December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

<sigh>
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Due to a misbehaving mailing list I have lost some mail this morning. :( If you have sent any message to me between 00:00-13:00 GMT-0400 today please resend the message. Also could someone from the mailing list send me copies of the messages that I have missed. Thanks, - -- - --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html - --------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a Charset: cp850 Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000 iQCVAwUBM85dN49Co1n+aLhhAQF3fAP8Db4z+7GLaSsst8ZkGVG151NO4lIt0wbR S5oRTbLWRQbuAGccvGvKJSLtu3QPzn1wwp3khVJiVvz6QvweMTXBd6IV7QNvhE5o An519HaatiAICAgkPcBC5/l1SkTfcRxX8GYk1SUWI8Ockw9zyLZtY9VsbgtgD3Yk QFqprV7VQrQ= =fiQQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: payment & tents
by Hacking In Progress 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 8 Jul 97 at 23:21, Secret Squirrel wrote: > Can you please tell me where tents (for 10+ people) > can be bought/hired in the region of Amsterdam ? > Some of us are eagerly trying to organise this aspect > of the trip, and would welcome pointers. Try for rent: In Purmerend, Netherlands call 02994-20999 They rent army tents. But you'll have to arrange everything with them we can't do that. Expect around 350 guilders rent and about 1000 for deposit. Maurice > Also, I cannot read the [INLINE] phone numbers to call > with my credit card number - can you please publish > both answers on your mailing list ? Call in the Netherlands to 31 20 6263438 cu, Maurice Wessling -- Hacking in Progress 8-9-10 August Tents, TCP/IP, Jolt and politics http://www.hip97.nl/

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Re: e$: Cypherpunks Sell Concepts
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I posted this: > Second, we need a lawyer. This is a good thing, 'cause a you can't hack > laws without a lawyer (most of the time, anyway...), and > (ObThreadRelevance) we need one to pitch this stuff to other lawyers > (regulators, et. al.) anyway... > > In search of Vinnie "the Pro" Bono, honorable second cousin of the esteemed > mayor of Palm Springs, > > Bob Hettinga I got the following in e-mail from a law professor (shall we call him/her "Professor Vinnie"?) who wants to remain nameless for some reason... Somebody should teach "him" how to use a remailer, eh? This person is emblematic of all the usual interface problems with spiffy new stuff... Oh well. The posting is late because of the time took me to get permission. They should be a little faster next time. Here's what s/he said: >My specialties involve law about the government, not law about financial >transactions, so I'm guessing more than anything else here, but it seems >to me that there are two simple rules of thumb that ought to apply: > >1) E$ is not a security so long as there is no suggestion that you might >ever get back more than you paid. I.E. no interest, no dividends, no >profits. So long as e$ is exchanged at 1:1 (or less if there is a >transaction fee) with US$, then odds are very good it's not going to be >seen as a security, at least under federal law (who knows what funny rules >they may have in *your* state...). > >2) It's not going to be a scrip problem so long as every e$ is purchased >in advance for a US$. People run into problems when they are seen to be >creating value, e.g. as banks do with fractional reserve lending. So >long as e$ sticks close to the travellers check model, I would imagine >(remember: NO RESEARCH WAS DONE TO REACH THESE CONCLUSIONS) that the only >rules which apply in the US will be UCC rules that apply to checks, and >IOUs. This would seem to be a desireable state of affairs for e$. > >I am late to this subject, so if in fact e$ fails either of the tests >above, please let me know. After I got this, I asked "him" to reply directly to the list, and "he" replied declining to do so, the following is the only part of "his" reply that is relevant to the above. >I should warn you again: I'm an administrative lawyer. The 'research' >for that note consisted of five minutes conversation in bed with my <spouse> >who is a securities lawyer. From another country. There's a good chance I >have no idea what I'm talking about... Great. We've got ourselves a lawyer in the loop who'll help us talk about this stuff. I fingered "him" <fingering a lawyer?> and "he" looks real to me. Guess I have some reading to do about this anonymity stuff, eh? Anyway, it's real nice to have another pair of (trained) eyes looking at the problem. Cheers, Bob Hettinga (Human remailer and mouthpiece mouthpiece) ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: broadcast encryption
by snyderra＠dunx1.ocs.drexel.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:56 AM 8/9/94, Eric Hughes wrote: >What is the policy purpose for signing packets? It will affect the >design. > >Do you want to identify users, processes, or machines? While I am a ham, I'm not directly on packet radio, so someone who spots something incorrect please speak up. I'll probably be getting the needed equipment within the month. I would think machines would need to be identified. Every packet contains a callsign within it, identifying the source of the packet. This is often the only criteria BBSes on packet radio will discriminate callers. You can change the callsign transmitted with a simple command to the TNC, and thus easily forge messages. Another situation this could solve would be the ability to log into a home machine without compromising the security on it. Your password must go in the clear, but if the packets are digitally signed, it would be difficult for someone to log into your machine using a replay attack. I had considered one of the challenge/response credit card devices out there, but someone could still break in by waiting for the chalenege/response to take place, and then send their own packets seemingly coming from the host that answered the challenge/response. I would say drop packets that are supposed to be coming from a signing source that aren't signed or have a wrong signature. For example, the local BBS would have listed that N2KGO uses signatures, and has a key on file. Any packet destined for the BBS with my call with a abscent/bad signature would be dropped. You need to keep the ability to respond to unsigned packets, though, since not everyone will switch at the same time, or switch at all. >Do you want each packet to carry an independent signature, or can >packets be aggregated for signature? This is a separate problem, >since "aggregation" doesn't mean a delay, it means there is state >information carried which is involved in checking the signature. This >question involves the abstraction level where authentication is taking >place. This one is a toss-up. One of the main characteristics of packet radio is its low bandwidth. A message digest on individual packets would probably take up more space than a digest on an aggregate group of packets, because the function should generate the same size digest either way. However, if testing a group of packets, and the signature is wrong becuase of an error, you now have many more packets to resend. Bob -- Bob Snyder N2KGO MIME, PGP, RIPEM mail accepted snyderra(a)post.drexel.edu PGP & RIPEM keys on key servers When cryptography is outlawed, bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl.

