December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The same is true of e-mail over the Internet--there is no statutory exclusionary rule that would prvent its admissibility in court. It is at least theoretically possible, however, to exclude illegally seized communications of these sorts using a "pure 4th Amendment" (nonstatutory) exclusionary rule. Don't hold your breath, though. Do you really think that? One could argue, fairly strongly, that the rules set forth in the ECPA have created an expectation of privacy, and that a violation of that expectation would be exactly the violation of the 4th Amendment that the Supreme Court addressed in the 1967 decision that led to the original wiretap provisions in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.

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Re: the public key minefield
by baumbach＠atmel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> The question is phrased improperly. Apart from the fact that the > concept (though not the reality) of anti-gravity is prior art, they > didn't patent the concept of public-key cryptography. Rather, they > patented a class of devices fitting a certain description, with one > public key cryptosystem as an example and as a separate set of claims. > To use your analogy, I could patent anti-gravity achieved by interposing > a screen of some substance opaque to gravity, and patent Cavorite as > an instance of that class. If you had another use for Cavorite, you'd > be home free. Or if you found a way to neutralize gravity by beaming > anti-gravitons downward, you'd probably be clear, too. But if you > found another substance besides Cavorite that was opaque to gravity -- > yes, that would be covered by my patent. (Fortunately, H.G. Wells didn't > patent his literary device. But I can't think of another science > fiction author who used that technique....) > > It's certainly possible that all possible cryptosystems that achieve the > same effect would be covered by their description. That, of course, is > the mark of a good patent attorney's work -- that he or she managed to > fashion so broad a claim. But maybe you can find a better way to do what > you really want to do, which is trade keys and authenticate messages. I think you have convinced me. I don't want to be convinced, so maybe I will try again later, when I have learned more about it. ;-) This means to me, that you cannot patent a broad claim, until you have a narrow specific example of it. Anti-gravity had prior art, public key systems did not. If without inventing a public key system, someone had described the concept in general terms, then prior art would exist for this as well. The person who invented the wheel (or sled?) might have been able to have claims broad enough to cover hovercrafts. > And if you do -- well, then, the patent system has succeeded in its goals, > in that the monopoly assigned to someone else has stimulated you to find > another way to do things, and thus furthered the useful arts and sciences. At what expense? Will our government win some battles, it might otherwise lose to the cypherpunks? Would legal access to pgp, now, be a deciding factor to maintaining legal access to non-clipper encryption later? Peter Baumbach baumbach(a)atmel.com

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Re: the public key minefield (fwd)
by Svetlana Borisova 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

svet wrote:

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Re: Clinton UN Speech / Msg to Prez/VP
by plaz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry Metzger states (perhaps incorrectly): >Mike Ingle says: >> In his UN speech this morning, Clinton talked about cracking down on nuke >> and missile proliferation, and he also mentioned eliminating cold-war-era >> restrictions which are harming American business. Let's put together a >> message to president(a)whitehouse.gov and vice-president(a)whitehouse.gov >> (since Gore is the info-highway guru) stating our position. > >Messages sent to president(a)whitehouse.gov are weighed, not read. I >suspect this will have about as much effect on the president as a note >written in a bottle and tossed into the ocean. > >However, on that basis, its perfectly harmless for you to send a >letter saying anything whatsoever other than a threat on the >president's life, so if you and others would like to spend time >writing such a thing, you can feel free. Just remember that there is >no cypherpunks organization, so you can't claim to represent us. Depends how you define harmless. If I recall the original e-mail release correctly, they do archive all messages. No assurances are made that these messages will not be used against you (ie- might end up in some file on you; I doubt that it would be used in court). To reenforce Perry's point: Any threats against the Prez or his clan WILL get forwarded to the secret service, so DON'T pull that one. Death threats are useless (and most likely counter-productive) tactics anyway. But writing letters to that address are probably at least as effective as writing to him via US Snail. Keep the message focused on one idea (remember it will probably be tabulated as for or against an issue) and make sure that the message gets across clearly. Who knows, if a enough messages get through on a subject, Bill or Al might get a one line statement in one of there meetings saying that the online community is "up in arms" about skipjack or the pgp subpoenas. _______________________________________________________________________ Geoff Dale -- insert standard disclaimers here -- plaz(a)netcom.com "Communists! Those bug-brained motherfuckers are even worse than the schmucks who think they run things here." - Norman Spinrad, from his novel "Little Heroes"

