December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

IRS LEARNING . . .
by Sandy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Paul Baclace wrote: Well, obviously he should have taken tip from Ollie North and paid a courier to fly back and forth with $9500 at a time. No laws against that. Well, yes and no. As Perry pointed out, there is no limit to how much you can take out if you report it. The trouble is, though it is legal to take out less than $10,000 without reporting it, you can't perform a series of such transactions in order to ultimately move out an amount greater than $10k. They call it *structuring*, and it 'taint legal. Of course, structuring may be difficult to detect, so as a practical matter, you might get away with it. (If, however, you are found with $9500 in cash, they still might seize it under our wonderful new "fruits of drug dealing" laws.) But in any event, there are better ways to accomplish the same result. My favorite *fun* solution would be to buy $80,000 in travellers cheques and then *burn* them. I leave the rest of the transaction as an exercise for the student. S a n d y >>>>>> Please send e-mail to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com <<<<<< ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Generating random numbers
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 17:46:32 MDT >From: "Mike Johnson" <exabyte!smtplink!mikej(a)uunet.uu.net> >Message-Id: <9309147506.AA750645992(a)smtplink.exabyte.com> >Subject: Generating random numbers > >If you have an audio input to your computer, try recording noise from a fan, >traffic on a busy street, or the roar of a crowd at a football game. Then >compress the output to remove any obvious redundancies such as 60 Hz hum from >a fan motor or unused dynamic range of the input digitizer. This results in >much better "randomness" than some keystroke timing techniques. True. You get even better entropy if you turn off the mic (or unplug it) and run the sampled audio output into compress -- assuming your mic is like mine and lets a bit of electronic noise sneak through every byte or two. The fan noise sounds random to us but it's relatively simple, in Fourier space. The same applies to fluorescent light noise. Although it's simple, it can defeat compress - so you end up with low entropy per byte. - Carl

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Re: Detecting double-spending (long)
by an41418＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So, this method relies on trusting the bank? After all, Alice must include her identity in the messages, so that double spending can be detected later. When the bank verifies that it says 'Alice' and not 'Bozo', then it could keep track of her coins. Is this true? Is there a way of ever having an ananymous cash system where the bank does not have to be trusted at all? What I mean is, where the bank could not possible know the identities of its customers under any circumstances where no violation takes place? Wonderer ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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NSA already has a key distribution card for us to use
by remail＠tamsun.tamu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Along the same lines, I'm fairly sure that the NSA had a RFQ out for > much the same kind of thing. (Key management on PCMCIA memory cards.) The card already exists. It is called the TESERA (sp?) card. Guess what, it uses the Capstone chip (clipper + key exchange). I have also heard a rumour that there is a proposal to use a similar version of Capstone for the Administrations Health ID card. Clipper, coming to a health care provider near you...

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Re: Detecting double-spending (long)
by nobody＠alumni.cco.caltech.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Actually, it _is_ from the person in the "from" address above. The Portal system, from which I usually post, seems to have lost the ability to send mail to toad.com.) Wonderer asks: > So, this method relies on trusting the bank? After all, > Alice must include her identity in the messages, so that > double spending can be detected later. When the bank > verifies that it says 'Alice' and not 'Bozo', then it > could keep track of her coins. This method does not depend on trusting the bank not to reveal Alice's identity. That's why this is called "cash". As long as she does not double-spend, her identity is kept secret. I'm not sure whether you are asking about the part of the protocol where Alice withdraws her cash from the bank, or the later part where she spends the money and the merchant sends it to the bank. When she withdraws the money, she blinds the f(xi,yi) candidates by multiplying them by ri. For half of those, she has to reveal the ri, but that half IS NOT USED in the rest of the protocol. The ones which are used are blinded and so the bank never sees her <info> in those. When she spends the money and reveals the values to the merchant, Alice only includes her <info> in the form (ai xor <info>), where ai is a random value that nobody knows unless she double-spends. The ai "blinds" the <info> so that (ai xor <info>) does not reveal <info>. Only if she double-spends is both ai and (ai xor <info>) revealed for some i, and only then is her <info> exposed. Hal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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IRS LEARNING . . .
by Sandy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Paul Baclace wrote: Well, obviously he should have taken tip from Ollie North and paid a courier to fly back and forth with $9500 at a time. No laws against that. Well, yes and no. As Perry pointed out, there is no limit to how much you can take out if you report it. The trouble is, though it is legal to take out less than $10,000 without reporting it, you can't perform a series of such transactions in order to ultimately move out an amount greater than $10k. They call it *structuring*, and it 'taint legal. Of course, structuring may be difficult to detect, so as a practical matter, you might get away with it. (If, however, you are found with $9500 in cash, they still might seize it under our wonderful new "fruits of drug dealing" laws.) But in any event, there are better ways to accomplish the same result. My favorite *fun* solution would be to buy $80,000 in travellers cheques and then *burn* them. I leave the rest of the transaction as an exercise for the student. S a n d y >>>>>> Please send e-mail to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com <<<<<< ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Triple-DES strength (was Re: Monitor radiation overlooking.)
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You wrote: >Some words about DES - I spoke with one cryptoanalisyst from >KGB and he sow, that for number crypto algotitm c(key, text) >(key is keyLength tall) present f(key, text), that for all >key1 and key2 present key with length keyLength, that >c(key2, c(key1, text))==f(key, text). > >He also say, that now present f() for c()=des(), more f() wery >like des(). > >That`s why for decrypting of des(k1, des(k2, ... des(kN, text) ... )) >we must try 2^56 keys with spetial function. I suspect that you will get several comments about the proof that DES isn't a group. That doesn't apply here since you have not claimed that f() is DES -- only that it's DES-like. I would expect the strength of triple-DES to show up in Diff.Cryp. attacks, but maybe not. Meanwhile, I stick to my sci.crypt suggestion: compress|des|tran|des|tran|des If you could get more details from your KGB friend about that attack, there are one or two people here who would be very interested. :-) - Carl

