December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Inman turns down DOD sec job
by jim＠Tadpole.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

supposedly there will be a press conference at 1:00pm to say 'why'.

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Re: PGP posting validation
by trestrab＠GVSU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DrZaphod writes: > Ah ha! Another facet of a LIST run authentication system > [Cypherpunks Run Authentication System - CRASs?] > may be to allow users to mail THE LIST and ask their mail > to be filtered so they don't have to pay for msgs they don't > want. THIS IS DANGEROUS because a forger could mail in > such a request.. to patch this, THE LIST could mail out a > weekly msg -- a compiled list of which msgs got thru, and > which were filtered, and why. > > This opens up another possibility which may prove more > effective. If THE LIST can maintain a list of msgs/posters/ > PGP authentication, then those users who trust THE LIST > to authenticate their mail can select the msgs they want > to receive [from the same compiled list]. The list software that Ray Cromwell wrote for the Extropians list does all these things. Users can exclude [user|thread] and receive a regular ( I think daily) list of filtered msgs. Users can also set their own mode of receiving the list (reflected or digest), and can temporarily unsubscribe by excluding all. About the only intervention needed by list management is for subscribes and permanent unsubscribes, other than general maintenance. The list also has a security feature that when turned on only accepts posts from addresses previously authenticated as belonging to list members. This can still be spoofed, but at much greater difficulty than LD has had to expend heretofore. Jeff trestrab(a)gvsu.edu

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Re: RETURNED MAIL, ANYBODY?
by drzaphod＠brewmeister.xstablu.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Yep, happened to me too (subject was "Re: PGP posting validation", a > coincidence?). > > Felix I wondered about that myself.. |-] -- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- - DrZaphod #Don't Come Any Closer Or I'll Encrypt! - - [AC/DC] / [DnA][HP] #Xcitement thru Technology and Creativity - - [drzaphod(a)brewmeister.xstablu.com] [MindPolice Censored This Bit] - - 50 19 1C F3 5F 34 53 B7 B9 BB 7A 40 37 67 09 5B - -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

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unsubscribe
by Yaoshiang Ho 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

UNSUBSCRIBE

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MISC; reminder
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Punkster's Just a reminder, tonight on Nova "Codebreakers" stories of the world war II effort, check local listings. Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot Cryptocosmology: "sufficently advanced comunication is indistinguishable from noise." Chicago Current temp -19 wind chill -63 4pm CST -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLTxaZNCcBnAsu2t1AQFOdgP+NgsenZ1otjdCLK2aUKnhGW1Nwdr2Rk5+ V76MAqVWn+Iys190Hj3HTHBd6/aI7rhP9mRYWo8097pgYhMRmR35URa+hKRNLzP0 Iucwe9cWTLlbNnTPh+N04JJbwVhlDG3xXGykKeY0y9+IkUIeS0acu8nL01oGIurX hkqqkgmzxvE= =X6Ol -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Mr. Squish
by consensus＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I explained to a list manager about our problems regarding the source of SQUISH and the system administrator that does not respond to requests to deal with the problem. >Return-Path: <rburns(a)cap.gwu.edu> >Received: from cap.gwu.edu by mail.netcom.com (8.6.4/SMI-4.1/Netcom) > id MAA05785; Tue, 18 Jan 1994 12:47:43 -0800 >Received: by cap.gwu.edu (4.1/SMI-4.1) > id AA18334; Tue, 18 Jan 94 15:47:25 EST >Date: Tue, 18 Jan 1994 15:42:14 -0500 (EST) >From: Roger Burns <rburns(a)cap.gwu.edu> >Subject: Mr. Squish >To: Christopher Allen <consensus(a)netcom.com> >Message-Id: <Pine.3.07.9401181514.C17300-b100000(a)cap.gwu.edu> >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII > > >> Do you mind if I forward the above message to the cyperpunks list? Or would >> you be willing to do so yourself? > >Sure. I don't have ready access to Usenet, so feel free to post my comments. >BTW, I found two typos in my original message, so below I copy a revised >version. > >-- Roger rburns(a)cap.gwu.edu > >---------- Forwarded message ---------- > >Thank you for response. If I may give some unsolicited advice, I would >take a "Margaret Thatcher" approach to the postmaster who is allowing this >problem to fester. > >I would (1) trace down his office phone number (through nic whois or >nslookup or whatever) and ring him up and explain that allowing abuse of >the Internet is an abrogation of his company's contract for obtaining an >Internet connection, and that if he doesn't consent to handling this problem >appropriately, you will seek to have his company disconnected from >Internet based on that abrogation. > >If he doesn't succumb to that threat, I would then (2) phone thru his >company's main switchboard and ask to be connected to the postmaster's >boss, and explain to the boss that you will be seeking to have his >company's Internet connection ended due to the postmaster's >irresponsibility in allowing an unstable person to wreak havoc on the >worldwide computer network community. > >Now while it might be a pain to actually follow through on this threat, if >you put enough of a poker face on what you say, the bluff might very well >be enough at either step 1 or step 2. > >Good luck! And I hope I don't have to deal with this problem! (But if I >do, I've outlined how I will proceed.) > >-- Roger Burns rburns(a)cap.gwu.edu ..Christopher Allen ..Consensus Develoment Corporation ..4104-24th Street #419 ..San Francisco, CA 94114-3615 ..(415) 647-6384 Fax ..(415) 647-6383 Voice ..email: consensus(a)netcom.com ..mosaic frontpage: .."ftp://netcom.com/pub/consensus/www/ConsensusFrontDoor.html"

