December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Nazis/probability of their mention and/or use to discredit
by Dark 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Message 53: - From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Mon Nov 1 10:35:58 1993 From: James Still <still(a)kailua.colorado.edu> To: 'Cypherpunks List' <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> Subject: RE: Nazis/Privacy/Cypherpunks Date: Mon, 01 Nov 93 09:08:00 PST >Personally, I don't rule out examination of Nazi tactics as a >worst case scenario model. Let's face it, as ugly and dark as >Nazi rule was, they did some things quite efficiently indeed. [Stuff Deleted] If I understand your basic point to be: "consider the worst possible scenario in order to better prepare for it" then I agree completely. However I have serious reservations with emulating or (gadzooks!) *admiring* those Nazi tactics that seemed to "work" because I would disagree that, first they actually did work, and more importantly, that their ends justified the means. Which brings me to your second point: - -> Let me make clear that I do not (gadzooks appropiate here) condone any Nazi security measures. My point was more to provoke thought about how Nazi security techniques would pan out in the information age. Again, the question, did they work, is debateable. <- >[Note 2] >No one writes code from "the bottom up" in the manner that you >suggest. If that were the case we'd see the wheel invented time >and time again. I disagree. (Semantics check: I'm not talking about a mouse driver or a basic windowing interface here. Obviously, there's no need to hammer out that wheel again.) I am talking about what I see as a basic cypherpunk mission, that being, "the constant reevaluation of the approach towards privacy." We have the ability to constantly rip apart our own ideas, like children's ABC blocks, and see if they fit back together again in a better way. I would prefer to see constant rewrite's of a "given" (like PGP for instance) than to stagnate and rely on the one idea, concept, or proof just because we've always done it that way. Our code should be like our ethics: constantly re- evaluated, questioned, and tested for validity. - -> I interpreted your ground up analogy incorrectly. I do believe that ideas should be examined and reassembled. I just think it's silly to rule out anything that might have merit. (I guess I'm just determined to be flamed here on the merit of anything Nazi) <- - -uni- (Dark) --- still(a)kailua.colorado.edu -------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLNc0/BibHbaiMfO5AQFrXwQAoxfek4YivmYGsAc21mS6LrRLqTkDXrB1 62o+te0Fge3k2drHiC9oKPEXGa3Aid6/Td3HjDb7IjFsXvAlyD6P/x4IXtVw1W2J Tb2CnwoNl0mz171iLIjHIHAWcfDqwzU5mYgPb1T5XyntgFJTJ966tvEIYhhfkvcH nU5EVDMsdyo= =nSBc -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: trivia question
by Alan Ruttenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This topic is inappropriate for cypherpunks. At the least next time please acknowledge this and ask for replies in private email. Eric My apologies. I've only joined the list recently and was just passing on a question which someone else thought might be answered in this forum. Please direct any further responses to my email address. Thanks -alan