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CLIPPER CHIP /NO!
by charliemerritt＠BIX.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Mr. Prisident: I do not like the "Big Brother Inside" Clipper chip. Wire Taps need to be hard to do. I know you and Al are nice guys, but Richard Nixon and his plumbers could come back! A crypto chip with a government trapdoor (key escrow) is an idea fit for a J. Edgar Hoover, not nice people. Please dont make a techno-fool of your administration. A Razorback Fan from Arkansas...Charlie Merritt [charliemerritt(a)bix.com]

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Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
by Mike Godwin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

smb(a)research.att.com writes > The same is true of e-mail over the Internet--there is no > statutory exclusionary rule that would prvent its > admissibility in court. It is at least theoretically possible, > however, to exclude illegally seized communications of these > sorts using a "pure 4th Amendment" (nonstatutory) exclusionary > rule. > > Don't hold your breath, though. > > Do you really think that? One could argue, fairly strongly, that the > rules set forth in the ECPA have created an expectation of privacy, > and that a violation of that expectation would be exactly the violation > of the 4th Amendment that the Supreme Court addressed in the 1967 > decision that led to the original wiretap provisions in the Omnibus > Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. What's your point? One can argue all sorts of things. Are you saying you have reason to believe an argument of this sort is likely to be a winner? Me, I just work from what I know about 4th Amendment caselaw. --Mike