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Re: RSA Questions
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:54 1/18/94 +0000, SuperDupont wrote: >Hi Cypherpunks ! > >I've got a few questions about the RSA encoding (if they're answered somewhere >in litterature, just give directions, thanks) > > If the public encryption key is e (the exponent) and n=p*q (the modulus), > then the encryption scheme is: > > cypher= (plain^e) mod n. > > Number theory tells us that the reverse operation (taking the e-th root) > can be performed, as long as we know p and q: we know how to compute d > such that for any plain<n, (plain^e)^d=plain. > > Now my questions are: > > 1. Is there a way to determine ALL the possible values of d verifying: > (plain^e)^d=plain for any plain<n (or at least have an evaluation for > their number) ? > > In other words, is there a way to know the number of keys that unlock > what your public key locks ? > > 2. Is there a way to determine ALL the possible values of d verifying: > (plain^e)^d=plain for *a given plain* ? > > In other words, is there a way to know the number of keys that unlock > *a given message* ? > >Here's an example that's quite worrying (maybe because I chose p and q >to be random primes, and they have bad properties): > >e=17 # Exponent >p=967 # Prime p >q=1031 # Prime q >n=p*q=996977 # Public modulus > >phi=(p-1)*(q-1)=994980 >g=gcd(p-1,q-1)=2 >f=phi/g=497490 >d=(1/e) mod f=234113 # A possible value of d given by number theory > >Here's the result of the exhaustive search for the answer to question No. 2: > >plain=12345 >cipher=(plain^e) mod n >decipher=(cipher^d) mod n > >The possible values for d (138 of them) are: > >3393 10603 17813 25023 32233 39443 46653 53863 61073 68283 75493 82703 89913 >97123 104333 111543 118753 125963 133173 140383 147593 154803 162013 169223 >176433 183643 190853 198063 205273 212483 219693 226903 234113 241323 248533 >255743 262953 270163 277373 284583 291793 299003 306213 313423 320633 327843 >335053 342263 349473 356683 363893 371103 378313 385523 392733 399943 407153 >414363 421573 428783 435993 443203 450413 457623 464833 472043 479253 486463 >493673 500883 508093 515303 522513 529723 536933 544143 551353 558563 565773 >572983 580193 587403 594613 601823 609033 616243 623453 630663 637873 645083 >652293 659503 666713 673923 681133 688343 695553 702763 709973 717183 724393 >731603 738813 746023 753233 760443 767653 774863 782073 789283 796493 803703 >810913 818123 825333 832543 839753 846963 854173 861383 868593 875803 883013 >890223 897433 904643 911853 919063 926273 933483 940693 947903 955113 962323 >969533 976743 983953 991163 > >That makes a probability of 0.013% >Looks to me like it's a LOT. Maybe I'm wrong. > >-zap > >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. >Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, >and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. >Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi. Laudable Paranoia! In short the numbers: cipher, decipher, plain, d and e must all be relatively prime to p and q for all of this stuff to work. In practice, since p and q are very large, the probability of the cryptanalyst finding another value d that deciphers your message is about the same as him finding p or q. That is the same probability of him factoring pq by guessing. In your example 138 out of 996980 is about the probability of being divisible by either p or q. You might check to make sure that the message that you are enciphering is relatively prime to p and q. You could better spend your, however, verifying that your hardware had not made a mistake, which is more likely, unless, however you are sending one of your factors so that a friend can share your secret key. In that case, however, anyone with your public key can compute your secret key,