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Style Analysis
by Dark 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -> Back when jpinson(a)fcdarwin.org.ec said.... [Stuff deleted, no value judgment implied] The researchers analyzed the frequency distribution of words found in the works of Shakespeare, and compared them to the other writers of the day. I don't recall the results of the project, but that kind of research would have implications for anonymous postings. It is not too difficult to see how certain spelling errors, word frequency (how often do you say 'I':-) choice of wording, and the working vocabulary of an individual could allow you to identify an anonymous poster. This would be particularly easy if the individual also posted under their real name. [Stuff deleted, no value judgment implied] This brings up the subject of how one can post without leaving an "ASCII fingerprint". I suspect the use of a spelling checker and grammatical checker would help. Perhaps running your text through a language converter, (say English to French) then back would remove many identifying characteristics. Jim Pinson Galapagos Islands PGP key available by finger jpinson(a)fcdarwin.org.ec - -> to which I reply: It seems to me that the software to "filter" a message through and remove anomalies, standardize punctuations and replace words over 5 letters with more standard words.. etc.. has a kind of utility. I particularly like the two sweep translation program idea. If enough people used this software it would become meaningless to attempt this kind of analysis, which looks to be straightforward enough to give even the persistent investigator a "gut feel" for the identity of an otherwise anonymous poster. It seems that the most solid basis for this kind of message analysis is non-standard use of grammar, spelling, and punctuation. I, for example, use too many commas. Anyone have any information on what factors identify posters? Is it just word frequency analysis or...? It would be easy enough to correct that. - -uni- (Dark) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLNGcxxibHbaiMfO5AQFVIwP+JsuNvRmE1WlFZ7wxvIybg1bTa0FO5/N7 4XrHQ0On1avtoFDjPAmA7dqgrHHscz8LiwYEx1eXx/exOPmZkA2sCg5/AVo61zv6 iBjsqd3o5IgV9L+uXmzl2+OBJ0zpdTyNxiV7VzrKjJqKVlzZgCqbYCB8tN5cOpFj M3FnGQZfSsg= =a1Hf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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My PGP key
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I finally got linux/a secure place for PGP set up-- here's my key. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAiyGsCgAAAEEAKrK7SMIBaiBzQRigdhA5BlztMpiCrs4ooWeMEZYpCl8/FPf bz3LHri5dYRNBMLnpv7c8Ezn/nUTbcIPs0zVXpj/8t/4lP1AHHg6QDky1KwBYFaW 9LLAye4EBD3kKq3UvctmdIK225ouMKn6X5+PgNT+dbhwV5LPeXi7eNFdXppdAAUR tCpTYW1lZXIgUGFyZWtoIChzdHJvbmcpIDxzYW1lZXJAbmV0Y29tLmNvbT6JAJUC BRAsiAJ+C/JrSKEuC60BAaFuA/0cu/WBeLvnc1dIEIep/oI4JHqx96QwpC2TOJAp LK/IkVXF9fUUnNHYK6JtxnWj4iowoxYmsuVqJR3bfPND4wYk0Amgu9SQAHu1IDiz cFbXVJ9YwY1u/yZ1+CEQGnUD+ZcXSkIZh3UXu1ubW3iHcAIZ+AbVfuXd082tJo5E QWqzPLQvU2FtZWVyIFBhcmVraCA8Y3M2MGEtcXVAY29yeS5FRUNTLkJlcmtlbGV5 LkVEVT60JlNhbWVlciBQYXJla2ggPHNhbWVlckBnZW5lc2lzLm1jcy5jb20+tChT YW1lZXIgUGFyZWtoIDxzYW1lZXJAc29kYS5iZXJrZWxleS5lZHU+tCdTYW1lZXIg UGFyZWtoIDxzYW1lZXJAb2NmLmJlcmtlbGV5LmVkdT60KlNhbWVlciBQYXJla2gg PHNhbWVlckB1Y2xpbmsuYmVya2VsZXkuZWR1Pg== =Rgag -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Procmail update.
by J. Michael Diehl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all! Just a quick update on my procmail mail processor rc file. I have most of the functionality implemented. I'm working on speeding up mail delivery and making sure I don't have a file locking problem. So far, my system will: 1 Accept incoming mail and determine if it contains a pgp message, key, or signature. 2 If it contains a message, it determines who can read it. 3 If it contains a key, it is added to your pubring.pgp 4 If it contains a signed message, the signature is validated. 5 An informative subset of pgp's output is tacked onto the head of the message, surrounded by user-defined lines to prevent spoofing of the validation info. 6 Finally, the subject of the mail is prefixed with either (key), (sig), (prv) to indicate that the message contains a key, signed message, or encrypted (private) message. I also have the capability to use procmail as a pgp-info server. You could send me mail with the subject: send pgp-help and my machine would send you a file which contains help for pgp. This could lead to lots of uses.... Any comments are welcome. I should be releasing my procmailrc file within the week. Take care, all Lagers, J. Michael Diehl ;^) |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the mdiehl(a)triton.unm.edu | Government forgets about the 1st! <RL> Mike.Diehl(a)f29.n301.z1 |*God is a good Physicist, and an even .fidonet.org | better Mathematician. <Me> al945(a)cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politicly Incorrect! <Me> Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1 12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D

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MORE Z
by thomas.hughes＠chrysalis.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

some seriously moronic dribling idiot wrote: >> o i suggest adding an "ignore list" of sites. fine. it was late. i wasn't thinking clearly. shut up. i don't wanna hear it. this idea would work fine if you happen to have a clue where the hell the abusive/annoying messages are comming from ... how about just switching that around to be a "lock out these sites" list and ignore all messages that ask to be remailed to those sites. and be sure to stick "willy(a)whitehouse.gov" on the top of the list.