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Re:Glitches in PGP messages
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To all who responded to my question about some truncation of lines in PGP messages, my thanks. It did indeed turn out to be a CR/LF problem. The problem being that there were none in the entire message! I looked at the messages I had been getting in my text editor and found the text to be one long line. I surmise that this has something to do with why PGP then truncates at line 16 of the ciphertext every time, interesting. My friend uses a program called POPMAIL to post with, which I now advise people to avoid. It seems to be hard to hack with a Mac. Thanks to y'all again. Scott G. Morham !The First, vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu! Second ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace

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key management workshop
by zeek 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm interested in starting a key management workshop for the purpose of learning more about how to properly manage keys, the use of anon remailers, hopping mail, and pgp in general. I would appreciate copies of your public key if you are interested in participating. Please keep in mind this exersise is for EXPERIMENTAL PURPOSES ONLY. I'm running pgp on a shared system, therefore the security here is not fully tamperproof (ie. passwords can be picked up on the line from this local machine to the remote site). If you would rather submit a "test" key, please do so. I would like to know if anyone on either list has objections to using the cypherpunks(a)toad.com and/or austin-cypherpunks(a)mcfeeley.utexas.edu list as places of exchange of group messages. One last thing; any information on the format for hopping mail through encryption supported remailers would be appreciated. I look forward to your support and participation. Thank you, - -z - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAiy/d2oAAAEEAPEFrakegXbaR6SYC8/aG0Fy6I0BFF8jjzim/6ekJP3wdVXb EGqjnRGoL9yJHNuLQudDBoHmV1LfJdsy1gzONcEbM2mmuxKGUSh1KUypbtZVc23Z FD/LmQmOs1cl3yQgs5d8r1/2H1TWl80sWS+RAg02lMqkTxhL/GH4Xujemt89AAUR tCtLZXZpbiBULiBLcnV6aWNoIDx6ZWVrQGJvbmdvLmNjLnV0ZXhhcy5lZHU+ =TgqV - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLMHzrGH4Xujemt89AQG7ZQP/Qlbp/VVNRYp1J+z9IbFhGU1866rzxTyh ErPNxyJ2HLIs4iSBQDMFRbHLCwtoZw7qnPXyBY4EH1Xjwdbp/bbq+vChH7n7mA0E s05u4zKNklT5bTjX0WC0tNXSX87YrDvcnysCbdxQWpXJzu9TbHBJwfVFEPA+f98B E8Cwl0/TMWs= =un/i -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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IRS LEARNING . . .
by Sandy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Punksters, I wrote: My favorite *fun* solution would be to buy $80,000 in travellers cheques and then *burn* them. To which Phil Karn responded: Well, yes, I suppose you could then leave the country, find an **Amex** office and file a claim for the missing $80,000 of travelers checks, but wouldn't this generate precisely the kind of paper trail you're trying to avoid? . . . I do suspect that **the** government will eventually point to digital cash as justification for controlling all of cryptography. [**emphasis** added.] Folks, you have to stop thinking so parochially. The world is full of travelers check companies. Most of them protect their clients' privacy. Moreover, there is no *the government*. At any given time, their are 100-200 competing nation-states and other semi-autonomous political entities. Phil went on to say: Or they will refuse to back it [digital cash] up in court as legal tender, thus helping undermine it. I know there's this concept called "reputation" that's supposed to take the place of the government enforcing contracts, but I have a hard time understanding just how it will work for very large transactions between individuals (like buying a house or even a used car). Think a minute here. What legal tender laws back up the very travelers checks we have been discussing? What government says merchants must accept your Amex/Bank of American/Citibank/Thomas Cook/etc. travelers checks? As for "very large transactions," I again leave that as an exercise for the student. (Hint: How might an escrow be used?) I apologize to Phil for using him as an example of the provincial nature of the Cypherpunks list. At least, he is working with the concepts. The Cypherpunks list, though nominally international, is dominated by Americans. Unfortunately, we Yanks bring our own peculiar form of ethnocentrism to the list. (I also apologize to non-US list members for belaboring the obvious.) Punksters, we live in a transnational world. We work and play on the transnational Internet. Our computers and our cryptography transcend the evil empires. Transnationalize yourself; and swim like a fish through the sea of the nation-states. With apologies to Mao, S a n d y >>>>>> Please send e-mail to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com <<<<<< ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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