December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Scientologists may subpoena anonymous remailer records
by me＠muddcs.cs.hmc.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Steve Reid writes: > When a person recieves a message from someone using an anonymous > remailer, the return address will usually work, depending on the > remailer. The return address is for an address on the remailer, and > sending to that address, the remailer will forward the message back to > the person who owns that anonymous address. > > The problem with that, of course, is that the remailer has to keep a > record of who owns each anonymous account, so that it can direct the > replies to the anonymous person. These records could be siezed. This is a very good reason to use one of the "alpha" pseudonym servers. These remailers in turn use other remailers to return the reply to the owner of the alias (crypted, of course). In this way, the server is operating in double-blind mode. However, the scariest thing about this is that the CoS was able to coerce the gov't in a foreign nation to get access to anon remailers. US remailers have always been suspect for just this reason, and I wait with bated breath to see whether or not the subpoena is issued. But if chaning outside the US won't even work, then the remailers aren't going to do a whole lot of good. > BTW, has anyone out there created an anonymous web forwarder? I'm sure > there are a lot of people out there who don't like the idea of having > their email address in the log files of dozens of web servers... Creating > a simple web forwarder wouldn't be hard. I've heard several people make this statement... Can anyone confirm that it is really possible to log the uid (username) of the person making the http request? I know they can get your ip address, but I'm skeptical of getting the username. me -- Michael Elkins <me(a)cs.hmc.edu> http://www.cs.hmc.edu/~me PGP key fingerprint = EB B1 68 32 3F B5 54 F9 6C AF 4E 94 5A EB 90 EC

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Re: Scientologists may subpoena anonymous remailer records
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:12 PM 4/10/96, Steve Reid wrote: >> I thought that most or all of the cypherpunk anonymous remailers don't >> keep records. Not even on backup tapes. The whole idea is that there >> aren't logs. But maybe they have found some remailers that are > >When a person recieves a message from someone using an anonymous >remailer, the return address will usually work, depending on the >remailer. The return address is for an address on the remailer, and >sending to that address, the remailer will forward the message back to >the person who owns that anonymous address. Not the standard "Cypherpunks"-style remailers, except with some fairly cumbersome tricks with "reply blocks" and/or message pools. I think you are thinking of Julf's system, of which there is only one instance, his. >I don't really know much about remailers, but I don't think there's much >to know... If I'm mistaken about any of the above, I'm sure someone will >correct me. Glad to oblige. I note also that Jim Byrd and Jim Warren are unclear on some details. (To Jim Byrd, that "alumni account at Cal Tech" that you mentioned was one of the Cypherpunks remailers at Caltech that our own pioneering Hal Finney runs.) Cypherpunks remailers account for something like 29 out of 30 of all the world's remailers, by site count, though not volume. Sophisticated users know that the Cypherpunks model is the only robust one; Julf's approach has an ecological niche, but is highly vulnerable to the very subpoena approach used recently (not "several years ago" as Jim Warren says). --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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On computer face recognition:
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On computer face recognition: >> Shaving probably will not be a problem, but holding your head at a >> slightly different angle... will screw up the system totally, >> unless the system has radically improved since the last time I read >> up on it. At 11:45 AM 4/9/96 -0500, K00l Secrets wrote: > Well, the systems I have seen are quite good at finding people's eyes. > Scaling (for distance), and rotation (for the angle of your head) > therefore don't really confuse the system once it has your eyes. Finding the eyes can only control for rotations in the plane of the image, when you tilt your head to one side. They cannot handle the much more common case of 3D rotations, where you look slightly to the right or slightly to the left of camera. Facial expressions also throw them badly. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Know Your Net.Enemies Project
by Declan B. McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Would anyone be interested in collaborating on a "Know Your Net Enemies" project? We'd start with a resource like Bob Chatelle's excellent web pages at <http://world.std.com/~kip/bcfenatl.html> and with permission build on it and list the deceptions and misrepresentations each Net-Enemy has engaged in -- what each has done to restrict liberty online. We'd include original documents and links as appropriate. Who would be listed? Well, there's the family values groups [AFA/CC/NLC/EE!/FOF/FRC], the green card spammers, Carnegie Mellon University, Marty Rimm, the Church of Scientology, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, the NSA, German state prosecutors, Senator Exon, Dorothy Denning, and so on. If each collaborator takes a particular group or person, this could be done relatively quickly. Then we'd put it online at EFF's web site, with prominent treatment. All contributors would receive full credit for their work, of course. Anyone interested? This would be a great resource. -Declan

