December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Banning any subscriber
by plaz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I said: >>I personally disagree with censorship. It would be impossible to enforce >>anyway. A move of this type would simply drive Detweiler to use the >>Cypherpunk remailers which would be harder to detect. Then what do we do? >>Stop accepting mail from our own remailers? Eric replied: >Basically, yes, except for signed letters from previously >authenticated pseudonyms. This is a simple form of a positive >reputation system. A kill fill is a negative reputation--'not that >person'. A positive reputation rejects all but a particular set of >identities. I'm sorry, I didn't realize that you wanted to erect a barrier against anonymous newbies, such as "wonderer" and "Dark Unicorn" were recently. You know, Detweiler might get a new account under a new name, better seal the list to only postings from "previously authenticated" accounts too. Then we'd be all happy and safe from the dreaded Detweiler. Don't let this guy screw up the positive aspects of the list. His irritant is the by-product of the free world that we are trying to create. You can't stop his communication without comprimising our own goals. (You can delete it without reading it or kill file him or once we are on extropians list software, ::exclude him.) >Much of the debate on cypherpunks magically incants 'reputation >systems' to solve all sorts of sticky problems, but none have ever >been implemented in software, except for killfiles, which are not >effective against disruption in an anonymous environment. > >Necessity is the mother of invention. A motivated individual trying >to disrupt a communications forum and who has to avoid a kill file >will be necessary to create the need for a positive reputation system. >Once the need is there, the software will follow. LD could become the >most valuable participant in the endeavor of creating a positive >reputation system, namely, the irritant at the center of the pearl. > >Let us encapsulate him well. > >Eric I'm not entirely against positive reputation systems, but they really need to be implimented on the user end, or at least be user settings, as on the extropians list. But the main problem with positive reputation systems is dealing with the zero reputation newbies. I don't want to see these guys shut out. Think well, before you act on this impulse. _______________________________________________________________________ Geoff Dale -- insert standard disclaimers here -- plaz(a)netcom.com "Life is a sexually transmitted terminal disease." - Peter McWilliams

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Britain-Right of Silence (AP) (fwd)
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Abolition of Right of Silence Delights Police, Appalls Critics By MAUREEN JOHNSON Associated Press Writer LONDON (AP) _ As the police see it, the government's plan to abolish the right of silence is a break they deserve. ``We're not asking anyone to confess,'' said Dick Coyles, head of Britain's 130,000-member Police Federation. ``We're just asking them to tell us, for example, `The reason my house is full of stolen goods is that this man asked me to look after them.' ``We want people to put forward their defenses at the time ... instead of when they've had time to concoct one.'' To lawyers and civil rights groups, the bill due to come before Parliament soon violates a basic tenet of British justice: A suspect is innocent until proven guilty. The principle dates to the 17th century, when Parliament abolished the infamous Court of the Star Chamber. The Conservative government's Criminal Justice Bill does not force anyone to talk. But judges and juries could conclude that a suspect who refused to answer police questions has something to hide. In some cases, silence would become part of the prosecution evidence pointing toward guilt. Civil libertarians are campaigning to save what they see as a historic right _ the model for the U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment which protects Americans from self-incrimination. The legislation is part of Conservative government efforts to stem rising crime. It has pitted Prime Minister John Major's administration against some judges, though others support him. Major has only a 17-seat majority in the 651-member Commons, and the bill's fate is uncertain. But the issue will mean another bruising battle for a government already in trouble over squeezes in welfare spending. Major is going against the advice of a Royal Commission he appointed two years ago to study the criminal justice system. It concluded that the right of silence was a valuable safeguard against miscarriages of justice. Critics argue that removing it will increase the risk of bullying and oppressive police interrogations and tempt police to rely too heavily on confessions instead of getting independent evidence. The government sounds determined, however, and the move is widely supported by the party's rank and file. To prolonged applause, Home Secretary Michael Howard announced the policy at the party's annual conference this fall, saying terrorists were exploiting the right of silence. The change would apply to all suspects _ from careless drivers to murderers. Opponents say hardened criminals and terror suspects know the ropes and usually are convicted despite their silence. Those likely to be harassed into false confessions are confused and frightened suspects, often of low intelligence, says the civil rights group Liberty. Roger Ede, secretary of the Law Society, says the average IQ of suspects at police stations is 82, well below average. ``It is a basic principle of English law that suspects don't have to prove their innocence by having to explain their actions,'' Ede said. ``Why does the government end up doing the opposite of what they were