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CONFERENCE: European Computers, Freedom & Privacy
by russell＠eternity.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ECFP '93: The First European Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy The New Cavendish Club London, England 20th November 1993 Organised by ECFP Ventures Limited Co-operating organisations : The Libertarian Alliance Privacy International, UK UK Cryptoprivacy Association SCOPE - ---------------------------------- The widespread use of computers and communication systems has brought considerable benefits to our business and personal lives and will continue to change and shape the way in which we live. However, with those benefits come unprecedented threats to our personal privacy and potential for abuse. A variety of different models for protection of individual privacy in the electronic age have been suggested, ranging from state regulation to individual action through the use of strong cryptography. However, these solutions bring with them their own class of problems, including excessive state involvement in private matters and the frustration of law enforcement and national security objectives. The First European Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy will both provide an introduction to these issues and the technological developments that drive them, and examine different ways in which individual rights can be guaranteed. These questions are central to the preservation of a free society in the Information Age. John M. Brimacombe Conference Chair KEYNOTE SPEAKER - ---------------------------------- John Gilmore Email: gnu(a)cygnus.com JOHN GILMORE is Chairman of the Board of Cygnus Support, who provide commercial support for free software. As founder and board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Cypherpunks, he has campaigned extensively for electronic privacy. John will speak on building a society in which personal privacy is guaranteed through the use of strong cryptography. OTHER SPEAKERS - ---------------------------------- John Brimacombe (Chairman) Email: john(a)mantis.co.uk JOHN BRIMACOMBE is the Managing Director of Jobstream Group plc, developers of business software. A graduate in both law and computer science, he was an advisor to CFP '93 in San Francisco. John will serve as conference moderator. Simon Davies Email: davies(a)privint.demon.co.uk SIMON DAVIES is Director General of Privacy International and a member of the School of Law at the University of New South Wales. He will be looking at new developments in surveillance and ways of combating them. Tom Burroughes Email: tom(a)reptile.demon.co.uk (after 10 October 1993) TOM BURROUGHES is Deputy Chief Reporter with the East Anglian Daily Times in Ipswich, England. He will be giving a journalist's point of view on privacy issues, including recent incidents involving eavesdropping on cellular telephones, and the roles of various corporate and government bodies in the recent adoption of cellphone signal encryption standards in the UK. David Chaum Email: chaum(a)digicash.nl DAVID CHAUM is head of the Cryptography Group at the Center for Mathematics and Computer Science (CWI) in Amsterdam, and founder of DigiCash, which develops electronic payments systems. Dr. Chaum received his Ph.D. in computer science from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1982, and joined CWI in 1984. He helped to found the International Association for Cryptologic Research and remains active on its board. David also consults internationally on cryptology. Duncan Frissell Email: frissell(a)panix.com DUNCAN FRISSELL is an attorney, technical author and consultant on matters of personal and financial privacy. Duncan will speak on "Traditional Privacy in the Electronic Age". Elaine Fletcher ELAINE FLETCHER is Assistant Solicitor for Eric James Howe, Data Protection Registrar (UK). Elaine will speak on issues arising from the Data Protection regime established under the 1984 Data Protection Act. Chris Tame CHRIS TAME is the Director of the Libertarian Alliance and Director of the smokers rights group FOREST, as well as UK representative of the Libertarian International. He has written extensively for such academic journals as /Science and Public Policy/, /Economic Affairs/, and /The Jewish Journal of Sociology/, and such books as *The Case For Private Enterprise* and *The Politics of Crime Control*. He appears regularly on radio and television in the UK. Chris will speak on the libertarian views of data protection and privacy. Russell Whitaker Email: whitaker(a)eternity.demon.co.uk RUSSELL WHITAKER, conference co-organiser, is a consultant on electronic communications, a director of ECFP Ventures Ltd and communications editor of Extropy magazine. Russell will speak on the composition of, and influences upon, the electronic community in Britain today, and how public policy affects those on computer bulletin boards and online services. PROGRAMME - --------------------------------- Registration 9.30 - 10.00 am First session 10.00 - 11.30 am BREAK 11.30 - 11.50 am Second session 11.50 am - 1.20 pm BREAK 1.20 - 2.20 pm Third session 2.20 - 3.50 pm BREAK 3.50 - 4.10 pm Fourth session 4.10 - 5.40 pm PANEL SESSION 5.40 - 6.20 pm Closing remarks 6.20 - 6.30 pm Lunchtime is the break after the second session, and lunch itself is not included in the price of the conference. There are pubs and restaurants in the immediate vicinity. Coffee, tea and biscuits will be on sale through the day, however. Registration form: - --------------------------------- NAME _____________________________________ JOB TITLE _____________________________________ ORGANISATION/AFFILIATION _________________________ ___________________________________________ MAILING ADDRESS _____________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ TELEPHONE ___________________________________________ FAX ___________________________________________ E-MAIL ___________________________________________ IMPORTANT NOTE: only *fully* completed forms with full telephonic details will be accepted, to be used in the event of any emergency changes, such as change of venue. This is not optional. CLASS OF REGISTRATION : [Prices are Pounds Sterling] Student 10.00 ($16.00 U.S.) Normal 17.50 ($28.00 U.S.) Normal before 1 Nov 93: 15.00 ($24.00 U.S.) Press (Contact for arrangements) MEANS OF PAYMENT: - U.S. cheques/cash - U.K. cheques/cash - EuroCheques (tm) Unfortunately, due to bank conversion charges, we are unable to accept cheques drawn on other overseas accounts, for payment of this year's attendance fees. PROCEEDINGS AND AUDIO/VIDEOGRAPHY - ------------------------------------------- You may pre-order copies of transcripts of the proceedings, which will be shipped within 90 days after the conference: "Please send me ____ copies of the conference proceedings at 20 pounds each." Video and audio recordings will be made of the conference, in its entirety. No pre-sales will be made; tapes go on sale in December 93/January 94. Cheques, made payable to "ECFP Ventures Limited", should be sent with this form to : 16 Circus Road MM Box 8593 London NW8 6PG England Please direct any further enquiries to the above address, or: ecfp-1st(a)eternity.demon.co.uk (Email) +44 81-812-2661 (Manned message service; quick response) HOW TO FIND THE NEW CAVENDISH CLUB : - ---------------------------------------------- The New Cavendish Club is 2 minutes walk from Marble Arch Underground station. Immediately turn right as you exit from the station onto Oxford Street. Then take the first turning on the right, i.e. Great Cumberland Street. The New Cavendish Club is 3 blocks north on the northeast corner of the intersection of Great Cumberland Street with Upper Berkeley Street. Address: New Cavendish Club 44 Great Cumberland Place London W1H 8BS - ----- Text ends --------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLKjhjYTj7/vxxWtPAQGjQAP+NW1LOc806i0c3MmA2RiluzWmDKvFEPPm ibtU3tbqqF93fb0lqJ/z1q8DEtWeiG6LnLQ41IasIHDL6o7EmZEWXN6G17CDFLSk cQHCGaIpC9BkBI8VwnsPZIlItL5T+TkcOwLjdqp7x24tQ9uAm3BhpFLGMfLJAnwB xI/ZG0zMEIs= =QElR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Russell Earl Whitaker whitaker(a)eternity.demon.co.uk Communications Editor AMiX: RWhitaker EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI) Co-organizer, 1st European Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy, London, 20 November 1993

