an underground economy one day you sit in a caf with the wrong guy and he pulls out his I.R.S. credentials and says, "Can we do an audit, please?" Now it might be difficult for them to be able to spend the resources necessary to try to track lots of people down for abusing this sort of thing. In fact, I would argue that there's no way that they have all the resources necessary to do that. But nonetheless, let's point out you can't do everything in cyberspace. You can't live in cyberspace. You have to live in a home somewhere. You have to go to the corner store to eat. You have a physical body. They can still get you. They can still pass laws to try to restrict your freedoms. Cryptography, however, does make them much weaker in many ways. One of the things that's been pointed out repeatedly is that government feeds on money. The lifeblood of government is money. If they don't have money -- what traditionally happens in a Third- World country that's experiencing hyperinflation? At some point the soldiers discover that their pay no long will buy them food, and they start revolting. Government workers are like everyone else -- well, sort of like everyone else, but [LAUGHTER] -- government workers do have families, they do have mouths to feed. They need to be paid. And when the government tries to print money to pay them the money becomes less worthwhile. So they depend on taxes in order to be able to control people. In an environment where it becomes increasingly difficult to tax activities, it becomes increasingly difficult for the government to exert control over the population. In fact, the more people move into some sort of cryptographic black market, the more difficult it becomes for the government to try to stop it because the fewer resources the government has. It's sort of a vicious cycle for them. They need to have money in order to try to get money, and the less resources they have to -- actually, Duncan, you know this off the top of your head. How many millions of Americans are thought to evade taxes right now? DUNCAN: The Feds say officially there are ten million nonfilers who should be filing, and at least another ten million filers who file incorrectly on purpose. That's out of 114 million personal tax returns filed last year, down from 117 million predicted. They undershot by 4 mil. FEMALE: They had like 900 convictions out of ... PM: How many convictions were there for tax fraud last year? DUNCAN: It's only about three or four hundred a year. PM: In spite of this -- it's very, very difficult for them to expend the resources to try to get a tax fraud conviction. DUNCAN: It costs $50,000 bucks, or -- and then you got to imprison 'em. I mean it costs half a mil or a mil. MALE: Usually there's one other factor, and that is that there's only one Treasury agent per 900 filers. So the enforcement bureaucracy is actually very small. This came up in the debate over the gun issue, where there's a mention of 240,000 gun dealers and about one enforcement bureaucrat for every 240. That's a highly regulated field by comparison with general tax filers. PM: Anyway -- Dave points out that I'm kind of dragging this on, and we should open it up for questions. MALE: ... one other factor that hampers the I.R.S.? PM: Yes? MALE: They've got infiltrators. PM: Oh? MALE: There are people in the I.R.S. who are on our side. PM: Okay. Anyway, if we're done with the major, initial part of the talk -- I think we made some of the interesting --I've missed talking about a bunch of things, like the fact that you can put -- there are all sorts of neat things people have discovered about cryptography over the years. You can play poker with people by computer without having to trust the dealer or any of the other players, and you can mathematically prove that no one has cheated in the course of the game. There are all sorts of neat tricks that cryptographers have come up with over the last few years, and if people -- anyone with a mathematical background, I strongly encourage you to go out and buy a copy of one of the books on the subject. Actually the best book on the subject right now is Bruce Schneier's Applied Cryptography. This is a technical text. If you're not interested in cryptography on a technical level, if you stopped with math before algebra or something -- I'm not trying to denigrate anyone. Some people are not interested in math. There's nothing wrong with not being interested in math. But this is a math book, basically. It's full of math. If you want to know the details, however -- published by John Wylie & Sons. There are some very good books -- it'll be up here. If you're interested in the history of cryptography, David Kahn wrote an extremely good book that only covers the world up to about 1970. He mentions the N.S.A. These were the days before they admitted that they existed, but he has chapters discussing them. The book is called The Code Breakers, by David Kahn. It is still an interesting book to read, because it gives you some idea about how hard it is to produce good codes and how important it has been in history. Most people are completely unaware of the historical importance of secret communications and breaking secret communications. MALE: The British government for about seventy years claimed they weren't breaking any telegrams, and in fact they were taking every one into a room and trying to ... MALE: The