advised to do? Because they perceive for political reasons it is what is required of them.'' Liberty began a leaflet campaign to get voters to lobby members of Parliament. Rising crime _ a 120 percent rise in reported offenses since the Conservatives won power in 1979 _ is a particular embarrassment for a party that gave the police big pay raises, built new prisons and made law and order a centerpiece of its election platforms. The right of silence developed in protest against the oppressive operation by the Star Chamber Court under the Tudor and early Stuart kings. In a landmark case in 1637, John Lilburn, accused of printing seditious books, refused to answer questions. Parliament later compensated him and the Star Chamber was abolished in 1641. The right of silence became part of English law in 1848. -- Stanton McCandlish mech(a)eff.org 1:109/1103 EFF Online Activist & SysOp O P E N P L A T F O R M C R Y P T O P O L I C Y O N L I N E R I G H T S N E T W O R K I N G V I R T U A L C U L T U R E I N F O : M E M B E R S H I P @ E F F . O R G

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Encryption and the NII (fwd)
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,comp.org.eff.talk From: kadie(a)cs.uiuc.edu (Carl M Kadie) Subject: [NWU] "Encryption and the NII" Organization: University of Illinois, Dept. of Comp. Sci., Urbana, IL Date: Mon, 29 Nov 1993 18:38:50 GMT [This is an excerpt from the Newsletter of The Political Issues Committee of the National Writers Union (UAW Local 1981) Address Correspondence to: Bob Chatelle, 296 Western Avenue, Cambridge MA 02139 (617/497-7193). The full newsletter was posted to alt.censorship. (c) 1993 National Writers Union. Posted with permission from the November 1993 issue of the PIC Newsletter, the journal of the Political Issues Committee. All rights reserved to the authors. Reproduction without permission is expressly prohibited, but requests to repost articles on electronic systems serving writers are encouraged. Send permission requests to Bob Chatelle, kip(a)world.std.com -cmk] Encryption and the NII, by Jenevra Georgini As stated in President Clinton's message of November 5, gov- ernment policy regarding the national information infras- tructure (NII) shares two significant objectives with the Writers Union goals. The Clinton administration seeks to ensure broad access by adapting the concept of fair use to the NII, while simultaneously strengthening domestic copy- right laws and international treaties to protect the integrity of intellectual property. Because the network will span the globe, standards must be coherent and uni- formly applied in a way that permits industry growth. A standard-based regulatory approach posits legal solutions. Yet standards remain toothless unless implemented by tech- nology promoting the dual goal of access and integrity. Encryption technology is one suggested means of embedding electronic signatures to authenticate digital works. Encryption was originally developed by the government for wartime uses. Now the technology has become available to private citizens through programs such as RIPEM (public domain software based on a program developed with federal funding at MIT) and Philip Zimmermann's PGP (Pretty Good Privacy, whose underlying algorithm is pirated from the patented MIT program). Zimmermann describes his product as "the *de facto* worldwide standard for encryption and email." It can be used to keep message transmissions (such as downloading works from a net) private while simulta- neously authenticating the work. Each use has a public key and a private key. Correspondents use the public key to encrypt a message to that key's owner. The key owner gives out or publishes the key as one would give out an address. Although the public key can unlock the code that the private key makes and vice versa, knowing the public key doesn't enable anyone to deduce the private key. Those who know the public key can only encrypt messages for sending; they can- not decrypt the recipient's messages. The recipient uses her own private key to decrypt messages sent. At the same time, an author making works available online could encrypt that work with her own private key. This would provide a digital "signature" (or perhaps "fingerprint" would be a better term; signatures can be forged but private keys are given to only one person). Anyone wishing to access the work could use the sender's public key to verify the origin. The public key could be included on the work's title screen to facilitate access. The user could decrypt the private code by means of the public code enough to ascertain that the work had been tampered with but not enough to reveal the private code (analogous to being able to fit a key into a lock without the door opening.) The development of micro-sized encryption chips has made this technology accessible to a broad range of consumers-- including drug dealers, tax evades, and traders in national secrets. Of course, the larger and more powerful government machines can crack any private citizens 140-digit code in a day. However, this represents a substantial outlay of gov- ernment time and resources for very little reward. As the number of messages posted on the net increases, forced decrypting offers ever-diminishing returns. (Note! This is know as the "logic of the net," a digital variation on "the more the merrier." It is also referred to by some commenta- tors as "the fax effect:" owning the only fax in the world won't do your business much good, but your fax's value increases every time someone else buys one because you can now exchange more information.) Instead of trying to con- tain the encryption explosion, the government should harness its energy to protect citizens' privacy and encourage dis- tribution of works on the net. Building on encryption to prevent piracy on the net is the logical next step in beat- ing