December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

A Nice Summary of Motives for Clipper
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This fellow has written a nice summary of the "carrot and stick" motivations on Clipper. Nothing we haven't seen discussed, but a nice synopsis. His analysis is accurate: - the government will make Clipper use very easy to export, and to use (perhaps by subsidizing production costs of the MYK-xx chip for some time) - the government will make non-Clipper use very hard to export, may harrass those who post code to ftp sites (a la PGP, Moby Crypt, etc.), and will do other things to throw roadblocks up - the result will probably be that in 5 years mosts crypto use is of the key escrow sort, with all that that implies Comment from TCM: Yes, we've "already won" in some sense, in that strong crypto can't be completely eliminated. But if 99% of all crypto users are using key escrow in 1999, for practical reasons, then in some sense we have lost. I'm curious about what RSA Data Security Inc. thinks of all this, as this carrot-and-stick move worsens the export situation immmensely: key escrow technologies get a "pass," while non key escrow technologies get scrutinized, delayed, and generally told not to bother to try to export (this is my interpretation). Could be real bad news for Bidzos and Company. (Don't flame me for urging an alliance with RSADSI! I'm just speculating on who will be hit hard here. Could have some implications for what Cypherpunks support.) Here's the article: Newsgroups: alt.activism,alt.politics.datahighway,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.clipper,alt.security.pgp,alt.wired,comp.org.eff.talk,talk.politics.crypto From: shephard(a)fraser.sfu.ca (Gordon Shephard) Subject: Re: CRYPTO: DoJ's new rules for access to Clipper keys Message-ID: <shephard.760538361(a)sfu.ca> Sender: news(a)sfu.ca (seymour news) Organization: Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C., Canada Distribution: inet Date: Sun, 6 Feb 1994 12:39:21 GMT Lines: 107 strnlght(a)netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >You still don't get it. Clipper is a system for the private sector with good >security except for the escrow. The escrow is there to prevent the bad guys >from using what would otherwise be a very hard to break system. This reveals some of the mindset behind Government encryption policy. For the past year or so, I've been discussing the "Clipper Concept", and have constantly bewildered myself and others with the question: Why on earth would the black hats use a system which can be compromised by law enforcement agencies? The conclusion which we normally came to was that after the introduction of Clipper technology, the United States Government would work towards making it illegal for cryptographic systems other than Clipper (or some other Government controlled Key Escrow system) to be sold or produced in the United States. Now, Mr. Sternlight's view that Government is not attempting to prevent black hats from using non-clipper technology, and that they simply do not wish to allow criminals to use the Governments strong encryption system, contrasts somewhat with the current dialogue on the subject. And it makes sense - Clipper is going to dominate the market. We may all strut about and swear up and down how we will never use a cryptographic system which the Government can break, but, given that commerical providers will probably have huge incentives to develop clipper chip systems, (Govt. Contracts and such :) this is the system that you and I will probably be purchasing. A careful re-reading of the Press Releases provides supporting evidence. In particular, the administration will allow export of key escrow technologies, and their new policies will result in: - expedited delivery of products - reduced shipping and reporting costs - fewer individual licenses - personal exemptions for the use of encryption technology taken out of the country by business persons. The administration is going to also work with industry, with the NIST leading these efforts. Mention was made of money being tossed into this effort (Staff will be hired....) So, that's the carrot, now for the stick: "The Administration will continue to restrict export of the most sophisticated encryption devices." So, picture in your mind a Company such as AT&T, or U.S. Robotics, that is about to start selling an encrypting modem/telephone: They can either provide to Joe Public a Key Escrow technology, or they can put together their own proprietary encryption system. The Key Escrow technology system can be sold to the U.S. Government (Big Bucks, How much would you like to bet that in the next 3 or 4 years, numerous government departments will be allocated large sums of money to purchase encryption devices, regardless of whether they need it or not - The press releases reveal that All Govt. Purchases will be Key Escrow - Never underestimate the impact of Government contracts) The Key Escrow technology system will be free of Red Tape, can be exported, will not require individual licensing for each country, can be taken out of the country by business persons (The vast majority of which could care less whether the Govt. can crack their communications, it's the competition they are concerned about), etc, etc.... Or, they can create a proprietary system and face the mother of all red tape trying to sell the damn thing (At a significantly increased cost.) The Result: 1) Commerical Companies will not produce Non Key Escrow Technology. 