December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Surf-filter lists
by Damaged Justice 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Vlad: How can consumers make an informed decision as to which filter they wish to purchase, if they are not told exactly what information each product is filtering out? Meeks et al may be guilty of flamboyant, emotionalistic prose, but I find the concept that the public is expected to buy various filters without knowing what they filter...frankly, ridiculous. -- "Your wish is my command, if you know what's good for you, bitch." - William Shakespeare (Or perhaps it was his brother Fred who said that.)

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Seek-and-Destroy
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Do NOT visit: http://xxx.lanl.gov/seek-and-destroy The sysadmins for xxx.lanl.gov don't like robots visiting their web site, so they've published a statement on indexing at: http://xxx.lanl.gov/RobotsBeware.html Remember, do NOT click on: http://xxx.lanl.gov/seek-and-destroy -Declan

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Cookie alternatives
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There has been quite a bit of discussion recently about the "cookies" used by Netscape Navigator and their effects on privacy of users. Here is some background and some thoughts on alternatives. I think the term "cookie" goes back to the 1960's. According to legend, there was a virus-like program called "cookie monster" which would occasionally pop up on people's terminals and say "gimme cookie". You then had to type the word "cookie" to satisfy the program, and it would go away. The program was hidden in the core memory of the large, multi-user computer systems which were common in those days. I first heard "cookie" used similarly to its current context in the 1970's. It referred to a data item which would be given by a service to a client of that service, and which would be used on later interactions. I think the usage comes from the cookie monster, where you imagine the client saying "gimme cookie" to the server. The cookie is an "opaque" data item, that is, its structure if any is not visible or documented for the client. It has meaning only to the service. There is a similar concept in cryptography, the "nonce". A nonce is a random value which is generated by one party in a cryptographic protocol and which is exchanged at later stages of the protocol. The purpose of the nonce is to prevent replay attacks and to maintain continuity during the (possibly) many exchanges of data which make up the protocol. When the client sends a request to a service it includes a nonce, and the return reply includes the same nonce. This way the client can make sure that this is a reply to its current request and not something which is replayed from an earlier interaction. Cookies seem a little more general than nonces, in that nonces are pretty clearly supposed to be just random numbers, while cookies are more general and could have internal structure which is known by one of the parties, although it is usually opaque to the other. However I think in current usage on the web cookies are most commonly used basically as nonces, random values whose purpose is to maintain continuity in a series of interactions. When a server gives a cookie to a web browser, that browser supplies the cookie on future interactions with the server. The cookie probably does not have any specific data about the user or the interaction, but is used only to link up the interactions which take place. It is most probably used as an index into a database maintained on the server itself. Its only requirements for this purpose are that it is unique and that it can easily be used as such an index. One typical usage would be to maintain a "shopping cart" while browsing at a store. If I am visiting an online clothing store, I may choose to buy some pants, a shirt, and a jacket as I browse around. Each time I click on the "buy" button, my browser includes the cookie I received when I first visited the site. This indexes into a database on the server which is keeping track of what I have bought. With each new item, the cookie allows the server to add it to the correct virtual shopping cart. Then when I "check out", again the cookie allows the server to display everything I bought. Given that cookies generally work this way it is clear that the notion of editing cookies doesn't make much sense. If cookies are opaque data structures, changing them is just going to make them invalid. You might as well just delete them. This also implies that you don't have much control over what kinds of information the server is maintaining in its database which is indexed by your cookie. In the shopping cart example, the cookie is sent on every transaction, not just when you click to make a purchase. This will allow the server to track your progress through the site, see which if any ads you have seen, and generally record many details about your interactions. More generally, cookies are used for this purpose even on sites which do not need them for shopping carts. As a user of the web, I would prefer to have more control over the kind of information which servers gather about my browsing habits. Of course, since web interactions are voluntary, a server is free to put whatever restrictions it wishes on clients in return for letting them access its information. It can require clients to accept cookies, to register with their names and addresses, or to FedEx their firstborn children to the store, for that matter. Nevertheless to the extent that I have bargaining clout in these interactions, I will prefer systems which do not infringe so much upon my privacy. It is interesting to consider how shopping carts might be done without cookies and similar technologies which allow servers to get more information about me than necessary. I would prefer a system where the list of things I have chosen to buy is saved on my own computer, in a format I can clearly see, and without linking my purchase decisions to other browsing I may have done on that site. Consider a system where when I click on "buy", a dialog box pops up in the corner of my screen which is my virtual shopping cart. It holds a list of the items I have selected for purchase, with each new item appended to the list. When I go to check out, the contents of this dialog box are uploaded (with my permission) to the site, where payment arrangements are made. Since I can see what is being put into the dialog box and what is being uploaded, I know that I am controlling exactly what information is being revealed about me. I don't have to trust the server to protect my privacy by not recording excessive information about my browsing. (Given the difficulties in creating new protocols for this kind of support, I think a step in the right direction would be to change the user interface so that cookies are only sent upon user request. Maybe you have to shift-click or use some other key modifier to send a cookie. Then shopping pages could ask you to shift-click the buy button to add the item to your shopping cart.) All this is in accord with the general principle that we support here, of protecting privacy by limiting the collection of infringing data, rather than trying to pass laws to restrict the dissemination and sharing of such information. We support ecash since it allows transactions without identification, rather than using credit cards but trying to put legal restrictions on what the CC companies can do with their transaction data. Cookies allow many kinds of privacy infringing data to be collected. I would prefer to see alternate mechanisms to allow for the kinds of transactions that cookies are needed for, which allow users to protect their own privacy. Are there other uses of cookies for which alternatives are needed? Hal