defense budget swords into information plowshares. Leg- islation should be enacted limiting state and federal decrypting requirements to the reasonable search and seizures contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. No one should be forced to decrypt their data without due process of law, including probable cause shown in the form of a court-ordered search warrant. The practice of seizing not only hackers' computers but all electronic equipment in their possession is a blatant violation of civil rights. Perhaps, as suggested by leading scholar Laurence tribe, a new amendment to the Constitution should be enacted to safe- guard our traditional-rights in the new frontier environ- ment. Encryption technology has been responsible for startling (some might say threatening) advances in digital tape infor- mation retrieval. Digital Audio Tape (DAT) records music in sixteen binary digits. The human ear does not register sounds down to the sixteenth bit. Thus, encrypted informa- tion such as books or programs can be recorded on each six- teenth bit. One could play the tape and hear only music without interference from the other recorded information because it takes us such a small space. The encrypted data would also be invisible to one examining it on a computer screen. The only way to tell that there is anything other than music on the tape is to compare it bit to bit on a com- puter with a virgin cassette. Even with the computer's help, the encrypted data could look exactly like the noise that typically appears during recording. In the words of Tim May, retired Intel physicist, "Anyone carrying a single music cassette bought in a store could carry the entire com- puterized files of the Stealth bomber, and it would be com- pletely and totally imperceptible." May further related that information can also be encoded in images: he could download a photo, insert an encrypted message in the least significant portion of each pixel (to minimize distortion) and repost the image without any recognizable difference. In addition to its possibilities for authenticating works online, encryption responds to the problem of royalty track- ing traditionally solved by licensing. A microchip invented by entrepreneur Peter Sprague is programmed to decrypt only as much of its encrypted database as the user pays for. After browsing a topic menu, the reader selects what infor- mation she wants. The program decrypts that information and counts how many times it has decrypted (or how many bytes in a per-byte fee structure). The user is billed accordingly, to a debit card or even to an electronic account where e- money takes the place of cash. Although encryption, like any other software, is not completely hackproof, methods can be developed to make piracy much more trouble than it is worth. --Jenevra Georgini, NWU Intern -- Carl Kadie -- I do not represent any organization; this is just me. = kadie(a)cs.uiuc.edu =

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Re: Crypto Anarchy, the Government, and the National Information Infrastructure
by owen＠autodesk.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: tcmay(a)netcom.netcom.com (Timothy C. May) > In this essay, quickly written, I'll address some points raised about > the government and its "willingness" to let strong crypto and crypto > anarchy develop, and how the Data Superhighway will require all data > packets to have "license plates" on them (my biggest speculative > leap). By definition, government is the enemy of any anarchic movement. > We're in an arms race, us versus them, and I think the government as > we know it will ultimately lose. WE have met the enemy and they are us. What I hear you saying is that crypto-anarchists will win, and thus replace the governmement as we know it. ( or perhaps transform the govenrment as we know it) > Mike McNally writes: > > > Given the material in the WiReD 1.6 article, how likely is it that a > > true anonymous digital cash system would be allowed? I know, I know; > > there's "no way to prevent it"; however, I think that concept is based > > on the premise that the Government proceeds rationally. > > You mean, how likely is that the government will allow a system that > makes taxation almost impossible, that enables black markets, that > facillitates the transfer of illegal information, and that basically > nukes the present arrangement? > > I don't think they'll "allow" it. But this doesn't mean it won't happen. when crypto is outlawed, only outlaws will have crypto. > The "crypto crackdown" Mike is alluding to is one that has be > predicted for a long time. We are indeed in an "arms race": both sides > are racing to cut the other off. "Get Up Get up, Lord Donald Cried Get up and fight for your life. Oh , I won't get up, I won't get up. I can't get up and fight. For you have two long beaten swords, And I but a pocket knife." from Matty Groves (trad) > Strong crytography means government can no longer do its thing, at > least not has it's accustomed to. Strong crypto means untraceable > payments, secure phone lines, information markets in what are now > military and corporate secrets, liquid markets in illegal services, > and of course a nearly total collapse in taxation abilities. Strong crypto in the hands of the individual leads to this scenario. Thats why strong crypto will be reserved for the privileged, and kept from those not connected to the power-system. > On taxation, it is certainly clear that many folks will still be > "visible" and will be taxed as heavily as other--I don't want to imply > that the guy who works for Lockheed or behind the counter at Safeway > is somehow going to be liberated from paying taxes by the onset of > crypto anarchy. > > No, the effect will be more of an erosion of _support_ for taxation, > as word spreads that many consultants, writers, information sellers, > and the like are sheltering