December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

subpoenas coming against 2 anon remailers?
by Jim Byrd 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This was posted by henri(a)netcom.com to alt.religion.scientology: ---------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have just received urgent email from Grady Ward regarding the case against him by the cult of $cientology. Apparently, the depraved and insane cult of degenerates and reprobates has decided that Grady Ward is responsible for the recent posting of the NUTS scriptures, the final secret of the crime cult. Many of these 'scriptures' are simply recipes for crime, including how to practice medicine without a license and get away with it, in defiance of Judge Gessell's order demanding that they cease that fraud immediately. Nevertheless, this demented nut-cult has demanded a third-party expedited subpoena to obtain the records from the University of Maryland which they claim will prove their preposterous allegations. Two unnamed anonymous remailers will also be harassed in this bizarre fashion, though news on that is sketchy. The deranged and idiotic cult cites as 'evidence' of their ludicrous allegation that Grady filed a Motion to Dissolve the injunction against him after the NUTS pack was posted, on the grounds that it was then moot. This is the sole 'proof' they have. Bullshit and lies. So the nut-cult intends to rape remailers with no evidence at all. - From the criminal cult's filing: ". . .strong inference that defendant (1)is or is acting in concert with SCAMIZDAT; (2) has made postings of Plaintiff's Advanced Technology works; (3) may have made or been acting in concert with those who made the May 6 postings of the NOTs works for the express purpose of undermining the injunction entered herein. Defendant certainly let no grass grow under his feet in attempting to take advantage to [sic] those postings by asserting the invalidity of the injunction four days later. "As the collusion become more and more apparent with the latest blatant attempt to destroy RTC's trade secrets, the need for complete and expedited discovery of defendant becomes even greater." Not a scrap of evidence is offered that Grady Ward had anything to do with SCAMIZDAT, is SCAMIZDAT, or even knows who SCAMIZDAT is. Just brazen lies, bizarre accusations, and increasingly shrill and hysterical court filings, now even including sloppy grammar, as the cult lawyers are obviously working without sleep, and possibly under the influence of mind-altering drugs. In further proof of Grady Ward's guilt, the clam-cult offers the fact that Grady Ward has exchanged email with Alex de Joode, who operated the now-defunct remailer at utopia.hacktic.nl. Obviously, anyone who would associate with such a nefarious remailer operator must also continually post NUTS packs. In more absurd claims of the cult, they actually have the gall to accuse him of "taking advantage" of not having a lawyer while facing a worldwide criminal organization which has retained dozens of lawfirms simultaneously in order to fight its frivolous lawsuits against everything in existence. They are claiming that Grady Ward is somehow at an advantage over them because he doesn't even have a lawyer. They are also claiming, this cult which filed hundreds of lawsuits against the IRS alone, to dodge their taxes, that somehow the net "tricked" them into suing everything in sight. They also claim that Grady Ward (and everyone on the net) obviously keeps huge archives of mail and news, because "it is inherently unbelievable that defendant retypes several paragraphs of identical wording in message after message." In short, what the cult is claiming is that quotes ">" in USEnet followups prove that you keep huge archives. Apparently, these invidious cretins have never heard of the "F" key on a keyboard. One wonders how they manage to type a single word. "uck you you motherucking uckhead" just doesn't have the same "zip" without an "f" in there now and again, does it? They also accuse him of keeping huge archives, despite the fact that he doesn't keep any, because he had a list of cancelled messages that were feloniously cancelled with forged control messages, despite the fact that Ron Newman's web page at http://www.cybercom.net/~rnewman/scientology/home.html keeps a complete tally of all the forgeries. The cult then tries to impugn all of Grady Ward's exhibits as "unauthenticated and hearsay," because they're USEnet posts, while submitting as exhibits all of Grady Ward's posts, which by their own claims are ALSO "unauthenticated and hearsay." In other words, they've blown their own case out of the water! Well, their case is doomed, but it's still entirely possible that this imbecilic cult of droolers could cause some damage to remailers in their last dying thrashings. h - -- fuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuck f f u "When you can't say 'fuck,' you can't say u c 'FUCK THE CDA!' -- Lenny Bruce rephrased c k k fuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuckfuck ObURL: http://www.cybercom.net/~rnewman/scientology/erlich/defense-fund [ For Public Key: finger henri(a)netcom.com ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.i Comment: PGP signed with SigEd v1.3.1 - http://www.nyx.net/~pgregg/siged/ iQCVAgUBMaKFP2130hVrA/MJAQFaDgQAmWYgLr78HTeH7uNF9pcWnu862IokSt1d sIR9jjlKRApSSjiOPkNInDf4XwTHUsx6VxpAV16f4d2lEJrNcoRH1sizEKnNeEi3 +V5tqsdaawzYWi6kncHfONTqElshmWnRvXh5Zs1cjW11xjoXlWn2GEViKKO8UHtm vsK3PXuJEsg= =+ybQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: PROPOSAL
by Jay Haines 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reply to: RE>>PROPOSAL Thirded, with bilateral agreement. -------------------------------------- >Motion: To create the alt.politics.assassination.politics newsgroup and >the "AP" mailing list so as to clear the meaningless traffic (for which I >am significantly responsible) out of this forum. >Any seconds? So long as the AP list is specifically for debates about the ethics of such, seconded. If it would remove from cypherpunks discussion of implementation or of social consequences, that wouldn't be good, since the implementation of this is definitely cypherpunks material. -Allen

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TILT! Counterfeit pachinko cards send $588 million down the chute.
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The WSJ of Wednesday, May 22nd, 1996 (A18) reports that two Japanese firms lost about 55 billion yen when criminals counterfeited the stored money cards that they manufactured. These cards are used to pay for pachinko games, but you can get refunds wired to an account if you cash in a card. If my memory serves me correctly, there is a certain amount of skill involved. If you play well or are lucky, you might even add money to the cards. But I'm not sure about this detail. In any case, the people with the counterfeit cards could get refunds when they didn't pay for the original card. The Journal mentions three interesting details. First, the cards were pushed by the police as a means to track the flow of cash and stop money laundering. Obviously, there wouldn't be these losses if they could really track the flow. Second, the convenience of the new cards initially boosted profits because it was so much easier to play with the cards that automatically kept track of your money. Finally, the Journal reported that there are 18,244 pachinko parlors in Japan.

