December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

CPSR NII Paper
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com B> COMPUTER SCIENTISTS RAISE SOCIAL AND DESIGN CONCERNS B> ABOUT THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY B>many dangers on the horizon B>small number of companies dominate the market B>companies control the programming B>pricing structures do not cover universal service B>privacy isn't protected B>not designed to allow everyone to communicate freely B>"To achieve that vision, however, the government must play a major role B>in the design, development, and regulation of the network." Commies -- Ya gotta love 'em. Are there any "designs" for the NII that don't include telephones, email, and internetworking connections? Given those, the rest is irrelevent. Anyone who wants to can build their own virtual networks no matter what the "service providers" do. Are these people stupid or just power mad? Networking is and will continue to be nearly free. Who has better network connections with "universal access" Europeans or Amricans? Duncan Frissell "Skim the Cream" "Skim the Cream" "Skim the Cream" -- the next commie that says that to me is sure going to get his cream skimmed. --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Re: an open offer
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"S. Boxx" tries to scare us by writing: > >(To the insiders: it will be quite awhile before we sort everything out >and file charges, so be patient.) Perhaps as long as several millenia, eh? -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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Join kotze1@batis.bis.und.ac.za
by Christopher Kotze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, please Add me Chris

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No subject
by an45548＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Any other cypherpunks going to the ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security next week? If so, is there any interest in getting a BOF together? ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Another Tussle with a Tentacle
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor(a)foretune.co.jp> >I agree with him that this is an area of great potential concern. While >I am not opposed to the principle of maintaining multiple identities on >the net, the rule of netiquette should be that "multiple identities should >_NEVER_ intersect." what, pray tell, do you define as *intersection*? the very existence of the two pseudonyms on the same Cyberspace can be considered an `intersection'. >So I support "L. Detweiler"s right to be "Jim," but they ought never to >support each other. His scenario is chillingly _possible_. the scenario is chillingly *true*. And I do not support it. I condemn it. >At the same time, I think such episodes will be rare. The amount of >effort needed to maintain multiple intersecting identities is quite high, >and in most cases would be "uneconomic." However, in some cases, for >some people, the effort might be worth it, so some thought ought to >be placed into ways to detect or discourage it. again, more Medusa-cypherpunk brainwashing. `don't worry about this. it's not a big deal. no one would be evil enough to do this. heaven forbid, don't do anything rash like invent robust identity mechanisms that would *prevent* me from continuing to exploit this weakness in the system and inherent trust of others.' >Which brings up the question: how can we, in the era of digital pseudonyms >determine that two pseudos are, or are not, the same person? One possible >method would be careful automated analysis of the language used by >the participants in a net discussion. hah, hah! society has already evolved many other mechanisms that have worked for centuries, and `you' promote obscure black magic. the problem is, all that stuff is just to damn mundane and oppressive. it's equivalent to Retinal Scans and a Camera on Every Corner. cypherpunks, you have no idea how much you are being brainwashed. a true Thought Crime if there ever was one. wipe wipe, slosh slosh, scrub scrub. look! sparkling white! now, to pour in the blackness...

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Some possible projects/topics for CypherPunks
by remail＠tamsun.tamu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's some topics that I've been wanting to bring up with the CypherPunks. I figured it'd be best to just drop one email/post rather than 4. 1. HARDWARE: What about building our own machines? This is the Vinge-ian crypto-anarchy theme ultimately. We should be able to produce our own technology, and not depend on the merchantile/government-mandated economic system/monopolies. I see this as being very important to the oceania/autopia/technomad ideas and projects of creating ocean-going free societies. Or is anyone interested in starting a parallel list of sorts for the hardware-punks? 'ware-punks? :-) or perhaps an even better name would be The Homebrew Computer Club^2. 2. STEGENOGRAPHY: Using the genome project data listings (bionet.molbio.genbank.updates) as a stegenographic source to hide encrypted info in. Similar to the alt.w.a.s.t.e NG, but more public. Of course, it'd be bad if your ecrypted data got credited with curing/causing a genetic disease.... => 3. PUNK-NET: (see HARDWARE above) 4. POLITICS/ANONYMITY: I may have missed this, but has anyone discussed Gibson's "The Republic of Desire" idea of having a network based guerilla organization? Not that we need to be guerilla's yet, but... I think the guerilla cell organization would probably lend itself to using the DC-net protocols, and developing webs-of-trust organizations. Thoughts, comments, etc? sweetly, Ducoyuh Gemugez Tokuzuham Neshotsu