much of their income via use of networks > and strong crypto. The privileged members of the unseen-unknown oligarchy have long enjoyed the privilege of sheltering their wealth. I suppose it is the natural progression of things that the individual slowly gains ground once held by the powerfull and privileged, but usualy not unless giving that ground makes the privileged more powerful than before. The margin rarely diminishes, it is an ever widening gulf IMNSHO. > This "crypto phase change" (a term I prefer to the term "Singularity," > so beloved by the nanotechnology folks) is what I see coming. Whether > the government can crack down first is the fly in the ointment. Is there a question regarding whether they *can*? Of course they *can*, they have more weapons, and a history of using them. Don't you really want to ask other things like what happens when/if they do? > Note that the way strong crypto works means a successful crackdown > could only come as the result of strong police state policies. That > is, outlawing of unapproved encryption, on demand inspection of all > data packets, strict regulation of across-the-border > telecommunications, an end to the Internet as we know it today, and > strict penalties merely for "conspiring" to use strong crypto. Eric > Hughes' "Use a random number, go to jail" line is not so far from the > truth. whats their option, to just hand over the keys, go have a beer at the local pub, and contemplate getting honest jobs instead of fighting to keep you from destroying their current way of life? "Darn those hackers, they've got checkmate in three moves. Oh well, I wonder if Burger Sri is hiring?" > I oppose the government's plan for a "data superhighway" for two main > reasons. First, there's no need and the free market is already giving > us a multiplicity of lines, channels, satellites, etc. Anarchic > development can produce a more robust system, actually. You are preaching to the choir. bettre to just keep plugging at implementing those *channels* and methods of accessing them. > Imagine this: to get on the Data Superhighway, which will likely be > the only major lines if the government succeeds in making it the > mandatory standard, every data packet must have a "license plate." > Don't laugh! The idea of a license plate on data packets is coming. It > would provide the kind of traceability that control freaks like > Detweiler claim to want (I say "claim" because our pal LD is the > largest user of pseudonyms we have.) It would provide for taxation of > packets, much like road fees and truck charges, and it would generally > make the Net an environment hostile to crypto anarchy. Our nation is criss crossed with super-highways, but there are plenty of folks who prefer to stay on the back roads. Its awfully hard to build competing highways where folks can drive their un-registered vehicles, because the real-estate involved is finite. May I point out that cyberspace has un-real estate, and that there is all you want. > The forces of NIST/NSA and the National Information Infrastructure are > moving in this direction. > > I'm moving in another direction, toward the overthrow of the present system. > Remind me when I get too close to you, I don't want to get caught in the crossfire. > Over the past several years I've thought about these issues at length. > I don't think they can crack down. Can they stop "dial-a-prayer" > computer confessionals? (priest-confessor privilege, recognized at a > deep level) Can they stop attorney-client computer communications? (To > wiretap these would break open the entire legal system.) Whats that old saying about Death and taxes. Given the choice between these two necesary evils , which one would you choose. *Give me liberty or give me death* is the cry of the revolutionary who is already marked as an enemy of the state. Go shout it in a crowd and march on the halls of government. see how many line up behind you to join in the fun. > Can they place police monitors in every role-playing game or > deep-immersion VR system? (Make no mistake about it, systems like > "Habitat" and LambdaMOO, and many more are coming or already exist, > will be full-fledged agoric marketplaces, with goods and services > being traded. Read "Snow Crash" or "True Names" to remind yourself of > this (I'm not endorsing the specific views of Stephenson or Vinge, who > got some things "wrong"--no big deal, as their general vision was what > was so important.) > > Can they tell people they can't compress their files? (compressed > files look outwardly like encrypted files) Can they ban the use of > steganography--if they can find it being used at all? > > No, too many bits are flowing already. Too many degrees of freedom. A > Soviet-style crackdown is not in the cards. I think it is unwise to use linear thinking to try and deduce what the ultimate outcome of this complex equation may look like. When you evoke a Demon into the triangle, you can utter the command that the unholy creature appear in a comely form, but nothing guarantees that it will be so. > But we stil have to fight. Yup.. And I'm right behind you brother.. uh.. no need to look around and check.. I'm right here at your shoulder.. We'll get those bastards.. thats right - charge in there and give 'em hell. say.. where's the bathroom. > Things like the Clipper still need to be fought, by ridicule ("Big > Brother Inside" stickers), by lawsuits (not my specialty), by > denouncement (as when industry groups denounce it), and especially by > developing and promoting alternatives. The market is truly ripe for a > Soundblaster-type voice encryption system---when will one of you > budding entrepreneurs get one out? The problem with secrets is that if you share them with too many people they aren't secrets anymore. > Having read the three main "position papers" on NII (the White House > paper, the CPSR analysis, and the EFF "Open Platform" piece), I'm as > convinced as ever that the Data Highway is largely about regaining > control of the currently anarchic network system. It just isn't about > giving ghetto residents access to Crays, nor is it about the > government being benificent in expanding our cable choices from 50 > channels of shit to 5000 channels. "We're from the governmemt and we're here to help you" is listed just above "the check is in the mail", and " I won't come in your mouth" > No, it is about taxing the commerce that is moving increasingly into > cyberspace. It is about continuing to regulate and control. It is > about the survival of Big Brother. > The arms race is on. WE are primates, we live in primate societys. survival of primate-alpha hierarchy is the first order of business. Fight it and you will die or be driven out. LUX ./. owen

