December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Public key/3DES datastream software over WAN Bastions
by sdw＠lig.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone produced software (preferably Unix based) that provides a public key authenticated, DES/3DES encrypted datastream over WAN firewalls/bastions? A typical use would be to connect transaction feeds between two data centers in a secure, automated way over Internet. I can't see anything conceptually difficult with it, and it seems the PGP library could be used to create simple Unix daemons. sdw -- Stephen D. Williams Local Internet Gateway Co.; SDW Systems 510 503-9227APager LIG dev./sales Internet: sdw(a)lig.net In Bay Area Aug94-Feb95!!! OO R&D Source Dist. By Horse: 2464 Rosina Dr., Miamisburg, OH 45342-6430 Internet Consulting ICBM: 39 38 34N 84 17 12W home, 37 58 41N 122 01 48W work Newbie Notice: I speak for LIGCo., CCI, myself, and no one else, regardless of where it is convenient to post from or thru.

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_American_Survival_ mag article
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Oct. issue of _American_Survival_ has an article called "Clipper Inside". Dunno anything else about it, might be good, might suck rocks. -- <A HREF="http://www.eff.org/~mech/mech.html"> Stanton McCandlish </A><HR><A HREF="mailto:mech@eff.org"> mech(a)eff.org </A><P><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/"> Electronic Frontier Fndtn. </A><P> Online Activist

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Re: Such a Sweetie Pie
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Sandy: > > It was nothing. > [What a Nice Guy (tm)] > > @ @ @ @ > @ @ > @ ~ ~ @ > . * * . > . \/ . > . . . . > . . . . . . > . . > . . . >Blanc >(please, no more!) > > Will you two cool it? You're getting my monitor fogged up :-) (or at least take it off the C'punks list - you're scaring my cats :-) Dave Merriman - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints. Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender. PGP preferred. Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to *love* Big Brother.

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I ONLY SHOOT BLANCS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, In response to my candle comment, Blanc wrote: That's not funny, Sandy. (but I'll keep it in mind, whenever I think about you) Well, I still think it was funny, but now I *AM* embarrassed. (Blanc, wipe that smug expression off your face, this instant!) S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Such a Sweetie Pie
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy: It was nothing. [What a Nice Guy (tm)] @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ~ ~ @ . * * . . \/ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Blanc (please, no more!)

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Re: art encryption...
by Pierre Uszynski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Lile Elam <lile(a)art.net> > > [...] a way an artist can insure a viewer that the art > they are viewing is really that of the artist, the artist can *sign* their > art with their private key and others can check it with their public key. The problem is that's pretty much all that can be done so far: The viewer can *verfify* that the copy is a full un-molested copy of what the artist released, or for physical works, maybe that the object being scanned *is* the original object (maybe). But for pictures released in bitmap form, and then lossily compressed, cropped, scaled, dithered, and whatnot, the (ahem) authenticity of the copy can't be checked anymore. At least not if the signature was, for example, a signed message digest as has been mentioned. Message digests, in the form we now know them, do not resist lossy compression and such injury. That's what they are designed for. So, in particular, a magazine can still take a signed copy of a picture, creatively modify it slightly, and print it claiming this is original work by somebody else. In this case, the printing process itself is most likely enough to dispell any hope of recomputing the same message digest. Handling this case relies back on conventional evidence and juries. Other formats such as CAD drawings, text, and pictures in primitive forms (such as Postscript), and source and binary code, are susceptible to more: It is possible to hide some identifying info in them. But they also are susceptible to mechanical modification (lossless in terms of the "artwork", but lossy in terms of the steganography.) For example, by rewriting "for the same functionality" mechanically or manually. For a mechanical translation, the plaintiff may now have to identify which mechanical process was used before, maybe, having a case again (in addition of conventional legal wranglings). What would be ideal in all these cases is a steganographic process that would map to the whole as much as to the parts. Fractal steganography. In the case of architectural drawings, a signature of the original architects would be embedded in small sets of dimensions, in small sets of proportions, in ways the CAD language is used, in the background details of artwork, in the text included in drawings as well as in CAD files comments and variable names... etc... In summary in sufficiently numerous and different places that mechanical modification, or even extensive manual rework could still forget some instances of the signature. The signature still has to be specific enough to identify certainly the author, as opposed to being attributable to random luck (as in DNA matching). This means this signature requires a rather large number of bits (fewer if the signatures are registered precisely and provably before the works are released), but still enough bits that it is not so easy to hide many of them (depending on the medium: rather hard in text, rather easy in complex pictures.) The signature becomes part of the picture, it is not an afterthought anymore. Fractal message digests, whose verifiability would degrade gracefully as the original is more and more mutilated, would serve the same purpose for verification (you could check that a decompressed, cropped part of a picture is really from the artist who fractally signed the whole.) Conceivably it would be the same if the part was printed in weird colors or something: "some" of it still "is" from the same artist. But, for legal issues, how would that be different from copyright registration? Doesn't copyright registration rely on the same principle: a set of jurors will determine what the chance is that this is the same work or not. This just provides tools to fortify a court case. Enough ramblings :-) I'll stop now, Pierre pierre(a)shell.portal.com

