December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: future entrapment
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>* establish a local WWW server hosting some useful information >>* configure the server to record the IP addresses of people who >> access it, and cross-reference them to obtain geographical >> locations as registered with NIC. Feed this into a GIS and >> track local accesses. >>* have a list of people who I want to nail. >>* filter all HTTP requests through a script that >> - checks the list of victims >> - if a request for a file comes in from one of the >> targets, munge the outgoing web page to include >> a <IMG SRC= ...> tag pointing to a foreign site >> carrying images deemed pornographic in my jurisdiction >> - ring the console bell >> >>As soon as someone on the hit list downloads a file, you have prima >>facie evidence that they are probably in posession of some kiddie porn. >>Instant search warrant time ... "But your Honor, I had graphics turned off for speed." "The Geheimestaat Polezi has to prove not only that I connected but that I actually got something." "Too bad my swap file is on a partition that was corrupted when the ossifers grabbed my machine." The ancient question, do you possess something if it is encoded and cannot be decoded? DCF

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RE: Date?
by Johnathan Corgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Is it really Christmas eve already where you are? Hehe, you caught me fiddling with my system date to generate a 2048 bit key with PGP. Actually, if it were Christmas Eve already, that would mean that the pain of holiday shopping had already past.... ======================================================================= Johnathan Corgan "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent" jcorgan(a)netcom.com -Isaac Asimov PGP Public Key: http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html Or send email to: pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.ai.mit.edu Subj: GET jcorgan ======================================================================= -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLuMiW01Diok8GKihAQFs0QP/UplPL2g2t86goL1o5xK3gkv9IM6nGeEW GCe41PX3Q4yiYkopIz+1bXe9kGYvrd9jJ0fusM9CRp+QnaiizzZxudAL7BGRlsGD 9c0jLLR9KtFmiiSQM5pgBIMEzXC3zPY+Xm+hPhV6/URx84qxrcjneOrnOJjBtjkO ekZ8ApHUhxo= =wNu9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.30.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, as well as some help on how to use them, finger remailer.help.all(a)chaos.bsu.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"vox"} = "<remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post"; $remailer{"avox"} = "<anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl> cpunk pgp post"; $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"rebma"} = "<remailer(a)rebma.mn.org> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"jpunix"} = "<remailer(a)jpunix.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash"; $remailer{"soda"} = "<remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu> eric post"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"usura"} = "<usura(a)xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. hash latent cut post"; $remailer{"desert"} = "<remail(a)desert.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post"; $remailer{"nately"} = "<remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"myriad"} = "<remailer(a)myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"xs4all"} = "<remailer(a)xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<tomaz(a)flame.sinet.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)nately.ucsd.edu> cpunk hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. Last ping: Mon 5 Dec 94 6:00:01 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- xs4all remailer(a)xs4all.nl ++##******+* 7:31 99.99% usura usura(a)xs4all.nl ++##******-* 13:31 99.99% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu +##**-*+*+** 11:24 99.99% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi +++++++++*** 1:00:13 99.99% c2 remail(a)c2.org +****-++++-- 37:40 99.96% flame tomaz(a)flame.sinet.org ***#***+*++* 8:43 99.92% nately remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu ++++++++++++ 44:54 99.92% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ###*-****** 6:46 99.85% jpunix remailer(a)jpunix.com ###****+*++* 8:11 99.83% vox remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl .-.-------- 10:32:31 99.99% desert remail(a)desert.xs4all.nl ----------- 8:03:49 99.99% myriad remailer(a)myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu ###*****+** 5:11 99.70% rahul homer(a)rahul.net ###**** **** 4:32 99.37% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu #*.# ** *+-* 50:33 99.05% mix mixmaster(a)nately.ucsd.edu -+-+- 59:51 98.94% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com ###**** *** 8:21 98.77% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com +---.--+++ 3:59:21 98.42% rebma remailer(a)rebma.mn.org -_.--..*-.. 22:38:33 98.13% soda remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu -....-. 12:55:27 86.22% For more info: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). Options and features cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. oldpgp Remailer does not like messages encoded with MIT PGP 2.6. Other versions of PGP, including 2.3a and 2.6ui, work fine. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. ek Encrypt responses in relpy blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. Comments and suggestions welcome! Raph Levien

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cypher bickering
by William A. Kennedy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

internet: kenned09(a)ssw.alcoa.com I am a relatively new member to this list. There is so much potential for great discussion because the topic is technically challenging and politically sensative. That's why it is extremely frustrating to see the list contributors, and it's moderator getting all tied up in their collective underwear over whether or not the moderator can and/or force people to affix a digital signature to every posting. What's worse, they seem to stay up through the night just to bicker about it. In the paper world, I send out many things that I don't sign. I don't sign them because it is of no significance that it be proven that I sent it. It also might be that the information is of such a general nature that it makes no neverminds who sent it. I submit that digital signatures are the same way. But, as Tim May proposed, it could be the "secret-decoder-ring" phenomenon at work. By digitally signing all of our postings we prove that we are committed members of the "cause." But to whom are we proving our dedication. We would be demonstrating it to people who, by nature of their own interest in this list, are already committed. Oh, but wait a minute. Maybe we're afraid that people who don't even own digital signature software, are posting there ideas on our favorite subject. Isn't the posting of any ideas on cryptography by anyone more important than who's doing the posting?