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FOIA: Released Records
by gnu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

November 22, 1993 Chief, Office of Policy National Security Agency/Central Security Service Fort George Meade, MD 20755-6000 Reference: RELEASED RECORDS Dear Sir or Madam: This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. € 552(a)] on behalf of my client, Mr. John Gilmore. I write to request a copy of all agency records or portions thereof, in electronic or other form, which NSA has declassified during the months of September and October 1993. This request specifically excludes any information already provided to Mr. Gilmore in any other request. We also remind you that the long-standing rule that the FOIA "makes no distinction between records maintained in manual and computer storage systems," Yeager v. D.E.A., 678 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C.Cir. 1982), has recently been amplified in Armstrong v. E.O.P., No 93-5002 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 13, 1993). Any paper print- outs of electronic records, such as e-mail, must include all information in the electronic record. Assuming that there would be no loss of releasable information, such as written comments made on paper print-outs, we therefore ask you to release all responsive electronic records in electronic, i.e., machine-readable, form. Mr. Gilmore would also like a list of all records responsive to this request if such a list can be provided in advance of the records themselves. As you know, the FOIA provides that an agency must make an initial determination of whether to comply with a FOIA request within ten working days of receiving the request. Your own regulations provide that Ò[t]he Chief, Office of Policy, shall notify the requester of his determination within 10 working days of his receipt of the request.Ó [32 C.F.R. € 299.4(b)]. Please do not delay processing because of uncertainty about the request. I have reasonably described the records sought. If you have any questions regarding this request, please telephone me at the above number, and we can discuss your questions. I also request that fees be waived because Mr. Gilmore is deemed a media requester by your agency for FOIA purposes. Should there be any problem in this regard, Mr. Gilmore promises to pay up to $1000 in fees, and you should therefore begin processing of this request without fee-related delays. As provided under the FOIA, I will expect a reply within ten (10) working days. Sincerely, Lee Tien Attorney at Law On behalf of Mr. John Gilmore

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FOIA: Cellular Encryption
by gnu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

November 23, 1993 Chief, Office of Policy National Security Agency/Central Security Service Fort George Meade, MD 20755-6000 ATTN: FOIA request Reference: CELLULAR ENCRYPTION Dear Sir or Madam: This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. € 552(a)] on behalf of my client, Mr. John Gilmore. I write to request a copy of all agency records or portions thereof, in electronic or other form, which pertain, relate, or refer to encryption for cellular telephone communications. This request includes, but is not limited to records about: a standard known as the Cellular Message Encryption Algorithm ("CMEA"); NSA's involvement in the development of CMEA; NSA's assessment of the strengths, weaknesses, and technical features of CMEA; standards or technologies other than CMEA considered for cellular telephone communications encryption contacts, conversations, meetings or communications of any sort involving NSA employees and persons not employed by NSA regarding cellular telephone communications encryption. Mr. Gilmore is informed and believes that NSA employees have been involved in meetings with persons not employed by NSA, including persons outside of the U.S. government, about the CMEA standard, and he specifically asks that you disclose all agency records of any or all such meetings. As you know, the FOIA provides that an agency must make an initial determination of whether to comply with a FOIA request within ten working days of receiving the request. Your own regulations provide that Ò[t]he Chief, Office of Policy, shall notify the requester of his determination within 10 working days of his receipt of the request.Ó [32 C.F.R. € 299.4(b)]. If the records that you possess were originated or classified by another organization, I ask that your organization declassify them (if needed) and release them to me, as provided in the FOIA, within the statutory time limits. If there is a conflict between the statutory time limits and some regulation or policy that requires you refer the records, the statutory requirement takes precedence over any Executive-branch regulation, policy or practice. As you know, the FOIA provides that no more than an additional 10 working days be taken for such consultation. 