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Spread Spectrum xcever moduals
by mycal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks, Looking through the new Nuts and Volts I came accross this ad: SPREAD SPECTRUM tranceiver modules, USA, part 15, 100mw 902-928 MHz. XT interface needs only an address decoder, 74ls245 and antenna. Data or voice to 242kb/s. With manual $240 + $5 S&H, VISA or MasterCard. SKV International, 37200 Central Court, Newark, CA 94560. 510-796-1101, call for RF sales. Anyone up for setting up a bay area network based on these things? 100mw into a yagi could be good for 10 miles or so, and I think you are allowed up to a watt under part 15 as long as your signal meets certain requirements, this could extend the range to 30-40 miles per link. Local links could be set up to cover a number of users in a local area. How does this sound? Does anyone know of a better deal for SS modules? mycal -- Welfare by mycal(a)netacsys.com welfare, ha, your not my friend you bury the people, in the end gernerations of lost hope you feed destruction of famlies is your need an illusion of of hope that you pretend is the wasting of soles that will never mend wastfull bureaucracy is what you breed the middle class is what you bleed tentions of race is your rift stagnation of life is your gift so, welfare it is time to meet your death before you suck the life out of everyons breath

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Re: RETURNED MAIL, ANYBODY?
by drzaphod＠brewmeister.xstablu.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Yes, I got the same thing in response to my posting -- I wonder if someone > hacked his account or somesuch to put in a filter. He may not even be > seeing the emails. Perhaps a phone call is in order? Well.. the mystery has been answered; however, I DID check his directory for a .forward file to no avail.. must be an offline mailer. -- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- - DrZaphod #Don't Come Any Closer Or I'll Encrypt! - - [AC/DC] / [DnA][HP] #Xcitement thru Technology and Creativity - - [drzaphod(a)brewmeister.xstablu.com] [MindPolice Censored This Bit] - - 50 19 1C F3 5F 34 53 B7 B9 BB 7A 40 37 67 09 5B - -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

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New Keyserver
by mikeingl＠news.delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,nlnet.comp,sci.crypt >Path: news.delphi.com!noc.near.net!MathWorks.Com!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!howland.reston.ans.net!xlink.net!zib-berlin.de!netmbx.de!Germany.EU.net!EU.net!sun4nl!news.nic.surfnet.nl!news.kub.nl!kub.nl!teun >From: teun(a)kub.nl (Teun Nijssen) >Subject: Yet another PGP public key server running >Message-ID: <1994Jan18.152726.9396(a)kub.nl> >Date: Tue, 18 Jan 94 15:27:26 GMT >Organization: Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands >Nntp-Posting-Host: kubds2 >Lines: 20 >Xref: news.delphi.com alt.security.pgp:7821 sci.crypt:15950 Hello Internet, a new PGP public key server has been setup; this time in the Netherlands. It is a mail-only server, no anon-ftp. The address of the server is pgp-public-keys(a)kub.nl the service is already synchronized with the other international keyservers, although I will ask more servers to directly sync with me in the near future. The system running the service is directly connected to Tilburg University's FDDI ring, which is one 2 Mbps hop away from Delft, which is one 34 Mbps hop away from Amsterdam, which will soon have its Europanet/EMPB/Dante fatpipe to the USA. It should be well connected... For the time being, the server starts up every 15 minutes. greetings, teun

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