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Re: (Fwd) British Study Claims That Photo Credit Cards Don't Work
by Clay.Olbon＠dynetics.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:10 AM 4/9/96, jim bell wrote: >At 07:57 AM 4/9/96 -0500, Mike McNally wrote: >>jamesd(a)echeque.com wrote: > >>There are supposedly some new techniques that look at the infrared >>signature of your face (like, I guess, distribution & position of >>hot & cold spots), and that's less likely to be fooled by facial >>hair and other superficial disguises. It's probably a fairly simple >>technology, and could be applied to the credit card ID problem. > >I think this is based on looking at your face with near-infrared, not the >medium and far (thermal) infrared. Near infrared is supposed to penetrate >flesh far better, so your blood vessels are visible and form a pattern >which can be recognized. > >Jim Bell >jimbell(a)pacifier.com Jim, Where did you get your info? Near IR is around 1-1.5 microns, at these wavelengths, the body radiates very little energy. I think most of the systems you are discussing use mid (3-5) or long-wave (8-12) IR, where objects that are room to body temp radiate most of their energy. Clay --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Clay Olbon II | Clay.Olbon(a)dynetics.com Systems Engineer | ph: (810) 589-9930 fax 9934 Dynetics, Inc., Ste 302 | http://www.msen.com/~olbon/olbon.html 550 Stephenson Hwy | PGP262 public key: finger olbon(a)mgr.dynetics.com Troy, MI 48083-1109 | pgp print: B97397AD50233C77523FD058BD1BB7C0 TANSTAAFL - Robert Heinlein, in various works ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: questions about bits and bytes
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:00 PM 4/10/96 -0700, Rich Graves wrote: >On Wed, 10 Apr 1996, jim bell wrote: > >> >Be careful writing code - sometimes a byte is -128 to 127 instead of 0 >> >to 255. Also, there are machines (mostly old kinky ones) that use >> >bytes of sizes other than 8 bits. >> >> No, Bill, a "byte" has ALWAYS been 8-bits. > >Not that it really matters, but you're wrong; if you're talking about an >asynchronous data stream, a byte is however many bits it takes to express >one character. If you're using ASCII, it's 8; if you're using Baudot, it's >5. If you're talking about data in computers, then I think you're right, a >byte is always 8 bits. >-rich What's the old saying, "Those of you who think you know everything are very irritating to those of us who do." First off, serial binary formats for transmitted data are at least as old as the 1930's, and the term "byte" was coined in the early-middle 70's, as I recall. Therefore it is highly unlikely (and, in fact, wrong) that the term "byte" referred specifically to serial binary streams. In fact, the term "character" is the word used to describe a serial data object composed of bits. The length of that character can vary: As any ham knows (or ought to know!) many early teleprinters used a so-called 5-level (5 bits per character; there were shift characters inserted to multiply the available codes) code called Baudot, while more recent ones used the now-common, 7-bit ASCII code. A typical ASCII asynchronous character is transmitted using a start bit, seven or eight data bits, an optional parity bit, and one or more stop bits (usually 1, today, but it can be 1.5 or 2.) Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Protocols at the Point of a Gun
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:50 PM 4/10/96 -0700, Jeff Weinstein wrote: > Given that the IETF has no "official" (whatever that means) sanction, >what would prevent any other organization from coming in and trying to >take over their turf? I saw an article today (sorry, can't remember >where) that suggested a brewing fight between IETF and W3C over future >HTTP and HTML standards. If someone stands up and says that the IETF >is becoming too slow and overcome by bickering (not my opinion, just >a what if), and that their new group is better suited to setting standards, >who decides who is right, and based on what criteria? It seems that >one aspect of anarchy is that anyone could move in and replace "their >anarchy" with the "new anarchy". > > Just some philosophical pondering late one night... > > --Jeff Why nothing. Even your employer has done a bit of this protocol "forcing". The actual question though is would a successor organization(s) do anything significantly different. The question is can a *government* order protocols. IBM couldn't (after a while). If the government can't order protocols and protocols are created by (rough) mutual consent, I'll be happy and Dorothy won't be. DCF

