December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

spread spectrum
by hiscdcj＠lux.latrobe.edu.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hiyas, I think I missed the discussion on spread spectrum. Can someone email me a summary? Dwayne. hiscdcj(a)lux.latrobe.edu.au

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CPSR Comments to NIST
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Path: digex.net!lynx.unm.edu!pacs.sunbelt.net!udel!wupost!howland.reston.ans.net!agate!ames!sgi!cdp!dsobel >Newsgroups: alt.privacy.clipper >Subject: CPSR Key Escrow Comments (long) >Message-ID: <1838400007(a)igc.apc.org> >From: David L. Sobel <dsobel(a)igc.apc.org> >Date: 27 Sep 93 10:58 PDT >Sender: Notesfile to Usenet Gateway <notes(a)igc.apc.org> >Lines: 200 September 27, 1993 Director, Computer Systems Laboratory ATTN: Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard Technology Building, Room B-154 National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Re: Request for Comments; Docket No. 930659-3159 This letter constitutes the formal comments of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) on the proposed Federal Information Processing Standard for an Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES), as described in the Federal Register on July 30, 1993 (58 FR 40791). CPSR, a national organization of professionals in the computing field, has a long-standing interest in government policies concerning cryptography and computer security. During the past several years we have pursued an extensive study of cryptography policy in the United States. We have organized several public conferences, conducted litigation under the Freedom of Information Act, and appeared on a number of panels to discuss the importance of cryptography for privacy protection and the need to scrutinize carefully government proposals designed to limit the use of this technology. While we do not represent any particular computer company or trade association, we do speak for a great many people in the computer profession who value privacy and are concerned about the government's key escrow initiative. To properly evaluate the key escrow proposal, it is necessary to consider the Computer Security Act of 1987, which made clear Congress' intent that in the area of unclassified computing systems NIST -- and not the National Security Agency (NSA) -- would be responsible for the development of technical standards. The Act emphasizes public accountability and stresses open decision-making. In the spirit of the Act, NIST set out in 1989 to develop a public key cryptography standard. According to documents obtained by CPSR through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), NIST recommendFrom owner-cypherpunks Fri Oct 1 10:30:15 1993 Received: by toad.com id AA09012; Fri, 1 Oct 93 10:28:09 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA09009; Fri, 1 Oct 93 10:27:43 PDT Return-Path: <msattler(a)netcom.com> Received: from netcom.netcom.com ([192.100.81.100]) by toad.com id AA09005; Fri, 1 Oct 93 10:27:41 PDT Received: from netcom2.netcom.com by netcom.netcom.com (5.65/SMI-4.1/Netcom) id AA01395; Fri, 1 Oct 93 10:27:53 -0700 Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 10:27:53 -0700 Message-Id: <9310011727.AA01395(a)netcom.netcom.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" To: mgream(a)acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream), cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: msattler(a)netcom.com (Michael Sattler) Subject: Re: POISON PILL :-) At 10:35 10/1/93 -0500, Matthew Gream wrote: > >I have Australian Defence Security Clearance stickers on my computer, >they are so cool, these little yellow and red stickers that authorise >the computer for secure use (and something else I can't remember). Any chance of getting a few sent to me in San Francisco? ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Michael S. Sattler msattler(a)netcom.com +1 (415) 358-3058 Digital Jungle Software Encrypt now; ask me how. (finger for PGP key) "Don't Panic!" -- Douglas Adams "Don't Panic. Stay Cool." -- PRZ