2) The few that do, will have their lives made so difficult by the Administration, it will be difficult to find their product. And this is an issue that Nobody seems to discuss: Encryption is only useful if BOTH ends of the communciation line are using the same encryption technology. Who will you be able to talk to if you are using a proprietary encryption system. (A technically alert member of the press should ask the following question: Will the administration seek to prevent encryption systems which incorporate the clipper chip from having secondary encryption technolgies embedded (I.E. Imagine if the modem you manufactured could only talk V.32terbo, and not V.32/V.32bis - Nobody would buy it because everyone else has a V.32bis modem. ) And here is where the Government may have made a strategic error though; by not revealing their encryption algorithm, they may have opened up a market for people who are concerned about the strength of the encryption algorithm. E.G. AT&T can come along and market their encrypting telephones with multiple levels of security, standard "Clipper" encryption, or new and improved AT&T laboratory technology which has been attacked by every encryption researcher on the planet. Of course this device would still face the Red tape which the government will be using as its primary weapon against non key escrow technology in the coming years. You heard it here first. (Well, maybe not. Anyone hear how the Government has been treating PGP lately? :) | Gordon Harry Shephard, shephard(a)sfu.ca,(message)252-4387, (res)524-8622 | In No Way am I speaking for my Employers or Simon Fraser University. --

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Re: CypherPUNKS. Not!
by qwerty-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Anthony Garcia wrote, "> Get Off the Internet and Write Us a Real Encryptor. Get a copy of Schneier's "Applied Crypto" and write it yourself. Don't expect other people to provide encryption technology for you, because they probably won't." You sadly misunderstand. "Us" means US. All of us. Humanity. You also didn't understand the point of the Dead Kennedy's "Anarchy For Sale." Fortunately Phil Zimmerman and a few others do, and hopefully they will also give PGP a "random data block" format output. If we (all of us using PGP on this planet), don't get PGP off the internet and into the hands of MOST Mac and Windows users, as well as in hardware form in devices like phones, then as the last song I quoted said, "You'll (Cypherpunk activists) be the first to go." I don't code. I make molecules, and soon I will be using standing waves made by lasers to deposit atoms on surfaces, working at Harvard, Bell Labs, and NIST to help develop the next next generation of CPUs, sensors and other devices. If you want something to write code for, 10 years from now, don't disrespect those who do sciences other than programming. Your answer is what the government WANTS the programmers to be like, like this: "You want bulk vitamin C powder which has been rumored to cure that new AIDS strain that started spreading by air? Well that wouldn't make me or anyone else any cash, and since the FDA has banned vitamin supplements, you better go pick up a book on synthesis. I think you start with glucose. Oh, and include organometallics, since it's only certain mixed oxidation state Copper complex dimers that seems to work. Fairly complex stuff. Hurry up though, I hear that AIDS (Clipper) virus kicks in pretty fast! But don't expect chemists to give you any, well since you see, that would be altruistic and that is not logical, since my value system is selfishness. As long as I can cure myself, and you aren't paying me large sums, well, bye bye." And making PGP better and posting it anonymously or not, is no where as illegal as if I were to offer an unapproved medicinal to patients in need, something that would immediately put me in handcuffs. Happily, drugs that are truly effective become available to terminal patients, since of course that makes money. I'm going into crystal and surface chemistry anyway, and the FDA seems to be failing in its ongoing attempts to take away my legal vitamin C powder. I fear though that they may succeed in 10 years, and the Clipper's going to send my e-mail into the FDA's "bad guy" files, as being a person who takes more vitamin C than can be found in a can of Coca Cola. I just want privacy and to be left alone. And research funds ;-). -=Xenon=- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLVT86QSzG6zrQn1RAQGNgwP/YONeGygK20IMXXL96hgu6MKDqZToslzK BLgaWOYAvCz9e48aR6AemamQ3R7Dm9ZdqTyf2QIIgV/2VliARX4+9ADBiS3BUtET Kck3gALq88weWfysdrxkc433b+sP9s28GOdMK2sHAjWaf9PImmoeqsaVBaAi9DzN rTMRSKnp6ko= =JKEA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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a reference to STS
by hughes＠ah.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's the reference for the STS paper. STS is the Station-to-Station protocol. _Authentication and Authenticated Key Exchanges_ by Diffie, Oorschot, Wiener _Designs, Codes and Cryptography 2_, pp 107-125 1992 Eric

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No Subject
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm moving to Oceania.

