December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

crypto++ help
by wwoelbel＠midwest.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I recently downloaded the crypto++ class library and am having a bit of trouble getting things to happen. I have read the text on the source-filter-sink concept and was able to create a DES file encryptor. What I would like to do is use either blowfish or IDEA to encrypt a variable length data stream. Does anybody have experience with this library? A short code snippet or similar help would be appreciated. Bill Woelbeling wwoelbel(a)midwest.net

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Micali's rights to lightweight certificates etc.
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Wed, 31 Jul 1996 17:28:56 -0400 From: Silvio Micali <silvio(a)sunspot.tiac.net> To: cme(a)cybercash.com, d.adams(a)xopen.co.uk, frantz(a)netcom.com, hallam(a)w3.org, rodney(a)sabletech.com, rsalz(a)osf.org, silvio(a)sunspot.tiac.net, spki(a)c2.org Subject: Micali's rights to lightweight certificates etc. Sender: owner-spki(a)c2.org Precedence: bulk Dear Carl: Last April I was forwarded by Ron (Rivest) the following e-message addressed to you: "[Re: Micali's lightweight certificates with hash chains] The mechanism maybe patented, but who owns the patent? I am aware of claims by two european groups who have payment schemes using a combined s/key and signed cert technique Pghill" As I do not know the context of your conversation, it is hard for me to guess which technology's rights the above question refers to. There are (at least) two possible technologies the question refers to. Let me thus answer it in either case. I would appreciate if you could pass this information to people you feel may be interested in it. (I am trying to CC all the people CCed in the original message, but I am not sure that this reaches all the right people.) RIGHTS INFORMATION My efficient certificate revocation technology is itself based on my off-line digital signature technology. The efficient certificate certificate revocation technology has been invented by me alone. I have filed for patent protection, and the patent is currently pending with the U.S. Patent Office. The underlying off-line signature technology has been invented by Shimon Even, Oded Goldreich and me. The technology is protected by U.S. Patent No. 5,016,274. The rights to this technology are only with me. (The latter technology, among other things, covers the process of separating the signing process into two stages: a OFF-LINE one --that can be performed before knowing what the message to be signed is--- and an ON-LINE one --which is typically performed when one knows exactly what he/she wishes to sign. In the preferred embodiment, in the off-line step, the signer uses the secret key SK of a first, conventional secret-public key pair (SK,PK) to digitally sign the publick key, pk, of a second, restricted but very fast, signature scheme. In the on-line step, the signer uses the second secret key --i.e., the one associated with pk-- in order to sign the desired message. In particular, the second public key, pk, can be obtained by evaluating k times a given one-way hash function on input sk. After doing so, one can sign in an off-line step pk together with a certificate serial number (and other information). Then, in an on-line step, one can sign that a certificate is being valid for at at least i days --where i is between 1 and k-- by releasing the ith inverse of pk; that is, by releasing a value that, hashed i times, yields pk. You can thus see the connection between the two technologies.) Both technologies are available for licensing. If you or someone in your discussion group is aware of a company using either technology, I would appreciate if you could facilitate a contact between me and such a company, so that we can discuss possible licensing arrangements. The Efficient Certificate Revocation Paper is presented in MIT Technical MIT/LCS/TM-542, dated November 95. A better version appears in a March 1996 manuscript. Either version could be obtained from me, if more convenient. Off-Line Digital Signatures also appear in the Proceedings of Crypto 89. A better version can be found in The Journal of Cryptography (1996) 9; pp. 35-67. Any version is also obtainable from me, if more convenient. Hope this helps answering the above ``rights'' question. Thank you also in advance for forwarding the above information to whomever you believe may be interested in it. All the best, Silvio --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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CDT Policy Post 2.29 - Administration, Congress Propose Sweeping Anti-TerrorismInitiatives