N.S.A. lied about it for years, also. PM: The so-called Black Chambers. All through the 19th century virtually every government in Europe had something called a Black Chamber, which was the room into which all diplomatic correspondence coming into and out of the country was brought to be read. Most of it was encrypted, but some countries had pretty good cryptographers. This has been going on for centuries. There is nothing new about this. The only thing new about this is that suddenly world-class cryptography is in the hands of everyday people. Lastly, there's a great book about the N.S.A. that Lou mentioned a moment ago, called The Puzzle Palace by ... DM: Bamford. PM: The Puzzle Palace is, again, about ... (Inaudible; overlap) DM: It's available in cheap paperback. Very good book. PM: Oh, by the way. If you get a copy of The Codebreakers by David Kahn, do not get the paperback. Get the hard-cover. The text is different. The text of The Puzzle Palace in softcover is exactly the same. It's a really good book. It's unfortunately about a decade old, but it covers them in an enormous amount of detail. Most people are completely oblivious to what the largest intelligence agency in the U.S. is. You should inform yourselves. DM: So let's open it up ... PM: For questions. * * * Q: I don't understand the details of Chaum's method of electronic banking, but I thought it required that the bank would issue essentially denominations of bills that were public keys. PM: Are they publicly keys? I could go into the details, but I don't know ... Q: My point is, how do you get this going without the cooperation of a bank? PM: Form your own bank. That's basically the answer. You have a digital bank that issues digital money, basically. MALE: If you have a couple of hundred people you can form your own credit union. PM: In fact there are some people in Texas who are now forming a credit union on the premise that the credit union is going to permit people to make electronic cryptographic transactions. MALE: The problem with this digital bank and any other under-ground economy is that if your digital cash is stolen or if this digital underground economy collapses you will have no recourse in law enforcement, in civil suits or FDIC insurance. PM: Well, first of all -- I don't want to claim that the FDIC is a wonderful thing here, but even assuming that it was I honestly trust AAA-rated Swiss banks far more than I trust any bank in the United States -- or the full faith and credit of the United States government. MALE: Here, here. PM: Which is going down every day as the deficit increases. Q: But who issues digital cash? PM: No, the point is that you cannot steal digital cash. It doesn't work that way. You can -- now the bank can defraud you. You admittedly have to trust your bank. However, you cannot really steal digital cash. It doesn't work that way. MALE: It's protected using encryption. It's very complicated. Q: Are you claiming that Virtual Virtue has been invented? PM: No. I'm claiming cryptography has been invented. It does not -- the bank can defraud you. Someone cannot steal your digital cash. Q: Why wouldn't this be an attractive notion to most Americans, and subsequently why would this seem to be a scary notion to the government? PM: I will explain it to you right now. In this city, most people think that most people comply with the tax regulations and with Federal regulation. New York City is one of the most fascistly-run places in the United States, so it would not be surprising that we have the most thriving underground economy. Go downtown to Chinatown and you will find building after building after building of off-books businesses: clothing manufacturers, import-export businesses, everything you can imagine, being run in a completely underground manner. The garment industry would not exist in New York City if it was not for the underground economy in New York City. Okay, forget what middle-American people will do. The underground economy already exists, and this sort of thing is going to move forward and there's probably going to be demand from people who are already in it. As for the question of "virtue", as I said I would go into the cryptographic protocols in detail, but -- you cannot be robbed of your digital cash from your wallet the way that you can be robbed of real cash. MALE: They can't rob you any more than a regular bank can. PM: It's not actual cash. It's really an anonymous transfer. Q: Doesn't digital cash (?) to the maximum capitalists and fascists, too, or are we just catching up with things? MALE: This is a problem. PM: Whether you like it or not, it's there. The computers are out there. The technology has been invented. It cannot be uninvented. It can't be put back in the bottle. There are tens of thousands of people in this country who understand how to build these things. At this point it's impossible to stop it. So whether you like capitalism or don't like capitalism, whether you like technology or dislike technology, this is a reality. I would advise personally that you try to use it to your benefit. Perhaps other people have different opinions. That's what I would think. Q: A two-point question. First of all, have you seen the article in the Humanist(?) about digital cash? PM: I'm afraid I have not. Q: Have you? DM: Can't say I have. No. Q: Okay. Secondly -- now the promo for this talk says it'll make