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Stickers
by Christian D. Odhner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I recently received email from Whit Diffie regarding some concerns he had about the "Big Brother Inside(tm)" stickers. I asked for and received permission to repost the message to the group, however I seemed to have misplaced (ie, hit the wrong button) it, so I'll paraphrase. Firstly, he suggested that I wait before ordering/distributing the stickers because without clipper phones to put them on they may very well be stuck in random places, and that could reduce the impact of a good, focused, silmultanius distribution. Secondly, He asked that I try to add some more substantial information to the stickers, such as a short note that basicly says this phone is pre-tapped, use at your own risk. After some thought, I sent in the order anyway. My reasons for this action were that 1) Some people stated that they had already sent me money, and I wouldn't want to change the facts of the matter after the money was sent, and 2) Any more substantial information would increase the size of the sticker, which would make it more visible, harder to place, and would anger the owners of the property on which it was placed substantialy more. I think it is appropriate at this time to restate the reason that these stickers have been (are being) produced/distributed. Everyone on the list is familiar I'm sure with the clipper wiretap chip and the issues surrounding it. Everyone on the list I am equaly sure has seen at one time or another the "Intel Inside" stickers on Ibm and Dell and other computers, and in ads for those computer and ads paid for by intel itself. It is an image seen by a signifigant portion of the population each and every day. I was in a local computer store not too long ago when I heard a man ask a salesperson "Does this one have intel inside?" and I'm sure that he had not a clue in the world what that meant. Everyone on this list I'm fairly certain has either read George Orwell's famous book, _1984_, or has at least been exposed to it's influence of society through the introduction of such words and phrases as "Big Brother", "Thought Police", "Doublespeak", etc.. Horible images of goverment invasions of privacy, mass media mind control, and legalslation run amok come to mind quite easily... Our Big Brother Inside sticker has been designed to look as much like the intel logo as possible, without breaking any copyright laws or anything like that. But instead of conveying the message "This product contains parts built by a company you know and trust" our sticker seems to say, "This product is a tool built by the goverment to keep tabs on your personal life". It is intended to be descretely applied to telephones, faxes, modems, computers, and other devices containing the clipper or capstone chips or other key-escrowed technology. It is intended to be seen by those who would potentialy purchase such items, as an attempt to dissuade them from doing so. It is intended _NOT_ to be seen by the owners of establishments selling said items, as that would lead to thier removal at least; prosocution at most. I think another sticker, in brighter colors and containing informative text, could be usefull for applying to clipper phones etc that have already been deployed; a use at your own risk type thing. The time for that has not yet come. I hope I didn't leave anything out, Please use discretion regarding what messages get sent to the list and what can be handled through email. BTW; My total of sticker orders and contributions (not counting today) is: 6875 stickers sold $166 contributed I sent a check for $145 today, so everything past that is going to my cost to mail out the stickers to the people who ordered them. Any funds left over wil be used as a starting point for some cypherpunks tshirts, and proceeds from the shirts (if I ever do them) will go to the eff. Happy Hunting, -Chris ______________________________________________________________________________ Christian Douglas Odhner | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry cdodhner(a)indirect.com | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!" "If guns are outlawed, only the government will have guns." -E. Abbey My opinions are shareware. For a registered copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash. Key fingerprint = 58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38 82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: the public key minefield (fwd)
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[ In the following 100 line post about the origin and philosophy of relevent law, I gradually lead in to privacy issues; I discuss U.S. laws regarding patents and privacy and such because I am largely unfamiliar with such laws in other countries; mea culpa. If you don't really care about legal issues, skip this. ] Svetlana Borisova <svet(a)nrcbsa.bio.nrc.ca> said: >smb(a)research.att.com wrote: > And if you do -- well, then, the patent system has succeeded in its goals, > in that the monopoly assigned to someone else has stimulated you to find > another way to do things, and thus furthered the useful arts and > sciences. > Of course, wonderful idea! Hey, let's patent all irrigating systems >so that people have to think of other ways to make plants grow. I agree that the patent system in the U.S. (and elsewhere, 'though I know much less about that) has severe faults in