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Re: Responding to Pre-daw
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > If you want to own guns then you should accept the fact that you risk > > having your head blown off in the middle of the night by a SWAT team. > > Just as the car has introduced the risk of being killed in a trafic > > accident the gun has introduced new risks. If society dosen't like the > > risks then it can opt to ban the technology. > > Except that getting killed in a traffic accident IS an accident (mostly :) > while having black clad Fed's storming into your house was _consciously_ > decided by them, because THEY have a problem with YOUR guns (?!)... I think the original point was that they MIGHT storm into your house by mistake (say, because they incorrectly accepted a informant's story). Therefore, it is truly a mistake. That said, it is still not justifiable for a SWAT team to FORCE a situation where they may necessarily be in physical danger, and therefore, are forced to respond with overwhelming force when the target may reasonably be innocent. Worse yet, the bureaucrats, whose asses are on the line when a tragic mistake occurs, will rarely, if ever, admit to any wrongdoing. They may be forced out, at worse; there may be a symbolic verbal lynching in front of the Congress, but that would be about it. If such a tragedy were to occur to me, and I were to survive, I would want the responsible PERSONS fully acknowledge their mistakes (and be properly punished). It is a travesty of justice to blame a no-name, faceless "system" as was done in the well-known recent cases (whether or not the target was ultimately found guilty of any misdeeds). Ern

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Bare fibers
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:32 PM 7/18/96 -0700, Cerridwyn Llewyellyn wrote: > >>a (hidden) drive to your computer using a reasonably surreptious link that >>is difficult to trace. Say, an IR optical link, a single bare (unjacketed) >>optical fiber, a LAN with hidden nodes, or a similar system. Maybe an > >I find the idea of the optical fiber very interesting. Is there such >a beast currently available? I really don't know anything about fiber, >and therefore it would be very difficult for me to construct such a >system myself... Unjacketed fiber exists, but since its primary use is to build up jacketed fibers and fiber bundles, it is rarely seen in industry outside of the companies which normally use it. But it is available. The fiber is usually coated with a very thin layer of clear plastic to protect against moisture and abrasion, and the diameter is around 0.5 to 1.0 millimeters in diameter. Terminating fiber is specialized; it is cleaved using diamond tools, and is usually polished after mounting in a holder. These days, transmitters and receivers are easily available. For a relatively short run, plastic fibers would probably be the best bet. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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take the pledge
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Look, folks, we all know that 99% of what David Sternlight posts is garbage. Why don't we all pledge not to answer any of his posts, and then he'll go away. If necessary, someone can be appointed to post a weekly "the views expressed by David are junk and we are deliberately not replying to them directly" message. David has plenty of places to argue with the wind. We don't need to add this one. I'd like to ask people to publically pledge that they will not reply to David's messages. This is such a pledge. Perry