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Nice little privacy threat...
by L. Todd Masco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just a little tidbit for the privacy-paranoid among us. I live in NYC, while my father, H. L. Masco, MD, lives in Florida. My dad's never lived in NYC, and I've never forwarded mail from his address to mine... in fact, I haven't forwarded anything from his address since before I left Pittsburgh. I just got a mailing from Harry & David that included a pre-printed list of folks from "my" last year's orders so I could repeat order this year. They were my father's orders from last year. Masco isn't that common a surname, so I have to wonder how often this is going to happen to people with more common surnames. -- L. Todd Masco | "A man would simply have to be as mad as a hatter, to try and cactus(a)bb.com | change the world with a plastic platter." - Todd Rundgren

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art encryption...
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by pierre(a)shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski) on Mon, 19 Sep 6:32 PM > >What would be ideal in all these cases is a >steganographic process that would map to the whole as >much as to the parts. Fractal steganography. In the >case of architectural drawings, a signature of the >original architects would be embedded in small sets of >dimensions, in small sets of proportions, in ways the >CAD language is used, in the background details of >artwork, in the text included in drawings as well as in >CAD files comments and variable names... etc... In >summary in sufficiently numerous and different places >that mechanical modification, or even extensive manual >rework could still forget some instances of the >signature. [Snip] >But, for legal issues, how would that be different from >copyright registration? Doesn't copyright registration >rely on the same principle: a set of jurors will >determine what the chance is that >this is the same work or not. This just provides tools >to fortify a court case. Pierre, The fractal steganography sounds promising. Is this yours or has it been done? The need for authentic sigs on architectural and engineering drawings is not merely aesthetic. Right now municipal agencies will not accept digital documents because of the lack of verifiable authorship to establish responsibility, and liability, for the health and safety of the design and construction. Hard copy with original seal is required to prevent unauthorized manipulation. Beyond copyright protection, architectural and engineering documents are means to guide actual construction, rather than end products like paintings and drawings in the art world. If there could be a way for buildings themselves to convey authenticity, say, that they are healthy and safe, by a kind decryption by the public that could help prevent concealment of shoddy construction. It's not the drawings that assure safety but field verification of the end result that construction work was done right. What a great help if a building could convey its own message of authenticity about its fitness and safety for habitation and use. That might keep us architects more honest. Probably a long shot that your fractal idea could be stretched this far, but it is certainly needed in the flim flam world of New York City real estate where deception about building safety and health is all too common. Any other thoughts? John

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Re: Clarification of my remarks about Netscape
by cactus＠seabsd.hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199412131937.LAA00857(a)netcom10.netcom.com>, James A. Donald <jamesd(a)netcom.com> wrote: >I am sick of you misrepresenting what I say, and I am sick of Eric >misrepresenting what I say. > >Cut it out. Excuse me, but my Ironometer just pinged itself off my desk. - -- Todd Masco | It's difficult to be loud about keeping your enumerated cactus(a)hks.net | rights when you're busy exercising your unenumerated ones. cactus(a)bb.com | http://www.hks.net/~cactus/cactus.html - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLu4qYSoZzwIn1bdtAQHSfgGAqS3pIouxLUp0+da7igUyDpJUTuJ0Ouz9 aNIfa3Z59mJW9ZqIWnaOHuUq8s+lFMo3 =+g6l -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: calling all cpunks on netcom
by cactus＠seabsd.hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199412131946.LAA26053(a)netcom20.netcom.com>, Shrieks <srikar(a)netcom.com> wrote: >Just floating a trial balloon. Are you tired of the high traffic on >the cypherpunks list and having to wade through a ton of mail every >day? ... >Just a thought. Pheedback? % setenv NNTPSERVER nntp.hks.net % trn hks.lists.cypherpunks It's a bit slow because it has all the traffic since June. I'll implement "expire and archive" soon so it'll be faster. But its usable (I'm using it over a 19.2 SLIP connection to our local network). I understand that pine can do something much tidier, pulling newsgroups from multiple news servers. Read yer docs fer details. - -- Todd Masco | It's difficult to be loud about keeping your enumerated cactus(a)hks.net | rights when you're busy exercising your unenumerated ones. cactus(a)bb.com | http://www.hks.net/~cactus/cactus.html - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLu4rnyoZzwIn1bdtAQEFsAGAtecr1Ddz6GU25uZcvVPw8ohJbzxyYEnh sxqS8QBx6GU6MzcMNWydiPE3aZhoLcyk =Fsjn -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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