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Fwd: More on remailers
by Matthew J Ghio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know what this is??? ---------- Return-path: <genie-postmaster(a)geis.com> Received: from po2.andrew.cmu.edu via trymail ID </afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr12/mg5n/Mailbox/UhJJW=O00UdaEa=k5z>; Sun, 6 Feb 1994 15:52:27 -0500 (EST) Received: from relay2.geis.com (relay2.geis.com [192.77.188.3]) by po2.andrew.cmu.edu (8.6.4/8.6.4) with SMTP id PAA09729 for <mg5n+(a)andrew.cmu.edu>; Sun, 6 Feb 1994 15:51:36 -0500 From: genie-postmaster(a)geis.com Received: by relay2.geis.com (1.37.109.4/15.6) id AA26116; Sun, 6 Feb 94 20:51:28 GMT Message-Id: <9402062051.AA26116(a)relay2.geis.com> Date: Fri, 4 Feb 94 00:51:00 BST To: mg5n+(a)andrew.cmu.edu Subject: More on remailers Original Msg Id: Not Found genie-postmaster response to your message Subject: More on remailers System: QUIK-COMM Date: Fri 4-Feb-94 0:51 Status: 5 Message picked up by receiving system and delivered to all recipients with NO exceptions. ----------

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TEMPEST - Electronic eavesdropping
by R.O.Jackson-SE1＠computer-science.birmingham.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Emanation Standard (TEMPEST) is the US standard defining the amount of electromagnetic radiation that a device may emit without compromising the information it is processing. In the US it not illegal to posess TEMPEST-surveillance equipment but it is illegal to take appropriate counter-measures to prevent surveillance. The US government has refused to release details of its TEMPEST research and has restricted the dissemination of independent research by classifying it. The US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) makes use of TEMPEST secured electronics and computers as they believe that the drug cartels may possess surveillance equipment. I am interested in gathering comments on the social, legal, ethical, and technical aspects of use of TEMPEST surveillance equipment in the US and Europe with the aim of including it in a discussion of the threats to computer/digital systems. Please reply by E-mail. I will provide a summary to anybody who requests one. thanks, - Rob Jackson (more information on TEMPEST can be found in the paper "Eavesdropping On the Electromagnetic Emanations of Digital Equipment: The Laws of Canada, England, and the US" by Cristopher Seline - available on FTP from csrc.ncsl.nist.gov)

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Re: ADMIN: list statistics
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> 4 de Denmark ^^^ .de is Germany , it stands for 'Deutschland,' the german word for 'Germany'. Don't know what is the sign of Denmark... Hadmut ( danisch(a)ira.uka.de sitting in Karlsruhe, Germany)

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NIST - PKP settlements not over yet
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[from Gregory Aharonian's Internet Patent News Service] A hostile response to a tentative agreement to settle a patent dispute over the proposed Digital Signature Standard has forced the National Institute of Standards and Technology to return to negotiations. Last summer, NIST officials thought they finally settled the DSS public key patent dispute by granting Public Key Partners (PKP) of Sunnyvale, California, an exclusive worldwide license for the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) on which the DSS is built. In exchange for sublicensing rights, the PKP group agreed to endorse NIST's DSS proposal. But F. Lynn McNulty, associate director for computer security with NIST's Computer System Laboratory, said a majority of potential DSS users balked at the deal. NIST published the settlement terms for comment, and McNulty said all but 10 of the 270 comments were critical. [as many of you may remember, EFF coordinated the transmission of these comments to NIST, who did not widely announce the request for comment at all. The uncharitable might call that an attempt to sweep the matter under the rug. The naive might call it an oversight. At any rate almost all of the comments NIST received were routed via EFF, who were happy to publicize it "for" NIST.] Many