by editor＠cdt.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----------------------------------------------------------------------------- _____ _____ _______ / ____| __ \__ __| ____ ___ ____ __ | | | | | | | | / __ \____ / (_)______ __ / __ \____ _____/ /_ | | | | | | | | / /_/ / __ \/ / / ___/ / / / / /_/ / __ \/ ___/ __/ | |____| |__| | | | / ____/ /_/ / / / /__/ /_/ / / ____/ /_/ (__ ) /_ \_____|_____/ |_| /_/ \____/_/_/\___/\__, / /_/ \____/____/\__/ The Center for Democracy and Technology /____/ Volume 2, Number 29 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A briefing on public policy issues affecting civil liberties online ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CDT POLICY POST Volume 2, Number 29 August 1, 1996 CONTENTS: (1) Clinton Administration, Congress Propose Sweeping Anti-Terrorism Initiatives (2) How to Subscribe/Unsubscribe (3) About CDT, contacting us ** This document may be redistributed freely with this banner intact ** Excerpts may be re-posted with permission of <editor(a)cdt.org> ** This document looks best when viewed in COURIER font ** ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) CLINTON ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESS PROPOSE SWEEPING ANTI-TERRORISM INITIATIVES In the wake of the recent bombing at the Olympics and the suspected terrorist involvement in the TWA crash, the Clinton Administration and members of Congress are proposing a set of sweeping counter-terrorism initiatives. If enacted into law, these proposals will dramatically increase law enforcement surveillance authority over the Internet and other advanced communications technologies. An outline of the Administration's proposal was circulated on Capitol Hill on Monday July 29. President Clinton has urged Congress to pass new counter-terrorism legislation before the Congressional recess at the end of this week. While several prominent Republican members of Congress, including House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA), have said publicly that Congress should not rush into any new counter-terrorism legislation, most observers believe there is a strong possibility that some or all of the Administration's proposal will be enacted before the August recess. The draft proposal contains several measures which were rejected by Congress as part of the previous counter-terrorism initiative proposed last year after the Oklahoma City bombing, as well as several new measures including as-yet unspecified changes to U.S. encryption policy and funding for the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA, a.k.a. Digital Telephony). CDT is concerned that the latest counter-terrorism efforts on Capitol Hill are occurring without appropriate deliberation. Major policy decisions expanding the surveillance powers of law enforcement should not be made without careful consideration of the necessity of such proposals and the relative benefit to society. In the coming days and weeks, CDT will work with Congressional leaders, privacy advocates, and the net.community to ensure that constitutional civil liberties and the openness of the Internet are protected as Congress considers counter-terrorism measures. ________________________________________________________________________ MAJOR POINTS OF THE COUNTER-TERRORISM PROPOSALS CIRCULATING ON THE HILL The administration's new counter-terrorism initiative and other amendments circulating this week in Congress contain numerous provisions, but four are of particular concern to the net.community: * New Threats to Encryption, Opposition to the Pro-CODE Bill * Funding for Digital Telephony Without Public Accountability * Amendment to Criminalize 'Bomb-Making' Information on the Internet * Expanded Authority for Multi-Point, "Roving" Wiretaps The full text of the Administration's proposal and background information are available at CDT's counter-terrorism Web Page: http://www.cdt.org/policy/terrorism/ -------------------------------------------------------- I. NEW THREATS TO ENCRYPTION, OPPOSITION TO THE PRO-CODE BILL The Administration's outline contains the following statement on encryption: "* Encryption -- We will seek legislation to strengthen our ability to prevent terrorists from coming into the possession of the technology to encrypt their communications and data so that they are beyond the reach of law enforcement. We oppose legislation that would eliminate current export barriers and encouraging the proliferation of encryption which blocks appropriate access to protect public safety and the national security." While no specific legislative language has yet been proposed, this represents the first statement by the Administration that they will seek legislation to further restrict encryption. Even more troubling, the Administration is clearly attempting to use the recent suspected terrorist incidents to push for a new and more restrictive encryption policy. This new proposal comes as Congress is finally beginning to seriously consider major changes in U.S. encryption policy. Bipartisan legislation in both the House and Senate to relax encryption export controls is gaining momentum. The Senate Commerce Committee has held 3 hearings in the last 6 weeks, and is preparing to vote to send the Burns/Leahy "Pro-CODE" bill (S. 1726) to the floor of the Senate. The Administration's attempt to leverage the public's concern about terrorism to block passage of the Pro-CODE bill is disturbing, and poses a significant threat to privacy and security on the Internet. CDT is working with members of Congress, privacy advocates, and the communications and computer industries to oppose any attempt by the Administration to impose new restrictions on encryption, and we continue to work to move the bipartisan export relief legislation through Congress. -------------------------------------------------------- II. FUNDING FOR DIGITAL TELEPHONY WITHOUT PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY The Administration is also seeking to override the public accountability provisions of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA - a.k.a. 