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Re: No matter where you go, there they are.
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, we've pretty throughly convinced ourselves that Denning's scheme can be spoofed (I'm convinced, anyway.) It's actually worse than useless - it's a substantial security breach. To spoof being at a location, Mallory needs to know the location he is trying to spoof. With S/A off (as I understand it is now), he need to know the location within a couple meters, in three dimensions. Such precise location data is usually difficult to obtain, without actually visiting the site and recording the location using GPS. Mallory might be able to work out, for example, the location of the desk in the Oval office to that precision by triangulation (though setting up theodolites on Massachusetts Avenue may attract some attention :-) However, I defy him to find the location of a specific PC in NSA headquarters, or in a secured communications facility without actually visiting the desk carrying a GPS receiver (which he won't be allowed to do, unless he's got a damn good reason). However, since the protocol requires that Alice send out location data, once she starts using it she reveals her physical location to Eve, Mallory, and anyone ese who can see the packets. Since the nature of the protocol is that Alice's location does not change frequently (and needs to transmitted via a trusted channel to Bob when it does), after the first usage Mallory *knows* the physical location he is trying to simulate, and can use this information for future spoofing. The upshot of this is that Denning's scheme not only provides no security against spoofing, and leaks potentially sensitive data about locations. If Sadaam Huissain (sp?) had used this scheme during the Gulf War, we'd have been able to send a cruise missile directly to his keyboard. [These flaws in the protocol seem so obvious that I can't help but wonder if we're missing something - Dorothy isn't *that* stupid.] Peter Trei trei(a)Process.com

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Re: Message not deliverable
by Powers Glenn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've gotten these, too. glenn - From: JonWienke(a)aol.com - Date sent: Wed, 10 Apr 1996 16:49:33 -0400 - To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com - Subject: Re: Message not deliverable - >Subj: Message not deliverable - >Date: 96-04-10 11:51:09 EDT - >From: Administrator_at_DCACINTS(a)dca.com (Administrator) - >To: JonWienke(a)aol.com - - [body text deleted] - - Has anyone else been getting these when they post to cpunks? I get one every - time I post. I emailed the administrator at dca.com, a few weeks ago, but - nothing has changed. Anyone got suggestions? - - Jonathan Wienke -

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Re: Digital Cash Escrow
by John Deters 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:11 PM 4/10/96 -0700, you wrote: >At 10:14 PM 4/10/96, Bill Stewart wrote: > >>Of course, if you happen to become dead while you're storing it, >>the paper cash is far more useful to your heirs, so I assume we'll have >>a government-sponsored cash-escrow system announced soon to protect >>the government's interest in collection of inheritance taxes... > >Don't give them ideas, Bill! They are known to monitor our list for >insights into what to regulate next, and I can see the 15-watt lightbulbs >going on over their heads as they ponder the wonderful opportunities >presented by "digital cash escrow." Sorry, but I couldn't shut up here. Isn't this list about the free flow of cryptographic information? Let's not be like the government and shut down what we talk about because we don't want certain people to know about the technology. Of course, your posting probably came out with tongue firmly in cheek, but hey, censorship is still censorship (is still shit, thank you CDA.) ObOtherListComplaint (doesn't everyone?): Has anyone suffered ill-effects by having their mail program filter Jim Bell's postings? Perhaps a 10-point-rise in their IQs? "Bytes are ALWAYS 8 bits" indeed. Has this child never been exposed to anything but PCs? Go dig up the manuals for a UNIVAC 1100, Jim. Why do you think the RFCs for IP specifically refer to "octets" as opposed to "bytes"? Because (they explain) "octet" is unambiguous, which then infers a certain ambiguity to "byte", now, doesn't it? -j, I'll go back to lurking now for a while... -- J. Deters >From our _1996_Conflict_of_Interest_Statement_, re: our No Gift policy: "If you receive any alcoholic beverages, for example, a bottle of wine, you must give the gift to your location Human Resources Manager." This memo is from the Senior V.P. of Human Resources. +---------------------------------------------------------+ | NET: jad(a)dsddhc.com (work) jad(a)pclink.com (home) | | PSTN: 1 612 375 3116 (work) 1 612 894 8507 (home) | | ICBM: 44^58'33"N by 93^16'42"W Elev. ~=290m (work) | | PGP Key ID: 768 / 15FFA875 | +---------------------------------------------------------+

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