DSS critics have argued that another algorithm promulgated by RSA Data Security (Redwood City, CA), is a de facto industry digital signature standard and that it would cost too much to comply with a separate government standard. Now NIST is attempting to hammer out a new settlement based on the comments, McNulty said. "The real hang-up continues to be the patent issue", McNulty said. "We're still trying to resolve it". Scientists at CSL designed the CSS to serve as a standard agency tool for verifying the senders and contents of messages transmitted electronically. CSL also prescribed the public key Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). But PKP, which holds the rights to public key patents on behalf of Stanford University, MIT, and most recently, German professor Claus Schnorr, charged that CSL's proposed algorithm infringed upon these patents. NIST originally sponsored DSA research, and agencies are exempt from any licensing fees. PKP, however, has maintained that vendors that incorporate the standard into their products should pay royalties. [Government Computer News 1/24/94, 58] -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist F O R M O R E I N F O, E - M A I L T O: I N F O @ E F F . O R G O P E N P L A T F O R M O N L I N E R I G H T S V I R T U A L C U L T U R E C R Y P T O

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Re: remailer delays
by qwerty-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It's half done :-) ! Unfortunately the NSA run remailers haven't been handing out info, but this should help people know which blanks are still blanks ;-). God I hate these little sideways smileys! oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo ooo$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ooo $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ o$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$o $$$$$ $$$" "$$$$$" "$ $ $ "$ $$$$$" "$ "$ $$$ $$$$" "$$ $$oo$$$$$ $$oo$ $$$$ $$$$ " $$$$$ $$ $ " $$$ o$$$$ $ $$o "$$$$$o "$ $$ $ $$$$$ $$ $ $$$o $$$$ o $""$$ $$$$$""$$ $ $$$$ $$$$ o $$$$$ $$ $ o $$$$ $$$$ $$$ $o o$$$$$o o$ $ $ $o $$$$$o o$ $o $$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""$$$$$$$$$$$$""""""""""""$$$$ $$$$ "$$$$$$$$$$" o$$$$ $$$$ "$$$$$$$$" o$$$$$ $$$$ $$$$$$$$ $$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$ $$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$ $$$$ $$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$ "$$" $$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$o "" o$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$o o$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$o o$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$o o$$$$$$$$$$$$ "$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$" $$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$ "$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$" $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ """$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" Xenon's Full Disclosure Remailer List. Remailer Fast? OpLog SysLog Subj Batch RD NL CPU Phys PGP BitB ...and? --------- ------ ----- ------ ---- ----- -- -- --- ---- --- ---- ---------- bsu-cs + ? ?/? + ? ? ? ? ? 23a - catalyst + N? SM/MQ - - ? - PA M 23a - choas + ? ?/? + ? ? ? ? ? - - cicada ++ ? ?/? - - - - ? ? - - colostate ++ ? SM/MQ ? - ? ? Un M ? - dis.org -/-- ? ?/? - ? ? ? ? ? 23a - extropia +/- ? SM + - - - Pr M 23a - jarthur +/-- St SM/MQ - -/+ ? ? Un ? 23a - menudo -- N SM - t1 "?" Y Un H 23a - merde -/-- ? ?/? - ? ? ? ? ? - - penet.fi -- St SM - t? 24 + Pr H - - pmantis ++ ? ?/? - ? - - ? ? - - qwerty + C SM/MQ - - - - PA M 23a + rosebud ++/- N MQ - - - N Un M 23a - remba -- ? ?/? ? ? ? ? ? ? 23a - shell ++/+/- St ?/? - ? ? ? ? ? 23a - soda ++/- St+? ?/? - ? ? ? ? ? - Subj: Strips Subject header? NL: Non-linear remailing? 