'Digital Telephony') by providing a funding for the law in a way that prevents public oversight of the FBI's surveillance ability. Enacted in October of 1994, granted law enforcement new authority to influence the design of telecommunications networks (the Internet, Commercial online services, and BBS's were exempted) in order to preserve their ability to conduct court authorized electronic surveillance. Congress balanced this new authority with a number of mechanisms to ensure public accountability over law enforcement surveillance ability. While complicated, the public accountability mechanisms are designed to work as follows: * Law enforcement provides telecommunications carriers, the Congress, and the public with notice of its surveillance capacity needs (i.e., the number of simultaneous wiretaps in a given geographic location) with an opportunity for public comment. * Based on an assessment of the reasonableness of the law enforcement surveillance capacity request, Congress appropriates money to cover the cost of modifications. If Congress does not believe law enforcement has adequately justified its request, money will not be appropriated. * Telecommunications carriers are not obligated to comply with the statute or make any capacity modifications without government reimbursement. In October 1995, the FBI published its first notice of surveillance capacity (see CDT Policy Post Vol. 1, No. 26). The telecommunications industry and privacy advocates used the public accountability provisions of CALEA to respond to the FBI's request and argued that the FBI had not adequately justified the extensive surveillance capability contained in the request. As a result, Congress has not yet appropriated funds and no modifications have been made. The FBI clearly believes that the public accountability provisions of CALEA are working **too well**, and appears to be using the recent focus on terrorism to push for a new funding mechanism which does not contain public oversight. CDT is fighting hard to ensure that the public accountability provisions of CALEA, which have until now prevented the FBI from acquiring unnecessary surveillance capacity, remain a part of the law, and will vigorously oppose any effort by the FBI and the Clinton Administration to remove the last opportunity for public oversight over law enforcement power. -------------------------------------------------------- III. THE AVAILABILITY OF 'BOMB-MAKING' INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) has reintroduced an amendment to make it illegal to disseminate information on how to construct explosives knowing that the information will be used in furtherance of a federal crime. The amendment was adopted by the Senate earlier this month as part of a Department of Defense Appropriations bill. CDT believes that the vague provisions of the Feinstein amendment could have a chilling effect on online speech, needlessly duplicate existing criminal statutes, and should be removed. Feinstein first proposed the amendment as part of the 1995 counter-terrorism bill. The initial Feinstein amendment was extremely broad and would have resulted in a flat ban on certain constitutionally protected speech online. After civil liberties advocates objected, Feinstein narrowed her amendment substantially, although it was ultimately dropped from the final terrorism bill signed in April 1996. -------------------------------------------------------- IV. EXPANDED WIRETAP AUTHORITY The Administration's proposal would also significantly expand current wiretapping authority to allow multi-point (or "roving") wiretaps. This would dramatically change surveillance authority to include wiretaps of INDIVIDUALS instead of LOCATIONS. This proposal would do away with the delicate balance between privacy and law enforcement that Congress has struck over 30 years of wiretapping legislation. Federal law has always required that wiretaps issue for a specific location, to meet Fourth Amendment requirements. In 1986 Congress introduced a narrow exception to this rule, only for cases where it could be shown that the target was intentionally evading wiretaps by changing facilities. The Administration proposal would completely remove this standard, allowing so-called "roving taps" for any persons whose behavior makes wiretapping difficult for law enforcement. The administration proposed similar provisions in the spring of 1995 in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing. These provisions proved controversial in Congress and were dropped from the final bill. ________________________________________________________________________ FOR MORE INFORMATION For more information on the counter-terrorism proposals and their impact on the Internet check out: CDT's Counter-Terrorism Page: http://www.cdt.org/policy/terrorism/ CDT's Encryption Policy Page: http://www.cdt.org/crypto/ CDT's Digital Telephony Page: http://www.cdt.org/digtel.html Encryption Policy Resource Page: http://www.crypto.com/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ (4) SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Be sure you are up to date on the latest public policy issues affecting civil liberties online and how they will affect you! Subscribe to the CDT Policy Post news distribution list. CDT Policy Posts, the regular news publication of the Center For Democracy and Technology, are received by nearly 10,000 Internet users, industry leaders, policy makers and activists, and have become the leading source for information about critical free speech and privacy issues affecting the Internet and other interactive communications media. To subscribe to CDT's Policy Post list, send mail to policy-posts-request(a)cdt.org with a subject: subscribe policy-posts If you ever wish to remove yourself from the list, send mail to the above address with a subject of: unsubscribe policy-posts ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (5) ABOUT THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY/CONTACTING US The Center for Democracy and Technology is a non-profit public interest organization based in Washington, DC. The Center's mission is to develop and advocate public policies that advance democratic values and constitutional civil liberties in new computer and communications technologies. Contacting us: General information: info(a)cdt.org World Wide Web: URL:http://www.cdt.org/ FTP URL:ftp://ftp.cdt.org/pub/cdt/ Snail Mail: The Center for Democracy and Technology 1634 Eye Street NW * Suite 1100 * Washington, DC 20006 (v) +1.202.637.9800 * (f) +1.202.637.0968 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- End Policy Post 2.29 8/1/96 -----------------------------------------------------------------------

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Brain Tennis with Dorthy
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm following the Brain Tennis Match between Dorothy Denning and John Gilmore on encryption and the right to absolute privacy on Hot Wired (http://www.hotwired.com/braintennis/96/31/index0a.html) Were I a participant in this exercise, I would lob the following to Dorothy: I have to assume that Dorothy believes in absolute privacy (in some areas). I am assuming, for example, that she does not believe in torture as an interrogation technique. I assume, therefore, that she believes in absolute privacy in the individual brain. While she may support imprisonment (or the threat of imprisonment) as an interrogation technique (jailing for contempt), I think she would oppose bringing out the hot pokers. I have a wider point to make but please indulge me for a moment. The fact that many wiretapping advocates oppose torture raises a host of absolutely *fascinating* questions: 1) If it were technically possible to compel us (without pain) to disclose the contents of our mind, would Dorothy support the application of such techniques to suspects (under judicial warrants or other lawful authority)? That is, does the opposition to torture arise from squeamishness about pain or from some residual recognition of the right of personal autonomy. 2) Would those who support wiretapping but oppose torture waive their opposition to torture in certain cases. That is, if the continued existence of the United States or indeed Life on Earth were dependent on a bit of information stored in the brain of a single person, would those who countenance some invasions of privacy in the social interest allow torture in these (admittedly) rare cases? Back to the main thread: Dorothy, if you oppose torture then you have granted the validity of John's belief in absolute privacy. You are merely quibbling about where that zone of privacy ends. You might say that the zone of privacy ends at the brain but that is too narrow a range. Personal autonomy exists in the technical sense because only I command my thoughts. Only I can order my muscles to move. I can be chained and tortured and even hooked up to some sort of electrical apparatus to attempt to short circuit my muscular control and get my hand to jump but such coercion is pretty crude. If someone else wants me to dance a Waltz smoothly or write a paragraph of original material, they are going to need my cooperation (however secured). My zone of absolute privacy extends to those things I can directly control with my thoughts. This area also extends to communications. If I arrange things such that no one else can overhear me and whisper something to another person, then we both share knowledge that can only be secured by others through torture (and not always then) or through the decision of one of us to give it up. The same thought in two heads is still as much within the zone of privacy as that thought within one head. And so on multiplied by 1000. The zone of privacy arises from the inability of other people to directly command the mind of one person or a thousand persons. We have the control. Absent torture, you can't get it if we choose not to give it to you. Note that this zone already extends beyond the brain case. It travels down our nerves to the tips of our fingers and toes. We command those nerves and that wiring represents an extension of our brain. One of the things that we can do with those nerves is to use them to generate signals of various kinds. This signal generation is *also* an extension of our brain. It is under our control. If we like, we can arrange things so that no one else or only the intended recipient can know our thoughts. We have that power. We have used our zone of privacy to extend its scope. We have done (continue to do) it all from inside our brains. We have not left that sanctuary -- that fortress built by the rejection of torture by advanced societies. Therefore, if we develop the technical means to *extend* that zone of privacy beyond our heads, bodies, and those we can whisper to, you can only break the zone by the torture which you have already eschewed. The nature of the zone of privacy is not a grant from the State, it is the result of our nature as independent *actors* and our collective decision (in the West at least) to minimize the use of torture by governments. The Internet itself is an example of individual cooperation to extend communications channels from one person to