December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Info on L.Detweiler
by dmandl＠lehman.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> On Mon, 15 Nov 1993, Douglas Barnes wrote: > > > Here's some info folks might appreciate (all numbers area code > > 303, unless otherwise noted): [handy info to help you ruin Detweiler's life deleted] > > Note that this is just the easy stuff, I have folks digging deeper. > > More to come... > > > > -- > > ---------------- /\ > > Douglas Barnes cman(a)illuminati.io.com / \ > > Chief Wizard (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v) / () \ > > Illuminati Online metaverse.io.com 7777 /______\ I'd just like to say that I think this sucks bad. I don't like cops, and you're being one, or worse. And with a team of folks helping you to dig even deeper? This is ugly, vicious, and authoritarian, and I can't believe that you would actually BRAG to hundreds of people that you're doing it. Sounds to me like you're a very frustrated person. You are clearly an insensitive bastard. I just hope that you encounter this kind of sympathy if YOU go through a "difficult period" in your life. --Dave.

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Re:Info on L. Detweiler
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Douglas Barnes wrote: >here's some info folks might appreciate (all numbers area code 303, unless >otherwise noted). >[irrelevent information] I know that I do not appreciate knowing this and it is difficult to believe that you would actually waste your time by digging up information to make someone's life difficult (even if he does keep the list noise level up). Use the delete key or kill file. If you really succeed in annoying him enough, I hope for your sake you have few leaders as to where you reside and that you live far away. Gestapo tactics such as these, used by certain governments, are what we seek to eliminate in the digital world. Why would you seek to implement on the list that which we (at least some of us) are trying to eliminate from the net? It's crap that can be done without. Direct your efforts more profitably. Scott G. Morham !The First, VACCINIA(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu! Second PGP Public Keys by Request ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLOhyqz2paOMjHHAhAQHrSwP9GXG6nv1/ICtwCgvWte7Z15nhL/+wPSz2 LWFgFdJ/mJ1ecf9SVSNp2m3uyAoxG0ZARY/5Q6dPEm917W7gxCMxJ/JAFeNoH2hU 1FBLiP4vzNQYlqhiexqFQFOO4SgMLO6QNEAK2zLSv00SwQhqVdMHEHkp7KCMpESg bO46x8BGaYk= =D0tP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Image crypto info needed...
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi everyone, I am looking for any references or sources of information or code dealing w/ the use of images as a means of both transmission and encryption of plain- texts. Specificaly, I am interested in taking the 3 byte feild for each pixel in a .gif and replacing the lsb w/ the bits in a 'plain-text'. This in effect converts the image to a 'cypher-text'. The only real indication of a message is the individual pixel brightness will be altered. However, unless you have a source of known clean images there is little way to decode the messagr reliably. Right now we (a friend is helping work on it) are using the .gif galore CD as our library of reference images. We eventualy hope to have a source of such images available for all to access. Any information or feedback would be appreciated (keep your flames to yourself), thanks ahead of time!

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count me out
by jet＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I joined this list thinking there'd be a lot of good information about crypto. There was. Now, I'm better off reading sci.crypt. So I'm gone. -eric

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Portable TCL-based crypto
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The work Strick is doing sounds very much like what I am looking for. It is too bad about the export and usage restrictions but perhaps other packages can be incorporated in the future which are more freely available. TCL itself appears to be widely ported and sounds like a good foundation for this project. I am hoping to learn more about it soon. I do have some concerns about the portability of the gmp library specifically, but I know that the md4, md5, and rsaref packages are very portable. I guess we're not supposed to use rsaref as a "bare" mp library, though. Please keep us informed about the progress of this package! I'm sure many people on the list would be interested in beta testing when you are ready. Hal

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Image Encryption Request Filled!
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would like to thank all of those who sent mail relating to my earlier post requesting help finding information on graphical encryption - encoding. I have enough information to finish the project that I am working on.