123->231. RD: Random delay added (max, in hours)? Batch: Batched remailing? t2 means twice daily. n5 means after 5 messages. CPU: Pr = private. PA = account on public access machine. Un = university. Phys: Physical security of the CPU, especially at night. H/M/L. BitB: BitBucket feature? Fast?: ++ <5 min + 5-10 min. - ~10-30 min delay -- Pinging isn't practical due to long delays. Probably reliable though. +/- Sometimes +, sometimes -. Normal internet mail delays are common, and are not equivalent in the two directions between any two remailers. Mail still gets through. OpLog: F: full copies of all mail is archived. My large volume mailing should help put a stop to this. St: Stats logs of when mail was remailed. St+: Stats logs of when and where mail was remailed. St-: simple counter. N: operator keeps no logs. C: Simple counter. SysLog: SM: sendmail logs of when and where mail was exchanged. Root access needed. MQ: mailqueue accessible by anyone on the site. Could make logs. I have chosen nicknames based on a string common to both the outgoing address and to the address you see on an incoming message from the remailer. bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu catalyst catalyst(a)netcom.com chaos remailer(a)chaos.bsu.edu cicada hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu colostate nate(a)vis.colostate.edu dis.org remailer(a)dis.org extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com jarthur ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu menudo nobody(a)Menudo.UH.EDU merde remailer(a)merde.dis.org penet.fi anon.penet.fi pmantis hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu qwerty qwerty(a)netcom.com rosebud elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu (elee6ue(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu) shell hfinney(a)shell.portal.com soda hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu Discontinued remailers still on some lists out there: phantom(a)mead.u.washington.edu remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu sameer(a)netcom.com sameer(a)berkeley.edu (spelling?) cdodhner(a)indirect.com remailer(a)entropy.linet.org?? 00x(a)uclink.berkeley.edu? remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu? Background on each remailer: bsu-cs: Run by Chael Hall. Machine: ?? Problems policy: ?? Contact ?? Software: ?? Security: ?? Comments: History: ?? catalyst: Run by Scott Collins. Machine: personal dial-up account on Netcom. Problems policy: Outgoing address blocking, with proof of ID. Contact catalyst(a)netcom.com. Software: Customized Hal's ? Security: Netcom keeps sendmail logs, which root(a)netcom.com can read. Any Netcom user could also compile his own sendmail logs, by constantly logging mail as it arrives and leaves. Comments: History: ?? chaos: Run by Chael Hall. Machine: ?? Problems policy: ?? Contact ?? Software: ?? Security: Comments: finger remailer.help(a)chaos.bsu.edu for info using any remailer. ?? gopher chaos.bsu.edu for a collection of info about Cypherpunks. Comments: History: ?? cicada: Run by Eric Hollander. Machine: ??? Problems policy: ?? Contact ?? Software: ?? Security: Tread lightly. Being "phased out". colostate: Run by ?? Machine: ??? Problems policy: ?? Contact ?? Software: ?? Security: ?? dis.org: Run by Peter Shipley. Machine: ?? Problems policy: ?? Contact ?? Software: ?? Security: ?? Comments: History: ?? extropia: Run by Miron Cuperman. Machine: ?? Problems policy: ?? Contact ?? Software: ?? Security: ?? Comments: Only accepts PGP remailing. ::/Encrypted:PGP header is optional. Privately owned, in Canada. Not directly connected (delays possible). History: ?? jarthur: Run by Eli Brandt. Machine: Sequent Symmetry. Problems policy: Destination blocking is available w/ sufficient ID. Contact ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu. Software: The usual, tweaked for MMDF. Hal's. Security: jarthur keeps sendmail logs. Comments: Although jarthur doesn't batch, its connection often results in outgoing mail getting batched out anyway (1-3 hours delay). History: Set up late '92. PGP added mid '93. menudo: Run by Karl Barrus. Machine: University machine. Problems policy: see policy at gopher site. Contact klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu or elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu. Software: Modified Hal's. Security: Stores messages and sends them out randomly at midnight. Pads messages to 1K with random stuff. (?) Comments: elee9sf@menudo accepts RIPEM encryption. elee6ue@rosebud requires "digital cash" (basically random strings I made). Errors on elee9sf@menudo are forwarded klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu where they are deleted. I still get mail at that address which is why I have it forwarded and not just dropped. History: No comment. merde: Run by Peter Shipley. Maching: ?? Problems policy: ?? Contact ?? Software: ?? Security: ?? Comments: History: ?? penet.fi: Run by Julf (Johan Helsingus). Machine: ?? Operator owned. Problems policy: Account revokation. Contact ??