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Re: a desperate plea
by George A. Gleason 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ray, your little rant about Detweiler, with those "I'm going to kill you" things, is really getting on my nerves as well. "wimp" and so on are ad-hominems of the worst kind; in Berkeley we'd take that as a homophobic slur similar to saying, "typical Jewish attitude" or some such. Please stop clogging the mailing list with this bullshit, like NOW. If you have rational points to make in a spirit of good will, please do so. If all you have to say is along the lines of your last posting, then I'd urge you to get the hell off this list, and find somewhere else to play dumb games. -gg

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Re: No subject
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Any other cypherpunks going to the ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security next week? If so, is there any interest in getting a BOF together? I'll be there -- I'm presenting a paper. But I don't know about BOFs with a bunch of folks wearing masks... --Steve Bellovin

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Re: Apple, AOCE, and key pair security
by Peter Wayner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last night, I installed my version of System 7 Pro-- the new version of the Apple Macintosh Operating System with built in Digital Signature capabilities. Here's the details: 1) The package contains two extra pieces of paper. One is a voucher that is good for one free certificate. The second is an address and instructions for just what to do. 2) The installation process is very simple. You click on some icon to get the software running and then you: i) Fill in a form with your name and address. ii) Choose a country from a very long list. iii) Add in an identifying phrase. The manual says that you should "Type a word or phrase you can remember. You may have to provide this phrase if the Approval Authority needs to verify your identity." This may be used if you forget or lose something. I'm not sure. Perhaps it is a random number seed. Perhaps it is transmitted to RSA for the same purposes as the "mother's maiden name" passphrase used by banks. I don't know. iv) Then you type in a password. This is the same password that you type in each time you want to make a signature for a document. It seems to encrypt your private key. Jim Bidzos says that the software is careful enough to do this work only in memory where it is relatively safe. v) You choose a location for your signing icon. At first this will be "unapproved" and it won't work. Eventually, when you get a disk back from RSA, you'll be able to sign a document just by dragging it on to the signing icon. Then a dialog box will open up asking you for password. vi) A "processing" box appears and says that it will need to compute for the next 1 to 10 minutes. It doesn't say that it is looking for a prime, but that is entirely possible. Paranoids will hate this opacity. 3) Now, you get a nice print out of some random characters. The text says that you can just send the paper if you've a printer that is capable of 300 dpi resolution. Apparently, they plan on using OCR to read this in. 4) You take this paper to a Notary Public and present 3 forms of identification. The form asks the Notary to write down all of this and sign it. It also instructs the Notary that this cannot be done in any other way than in person. No Agents, Spouses etc. 5) You mail it off to a PO Box in Belmont CA and wait. 6) When it comes back, you probably get a disk that will allow you to initialize everything. Some Random Observations: *) The Certificates come with a built-in time limit. They're only good for two years. The software comes with a renewal mechanism so I think that people will be mailing checks in a couple of years. *) I'm not sure how complicated this procedure is for large corporate users. The book hints that you may get your signature from a company representative. *) They included a sample signer so you can play with the technology out of the box. I signed a few things and got the software to break by trying to sign the "DigiSign Utility." I.e. itself. *) The signature verification process is very well integrated. You simply open up the little info box that is available for each icon. There will be a extra button with a pen. Push it and the name and address of the signatory pops up. *) The signature is saved as a resource in the resource fork. The address is in the clear including several addresses for RSA. I tried fudging with them for grins and the signature broke. The software reported that it was tampered with. Good show. *) It took about 30 seconds to sign a 200k document on a IIci. Final impressions: Software Ease of Use: A+ Paranoia Avoidance: F (no source code or instructions on how to generate your own signature) RSA Cash Infusion: A (more checks in 2 years) Boost to Public Crypto Usage in short term: A+ Boost to Public Crypto Usage Two Years from now when the Certificates Run Out: INC (Who can remember to re-authorize these things?)

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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