December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

CryptoCards
by Matthew J Miszewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone send me either a vendor of SecureIds (or a similar challenge/response card) or a Spec sheet, parts list and approximate cost of manufacture of one of these monsters? I've got some ideas for Telco security schemes but Id like to see what sort of Margin Im looking at first. Thanx ahead of time. --Matt ______________________________________________________________________________ In defense of liberty, encrypt for all purposes, civil and professional. In defense of privacy, encrypt all correspondence, personal and professional. In defense of sanity, do not encrypt your dry cleaning invoice! ++++++++--------mjmiski(a)macc.wisc.edu (c)1993

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Re: Guerilla Cells
by owen＠autodesk.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI(a)macc.wisc.edu> > > The sendero luminoso in Peru also works this way...Of course if you break their > rules, they break your neck! > > For security reasons each 'member' of the Shining Path is only allowed > to know of two other persons in the heirarchy. This makes for good > plausible deniability as well as qwik and efficient dissolution. In Light of my posting regarding The A./. A./. ( oh.. my use of the "./." glyph is s'posed to be an ascii representation of a glyph comprised of three dots in an equalateral traingular shape, that is when its not signifying the everlasting secret family connections of the CP's -ie:cum pigs- and stands for the erect phallus and testacles :-) it should be noted that *Sendero Luminoso - shining path* is a blatant reference to Masonic/hermetic practice. It should also be noted that Masons have been (succesfully) using graphic key based encryption of their secrets for as long as they have been around, that passwords are another key element of their craft, and that every president of the united states except one has been a mason. ( can we guess which one? :-) LUX ./. owen this message needs no NSA fodder, it is subversive enough in its directness.

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Re: The Republic of Desire (anonymous organizations)
by owen＠autodesk.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > My only problem with this is knowing how to organize the > >"guerilla cell structures" or whatever it was he mentioned. Anyone have > >a ref for something that discusses guerilla cell organizations? > > The classic Russian model (late 1800's through the October Revolution) was > to have three-person cells, each of which had one person who knew one > person above them in the hierarchy and someone who knew one person below > them. This makes for good security as there is no redundant information in > the network and one failure breaks the chain. Which was also adopted by the weather-underground in the early seventys. I think a better, and non-political, model is the Astrum Argentum. The A./.A./. is a masonic style hermetic organisation. A secret society if you will. Yes it was headed by Aleister Crowley, yes it still exists today, no I cannot tell you how to contact any part of it. Thats your task to accomplish, if that is your will. I happen to believe that the philosophical basis of the A./.A./., and the OTO, otherwise known as THELEMA, offers us a glimpse of how the future is unfolding. To those pragmatists and engineering types who scoff at Magickal organisations and its members, I can only say that I truley believe if you look without prejudice - suspend disbelief - and recognise the key nature of the basic underpinnings of hermetic philosophy, you will see that *the mysterys* are laid bare all the time, and are no mystery at all, but rather good common sense. Cypherpunks above all others should easily understand that it is possible to code information in such ways that only those who have the key can understand the hidden message (esoteric) while all others see only the filler text ( exoteric). Protect the mysterys, reveal them daily. LUX ./. owen

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unsubscribe
by Thomas J. Merritt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please remove me from the cypherpunks mailing list and add me to the cypherpunks-announce mailing list. I don't have time to filter through all this stuff. Thanks, TJ Merritt tjm(a)netcom.com

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Re: All our eggs in one basket?
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry Metzger writes > Jim Miller says: > > However, proving them wrong while also retaining your anonymity may > > be a trick. > > If all transactions require digitally signed confirmation from the > bank, you have an audit trail from them that they can't deny was theirs. > So to prove that the bank is lying you show a third party your copy of the digitally signed receipt of the disputed transaction? I assume the third party uses the bank's public key and your public key to verify the receipt. This brings up a good question: How does the withdraw of digital money from a bank account work? In particular, how does the bank simultaneously give you money and a receipt that neither party could repudiate? I can see how they could give you the money and a receipt signed by the bank. I do not yet see how they could simultaneously give you the money and a receipt signed by both parties. I imagine the bank would use one of the simultaneous contract signing protocols and somehow produce an encryption key as the last step. The key would be used to decrypt the digital money, which was sent in an earlier step in an encrypted form. However, how can the person withdrawing the money verify the digital money is for the amount stated in the receipt if they only get the key after the last step in the receipt signing protocol. I am confused. I must not be thinking of the correct protocol. How is this situation handled? Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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Attn: BlackNet.
by an49149＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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UNSUBSCRIBE
by michael＠sdl.hitachi.co.jp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please remove me from your cypherpunks mailing list. Could you add me to the cypherpunks-announce mailing list instead? Thanks, M.B.

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The Republic of Desire (anonymous organ
by kone＠courier1.sha.cornell.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

< A < / \ < B - C < / \ < D G < / \ / \ < E - F H - I < Another problem in this set up is: What if "B" is caught and put in jail/killed? How are "D" and company (including "J, K, L" and on) going to stay in touch? Some one posted that useing a "I am caught" key might help cover the trail. I think it would cut down on the uptree pateren but might not pass on info downtree. Would a side to side contact help? A / \ B - C / \ D G / \ / \ E - F - H - I How would one keep the cross over safe? An "in case of loss of contact, use PGP Key xxx?" Ideas? Will

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Re: All our eggs in one basket?
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry Metzger writes > What needed is a) the bank has to be able to show a third party a > signed request for every transaction they've performed, and b) you > have to be able to show a third party a signed (by the bank) receipt > for every transaction you've performed. In other words, you are > protected because the bank can't simply claim to the arbitrator "oh, > he withdrew all his money yesterday" because they can't show an order. > The bank is protected because you can't claim "oh, I deposited ten > million dollars yesterday" if you can't show a receipt. > I'm still confused, only in a different way. Let's let I want to withdraw $10,000... 1) I send the bank a signed request to withdraw 10,000 dollars 2) The bank withdraws the money but doesn't sends it to me. I go to the arbitrator and say: "The bank cheated me!!" The bank says: "We sent you the money. Here is your withdraw request, signed by you. You are lying." ------ How can I prove that the bank did not send me the money? The withdraw protocol must somehow produce a receipt, signed by *me*, saying I receiving the money. If the bank cannot present such a receipt, then the arbitrator shouldn't believe that the bank really sent the money. Yet why would I sign a receipt before verifying that the bits the bank sent me was a valid chunk of digital money? Does this mean the bank sends me valid digital money first and I reply with a signed receipt? If so, what if I claim that the transmition failed and I didn't receive the money, but I really *did* get the money? I could then tell the bank that I changed my mind and I want them to rollback the withdraw transaction? I would walk off with a valid chuck of digital money, yet my account was not decremented. Obviously I'm still missing something. Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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Remailer cdodhner@indirect.com DOWN (temp)
by Christian D. Odhner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My sysadmin, due to some sort of security concern, has decreed that .forward files shall not be able to call any execution of code other than certain designated filters. Thus my remailer rolled over and died and lost three days of my mail. My sysadmin is helping me devise a workaround now so my remailer can be the exception to the rule, or bypass the rule entirely without compromiseing security of the site. I'll post to the list when it's back up. (btw, I'm off the cypherpunks list now, on cp-request) Happy Hunting, -Chris Christian Douglas Odhner | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry cdodhner(a)indirect.com | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!" My opinions are shareware. To register your copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash. Key fingerprint = 58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38 82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11

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