5 U.S.C. € 552(a)(6)(B). If you do refer documents to any other agency, and they are not provided within the time limits, we intend to litigate on this point. We also remind you that the long-standing rule that the FOIA "makes no distinction between records maintained in manual and computer storage systems," Yeager v. D.E.A., 678 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C.Cir. 1982), has recently been amplified in Armstrong v. E.O.P., No 93-5002 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 13, 1993). Any paper print- outs of electronic records, such as e-mail, must include all information in the electronic record. Assuming that there would be no loss of releasable information, such as written comments made on paper print-outs, we therefore ask you to release all responsive electronic records in electronic, i.e., machine-readable, form. As you know, the FOIA provides that even if some requested material is properly exempted from mandatory disclosure, all segregable portions must be released. [5 U.S.C. € 552(b)] If any or all material covered by this request is withheld, please inform me of the specific exemptions that are being claimed, and mark all deletions to indicate the exemption(s) being claimed to authorize each individual withholding. If the (b)(3) exemption is claimed, please indicate the relevant withholding statute(s). In addition, I ask that your agency exercise its discretion to release information that may be technically exempt. As you know, the Attorney General on October 4, 1993, directed that agencies should administer the FOIA under a presumption of disclosure, and that information which need not be withheld should not be. Please do not delay processing because of uncertainty about the request. I have reasonably described the records sought. If you have any questions regarding this request, please telephone me at the above number, and we can discuss your questions. I also request that fees be waived because Mr. Gilmore is deemed a media requester by your agency for FOIA purposes. Should there be any problem in this regard, Mr. Gilmore promises to pay up to $1000 in fees, and you should therefore begin processing of this request without fee-related delays. As provided under the FOIA, I will expect a reply within ten (10) working days. Sincerely, Lee Tien Attorney at Law On behalf of Mr. John Gilmore

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FOIA: Sensor fusion
by gnu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

November 22, 1993 Chief, Office of Policy National Security Agency/Central Security Service Fort George Meade, MD 20755-6000 Reference: SENSOR FUSION Dear Sir or Madam: This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. € 552(a)] on behalf of my client, Mr. John Gilmore. I write to request a copy of all agency records or portions thereof, in electronic or other form, which pertain, relate, or refer to sensor fusion. "Sensor fusion" is the activity or process of "fusing" or merging information from a variety of different sensors to produce a more informative product. For instance, merging radar data with intercepted radio transmissions and adding in satellite pictures may reveal a concentration of metal (from radar data) that coincides with a site that is transmitting communications. This request includes, but is not limited to: electronic records such as software for performing sensor fusion; all documentation for such software; documentation about equipment used for sensor fusion; and records about agency use of sensor fusion. If the requested records are not in the possession of your agency, or if other agencies may also possess such records, I ask that you forward this request to any agency that you believe may have records responsive to this request, and inform me of such action. Such agencies may include the NRO and the CIA. In the alternative, I ask that you inform me of other agencies that you believe possess and control such records. As you know, the FOIA provides that an agency must make an initial determination of whether to comply with a FOIA request within ten working days of receiving the request. Your own regulations provide that Ò[t]he Chief, Office of Policy, shall notify the requester of his determination within 10 working days of his receipt of the request.Ó [32 C.F.R. € 299.4(b)]. If the records that you possess were originated or classified by another organization, I ask that your organization declassify them (if needed) and release them to me, as provided in the FOIA, within the statutory time limits. If there is a conflict between the statutory time limits and some regulation or policy that requires you refer the records, the statutory requirement takes precedence over any Executive-branch regulation, policy or practice. As you know, the FOIA provides that no more than an additional 10 working days be taken for such consultation. 5 U.S.C. € 552(a)(6)(B). If you do refer documents to any other agency, and they are not provided within the time limits, we intend to litigate on this point. We also remind you that the long-standing rule that the FOIA "makes no distinction between records maintained in manual and computer storage systems," Yeager v. D.E.A., 678 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C.Cir. 1982), has recently been amplified in Armstrong v. E.O.P., No 93-5002 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 13, 1993). Any paper print- outs of electronic records, such as e-mail, must include all information in the electronic record. Assuming that there would be no loss of releasable information, such as written comments made on paper print-outs, we therefore ask you to release all responsive electronic records in electronic, i.e., machine-readable, form. As you know, the FOIA provides that even if some requested material is properly exempted from mandatory disclosure, all segregable portions must be released. [5 U.S.C. € 552(b)] If any or all material covered by this request