many (it was built by its users). Those same users can, if they choose, use their autonomy to build in security features of their collective design. It belongs to them as their minds belong to them. It is an extension of those minds. Dorothy, you or I may not like the thoughts or communications of specific people but they have the same right to secure those thoughts and communications if they choose to. Now in reading all this, you may wonder what this has to do with key escrow and Gang of Seven (G7) crypto policy. Dorothy, as virtually the sole non-government employee who supports Clipper and SKE, I believe you to be unique in another way. I think that you can be "saved" from tyranny (which is always rough on the tyrants). Unlike the government employees on your side of the argument, you have generally not favored outlawing private use of strong crypto. We would like to separate you from them on this fundamental question of personal autonomy. The Century of Blood that the world has just lived through at the hands of its governments (160 million murdered) causes many of us to believe that some of your allies (who BTW currently include the Kingdom of the Saud and the People's Republic of China) would use torture and other very inhumane means to violate even our traditional zone of privacy. If you will merely grant to us the *morality* of our attempt to use the zone of privacy which you have granted to us to extend that zone of privacy, we will grant you an understanding of your fears of this new world (which many of us share). Please, separate yourself absolutely from the torturers. DCF

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Re: fbi, crypto, and defcon
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:13 PM 7/31/96 -0700, Cerridwyn Llewyellyn wrote: >A more cynical view is that they are there to protect some of the biggest >institutions of "organized crime" (ie: Congress, At&t, Microsoft, etc) who >are ripping people off on a daily basis from the other organizations who >refuse to play by their rules. Speaking of AT+T, as I recall one of the incidents which preceded the introduction of Clipper was the news that AT+T was going to introduce an encrypted telephone using DES as the encryption algorithm. According to the story, AT+T was "bought off" by the US government. I haven't looked into that for a couple of years, but if we're looking for co-conspirators that would be a good place to start. Also: Clipper was fabbed by VLSI Technology. A few pointed inquiries might work wonders here. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Welcome Back
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:51 AM 8/1/96 -0400, Brian Davis wrote: >Uh oh. The hell with the FAA. What about the Disney people? Michael >Eisner may sent Goofy to lean on you! > >EBD >No longer a federal prosecutor! Welcome back. I missed your posts. Do you have an honest job or are you still taking the King's Shilling? DCF

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Re: A Libertine Question
by Vinnie Moscaritolo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think Bob Dole understands the needs for privacy rights for animals.. the following verbatim account of a segment of a Bob Dole appearance a week or so ago at a cotton cooperative in Bakersfield, California "My wife was here six days last week, and she'll be back next week, and she does an outstanding job. And when I'm elected, she will not be in charge of health care. Don't worry about it. Or in charge of anything else. (Muffled crowd gasp.) I didn't say that. It did sort of go through my mind. But she may have a little blood bank in the White House. But that's all right. We need it. It doesn't cost you anything. These days, it's not all you give at the White House - your blood. You have to give your file. I keep wondering if mine's down there. Or my dog. I got a dog named Leader. I'm not certain they've got a file on Leader. He's a schnauzer. I think he's been cleaned. We've had him checked by the vet but not by the FBI or the White House. He may be suspect, but in any event, we'll get into that later. Animal rights or something of that kind. But this is a very serious election." Vinnie Moscaritolo "Law - Samoan Style" http://www.vmeng.com/vinnie/ Fingerprint: 4FA3298150E404F2782501876EA2146A

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IPSEC for Linux
by ichudov＠galaxy.galstar.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, Is there an implementation of IPSEC for Linux? Thanks, - Igor.

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Re: Cracking RC4/40 for massive wiretapps
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wait a minute: RC4 is an OFB cipher. The previous plaintext has no effect on the ciphertext. Hence, an attacker with shitloads of storage capacity can generate some initial output for each key and test each pre-stored key against ciphertext for possible hits. Using 'flaws' in the key schedule (esp. if the key is based on a password rather than a hash of a password) one could search for 'more likely keys' first. Rob --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Is 1024-bit PGP key enough?
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is security provided by 1024-bit PGP key sufficient against most powerful computers that are available today? Say if smoe organization spent 10 billions of dollars on a cracking machine, would it be possible to crack the keys in reasonable time?

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