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crypto, why not catching on?
by William A. Kennedy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

internet: kennned09(a)ssw.alcoa.com This is a response to Tim May's well-thought-out piece on "why cryptography has not caught on." I think cryptography _has_ caught on. There are people in the crypto debate now that weren't there two years ago; perhaps even one. I think we should not measure the commitment to the cryptography debate buy counting the amount of encrypted traffic . There just isn't that much that people send that needs to be encrypted. Our debate should, and does, focus on the rights of people to have the technical tools to insure the privacy of messages and other communication that they deem to be worthy of special handling. Thanks to people like Phil Zimmermann and Romana Michado, and many others I'm sure that I don't even know about, we have those technical tools and should now be fighting for the right to use them. Interestingly enough, I sent a message to Phil and got a response from his vacation program. In it he tells us that, if we think that our message to him needs to be encrypted, then please allow more time to get it read.

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;-) The definitive argument for e$: tainted cash
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fun Facts to Know and Tell About *Your* Legal Tender... > >From the August 1993 American Bar Association Journal >> >> > >> >"The mere presence of trace amounts of cocaine on a common object ... >> > is insufficient to support a felony conviction of cocaine." Lord v. >> > Florida, 91-2147. >> > >> >"[T]he evidence of the narcotic-trained dog's alert to [tainted] currency >> > is of extremely little probative weight. . . . It cannot be doubted >>that >> > contaminated currency is widespread. The presence of trace narcotics on >> > currency does not yield any relevant information whatsoever about the >> > currency's history." US District Court Judge Thomas Wiseman of >>Nashville, >> > Jones v. DEA, No. 3:91-0520 (April 21, 1993). >> > >> >"The probability that every single person in the United States is >> > carrying drug-tainted money is almost certain." -- Dr. James Woodford, >> > forensic chemist in Atlanta. Woodford cites a 1989 experiment by Miami >> > toxicologist Dr. William Hearn, who gathered 135 dollar bills from banks >> > in twelve cities. 131 had traces of cocaine. >> > >> >It also cites a 1985 study by the Miami Herald, which asked eleven >>prominent >> >local citizens to supply a $20 bill for testing, including the Catholic >> >archbishop, George Bush's son Jeb, and Janet Reno. Ten out of the eleven >> >bills had traces of cocaine. >> > >> >Finally, there's a reference to an until-now secret 1987 DEA study >>showing >> >that 1/3 of the money at the Federal Reserve Building in Chicago was >> >tainted with cocaine. It's thought that cocaine is transferred from some >> >bills to agencies' high-speed sorting equipment [...] Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: Oceania?
by cactus＠seabsd.hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199412050839.AAA11133(a)netcom18.netcom.com>, Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)netcom.com> wrote: >I won't say it's a scam, but a lot of people think it is/was. I >thought it had died some months back, when all posts (of which there >had previously been many) suddnly stopped. They've resumed. The partners had a falling out of some sort, and the "Eric Klein" one has progressed. The Oceania posts for the last n months can be read via NNTP from nntp.hks.net, newsgroup hks.lists.oceania. >The idea of soliciting "contributions" to fund some kind of seagoing >barge, sinkable with a single torpedo (anonymous delivered, easily >enough), is crazy. They're getting more productive than that. The current plan is that they're trying to help launch a business that designs and builds sea structures. They've got some pretty good ideas, and are focusing now more on the idea of producing small tangible results that may one day build to their desired goal. I'm still skeptical as to their chances for success, though, but if enough people with some pragmatic sense get sucked in, there is a chance... - -- Todd Masco | "Roam home to a dome, Where Georgian and Gothic once stood cactus(a)hks.net | Now chemical bonds alone guard our blond(e)s, cactus(a)bb.com | And even the plumbing looks good." - B Fuller - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLuNSlSoZzwIn1bdtAQGNYQF5AUBTWMAkeujdopRa2d5tBDUfdzoO/6Cm AE/U82Juo0LdWcs2eadBL5kFQ+DjIHKl =2dCz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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PGP on a VAX
by peace＠BIX.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ViaCrypt PGP is now running on a VAX. It will be released after all quality control is complete, in about 2 weeks.

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Re: Oceania?
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>They find government by Singapore particularly comforting >because Singapore has demonstrated expertise in minimizing >the dangerous infection of freedom that accompanies >capitalism. Here's something kinda spooky. An OSF staffer doing consulting with the Singapore gov't was asking about how well the DCE security server scales. They're starting a pilot program to make, from birth, every Singaporese an entity known to their server. Based on other questions, I gather the DCE identity card will be used by all gov't services. /r$

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Re: Remailers, RSAREF for PERL
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Gah! I guess Mike won't send _me_ a copy of his Perl RSA routines... Oh well, I'll wait for some courageous soul to ftp it to garbo. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "In between the breaths is rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in the space where we live" rishab(a)arbornet.org - Lawrence Durrell Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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