the State a thing of the past. PM: I think that's something of an exaggeration. DM: Basically what we're talking about, and it remains to be seen how far it's going to go, is the withering of the State in the sense that governments can no longer say -- now they can say we won't let this book cross our borders, you can't do certain kinds of financial trans-actions, you're not allowed to read this stuff, you're not allowed to make bootleg copies of this record. All this stuff is going to be going on more and more, and it's unstoppable by the government. So in other words, a lot of these laws are just unenforceable, superfluous, as this stuff starts travelling over the Net in encrypted forms. MALE: That's victory to some extent. DM: Right. PM: Oh, yes. It is very much -- it's sort of the exponentiation of (?). As soon as you allow in -- the Chinese discovered this at Tiennamen Square. Fascists and totalitarian governments and Communist governments have known this for a long time. You want to keep the copy machines in your country as difficult to get to as possible. You want to keep the telephones difficult to get to, and make them bad and tap them all the time. You want to restrict the flow of information. One of the things that happened after Tiennamen Square were these informal fax networks came into existence all over China, and within hours people all over the country knew the truth about what was going on. Information from satellite broadcasts and from foreign radio stations got in and swept over the country. This just compounds that problem. If you're going to take part in the modern world, if you're not going to be like Albania, you're going to have to allow in the Internet. As soon as you allow in the Internet, people are going to start exchanging data. As soon as they start exchanging data some of that data might be encrypted, and you have no way of knowing what it is that they're bringing in or putting out. You can't control it, not short of controlling every single computer that exists in your country. Q: Has there ever been a case where the government has broken the code and ... (Inaudible; overlap) PM: In the thirties all the time. Bootleggers would use primitive cryptographic systems to communicate with each other and would get hauled into court. In fact Kahn's book, The Codebreakers, talks a lot about this. You bring up a very important point. Not all cryptography is good cryptography. The program WordPerfect is really popular out there. It has a little function that will let you save an encrypted version of your file. It's totally useless. With a couple of milliseconds' worth of work, another program can just break that wide open. You need strong cryptography. Just any cryptography won't do. Insist on -- but in the past very often people using secret codes for communication have been hauled into court by the United States government. It's happened. Q: Were they drug dealers? PM: In Prohibition they were drug dealers. Yes. Q: Recently. PM: Recently, no. It has not happened recently. One of the things that's very strange is that more of them are not using cryptography. There are companies in the U.S. that will sell you commercially phone scramblers that are really, really good. MALE: [INAUDIBLE]. I'm not sure who is reading my mail. It takes a lot of effort to do something, to cause anarchy to happen, and everyone would have to be involved, and I don't see that there's any payback. PM: I disagree for the following reason. First of all, the people who know these programs are reasonably smart, and most of them are actually talking to each other right now. And there are real attempts made to try to make sure that they all communicate with each other fairly well. This is intentionally so that people do not face the question of having: "Well, I've got Encryption Program A and you've got Encryption Program B. Yes, we can talk." One of things also by the way in public key is that it makes it easy. Just so long as I know that you're -- Duncan can give you two disks. If you want you can just throw one at one of your friends. Hopefully he'll catch it and it won't hit the floor. And you don't actually have to communicate with each other in advance or communicate with any of your other friends in advance in order to exchange information. You just have to have compatible software. And the marketplace is taking care of that, because people want to communicate with each other. MALE: But it is not anything the government can't regulate. I know you say that it can't, but you can regulate it that kind of stuff. PM: They can try to stop it. MALE: I don't see any way [INAUDIBLE] ... MALE: It also benefits me. I may consider that I benefitted from breaking Midway(?) codes or Atlantic codes or whatever it is. [INAUDIBLE]. PM: Well, there might be benefits to you, but unfortunately it's -- whether this is fortunate or unfortunate in fact, it's not your choice. It's not up to me, it's not up to you, it's not up to anyone. The cat's out of the bag. MALE: It's not. PM: Oh, yes, it is. Anyone can buy a copy of this book. MALE: I can get anything I want off your computer. Anything I want. You send any kind of electronic mail, I can get it (?). PM: How? MALE: There's always a way. PM: No. I'm an electronic mail administrator. There are ... MALE: I can use a rubber hose cryptosystem. PM: Yes. Admittedly. I can come up to you and