December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY and Mondo 2000
by schneier＠chinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

People: I would really like Mondo 2000 to review my book. Suppsedly my editor has been talking to someone there (if I had more details I would supply them) but they are reluctant to do the review. I remember some of you people at the meeting in Jan had some connection with the magazine. Any suggestions on who I should talk to? Bruce

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RE: REAL WORLD ENCRYPTION
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

* intend to use these tools, or is your interest only theoretical? . I would use the tools when these became essential; in my circumstance, not necessarily every day (not yet) . It also would depend on the tools; they presently appear unreliable, unstable *how much you are willing to reorganize your life in order to take advantage of these techniques. . It wouldn't take much adjusting to go from the potential to the actual based on my inclinations, if the techniques are convincingly effective in serving to enhance the possibilities in the real world, without making it too difficult to continue to interact with it. Is it secrecy alone which could accomplish this? I would agreeable to experiment with prototypes in order to work on real solutions which are effective in making the separation from the present attachment to government-regulated toolboxes. *what factors would increase or decrease your use of cryptographic products and services. . depends on how desperate the situation has become (how socialist & coercive) . the kind of equipment required (what special items; what cost) . portability; mobility (can I use any phone anywhere; do I need to take a laptop with me or would there be an "ATM" type card to use; how, where) . ease of use (I don't write code, I don't know Unix; automated set-ups & procedures) . conflicts or difficulties in coordinating procedures with the rest of the world, or at least wherever I may be at the time Concerns: . these are all dependent on electricity, . the electric/utility companies are not anarchist . power outages & access during those times . what problems would one face with the government from the use of such tools; how apparent could it become that one is using a system which operates within "their" territory, yet outside of their influence . what if they find out; do I call EFF *creating a digital bank/open an account in a digital bank: . just how would digital money be translated (exchanged) into other currency when needed it, . so that it would be possible to do business with those who are not also using digital cash; what sort of interactions between differing systems to expect, to deal with . who would 'man' the bank (if it matters) . where would it be located (do we need to know) . what if it's raining & cold outside (ha-ha) Basically, regarding digital banks & currency, I'm interested in any alternatives to the present situation, but am not very knowledgeable of just how these procedures would work or be managed, so that a customer like myself would understand what they were doing (follow the reasoning) and be confident that they could manage their accounts; also, how the value of this kind of 'cash' is established (relative to what?). Blanc

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Ccnet. Anonymous internet provider?
by qwerty-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forward from comp.org.eff.talk: Netcom would loose alot of customers if its libertarian counterpart became available.... -=Xenon=- comp.org.eff.talk #26742 (0 + 1 more) [1] From: allisat(a)r-node.io.org (Allisat) [1] ccnet anonymous service Date: Mon Feb 14 10:34:24 EST 1994 Organization: allisat(a)io.org Lines: 95 Distribution: inet ccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnet common carrier network a Mac GUI on-line system serving the metro Toronto community with an anonymous service and uncensored E-mail gateways. ccnet anonymous... (416) 588-1483 requires a Mac System 6.0+ & free FC Client software User ID : anonymous Password : anonymous Hours of Operation 00:00 - 08:00 EST ccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnet Our private lives and personal communications are increasingly being monitored and controlled by corporate and government agencies. Individual freedom of expression will soon mean nothing unless we provide ourselves with forums which guarantee and safeguard our inallienable civil rights. ccnet anonymous is such a place. Here you will find freedom to write anything. Here you have anonimity to end the fear of being persecuted or prosecuted for your thoughts, opinions and ideas. If we don't oppose the unending infringement of our rights they will simply not exist in futureure. The choice is ours... ccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnet ccnet electronic post guidelines ccnet's volunteer administrators do not edit messages for content and take no responsibility for any messages posted on-line. Individuals connecting to ccnet do so voluntarily and at their own risk. Parental guidance is advised. ccnet is not responsible for the titles and content of the messages which may be uploaded. ccnet does not edit remove messages for contents. The following guidelines have been established only in order to facilitate the efficient distribution and storage of messages not to interfere with, alter, determine or censor the flow of messaging 1. Messages posted to ccnet must be 18 Kilobytes or under in size. 2. All attachments to messages posted to ccnet must be PGP encrypted and compressed. 3. Messages which are over 18 K or attachments which are unencrypted or uncompressed will not be accepted for distribution and removed after posting notice to "deletions". ccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnet for information either log in directly and send a message to "administrator" or reply to "allisat(a)io.org" ccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnetccnet

