December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

A Secure Christmas
by an169306＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here is to everyone having a cryptographically secure Christmas! BTW: PGP 2.6.2 now gives 2047 bit keys, a nice present from Derek and the other underpaid, overworked PGP coders. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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PSWD: "The Girlfriend's Opinion"
by ddt＠lsd.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:28 pm 12/23/94, Black Unicorn wrote: >Who the hell are you to define the position of cypherpunks? >Who the hell are any of us to do this? Both interesting questions... and self-cancelling ones. As far as I know, Cypherpunks define their own personal positions and don't impose theirs on any one else, as you yourself seem to have done, Uni. Your argument, much like your "standard" is somewhat suspect in my view. Regarding your language: please tone it down a little? Rely less on ad hominem flames and the word "shit" and more on the strength of your arguments and I'd be more inclined to respect your opinions. Once I pick through your invective, you "seem" to have a point, but you really do go on a bit, making it a lot of work... are you sober as you write these things? On the topic: let me relay an interesting little tidbit I heard recently on radio (Fresh Air/NPR): the forensic psychiatrist who interviewed Jeffery Dhaumer (sp?) noted that he declines in his book(s) to describe the precise methods utilized by the killers he investigates in his book, because he feels that this will provide specific information directly to other psychopaths on how to be more effective in committing horrible crimes and eluding law enforcement. I think this rather closely parallels the posting of specific information on how to compromise the security of systems. Personally, I support his practice: while he does a very good job of describing things so that you can understand _why_ a killer did his deeds and possibly something of _how_ so that _you_ can avoid being killed by someone trying the same things, he doesn't compromise his responsibility as a physician. An interesting parallel. Privacy is Privacy, even if it's your intimate friend's privacy. Just because someone trusts you, it doesn't give you any rights to their personal data. I've had supposed "friends" try to break into my personal files before, so I wouldn't presume to pontificate on who deserves more privacy: everyone does. The free flow of information on system security is important, but when it sacrifices someone's privacy. If you intend to post information on how a system can be compromised, it seems to me that the responsible thing to do (as a cypherpunk or a physician) is to first notify the sysadmin or password-owner so as to make sure they've been able to close their doors, and THEN post the info to others judiciously using only enough detail as is necessary for educational purposes (like the doctor above). Uni, you don't work at a nuclear site, do you? ;) Ahem. Let's move on... __________________________ BTW, a collective "thanks" to the few of you who have so far sent in Q&A material for the Beginner's PGP-FAQ. By and large, they are all helpful suggestions. My only feedback for now is to remind you all that this has to be VERY basic conceptual material. As the rest of you (hopefully) send me stuff, please keep this in mind. Imagine you're explaining WHY crypto to a five-year-old, and HOW PGP to a six-year-old. :) We really have to aim low on this one. I'll be working on this for a while and will post a draft for you all to review as soon as it's ready. dave ___________________________________________________________________________ "Rudeness is the penultimate refuge of the Incompetent; violence, the last"

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Re: To Cpunks EveryWhere
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:29 PM 12/24/94 -0800, blancw(a)pylon.com wrote: > Ct7iHDbjkcn+!MerryChristmasCypherpunks!+3BF34RD Yeah, what she said. ;-) (Holiday) Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: No privacy with DigiCash
by ddt＠lsd.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:39 am 12/24/94, Jonathan Cooper wrote: >> one of the big selling points of DigiCash. Is there something I am >> overlooking, some way to buy things privately with DigiCash? > > I don't think so. It appears that the initial implementation of >DigiCash works exactly that way [based on what I've read on their W3 >server]. Of course, I could tell you more exactly had they replied to >any of my four separate attempts to try it out .. Interesting. I too have made four requests and still not received any software. Can you say "vapor?" dave _________________________________________________________________________ "You can put your shoes in the oven, but that don't make 'em biscuits."

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2048-bit key...I'm leery
by lce＠wwa.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ok, call me a skeptic. I made to tries at generating a 2048-bit key on my 33-MHZ 386 machine using PGP 2.6.2. Yes, I know I only get 2047 bits, but that's not what bothers me. What bothers me is the first key generation only took thirty seconds, and the second one under ten minutes. Two questions: 1) Why such disparity in the two times? 2) Can the key generation possibly be done on my machine that quickly? I was expecting it to take at least several hours, based on what I've been reading in the cryptology groups.

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Re: Comdex Disks?
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >David K. Merriman says: >> Back some time ago, there was some discussion of giving away disks at Comdex >> in NY; > >Comdex isn't held in New York. Fine. Whatever the hell the damn expo-thingy that was held in New York sometime in the April/May timeframe. Dave Merriman - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)fohnix.metronet.com for PGP public key and fingerprint. PGP encrypted Email welcome, encouraged, and preferred. "Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable." John F. Kennedy

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RE: 2048-bit key...I'm leery
by Johnathan Corgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >2) Can the key generation possibly be done on my machine that >quickly? I was expecting it to take at least several hours based on >what I've been reading in the cryptology groups. My first try took about twenty minutes on a 486/50. Second try was about 15 minutes on a 486/66. ======================================================================= Johnathan Corgan "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent" jcorgan(a)scruznet.com -Isaac Asimov PGP Public Key: http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html Or send email to: pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.ai.mit.edu Subj: GET jcorgan ======================================================================= -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBLv3mk+lPfVlQ1n99AQGz9Qf/Rdn+OQjX9Z6gXiMCZ+N6iHJhvDBVMyRm 7o8xHM/BO1x5ELfRS/aBWHwjRei61woEhGY5fo2QZQkAZw7LgKQ9fQlhuQyiEkg/ bNrwwS1KXPhfSOKn4xexSkRL2T7BEoipPOs+8lVwKBfZsKfVqK534wjYtXiEqEt0 QPqGkUPbdRxC54Vt2CxaKqMu6MInh6M8I6yoWhXDBRBwTq4LXN5Rg14ecIWr2++Q y6ECqnqqHCyR9ugfweF61tmJL8JkEXdCcr3hFn9S4/Z88ep7i6+4fJQVJ64GTs5J wiSWFUiMRemtbMx6t/RKE8oXZYYm+0VRqQqVKeKoKEGQOh4Hiikccg== =CD8i -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ======================================================================= Johnathan Corgan "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent" jcorgan(a)scruznet.com -Isaac Asimov PGP Public Key: http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html Or send email to: pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.ai.mit.edu Subj: GET jcorgan =======================================================================