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Re: Opiated file systems
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 18 Jul 96 at 11:01, Adam Back wrote: > For plausibility it would probably be best if very few people used the > duress key feature. And how can you guarantee that? Also: an attacker doesn't care about what percentage of (other) users use duress feature of not. His concern is whether you use it. Note that you'd have to be careful of what you say and do over email in the clear (or encrypted to someone cooperating with an attacker): if you post an excerpt of source code or maybe somehting like Edupage, or if you save mail, there might be reason enough for the attacker to expect to see some of that on your encrypted fs after he's rubber-hosed your key from you. If he doesn't, and he knows you have a possibility of using the duress-key feature... Oh yeah. Psychology is a good way of determining the likelihood of using a duress system. With the extra work and overhead of a duress system, you're better off using stego on some gifs or graphics files. Rob --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Re: MSNBC and cookies
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"junger(a)pdj2-ra.F-REMOTE.CWRU.Edu" "Peter D. Junger" 19-JUL-1996 13:57:57.15 >It's a nuisance, but I suppose there is no reason that a commercial >service can't do such a thing. But what happens when one tries to >access it with Lynx? At least with VAX/VMS Lynx (I assume the other version would be doing the same thing), you get stopped at "Welcome to MSNBC [IMAGE]". Both links lead to the same page, namely the one you're already on. -Allen

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Re: Gorelick testifies before Senate, unveils new executive order
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:04 7/18/96, David Sternlight wrote: >Serious studies have shown that the kinds of protections to make the >systems we depend on robust against determined and malicious attackers (say >a terrorist government, or one bent on doing a lot of damage in retaliation >for one of our policies they don't like), have costs beyond the capability >of individual private sector actors. Your friendly neighborhood ISP, for >instance, probably can't affort the iron belt and steel suspenders needed >to make his system and its connectivity sabotage-proof, and so on. Even >cheap but clever solutions involving encryption in such systems require >standards and common practices across many institutions. However, the neighorhood IPS doesn't need the kind of defenses required for the powergrid and other crucial systems. The systems that do require such heightend security are typically run by parties that can afford such security. If they choose not to implement them, then it stands to reason that their threat evaluation does not deem it necessary. Let market forces govern, lest we spend money on countermeasures for inflated threats. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne for President.

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Ignorance is Strength, Escrow is Security
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:01 PM 7/19/96, Steve Reid wrote: >I'm sure the evil Iraqi terrorists (and other horsemen) are snooping the >line, using their newly purchased PCs and FPGAs to crack the 40-bit crypto >so that they can gain the wonderful advantages of 128-bit SSL, which will >of course prevent wiretaps from working, thus aiding them in their >terrorist attacks and bringing about the end of the world as we know it. The Iraqi People's Benovolent Security Protection Brigade (IPBSPB) has no need to snoop the lines, at least for my communications, as I am voluntarily escrowing my communications keys as well as my storage key with the IPBSPB. To the United States government requesting a global key escrow regimen, be careful what you ask for, as you may get it. (Question: I know that the Iraqi IPBSPB has close relations with the French SDECE, so does this mean I can just escrow my keys with the Iraqis and assume they have let the boys at SDECE get copies?) "America will be stronger when 137 nations of the world and their notoriously corrupt security services have access to all communications of Americans." Ignorance is Strength, Escrow is Security, Arbeit Macht Frei. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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