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RE-RE-RE-RE: ZEE
by thomas.hughes＠chrysalis.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>Random mailing routes actually make it easier to track down the >>original sender. >>Perhaps you missed an earlier message I sent to the list ("Anonymous >>Mail"). If the message proceeds randomly through the remailers, then >>every single site must somehow be told the final address. Therefore, >>instead of just one site knowing the final destination, every site >>must know the final destination. if every single site knows the final address, so what? how is this going to help them track down the original sender?? anyone at the final destination who wants to track down the original sender would need to hop-scotch backwards through the numerous sites and try to track down the path the message took. this is of course, IF someone really wants to go to this much trouble and if they think they can talk a slew of administrators into helping them with the witchhunt. 1 out of 5 odds that a "special processing script" is executed on the message and it is forwarded through a remailer or two using encryption. just set up 20 different scripts that route the message in encrypted form through various/random/secret/obscure remailer-paths.

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Re: TRW PhonePrint (fwd)
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Each cellular telephone emits unique signal transmission characteristics - an >electronic version of a human fingerprint - which cannot be duplicated. These >characteristics are matched with the mobile identification number (MIN) and the >electronic serial number (ENS) of the phone to develop a unique pattern for >each legitimate customer I would take it that this would have to operate at the cell level?

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INFO: Word Cracking program
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I saw several requests for a program that can break the encryption on Word for Windows ans Word for Dos files....I have just uploaded WORDPWD>ZIP to (thats wordpwd.zip) to soda.berkeley.edu cd pub/cypherpunks/incoming. I think the author put it best; HELLO MICROSOFT: If any of you are listening; it would be very nice if future versions of Winword had competent encryption that can't be broken by any kid who understands his Spiderman Secret Decoder Ring. A false sense of security is much worse than none at all. It misleads people into thinking that they have assured the confidentiality of their documents when they have in fact not, and should have used another method to do so. The best approach is to have winword call an external program to do the encryption. This would let us plug in our favourite cryptengine and save you a lot of hassle vis-a-vis export controls on useful crypto technology. --- Marc Thibault | Automation Architect | All we are saying marc(a)tanda.isis.org | R.R.1, Oxford Mills, | is give global CIS:71441,2226 | Ontario, Canada K0G 1S0 | warming a chance. NC FreeNet: aa185 | | -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.0 mQBNAiqxYTkAAAECALfeHYp0yC80s1ScFvJSpj5eSCAO+hihtneFrrn+vuEcSavh AAUwpIUGyV2N8n+lFTPnnLc42Ms+c8PJUPYKVI8ABRG0I01hcmMgVGhpYmF1bHQg PG1hcmNAdGFuZGEuaXNpcy5vcmc+ =HLnv -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- enjoy... Brian D Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot

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TRW PhonePrint (fwd)
by remail＠tamsun.tamu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FACT SHEET What is TRW PhonePrintTM ? TRW PhonePrintTM is a system designed to block illegal access to cellular networks by cellular "counterfeiters" who use stolen telephone identification numbers. How Does It Work? Each cellular telephone emits unique signal transmission characteristics - an electronic version of a human fingerprint - which cannot be duplicated. These characteristics are matched with the mobile identification number (MIN) and the electronic serial number (ENS) of the phone to develop a unique pattern for each legitimate customer, TRW PhonePrintTM uses sophisticated signal analysis hardware and software to analyze and file the patterns belonging to legitimate customers. When a caller attempts to access the network, the system compares incoming patterns to those on file. If the patterns do not match the call is immediately terminated. Who Benefits? Cellular telephone fraud costs the industry up to $300 million annually. TRW PhonePrintTM benefits cellular operators and customers by: o Terminating fraudulent calls before they can access the system o Eliminating the need for legitimate users to change phone numbers or codes. o Increasing the capacity of the network by eliminating the flow of illegal traffic. o Building customer confidence in the security of the cellular network. When Will It Be Available? TRW PhonePrintTM is currently being tested by PacTel Cellular, Los Angeles. Testing is expected to be completed in early 1994, and the system will be made available to cellular carriers nationwide. The Company TRW, headquartered in Cleveland, Ohio, is strategically focused on providing products and services with a high technology or engineering content.

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