December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Graham Toal and His 'Fucking Religion'
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by nobody(a)c2.org (Anonymous User) on Fri, 29 Jul 9:22 PM Not at all. Mr. Graham Toal expresses civilized contempt of such unctuousness horseshit. His deft lance of this pus is salutary.

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penet.fi attack
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"L. Todd Masco" <cactus(a)bb.com> writes: > Ditto. El creepo was definitely using the real list for the attack (and > oddly, I got two total: one last night and one this evening). Might it be that El Creepo is a _subscriber_ here? If he were, he could get a list of addresses that people actually _post_ from. That covers cases like Roy's. Methinks the C'Punks have a Bug in our midsts. Since C'Punks Write Code, C'Punks also Debug Code, and this Bug needs to be Squashed. :-) --Jeff -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | ==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there a problem with the remailer at soda.berkeley.edu? Or are they simply moving machines around, as the message indicates? I received this "warning" message - (identifying headers removed) ********************************************** ** THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY ** ** YOU DO NOT NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE ** ********************************************** The Computer Science Division at the University of California at Berkeley is in the process of moving into a brand new building. This entails moving all machines. If you are getting a warning message that the individual's machine is not responding, you might want to try to contact them using something other than e-mail. Although we anticipate that most machines will be down for From owner-cypherpunks Sat Jul 30 14:16:24 1994 Return-Path: <owner-cypherpunks> Received: by toad.com id AA24030; Sat, 30 Jul 94 14:16:24 PDT Received: from MIT.EDU (ATHENA-AS-WELL.MIT.EDU) by toad.com id AA24024; Sat, 30 Jul 94 14:16:04 PDT Received: from UA.MIT.EDU by MIT.EDU with SMTP id AA04630; Sat, 30 Jul 94 17:15:58 EDT From: solman(a)MIT.EDU Received: by ua.MIT.EDU (5.57/4.7) id AA04787; Sat, 30 Jul 94 17:15:51 -0400 Message-Id: <9407302115.AA04787(a)ua.MIT.EDU> To: gtoal(a)an-teallach.com (Graham Toal) Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: "Just say 'No' to key escrow." In-Reply-To: Your message of Sat, 30 Jul 94 14:08:23 +0100. <199407301308.OAA23358(a)an-teallach.com> X-Mailer: exmh version 1.3 4/7/94 Date: Sat, 30 Jul 94 17:15:50 EDT Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk > : From: solman(a)mit.edu > > : This is a relatively inane conspiracy theory. Gates hardly requires any > : assistance since the feds were already committed to setting up licenses > : in bands that are good for these types of networks. Both the FCC and Hughes > : have sped up their efforts towards these systems in recent days. > > That's just the terrestrial side. What about actually getting the birds up? That's the easiest part. International competition for the precious few organizations requiring launching facilities has almost entirely elimintated government intervention in what goes up. Its just like dealing with regulations made by physical world entities in cyberspace. If you don't like the rules, it is easy to move it elsewhere. > : will be too late and that B) software based escrows are a good thing because > : they take the wind out of hardware based encryption efforts and they are > : difficult to make mandatory. > > This sort of talk is dangerous. If cypherpunks don't have a united front > against SKE, I can't see the less radical front organisations like EFF > and CPSR (well, maybe just EFF) going balls to the wall against it either. All we need is widely distributed software with optional escrow and the government will be helpless against us. They won't have a prayer of passing legislation that prevents you from using your software, so they'll pass legislation that requires you to use escrows. People will register a key with the escrow and then use a different key for everything. Escrow dies. Of course we should fight anything mandating escrow, but the reality is that if we can force the escrow into software it will be useless to big brother. JWS

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Re: The Strange Case of Amateur Action
by jamesh＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

mpd(a)netcom.com (Mike Duvos) Writes: > It is ironic that although the issues raised by this > case are of the utmost importance, Robert Thomas is just about > the last person anyone would have chosen as their First > Ammendment Poster Boy. Which makes him all the better choice for the Feds. He's harder to justify defending. JJH -- My loathings are simple: stupidity, oppression, crime, cruelty, soft music. -Vladimir Nabokov

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Re: Just say NYET to kneejerking
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ed Carp [Sysadmin] says: > > There is no excuse for being impolite. You can express your views > > without vitriol -- you may indeed be able to get along with people > > with views you do not share, and find that you are better off for it. > > Is this the pot calling the kettle black? No.

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17 Dec '03

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Re: No SKE in Daytona and other goodies
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric Hughes, replying to somebody, wrote: > As a previous > poster mentioned, users could select null or locally controlled key > escrow agents, and effectively have a non-escrowed system. > > The system I've seen (Whit's recollection of Steve Walker's) did not > allow a cooperating party to interoperate with a non-cooperating > party. In other words, both correspondents must comply with gov't key > surrender, or neither. It's a little better than that, but not much. There are three sides to the process - writing the wiretap field, verifying the wiretap field, and using the field to wiretap. The receiver can definitely verify the wiretap field, but has a choice about whether to do the verification or accept conversations with an invalid field. If a conformist receiver refuses to accept conversations without a verified wiretap field, the sender has to include it to talk. (This is the opposite of Clipper, where the receiver has no control over the system, but the sender can construct a fake wiretap block with some work.) The sender has a choice of what keymaster agencies to use, but the receiver can choose whether or not those agencies are acceptable. It's easy to turn off software key escrow, but only on your own machines. Unfortunately, the most interesting cases are applications like cellphones, where the sender is the occasionally non-conformist phone user, the receiver is the phone company, and the government can bully the phone company into being conformist about both verifying the block and only accepting politically correct keymasters. For other cases, like encrypting fax machines, they'll probably accept any keymaster, so you can probably use "Dev Null Key Security Inc." (The government *could* get nasty and insist that encrypting fax machines can only be imported if they verify that the keymaster's key is signed by the Key Generation Bureau, but it's a lot harder to control millions of fax machine users than a few hundred phone companies.) Bill

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Encypted voice communications?
by Mr. Wizard 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I seem to remember reading a while back about a voice-encryption scheme over telephone lines using a sound card, modem, and fast CPU. Does anybody have additional information on this topic? -/-\-/-\-/-\-/-\-/-\-/-\-/-\-/-\-/-\-/-\-/-\-/-\-/-\-/-\-/-\-/-\-/-\-/-\-/-\- "I bet you never smelled a real schoolbus before!" wizard(a)kaiwan.com

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HTML Archives
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have begun archiving a few lists with a mail->html gateway. They can be accessed on http://www.c2.org/hypermail This list is included among them. (The gateway hasn't yet been subbed to com-priv, but the subscribe request has been sent in.) -- sameer Voice: 510-841-2014 Network Administrator Pager: 510-321-1014 Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley Dialin: 510-841-0909 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

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penet hack
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I got a message from anon.penet.fi this morning: > You have sent a message using the anonymous contact service. > You have been allocated the code name an118709. and so forth. I have never sent any messages using the remailer. So whoever is fiddling with the remailer is still doing it. Is it a coincidence that I posted to this list for the first time a few days ago? -- Jim Dixon

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