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Re: broadcast encryption
by snyderra＠dunx1.ocs.drexel.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:34 PM 8/9/94, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >Eric Hughes says: >> What I would like to see is low-level digital signatures on the >> level of IP or AX.25. IP is doable, I would think. >> >> What is the policy purpose for signing packets? It will affect the >> design. > >Anyone even making such suggestions has not been following the IPSP >standardization work... Is this the IPng work I just saw a bunch of RFC notices go out for, or something different? Any drafts you can point me to? Bob -- Bob Snyder N2KGO MIME, PGP, RIPEM mail accepted snyderra(a)post.drexel.edu PGP & RIPEM keys on key servers When cryptography is outlawed, bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl.

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Re: e$
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408091606.AA22481(a)ah.com> Eric Hughes writes: > There is a small point to be made here which I think is really a big > point. The US government does not object to the use of financial > instruments so long as they are backed by the US $ (or another > accepted currency). > > No, this isn't so. They also object to barter schemes that are backed > by dollars. The object to them not by making them illegal _per se_, > but by making it illegal not to report all the transactions that occur > inside them. It may not be so, but this example is not relevant. A barter scheme is not a financial instrument or an exchange of financial instruments. If you agree to exchange a refrigerator for ten hours with your favorite shrink, no financial instruments change hands. But the IRS sees that your shrink is making "money" and not reporting it. > You also need to be concerned about Federal regulations > covering the import and export of money. I think that at $5,000 or > $10,000 you have to report the transaction. > > This applies to cash and some cash-like instruments, not to "money". > Originally it was just cash; it has been extended to other > instruments, but not to all of them, insofar as I know. When you fly into the US, you must fill out a customs declaration. You are required to declare money in various forms (cash, checks, etc) and then to sign a statement saying that your declaration is true. I believe that you must declare anything over a relatively small amount, a few thousand dollars. Banks are required to declare cash deposits and international movements of funds over either $5K or $10K, I forget which. The objective is to make money laundering difficult. -- Jim Dixon