(a)anon.penet.fi. Software: custom. Security: Comments: By far the most popular remailer, dwarfing in a day what the entire Cypherpunk remailers combined carry in a month. Supports easy return addresses as well as non-anonymous mailing to someone's anonymous address (na1234... instead of an1234...). Your real address is kept on Julf's hard disk, but is fairly safe there, especially if you do not abuse your anonymity to harass someone. On a bad day your mail and especially Usenet posts may be delayed up to a day. Very reliable though. Sends error messages back to you for failed mail. Limited to 48K mail. History: ?? pmantis: Run by Eric Hollander. Machine: ?? Problems policy: ?? Contact ?? Software: ?? Security: Tread lightly. Being "phased out". Comments: History: ?? qwerty: Run by Xenon. Machine: dial-up account on Netcom. Problems policy: "What problems?". Contact qwerty(a)netcom.com. Software: Hal's remailer. Security: Netcom keeps sendmail logs, which root(a)netcom.com can read. Any Netcom user could also compile his own sendmail logs, by constantly logging mail as it arrives and leaves. Operator often logs in using telnet. Comments: You must use na1234(a)anon.penet.fi not an1234(a)anon.penet.fi. Finger qwerty(a)netcom.com for a blurb on the remailer and updates on its software. Request-Remailing-To: /dev/null is a bit bucket. whitehouse.gov gets blocked and fully logged. History: Up 2/94. Set up by Xenon who needed more remailers to use to send PGP info to people with, since anon.penet.fi was overloaded. rembe: Run by Bill (O'Hanlon?). Machine: ? Privately owned. Problems policy: ?? Contact ?? Software: ?? Security: ?? Comments: Not directly connected (delays?). History: Second oldest remailer. rosebud:(elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu) Run by Karl Barrus. Machine: University. Problems policy: See gopher site. Contact klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu. Software: Hal's. Security: "syslog file can be read" Comments: Errors are "dropped". History: Third oldest remailer. rosebud: (elee6ue(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu) Run by Karl Barrus. Machine: univerisity Problems policy: see gopher site. Contact klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu. Software: standard scripts (Hal's) modified to accept cash strings. Security: "Syslog file can be read." Comments: Errors are "dropped". shell: Run by Hal Finney. Machine: ?? Problems policy: ?? Contact ?? Software: Hal's Remailer. Security: ?? Comments: whitehouse.gov blocked and fully logged. hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu forwards all mail to shell. History: ?? soda: Run by Eric Hollander. Run by: ?? Machine: ?? Problems policy: ?? Blocking of addresses. Mail sent to problem causer. Contact ?? Software: custom. ?? Security: Was keeping full logs till Xenon's bulk mailing venture. ?? Comments: History: ?? Remailer Public Keys: (I've got these).

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FOR Xenon (what's his email?)
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Info on the nate(a)vis.colstate.edu remailer colostate: Run by Nate Sammons nate(a)vis.colostate.edu Machine: Sun 4/280 - direct ethernet connection to the Colorado State University backbone. Getewayed to CU/BOulder, and then into the Net backbone. Problems policy: No problems yet. Nobody at CSU really knows about it yet ;-) Contact Nate Sammons nate(a)vis.colostate.edu Software: Hal's Remailer software, modified Security: What do you want to know? - -nate BTW, thanks for the work! - -- +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Nate Sammons <nate(a)VIS.ColoState.Edu> <nate(a)yuma.ANCS.ColoState.Edu> | | Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory | | Data Visualization/Interrogation, Modeling, Animation, Rendering | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

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