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Who knows a good basic text on Huffman Codes
by Syl Miniter 803-768-3759 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am referring to the minimum bits coding scheme invented by DAVID HUFFMAN in 1951. I would like something that does some concrete examples in radix other than 2 hanks for your help. I think Huffman is at ucal-santa cruz and would like to know his e-mail address as well. He was at MIT back in the fifties and worked with Fano et al on coding theory.

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Re: Clipper and Traffic Analysis
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Does anyone here have any thoughts as to whether Clipper enables traf fic >analysis or tracing more easy than it normally is under Switching Sys tem >7? SS7 uses out-of-band signalling. The clipper LEAF is an in-band signal. Therefore a tap for clipper yields two kinds of information, content and identities. Tapping an SS7 signalling network is more expensive and more difficult to justify. More expensive because it runs packet-switched, more difficult because it's not the conversation of any particular party except the phone company. Also, it probably goes via a different physical path. And at least some SS7 trunks are encrypted with DES.

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Re: SCHEME for FULL-SPEC RETURN PATH
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+(a)andrew.cmu.edu> > > > From: "Jon 'Iain' Boone" <boone(a)psc.edu> > > > > To: anon3+"(anon2+"(anon1+"(boone(a)psc.edu)Ka"@a.edu)Kb"@b.com)Kc"@c.org > > From: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com > > Message-Id: <99234.AA23492383(a)anchor.ho.att.com> > > > > C.ORG: > > > > To: anon2+"(anon1+"(boone(a)psc.edu)Ka"@a.edu)Kb"@b.com > > From: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com > > Message-Id: <2342349324.AA2343242(a)c.org> > ... > > Well, I guess great minds think alike. I'm already working on this. > I've been hacking on in my spare time for about a month now. My program > is about 75-80% done. Here's how it will work: > > You send mail to remail+getid(a)x.edu. Is this some kind of RFC822 hack? It doesn't work on my system. Mail to hfinney+xyz(a)shell.portal.com bounces. Are you assuming some special mail address processing has been installed by the administrators of the machines to handle this "+" hack, or is my machine broken in not respecting it? Hal