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Re: Postal Inspection (was Common Carriers...)
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408091950.AA02763(a)smds.com> FutureNerd Steve Witham writes: > > What was the conference about? (If the icon was printed on the envelope, > > I suspect that it represented the topic of the conference or the group > > sponsoring it.) > > Artificial Life. No relation to the icon that I can see. > Besides, it was on the back of the envelope on the flap. > > Some people have answered that it means "Okay to inspect, open here." > Scary icon (policeman looking into envelope). 1. Icons are commonly used in Europe because there are so many different languages. 2. You often get lower rates for printed paper. 3. He is a postman, not a policeman. "OK to open for postal inspection" (to verify that it is printed paper). -- Jim Dixon

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Re: broadcast encryption
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408091634.AA23392(a)snark.imsi.com> perry(a)imsi.com writes: > > What is the policy purpose for signing packets? It will affect the > > design. > > Anyone even making such suggestions has not been following the IPSP > standardization work... How can one follow the IPSP standardization work? -- Jim Dixon

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Re: e$
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408091725.AA22702(a)ah.com> Eric Hughes writes: > If A writes a check to 'cash', pays B with it, and B passes it on to > C, and so forth, are you saying that this is or will one day be illegal? > > An individual note and its transfers are unlikely to be made illegal. > But that's not the whole story. A company engaged in the business of > issuing such notes and not recording (perhaps, a fortiori, by not > being able to record) the transactions among people for these > instruments, however, could be ruled to be performing a separate > activity which could then be made illegal. Yes. But my initial point was that a check for $1.00 does not constitute an alternative currency and you do not seem to be disagreeing with this. 'Therefore' if e$1.00 is essentially a promise to pay one US dollar, and if that $1.00 is on deposit with a bank somewhere, and if that bank will pay out US$1.00 when the e$ "check" is presented, the Feds will not be able to prosecute anyone for using an illegal currency. > Just because a single act is legal doesn't mean that a bunch of the > same acts are. For example, not reporting a $5000 cash transfer is > legal, but not reporting half a dozen of them made to the same person > in the same day almost certainly is. Yes. But you must remember my original point. I think that whether the $5000 is transferred as greenbacks or as $e is irrelevant, if the creation of $e is handled correctly. I think that if you look back through the recent postings on $e, you will find that in many cases a discussion which seemed to be about $e is actually about something else. You could substitute US$ for $e without changing the substance of the postings. > A company engaged in the business of > issuing such notes and not recording (perhaps, a fortiori, by not > being able to record) the transactions among people for these > instruments, however, could be ruled to be performing a separate > activity which could then be made illegal. Every bank in the United States that allows checks to be made out to cash already does this. A second point, relating to this paragraph: obviously, a foreign bank cannot be constrained in the same way to report financial transactions to US authorities. We have all heard of Swiss bank accounts. So I think that if a company issued $e "checks" denominated in US $ and if a foreign bank were willing to pay against the checks upon demand, then (a) the $e checks would not violate the Constitutional provisions against alternative currencies and (b) neither the foreign bank nor the foreign company issuing the checks would have to make any reports to US authorities. Our company is a UK company. We can easily open a US$ account at the bank down the street. We could then write US$ checks made out to cash. Our bank would not object, any more than they already object to the sterling checks that we occasionally make out to cash. If the US government tried to force either us or our bank to file reports with them, we would simply laugh at the requirements. -- Jim Dixon

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Re: broadcast encryption
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Dixon says: > In message <9408091634.AA23392(a)snark.imsi.com> perry(a)imsi.com writes: > > > What is the policy purpose for signing packets? It will affect the > > > design. > > > > Anyone even making such suggestions has not been following the IPSP > > standardization work... > > How can one follow the IPSP standardization work? Read the drafts, show up at IETF meetings, and subscribe to the working group mailing lists. (The list subscribe address is ipsec-request(a)ans.net; however, I'll caution that we do work on that mailing list, its not like cypherpunks. Distracting from the discussion, and posts from newbies who haven't followed the work thus far, are not encouraged. This isn't to say that new people are unwelcome; its just to say that it IS a working group, and its been in progress for a while.) Perry

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