implementation. The entire area of software patents is being grossly mishandled, for instance. On the other hand, you seem to have a distaste for the entire *theory* behind it, and I must differ on that point. The legal philosophy of patents is to encourage invention that will be of value to society in general. It is *not* directly intended for the benefit of the person holding the patent, although it often seems to work out that way. "smb" is referring to that philosophy. The alternative to the general philosophy is to refuse to grant legal protection to invention. >The goal of patents is to give a researcher a reward for his invention; to >give him the opportunity to make money off it. This is incorrect; ask any patent attorney. In the U.S., anyway. Ask a Canadian patent attorney...but I'm 99.9% sure that Canada follows precisely the same legal philosophy. In the U.S., the legal philosophy is derived from the fundamental meta- philosophy of its law which evolved out of British common law dating back to at least the Magna Carta, which is that (loosely) the purpose of law is for the common good. Every year there are cases in the U.S. where judges make a "surprising" decision that overturns the apparent letter of the law in favor of an appeal to the common good of society. Case law is filled with such things. There is always a tradeoff against rights of the individual. But the Magna Carta itself was necessary in order to begin to establish some rights for individuals against that of society (as represented in that time by the sovereign). Similarly in the U.S., the Bill of Rights acts to establish those minimal rights. But whereever the Bill of Rights is not explicit, on average you can expect courts to rule in favor of the rights of society. (And sometimes even then...) There are some cases where this is easy to view as a bad thing, others where it seems clearly a bad thing. But there is nonetheless many centuries of tradition behind this approach. Patent law is merely one more example. As smb said, it offers a monopoly for an individual, which would usually be considered to be contrary to the good of society. But it does so in order to foster more invention, which is considered to be a good for society. It simply appeals to individual avarice for the sake of the common good, trading off the global long term good against the short term loss. In short, it has an unusual lack of short-sightedness to it...in *theory*. Patent law most certainly and unquestionably is *not* in existence for the benefit of the inventor, like it or not. If you are implying that you think that there should never be legal protection for intellectual property of any sort, as e.g. Stallman has told me he believes, then we'll just have to agree to disagree. Stallman believes that such a philosophy is in favor of individual rights, but historically that philosophy has resulted in a *loss* of individual rights. But then, Stallman isn't too hot on history of law... If on the other hand you merely mean that you disagree with the way that the patent system is working out in a lot of cases currently in the U.S., then you should be more careful to distinguish the legal theory from the legal implementation of the theory. It's very much like the U.S. Bill of Rights in theory versus practice; the two can be quite different. Cypherpunks is in large part about privacy. In Roe versus Wade, privacy was (rather amazingly) held to be an implication of the U.S. Constitution, and as a side effect abortion was judicially held to be legal. The right to privacy is not explicitly spelled out in the Constitution nor Bill of Rights, though, and so most courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have far more often held that there is no automatic right to privacy. That's why Roe vs. Wade was both amazing at the time, and has been in such jeopardy since. California is an interesting case, because its state constitution *does* guarantee a right to privacy, but that doesn't slow down the right to life protests, naturally, just as an aside. :-) Public key cryptography is a mechanism for privacy. There are vast complications because: 1) Privacy is not explicitly guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. 2) Privacy is not generally guaranteed by case law, Roe vs. Wade aside. 3) The patent claims for public key cryptography are overly broad, demonstrating obvious incompetence on the part of the patent examiners involved, yet to correct this injustice would require a test case in which the plaintiff willingly exposed himself to the potential of large damages. 4) This effectively makes the only known methods for *technically* private long distance communication via any media impractical for *legal* reasons. 5) Even in California, the state constitution is of no help, because the applicable patent law and privacy case law are in the federal domain, not the state's -- at least by default. Again it would take an actual court decision to decide otherwise, which doesn't appear likely. The question is what to do given all of this. If one works within the system, the answer is to find someone with bucks for a defense and devise a test case...one intended to lose at every level until it reaches the Supreme Court, where it is then intended to win and thus establish ultimate precedent. Chancy proposition. The other in-system approach is to lobby and to educate. Also chancy. But worth doing. Doug P.S. I am not a lawyer, nor do I play one on t.v.