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Phil Zimmermann
by Philip L. Dubois 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Phil Zimmermann and his defense team are heartened by the substantial outpouring of support that has been demonstrated through numerous postings in this and other news groups. As we approach a crucial meeting with the prosecutor, it is particularly encouraging to see that many others are willing to devote themselves, both financially and through volunteered time, to Phil's defense. A number of postings have suggested a variety of support activities ranging from petitions to the President to gatherings in San Jose. Phil's lawyers are concerned that some of these activities would not assist in our efforts to protect his legal interests and could in fact hurt. The upcoming meeting with the prosecutor is not a court hearing, but is a private meeting of counsel. Neither Phil nor any judicial official will be present. It will not be a trial or hearing, but a discussion with the Assistant United States Attorney who is handling Phil's case. As such, it is not an appropriate setting for any public demonstrations of support for Phil or for unrestricted dissemination of cryptography. What Phil needs at that meeting is a quiet environment in which serious legal issues can be discussed candidly in an effort to avoid the necessity for any trial. Given the purposes and importance of the meeting, we -- and most especially Phil ZImmermann -- ask that any of his supporters not come to San Jose for any form of public demonstration. We encourage you instead to continue to support Phil's defense by financial contributions. Communications of support to government officials in Washington, DC are also appropriate and helpful. To the extent that effective representation of Phil's interest permits us to communicate with his supporters, we will periodically post announcements to this and other appropriate news groups. Philip L. Dubois Lawyer -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 iQCVAwUBLwJTObZ7C+AHeDONAQH1jAP/T6ZMSIAbgjfLliPbDALVMaOkuHBHGdeq ny0KPsZhIz6/K6ate8yr1uF84RtdolHMx73DBpSf6L9H7d3zcPVfy3ArAv44J/kZ jX0y36eCcn9pxhtU+41k9vkSLnGaNdiM5JKpehbRLgP0Gm+dAq0tbGNIXwL0XOEq CKmZXTWj/vs= =4hhB -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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good blaze quote
by ddt＠lsd.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:41 pm 11/9/94, Matt Blaze wrote: >Cypherpunks write code, and design protocols, and analyze ciphers, and >assess risks, and write articles, and attend conferences, and lobby >Congress, and in general look at the world with a critical eye. I was just going through some old mail and found this nice quote from one of our own. BTW, thanks for those pointers to Rivest's RC5 materials...I'm just getting around to them but they're very educational. dave __________________________________________________________ I have a flawless philosophic/scientific model of reality. Unfortunately, it's actual size.

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.30.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, as well as some help on how to use them, finger remailer.help.all(a)chaos.bsu.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"vox"} = "<remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post"; $remailer{"avox"} = "<anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl> cpunk pgp post"; $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"rebma"} = "<remailer(a)rebma.mn.org> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"jpunix"} = "<remailer(a)jpunix.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash"; $remailer{"soda"} = "<remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu> eric post"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"usura"} = "<usura(a)replay.com> cpunk pgp. hash latent cut post"; $remailer{"desert"} = "<remail(a)desert.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post"; $remailer{"nately"} = "<remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"xs4all"} = "<remailer(a)xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<tomaz(a)flame.sinet.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)nately.ucsd.edu> cpunk hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"q"} = "<q(a)c2.org> cpunk hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. Last ping: Mon 26 Dec 94 6:00:25 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu +*********** 3:37 99.99% usura usura(a)replay.com +*********** 4:41 99.99% nately remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu ++++++++++++ 45:12 99.99% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com *******#*#*# 1:52 99.99% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi +*********** 22:14 99.99% mix mixmaster(a)nately.ucsd.edu ++++++-+++++ 55:05 99.99% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com +******++* + 1:33:50 99.99% vox remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl --...-..-..- 15:24:27 99.99% rahul homer(a)rahul.net ****-----*** 38:39 99.90% soda remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu ........-. 9:26:00 99.88% desert remail(a)desert.xs4all.nl --.-...---- 14:54:03 99.99% q q(a)c2.org +--++- -- 7:56:13 99.51% c2 remail(a)c2.org ++-++ -- 6:16:43 98.96% xs4all remailer(a)xs4all.nl +**** * **** 4:56 98.85% flame tomaz(a)flame.sinet.org **+* +*** * 6:03 97.30% rebma remailer(a)rebma.mn.org ..-.------*+ 10:22:19 97.32% jpunix remailer(a)jpunix.com **+* +*** * 5:38 97.26% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu *******+* - 8:30:01 93.77% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com _ .+.-+* 32:24:15 81.95% For more info: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). Options and features cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. oldpgp Remailer does not like messages encoded with MIT PGP 2.6. Other versions of PGP, including 2.3a and 2.6ui, work fine. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. ek Encrypt responses in relpy blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. Comments and suggestions welcome! Raph Levien

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