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Re: POISON PILL
by eb15＠postoffice.mail.cornell.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>You know, if people are going to discuss breaking blowing up computers >and killing people, they could at least have the taste to discuss it >elsewhere. Myself, I'm not a believer in violence, and I don't think >this list is devoted to explosives. Newgroup alt.terrorism.techniques >if you insist. > >Perry > I agree. Besides, there are much more tasteful and aesthetic ways to get the job done. A degaussing coil is a good idea, or why not sell a 'simple' add on (requiring making a hole in the hard-drive's casing), which, at the appropriate moment would quickly inject a fast drying epoxy laced with powdered aluminum, to which was applied a (well-grounded) high voltage/low amperage electric charge from a capacitor built into the case? There are cheap epoxies on the market that could harden in 3-4 minutes at that volume (rule w/ epoxies: spread out they take longer, in a glob as inside the casing of a hardrive, the reaction would run much faster). It will take them a while to chip the media out, and the electric field should do the rest.... ----------------------------------------------------------------- Ned Bade | And you all you sanctified moneybags City and Reg. Planning | Bandits anointed and crowned Cornell University | Your counterfeit towers of justice eb15(a)cornell.edu | and ethics will crash to the ground. | -Dick Gaughan. -----------------------------------------------------------------

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D.C Nets
by Timothy Newsham 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

some people mentioned that they want to set up local (neighborhood) networks and that they are "ideal" for making D.C. Nets with. I have a question about DC Nets. Is there anyway to use a DC Net to create sessions? The DC Net protocol is bit based right? So if you set up a session how do you tell which bits came from one person and belong to one session, and which came from another and belong to another session? Especially since the whole point of a DC Net is to make it undetectable where the bit originated from. Also once you solved that, what is to stop someone else from injecting bits into your session? ...

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Re: POISON PILL
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Actually, you'd be surprised what is recoverable in the aftermath of an explosion. Bombs truly are no guarantee of unrecoverability of data, at least not simple things like dynamite and pipe bombs. Furthermore, pipe bombs throw shrapnel, and as such are anti-personnel devices. The goal was to destroy data, not FBI agents. Booby traps that take lives are considered in court as 1st degree murder. There are more elegant approaches. Doug

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Unsubscribe (temporary)
by Reply to: hahn＠lds.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Unsubscribe I will be away for a week and my sys admin will not like all c.p. stuff accumulating and taking up disk space. I'll re-up on 11-Oct-93. Thanks.

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Re: POISON PILL
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

nate(a)VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons) said: >Well, as far as I know, it's hard to recover much of anything >if the bomb is a Thermite one.... they seem to do lots-o-damage >to metallic objects... and, OK, FBI agents. Yeah, I guess thermite would be better than a shock wave bomb in some ways. I could believe that, with sufficiently careful attention to detail, it might be able to heat 100% of the magnetic material beyond the medium's Curie point and therefore beyond all recovery. If on the other hand the thermite were simply tucked next to the drive...well, it's amazing what forensic investigators sometimes recover from things intended to be destroyed by thermite. A lot can go wrong in real world situations. >possibly a strong EMP? Conceivably. I'm unclear about the effects of EMP on magnetic media. Also, really good EMP requires fairly powerful shaped charges. Perhaps a simple degaussing coil would do the trick. Not sure. Seems like it should. Do any modern hard drives attempt magnetic shielding in their cases? Now that prices on recordable CD ROM drives are down to $4K, personal CDROM archiving will become more and more common; thermite would be handy there, too, again assuming very careful design & placement. This little discussion is all just for the fun of it from my point of view; I agree with other comments here that leaving your data encrypted is more to the point, not to mention far more reliable than just about any other trick. Doug

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Re: POISON PILL
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> 2) Refuse, and spend the rest of your life in jail for contempt of court. You can't be placed in jail for life for contempt. Eventually, they release you even if you haven't given them the information. Perry

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Re: POISON PILL
by dmandl＠lehman.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: jet(a)netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend) > > The US Gov policy for the disposal of any media that has been used to > store classified data is: > > wipe -- demagnatize with a *massive* demag unit > grind -- toss in a thing that'd make ground chuck out of godzilla > incenerate -- at some amazingly high temperature. > > -eric At last! I've always wondered that the mysterious "certain government conventions for wiping files" in the Norton Utilities Wipe Disk program referred to. Glad I never selected that option. --Dave.

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Re: Media declassification
by eb15＠postoffice.mail.cornell.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can you suggest the best overwrite programs for other platforms and where to get them? Ned > LAT sells the only overwrite program that has been approved >for Unix platforms. > > --Bob

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