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My comments to NIST
by Phil Karn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

7431 Teasdale Avenue San Diego, CA 92122 karn(a)unix.ka9q.ampr.org September 27, 1993 Director, Computer Systems Laboratory ATTN: Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard Technology Building, Room B-154 National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Re: A Proposed Federal Information Processing Standard for an Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) Docket No 930659-3159 RIN 0693-AB19 Comments of Philip R. Karn, Jr Sirs: I am writing in response to your call for comments on the aforementioned matter that appeared in the Federal Register on July 30, 1993. I am writing as a concerned individual with BS and MS degrees in electrical and computer engineering and 15 years of professional experience in communications, computer networking and security at leading edge R&D organizations. I currently work in the digital cellular telephone industry, a ripe application for robust encryption if there ever was one. I feel that my experience in this field qualifies me to comment on the practicality of the proposed standard. First of all, I am totally opposed to the entire concept of key escrow. It is a dangerous, un-American and fatally flawed idea that should never have been proposed. In my opinion, everyone has the Constitutional right to use the encryption scheme of their choice, whether or not the government can break it. The impact of strong encryption on the enforcement of legitimate laws is and will remain minimal. Even unbreakable encryption is incapable of thwarting standard investigational techniques such as informants, testimony compelled through grants of immunity, "end point" surveillance (e.g., hidden microphones), the gathering of physical evidence of crimes and so forth. Strong un-escrowed encryption will, on the other hand, finally put an end to illegal, often politically motivated interceptions of private electronic communications without having to rely on anyone's goodwill, such as the still-unnamed "key escrow agencies". Precisely because eavesdropping has been so easy to do and so hard to detect, the government has repeatedly proven itself untrustworthy in this regard, as documented in great detail by the Watergate investigations and the Church Committee hearings of the 1970s. Why should we trust it now? Although the government currently claims that the EES will be a "voluntary" standard, many of its features make no sense whatsoever in this context. For example, why must the Skipjack algorithm be kept secret if individuals remain free to use other algorithms such as triple-key DES or IDEA that are quite probably even stronger? The government's claim is completely transparent, as one simply cannot escape the conclusion that the EES is a prelude to a ban on all other encryption schemes, or at least a ban on those the government can't crack. And this presents a profoundly disturbing threat to some very important Constitutional principles. Countless others have argued forcefully against the proposal on these and other grounds. For example, see the points made by the Computing Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) in the attached Appendix. I fully agree with CPSR and feel that they alone should have been enough to stop the proposal long ago. However, the fact that the Escrowed Encryption Standard has advanced so quickly despite these serious problems reveals the totally one-sided nature of the decision process. Far from being an independent and impartial agency, NIST has proven itself to be merely a pawn for the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other powerful intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Despite (or perhaps because of) encryption's enormous potential to put real "teeth" into the Constitutional principles of privacy and freedom of speech and association, these agencies are notably unsympathetic to tFrom owner-cypherpunks Tue Sep 28 05:51:28 1993 Received: by toad.com id AA02707; Tue, 28 Sep 93 05:46:19 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA02651; Tue, 28 Sep 93 05:41:49 PDT Return-Path: <nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> Received: from bsu-cs.bsu.edu ([147.226.112.101]) by toad.com id AA02647; Tue, 28 Sep 93 05:41:46 PDT Received: by bsu-cs.bsu.edu (5.57/Ultrix3.0-C) id AA08271; Tue, 28 Sep 93 07:43:59 -0500 Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 07:43:59 -0500 Message-Id: <9309281243.AA08271(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> From: Anonymous <nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com X-Remailed-By: Anonymous <nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> X-Ttl: 0 X-Notice: This message was forwarded by a software- automated anonymous remailing service. Subject: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps Organization: Coalition for Cryptographic Freedom In the paper written by Delaney, Denning and Kaye (Wiretap Laws and Procedures -- What Happens when the U.S. Government Taps a Line, September 23, 1993), a few numbers were presented from a 1992 report which reflect the wiretaps put into place during that year. Without further details concerning the specifics surrounding some of these numbers, it should certainly raise eyebrows on a couple of points: - All 919 "interceptions" were authorized. The numbers presented in this report indicate that none were denied. - Out of this number, 303 were in single family homes, 135 were in apartments and 289 were categorized as placed in "other" locations. - Out of 919, 634 were placed into service for interception of information involving narcotics. The closest contender in this area involved racketeering, in which 90 was the magic number. - The number of persons arrested was 2,685. Of that number, only 607 were convicted. These statistics alone should concern YOU.

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