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Detweiler abuse again
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I got a lot of complaints today about copies of Tim's old "Blacknet" posting being sent to inappropriate groups: > From paw(a)coos.dartmouth.edu Mon Feb 14 09:34:13 1994 > Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 12:31:44 -0500 > From: paw(a)coos.dartmouth.edu (Pat Wilson) > To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com, root(a)portal.com, postmaster(a)portal.com > Subject: Re: Introduction to Blacknet > Newsgroups: comp.sys.sun.admin > References: <199402120837.AAA22008(a)jobe.shell.portal.com> > Status: R > > In comp.sys.sun.admin you write: > > >Introduction to BlackNet > > [etc] > > I believe that this is an illegal and unethical use of the Net > for commercial purposes (to say nothing of bounds of decency). > This posting lends credence to all sorts of (US) gov't paranoia. > Please cease and desist immediately. > > Non-anonymously, > > -- > Pat Wilson > Maanger, Academic Unix Systems Group > Dartmouth College > paw(a)northstar.dartmouth.edu > > From mcr(a)unison.com Mon Feb 14 10:11:51 1994 > Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 10:11:22 -0800 > To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com > From: mcr(a)unison.com (Michael Riehle) > X-Sender: mcr(a)hal822.unison.com > Subject: Introduction to Blacknet > Status: R > > This message appears to be from someone who is offering an illegal service > and is certainly not welcome. I can't tell if this person is serious or if > this is just a sick joke. It certainly isn't appropriate regardless. > > >Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 00:50:01 +0000 > >Reply-To: HP-3000 Systems Discussion <HP3000-L(a)UTCVM.UTC.EDU> > >Sender: HP-3000 Systems Discussion <HP3000-L(a)UTCVM.UTC.EDU> > >Comments: This message is NOT from the person listed in the From line. It > >is from an automated software remailing service operating at that address. > >Please report problem mail to <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com>. > >Comments: Warning -- original Sender: tag was NETNEWS(a)AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU > >From: nobody <nobody(a)SHELL.PORTAL.COM> > >Subject: Introduction to Blacknet > >To: Multiple recipients of list HP3000-L <HP3000-L(a)UTCVM.UTC.EDU> > > > >Introduction to BlackNet > > > > [...] > > From kwthomas(a)nsslsun.nssl.uoknor.edu Mon Feb 14 12:38:27 1994 > Date: Mon, 14 Feb 94 14:37:01 CST > From: kwthomas(a)nsslsun.nssl.uoknor.edu (Kevin W. Thomas) > To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com > Subject: Re: Introduction to Blacknet > Newsgroups: comp.sys.sun.admin > In-Reply-To: <199402120837.AAA22008(a)jobe.shell.portal.com> > Organization: National Severe Storms Laboratory > Cc: root(a)shell.portal.com, root(a)jobe.shell.portal.com > Status: R > > In article <199402120837.AAA22008(a)jobe.shell.portal.com> you write: > >Introduction to BlackNet > > > >BlackNet is currently building its information inventory. We are interested > >in information in the following areas, though any other juicy stuff is > >always welcome. "If you think it's valuable, offer it to us first." > > > >- trade secrets, processes, production methods (esp. in semiconductors) > > > >BlackNet can make anonymous deposits to the bank account of your choice, > >where local banking laws permit, can mail cash directly (you assume the > >risk of theft or seizure), or can credit you in "CryptoCredits," the > >internal currency of BlackNet (which you then might use to buy _other_ > >information and have it encrypted to your special public key and posted in > >public place). > > This doesn't belong in "comp.sys.sun.admin", or any other Usenet group. It's > postings like this that give Usenet a bad name. > > Kevin W. Thomas > National Severe Storms Laboratory > Norman, Oklahoma > > From lab(a)biostat.mc.duke.edu Mon Feb 14 14:05:15 1994 > To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com > Subject: Re: Introduction to Blacknet > In-reply-to: nobody(a)shell.portal.com's message of Mon, 14 Feb 1994 11:32:23 -0800 > Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:04:09 -0500 > From: "Lance A. Brown" <lab(a)biostat.mc.duke.edu> > Status: R > > What _IS_ this doing in misc.health.diabetes? > > Thanks, > Lance > > > nobody <nobody(a)shell.portal.com> writes: > > Introduction to BlackNet > > > > Your name has come to our attention. We have reason to believe you may be > > interested in the products and services our new organization, BlackNet, has > > to offer. > > [...] > > From appel(a)cea.Berkeley.EDU Mon Feb 14 14:24:03 1994 > To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com, root(a)shell.portal.com > Subject: Re: Introduction to Blacknet > In-reply-to: nobody(a)shell.portal.com's message of Sat, 12 Feb 1994 03:49:18 -0800 > Date: Mon, 14 Feb 1994 14:23:06 -0800 > From: Shannon Appel <appel(a)cea.Berkeley.EDU> > Status: R > > Please be aware that your anonymous remailer is being abused. The > following inappropriate post was recently sent to a rec.games.frp > group. Please see that this type of thing does not happen again. > > Shannon > -- > > Introduction to BlackNet > > > > > > [...] I set up a log file for "blacknet" postings, and got this: > From hal(a)alumni.cco.caltech.edu Mon Feb 14 17:46:41 1994 > Received: from nova.unix.portal.com (nova.unix.portal.com [156.151.1.101]) by jobe.shell.portal.com (8.6.4/8.6.4) with ESMTP id RAA11362 for <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com>; Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:46:41 -0800 > Received: from punisher.caltech.edu (punisher.cco.caltech.edu [131.215.48.151]) by nova.unix.portal.com (8.6.4/8.6.4-1.13) with ESMTP id RAA03081 for <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com>; Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:46:41 -0800 > Received: from alumni.cco.caltech.edu by punisher.caltech.edu with ESMTP > (8.6.4/DEI:4.41) id RAA14916; Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:45:46 -0800 > Received: from localhost by alumni.cco.caltech.edu > (8.6.4/DEI:4.41) id RAA23534; Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:45:42 -0800 > Received: from handel.cs.colostate.edu by alumni.cco.caltech.edu with SMTP > (8.6.4/DEI:4.41) id RAA23522; Mon, 14 Feb 1994 17:45:34 -0800 > Message-Id: <199402150145.RAA23522(a)alumni.cco.caltech.edu> > Received: by handel.cs.colostate.edu > (1.37.109.4/16.2) id AA28603; Mon, 14 Feb 94 18:45:32 -0700 > Date: Mon, 14 Feb 94 18:45:32 -0700 > From: lawrence detweiler <detweile(a)CS.ColoState.EDU> > To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com > request-remailing-to: comp.sys.ti.explorer(a)news.cs.indiana.edu > subject: Introduction to Blacknet > > Introduction to BlackNet > > > Your name has come to our attention. We have reason to believe you may be > interested in the products and services our new organization, BlackNet, has > to offer. > [...] It seems Larry is sending this posting to lots of inappropriate groups using several different mail-to-news gateways. This is a good way to get remailers shut down, which may be his ultimate goal. I call upon remailer operators to block incoming messages from Detweiler's known aliases. Thos using the slocal-based "cypherpunks" remailer perl scripts can add the following lines near the front of their maildelivery files. # Filter Detweiler >From ld231782(a)longs.lance.colostate.edu file ? /dev/null >From an12070(a)anon.penet.fi file ? /dev/null >From detweile file ? /dev/null Unless his access to the remailer network is blocked, he will be able to continue to abuse the system until it gets shut down. The alternative would be to block my remailer's access to all known mail-to-news gateways, but I am reluctant to take that step because of the loss of this ability for those who legitimately need it. If his abuse keeps up, though, that may be the only choice left. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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Crypto Tech Reports
by baum＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following technical reports are FTPable at ftp.cs.uow.edu.au pub/papers Cheers, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>|<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< Yuliang Zheng Email: yuliang(a)cs.uow.edu.au Centre for Comp Security Research Department of Computer Science Voice: +61 42 21 4331 (office) University of Wollongong +61 42 21 3859 (dept) Wollongong, NSW 2522 AUSTRALIA Fax: +61 42 21 4329 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>|<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< Preprint No. 94-1 Y. Zheng ``Improved Public Key Cryptosystems Secure against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks'' ABSTRACT This note describes an improvement to the first two of the three public key cryptosystems proposed by Zheng and Seberry, which are provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks. The improvement removes a shortcoming with the original cryptosystems, which occurs when they are used for both confidentiality and sender authentication purposes. Preprint No. 94-2 J. Seberry, X.M. Zhang and Y. Zheng ``Relationships Among Nonlinearity Criteria'' ABSTRACT An important question in designing cryptographic functions including substitution boxes (S-boxes) is the relationships among the various nonlinearity criteria each of which indicates the strength or weakness of a cryptographic function against a particular type of cryptanalytic attacks. In this paper we reveal, for the first time, interesting connections among the strict avalanche characteristics, differential characteristics, linear structures and nonlinearity of quadratic S-boxes. In addition, we show that our proof techniques allow us to treat in a unified fashion all quadratic permutations, regardless of the underlying construction methods. This greatly simplifies the proofs for a number of known results on nonlinearity characteristics of quadratic permutations. As a by-product, we obtain a negative answer to an open problem regarding the existence of differentially 2-uniform quadratic permutations on an even dimensional vector space. =========================================================================== Newsgroup Co-moderator: Richard Golding, Hewlett-Packard Laboratories compdoc-techreports-request(a)ftp.cse.ucsc.edu Be sure to send questions about specific reports to the poster, not to the newsgroup. ************************************************** * Allen J. Baum tel. (408)974-3385 * * Apple Computer, 20525 Mariani Ave, MS 305-3B * * Cupertino, CA 95014 baum(a)apple.com * **************************************************