is withheld, please inform me of the specific exemptions that are being claimed, and mark all deletions to indicate the exemption(s) being claimed to authorize each individual withholding. If the (b)(3) exemption is claimed, please indicate the relevant withholding statute(s). In addition, I ask that your agency exercise its discretion to release information that may be technically exempt. As you know, the Attorney General on October 4, 1993, directed that agencies should administer the FOIA under a presumption of disclosure, and that information which need not be withheld should not be. Please do not delay processing because of uncertainty about the request. I have reasonably described the records sought. If you have any questions regarding this request, please telephone me at the above number, and we can discuss your questions. I also request that fees be waived because Mr. Gilmore is deemed a media requester by your agency for FOIA purposes. Should there be any problem in this regard, Mr. Gilmore promises to pay up to $1000 in fees, and you should therefore begin processing of this request without fee-related delays. As provided under the FOIA, I will expect a reply within ten (10) working days. Sincerely, Lee Tien Attorney at Law On behalf of Mr. John Gilmore rom owner-cypherpunks Mon Nov 29 13:27:25 1993 Received: by toad.com id AA14244; Mon, 29 Nov 93 13:12:26 PST Received: by toad.com id AA14124; Mon, 29 Nov 93 13:09:31 PST From: gnu (John Gilmore) Return-Path: <gnu> Received: from localhost by toad.com id AA14120; Mon, 29 Nov 93 13:09:28 PST Message-Id: <9311292109.AA14120(a)toad.com> To: cypherpunks Subject: NSA FOIA: Public Domain Classified Records Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 13:09:27 -0800 November 23, 1993 Chief, Office of Policy National Security Agency/Central Security Service Fort George Meade, MD 20755-6000 ATTN: FOIA request Reference: PUBLIC DOMAIN CLASSIFIED RECORDS Dear Sir or Madam: This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. € 552(a)] on behalf of my client, Mr. John Gilmore. I write to request a copy of all agency records or portions thereof, in electronic or other form, which pertain, relate, or refer to documents which are formally designated as "classified" by the U.S. Government but which are known by NSA officials to be outside direct government control, in the possession of persons not presently employed by the U.S. government, available to the public in libraries, or otherwise in the public domain, whether within or outside the United States. This request also includes all agency records which were previously classified but are no longer classified or had their classification level downgraded if the fact that the records were outside direct government control, in the possession of persons not presently employed by the U.S. government, available to the public in libraries, or otherwise in the public domain, whether within or outside the United States, was a factor in declassification or downgrading. To help you understand the nature of this request, I refer you to Mr. Gilmore's earlier request for Military Cryptanalysis by William Friedman and Military Cryptanalytics by Friedman and Lambros Callimahos. As you know, your agency initially denied Mr. Gilmore's request for Parts III and IV of the Friedman treatise on the ground that they were classified, but later released these records after Mr. Gilmore proved that Parts III and IV were available to the general public. Mr. Michael Smith, Chief, Office of Policy, informed the court and Mr. Gilmore that NSA officials had known for many years that these records had entered the public domain, but that he himself was unaware of this fact, and thus chose not to disclose them at the time of Mr. Gilmore's request. This request is intended to reach any other such records (still classified) and any records for which downgrading or declassification was ordered if the presence of the records outside direct government control was relevant to the downgrading or declassification determination. Although Mr. Gilmore does not by this request seek the already-released portions of Military Cryptanalysis by William Friedman and Military Cryptanalytics by Friedman and Lambros Callimahos, he does by this request seek any records that pertain to whether the unreleased portions of Part III of Military Cryptanalytics by Friedman and Lambros Callimahos are known by NSA officials to be outside direct government control, in the possession of persons not presently employed by the U.S. government, available to the public in libraries, or otherwise in the public domain, whether within or outside the United States. This request is also intended to trigger declassification review of all records responsive to this request. Mr. Gilmore would also like a list of all records responsive to this request if such a list can be provided in advance of the records themselves. As you know, the FOIA provides that an agency must make an initial determination of whether to comply with a FOIA request within ten working days of receiving the request. Your own regulations provide that Ò[t]he Chief, Office of Policy, shall notify the requester of his determination within 10 working days of his receipt of the request.Ó [32 C.F.R. € 299.4(b)]. If the records that you possess were originated or classified by another organization, I ask that your organization declassify its. If there is a conflict between the statutory time limits and some regulation or policy that requires you refer the records, the statutory requirement takes precedence over any Executive-branch regulation, policy or practice. As you know, the FOIA provides that no more than an additional 10 working days be taken for such consultation. 