I can beat you up. At which point what does it matter? MALE: I can change your computer so it doesn't -- I can monitor your keyboard, watching you type. I mean there's all these ways. It's not a question of [INAUDIBLE]. PM: It becomes very rapidly prohibitively expensive ... (Inaudible; overlap) DM: There's a question of how much it'll cost the government. There are estimates that if the N.S.A. used every computer they have and they ran it for eighty years nonstop, they'd be able to break -- you know, it's like angels on the head of a pin. I mean ... PM: He points out very correctly that if they're willing to spend enough money they can monitor -- they can break you. On the other hand, it's extremely expensive for them to do that and cryptography is really cheap. In fact if you have a computer already cryptography is absolutely free. Now admittedly, computers are not absolutely free. But anyone who has a computer right now, anyone who has a computer right now can communicate with anyone else who has a computer right now securely, securely enough that what they spent a couple of hundred dollars setting up the government will have to spend tens of thousands of dollars trying to go after. MALE: It's actually millions probably. PM: Not necessarily. If they come after you with rubber hoses it might be relatively cheap ... [LAUGHTER] MALE: Forty dollars. PM: You say things like, "Well, I have to coordinate these things, and I have to come up with..." Yes. Admittedly you have to have standards. But remember, most people in the world who do technical stuff very naturally try to follow standards. You won't go to the average telephone store and buy a telephone that does not plug into your wall, and that's not because they particularly like you or they particularly like modular jacks; it's because they want to make sure -- because they know that if you buy a phone that doesn't plug into your wall -- well, you won't buy a phone that doesn't plug into your wall. Put it that way. DM: Perry, you know, keep in mind that a lot of this stuff is the ground floor. It's square one, whatever, and the idea is to let people know what's going on, let people know what the problems are, let people know what the solutions are now, and maybe five years from now -- again, the problem I sort of hinted at before was that because it's still early the government's trying to do things like slip in the Clipper chip and stuff to prevent these things before they happen. It's just important for people to know about this stuff. As time goes by new systems, new software, will have all this stuff built into it and ... MALE: You won't even know you're encrypting. DM: Yeah. Q: What about the falling price of processing power? PM: Well, this has two interesting effects. There is an extent to which this makes it easier to crack codes. However, not as much as you would think. Q: What about lengthening the number of digits in the prime that you ... PM: We won't get into these details, but basically one of the features of things like public key cryptosystems is that if you have twice as much computer power lying around you can encrypt things much more securely using the same amount of time and it takes exponentially longer for the people who are trying to break what you've done. MALE: Not only -- as processing power falls -- it is cheaper... PM: It becomes faster. MALE: As the specific cost of processing falls, of processing power falls, it becomes progressively cheaper to use longer and longer keys, which cost more and more time ... FEMALE: Witfield Diffy says to use three crypto scans ABA. PM: Well, that's DES. Never mind. We're getting into details that we shouldn't, probably. MALE: The point is the cheaper ... PM: As computers get cheaper, it will become harder for them to break codes using non-rubber hose techniques. That's true. MALE: Decryption becomes more costly. DM: Steve, in the back. STEVE: First of all, it's been very interesting subject, thanks but I'm goin to rain on your parade... A couple of things come to mind. [INAUDIBLE]. One thing of course is the issue of acces. Most of the population doesn't have access to the equipment, and certainly if they have access to the equipment have very limited knowledge, and really it winds up ... [INAUDIBLE] ... being a very small group of individuals. [INAUDIBLE] ... If we're talking about this in the context of -- this is creating a new, nonauthoritarian society, that can't be done by a small group of individuals acting through an Internet or electronic data process. It requires a [INAUDIBLE] social organization. You know, you mentioned Tiannemen Square. Well, the efforts [INAUDIBLE] ... You get an Army that is willing to repress the rest of the population for the resources of the rest of the population. As long as that happens ... [INAUDIBLE] ... One other thing I should mention, when we talk also about the issue about people pulling out, about the underground economy -- one you mentioned, the underground economy of Chinatown. I'm not sure [INAUDIBLE] ... exactly a model we'd want to impose for the rest of society. Suppose you get a lot of people to stop paying taxes [INAUDIBLE] ... without an overt social organization when sanitation services collapse and social services collapse -- unless you're [INAUDIBLE] ... It comes back to ultimately what anarchy

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