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Big Brother Inside Stickers, V2.0
by Matt Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To everyone that requested/was thinking of requesting the big brother inside postscript: The version I sent out individually this morning was buggy; the 'd' in "inside" filled in. (Too bad corel's screen image and postscript output isn't the same, huh? maybe they fixed that in v4.0?) I've re-exported it and the NEW version should be up for ftp sometime tonight at cpsr.org; Dave Banisar will announce its whereabouts. Sorry for the mixup. mt Matt Thomlinson Say no to the Wiretap Chip! University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. Internet: phantom(a)u.washington.edu phone: (206) 548-9804 PGP 2.2 key available via email or finger phantom(a)hardy.u.washington.edu

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Re: Detweiler abuse again
by W. Kinney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- hughes(a)ah.com (Eric Hughes): > The automatic broadcast property of Usenet is profoundly broken for > the long run, since there is no upper bound on the amount of resources > required. More immediately, this property also requires a 100% One can only reach the conclusion that Usenet is broken if one assumes that the remailers _aren't_. The automatic broadcast property if Usenet is not a problem if you can always determine the source of a message. This isn't an argument against anonymity, but just saying it's a little backwards to say that Usenet has to be redesigned because it doesn't work with the remailers. Why not use technology to solve a technological problem? The difficulty here is that it is impossible for any one remailer operator to prevent someone, say LD, from using the remailer system. The best he can do is stop LD from using his site as an entry point. So why not introduce a little cooperation among operators? This can be accomplished without collusion of the sort that would break anonymity. Pretty much all the remailer operators are 'punks, right? If a critical mass of operators get together and agree to block a standardized set of sources and destinations, then that group of operators will have enough pull to force the other operators to toe the line. The trick is to block messages from remailer _operators_ who refuse to agree to behave as part of the community, effectively isolating the wildcats. An isolated remailer is useless. Should be easy enough to work out -- a posted alert PGP signed by any two remailer operators is immediately implemented, no questions asked. Remailer scripts should include blocking by source, destination, or _content_, as in posts on a certain subject to a certain newsgroup. This would allow blocking of a nutcase using encrypted hops to post to Usenet without having to collude and blow his anonymity. Just say "Sorry, due to abuse of the remailers, we're not going to forward messages about the creatures from Uranus using microwave mind-control any more". This is a complicated idea in a general case, but scanning for subject lines, for instance, could be implemented as easily as scanning for destinations. What we have now is a bunch of single remailers. It's a very small step to create a cooperative group of remailers, and it would provide avenues for solutions to a lot of the potential problems. This is not perfect, but it's better. tytso(a)ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o): > Lance is, unfortunately, pointing out some huge, gaping holes in the > current architecture of the Cypherpunks remailers. It would be good if LD is smart enough to know that you _chain_ remailers for anonymity. I think he wanted us to know it was him, and wanted to see whether or not Hal would blow his anonymity when it came down to it. -- Will -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLWCOLPfv4TpIg2PxAQHOCgP9E2Q4R6ngHIeIv/IPePhcFqJgDaA8B4OO CDS0akeyVXZXMB5b5nCGY2Q0b52LcSHnzUlJ0N/o1COjVNLADNOlcF2k9BcBYUuC cqSWy1fJlx4lwd3P2kMgtk8v+pLHlVLJ4riopp2RXgLVfsesw8aJWOdSBf3bA7ft cBxNJhcI9t8= =BycG -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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