5 U.S.C. € 552(a)(6)(B). If you do refer documents to any other agency, and they are not provided within the time limits, we intend to litigate on this point. We also remind you that the long-standing rule that the FOIA "makes no distinction between records maintained in manual and computer storage systems," Yeager v. D.E.A., 678 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C.Cir. 1982), has recently been amplified in Armstrong v. E.O.P., No 93-5002 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 13, 1993). Any paper print- outs of electronic records, such as e-mail, must include all information in the electronic record. Assuming that there would be no loss of releasable information, such as written comments made on paper print-outs, we therefore ask you to release all responsive electronic records in electronic, i.e., machine-readable, form. As you know, the FOIA provides that even if some requested material is properly exempted from mandatory disclosure, all segregable portions must be released. [5 U.S.C. € 552(b)] If any or all material covered by this request is withheld, please inform me of the specific exemptions that are being claimed, and mark all deletions to indicate the exemption(s) being claimed to authorize each individual withholding. If the (b)(3) exemption is claimed, please indicate the relevant withholding statute(s). In addition, I ask that your agency exercise its discretion to release information that may be technically exempt. As you know, the Attorney General on October 4, 1993, directed that agencies should administer the FOIA under a presumption of disclosure, and that information which need not be withheld should not be. Please do not delay processing because of uncertainty about the request. I have reasonably described the records sought. If you have any questions regarding this request, please telephone me at the above number, and we can discuss your questions. I also request that fees be waived because Mr. Gilmore is deemed a media requester by your agency for FOIA purposes. Should there be any problem in this regard, Mr. Gilmore promises to pay up to $1000 in fees, and you should therefore begin processing of this request without fee-related delays. As provided under the FOIA, I will expect a reply within ten (10) working days. Sincerely, Lee Tien Attorney at Law On behalf of Mr. John Gilmore

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In Austin on 17th Dec - Want to meet Austin Cypherpunkers
by crunch＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greetings all you Austin Cypherpunkers. I'll be making a trek into your area on the 17th of Dec to attend the HoHoCon. If anyone wants to exchange PGP keys, and has a Mac, then contact me as soon as possible and I can give you all the details. I'll be staying at the Austin North Hilton & Towers and Super 8 Motel, abd be arriving about 4 pm or so. Looking forward to meeting all you Austin Cypherpunkers. I am also looking to see if any rave is scheduled on the evening of the 18th, as I would like to get in some serious dancing while there. Cheers Cap'n Crunch

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Re: Banning any subscriber
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The problem with user-based filtering is that the noise may still drive people off the list. New subscribers won't have filters set up initially (they may not know how to set them up, or it may take a while to figure out who, what, and how to filter) and they'll be subject to a barrage of rants and raves. They're likely to unsubscribe in disgust before taking the time to uncover the jewels amid the slime. Also, Tim has noted problems with the user-based filtering on the extropians list. Different people have different filter settings, so there can be multiple redundant postings of outside information - magazine articles, other newsgroup or mailing list posts, etc. Nobody knows what material anyone else has seen. There is also something of a learning curve in using the extropians filtering, despite it being conceptually easy to use. A few weeks ago, it seemed that almost every day someone accidentally posted a filter command to the list. Tim noted at one point that he had surveyed local list members and found a great deal of ignorance about using the filters. I think it works better if the list community is seeing a common message stream, one which is of high quality, one which does not include messages of disruptive posters. Eric has given his blessing (at least implicitly) to an alternate list, one which is gatewayed bidirectionally to cypherpunks, but where such filtering is done. New subscribers to CP who were upset by the noise could be directed to this list when they unsubscribed. This would allow people to avoid receiving harrassing messages while still participating on the cypherpunks list. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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Re: Banning any subscriber
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Geoff Dale wrote: >I'm not entirely against positive reputation systems, but they really need >to be implimented on the user end, or at least be user settings, as on the >extropians list. > >But the main problem with positive reputation systems is dealing with the >zero reputation newbies. I don't want to see these guys shut out. Positive reputations _must_ be implemented at the user level, to my way of thinking. Any system which centrally administers the reputations, as in approved reading lists or movies approved by the Catholics (does this still exist?) is not really what most of us want. Newbies are often desirable and often turn into valued contributors--sometimes from their very first posts. So I personally would not want to filter them out. The "Extropians" software, which many of us have mentioned here, allows this kind of flexibility. I hope Cypherpunks can get it soon. --Tim May -- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

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