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Review of "Design and implementation of an RSA cryptosystem using multiple DSP chips"
by an5877＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Source: Computing Reviews, November 1993, pp. 602-603; 9311-0871 ER, M. H.; WONG, D. J.; SETHU, A. A.; AND NGEOW, K. S. (Nanyang Technological Univ., Singapore) Design and implementation of an RSA cryptosystem using multiple DSP chips. Microprocess. Microsyst. 15, 7 (Sept. 1991), 369-378. The authors propose implementation of the Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA) public key cryptosystem using multiple digital signal processing (DSP) chips. They achieve a speed- up factor of 70 compared with a C software implementation on a PC. The use of multiple DSP chips (three in the authors' example) is hard to justify, in light of other known results. For example, Dusse and Kaliski reported a 25-50 millisecond decryption of 512-bit RSA with a single DSP chip [1]. My C implementation on a SPARC station runs in 2 seconds, about the same factor claimed by the authors. The design suffers from some other problems as well. One problem is the key size (160 bits). This is too small (even 512 bits is not enough for some applications). Another problem is that in this design the secret key is chosen first, and the corresponding public key is calculated accordingly. In most cases, the other way around is preferable, since it is advantageous to have short secret keys. A third problem is that any Carmichael number will pass the proposed primality test (Carmichael numbers are not primes). Better methods exist. The paper is intended for electrical engineers with little or no background in cryptology. The length of the paper is suitable, the drawings are clear, and the physical form of the material is suitable. A reference to Dusse and Kaliski [I] is missing. I believe that the authors did not know about that work, and would have reconsidered the project if they had. Overall, this paper is a fair description of a graduate-level project, but the quality of the design leaves something to be desired. Y. Yacobi, Morristown, NJ References [1] DUSSE, S. R. ND KALISKI, B. S., JR. A cryptographic library for the Motorola DSP56000. In Advances in Cryptology - Eurocrypt '90, I. B. Damgard, Ed., Springer, New York, 1991, 230-244. GENERAL TERM: DESIGN, MEASUREMENT, PERFORMANCE Brought to you by the Information Liberation Front and DEADBEAT <na5877(a)anon.penet.fi> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQBFAgUBLOkhMfFZTpBW/B35AQEU0AF/f9OF6e7asmftL0fTvsNTAxwSPB5GHXuG M9tIK5U9lH7AEC3VWPLgflsVIe/DO6ZS =PvRB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Fun with Steganography on "Seinfeld"
by dmandl＠lehman.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is technically not a cypherpunk subject, but it's related, and I've always wanted to mention it on the list. On an episode of the TV show "Seinfeld" from a few years ago, there's a scene where Jerry and Elaine are talking in Jerry's apartment. Jerry says something that Elaine doesn't like and she grumbles something unintelligible in response. He snaps back, "What did you say?" and she says "Oh, nothing, forget it." He says, "Are you sure?" and she responds, "Nothing, never mind" (or words to that effect). Later on in the episode, the same thing happens with Jerry's friend George: Jerry says something George doesn't like, George mumbles in response. Jerry then asks him "Did you say something?" George says "No." Jerry: "I'm sure you said something." George: "No, I didn't." Innocent enough. But if you turn up the volume REALLY loud, you can hear what Elaine and George mumbled: "What a bunch of bullshit." It's impossible to hear at normal listening level, but when the volume is cranked, it's there as plain as day. So, what we have here is the word "bullshit"--absolutely verboten by any interpretation of FCC rules--actually smuggled in inside the innocent conversation in a prime-time TV show. Even if the censorship police all sat around watching every minute of the episode for forbidden material, they would never have caught this (and obviously didn't). This episode was shown just like any other episode of the program, probably more than once. Most people are probably unaware of the hidden message. But it's there. (This is not an urban legend or a "Paul Is Dead" rumor--this has been confirmed by many people.) I've always thought this was an inspired and brilliant use of steganography. The producers of "Seinfeld" sneaking the word "bullshit" right past the censors' nose on prime-time TV? Awesome. --Dave. P.S.: I forget which episode it is, but I can go search for it if people insist.

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"Cyptography and Secure Communications"
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was recently at my friendly neighborhood technical book store and I noticed a cyptography book I hadn't seen before. It is called "Cyptography and Secure Communications" by Man Young Rhee. The publishing data is 1994. Does anyone here know anything about this book? How does it compare with "Applied Cryptography"? Thanks, Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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RSA/MP/FFT speedups?
by collins＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cetin Koc, Professor at Oregon State working with RSA, gave a lecture at the 93 RSA Data Security Conference on improving RSA performance, where, at one point, he discounted the efficacy of FFTs for multiplication/exponentiation of such small numbers (under 2000 bits), compared to better use of addition chains, separating squaring from multiplication, and cleaner MP multiplies, etc. Recently, someone (I can't remember) mentioned in conversation that someone else (I also can't remember) had very good results with FFTs. In fact, the break even point was actually just a few hundred bits. I would really like to find out: a) who is doing this work; b) is there a paper; c) some performance figures (test code would be good :-). If anyone has any pointers, please send them to me in private e-mail. If anyone else is interested in this topic, please tell me in private e-mail; I will CC answers to all interested parties, or (if interest exceeds my CC threshold) post to the list. Thanks, Scott Collins | "Few people realize what tremendous power there | is in one of these things." -- Willy Wonka ......................|................................................ BUSINESS. voice:408.862.0540 fax:974.6094 collins(a)newton.apple.com Apple Computer, Inc. 5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B Cupertino, CA 95014 ....................................................................... PERSONAL. voice/fax:408.257.1746 1024:669687 catalyst(a)netcom.com

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