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SURVEY: Trading on the Internet
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Sender: e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com Reply-To: Ian Grigg <iang(a)systemics.com> (by way of Rachel Willmer) Mime-Version: 1.0 Precedence: Bulk Date: Thu, 23 May 1996 12:37:41 +0100 (BST) From: Ian Grigg <iang(a)systemics.com> (by way of Rachel Willmer) To: Multiple recipients of <e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com> Subject: SURVEY: Trading on the Internet Following on from The Spring Street Brewery's successful IPO, I am researching the nature of Internet issues of debt and equity. This envisages the use of electronic token value systems such as Digicash and the digital bearer bonds that Bob talks about. The topic is for a management report that I am writing as the final deliverable in my MBA, and has a lot of bearing on what we are trying to do within the embryonic Internet Financial System. So, making whatever assumptions you like (but please mention them), here goes with some questions: ----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<---- Would your company be interested in the idea of issuing on the Internet? What specifically would attract you to issuing on the Internet? What specifically would worry you? Would you prefer Debt (bonds) or Equity (shares) (or something more exotic)? What sort of products/services does your company sell? Do you think Internet users would be attracted enough to your company to give you money (e.g. are you the Netscape of '97)? If not the general Internet community, who would buy your shares or bonds (local community, funds, family+friends, business contacts...)? ---->8---->8---->8---->8---->8---->8---->8---->8---->8---->8---- That's it, thanks in advance for your patience. Please forward to me directly, rather than posting (but post any deeper questions as they will, no doubt, be welcome). I am not interested in direct marketing anything (and please don't ask for a list of respondents), but any interesting answers I would like to follow up by email to develop them. Indicate if you want some summarised feedback (won't be for a few weeks). -- Ian Grigg iang(a)systemics.com --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "If they could 'just pass a few more laws', we would all be criminals." --Vinnie Moscaritolo The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Re: MixMaster fair use
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:14 AM 5/22/96 EDT, you wrote: >From: IN%"loki(a)infonex.com" 21-MAY-1996 17:19:02.59 > >>The problem is RSAREF. I can't chose license terms for that. > > Oof... I see the problem. No, it's not you, it's them. The Agreement, as written, covers all of Mixmaster; it would be easier for people to adapt Mixmaster code if you either release a bones version or a license that clarifies that you can't use the RSAREF portions commercially but can do whatever you want with the rest of Mixmaster (if that's what you want) or however much freedom you want to grant (e.g. you may want to say some disclaimerish words about obeying ITAR etc.) Consensus.com is doing commercial licensing for RSAREF now; there may be some reasonably-priced approach to the problem. RSAREF has at least three kinds of legal protection: - contract (if you're using a licensed version) - patent (on doing RSA-method encryption, not on the code itself) - copyright (on the RSAREF code itself.) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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Re: Long-Lived Remailers
by hendersn＠zeta.org.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Ideally the final emanation point will be epherimal indeed. Perhaps only a >few minutes or an hour or two. I really like this idea. How about instead of a full-scale remailer being the final jump of the message, you have a _very_ simple remailer set up along the lines of anon.penet.fi. No encryption, just strip off the headers and send the message to its final destination. Sorry for being clueless in how this works(I'm learning as fast as I can), but wouldn't this kind of system be incredibly easy to start up and fold? You could have a host of such final emanation points winking in and out of existence while the actual encrypting remailers remain relatively safe. Zed(hendersn(a)zeta.org.au) "Don't hate the media, become the media" - Jello Biafra PGP key on request

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Re: The Crisis with Remailers
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 15:04 1996-05-22 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >However, accounting systems DO NOT use 32 bit fixed point arithmetic. > >One client of mine had around $10Billion under management. Do you >think they were doing their accounting on a system that could only >deal with fixed point numbers of 45Million or so? Hell, individual >trades are larger. Sure, but we were really discussing Ecash(tm), not accounting. To quote from the FAPI: /* An EC_Amount is a signed 32-bit integer. It represents an amount * of money in units of the coinage's base value. */ >Accounting systems require exact math -- down to the cent. Come on, we're not talking cents here. Question is, how do you represent a one ITL coin in Ecash(tm) with a USD mint? We are way below the cent level, where no accountant has ever gone before... Regards, Matts

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Lotus Notes 4.0 stream encryption.
by Joseph L. Moll 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can anyone comment on this? --- Joseph L. (Joe) Moll mailto:jmoll@acquion.com Network and Communications Engineering http://www.acquion.com phone:864-281-4108 fax:864-281-4576 ACQUION, Inc. Greenville, SC USA -- Specialists in Electronic Commerce disclaimer: This email is not to be considered official correspondence ---

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CLI_pr3
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

5-23-96. WaJo: "Chasing Criminals at Cyberspeed." Three recent developments in the money laundering trade have governments especially worried: the proliferation of offshore financial centers, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the adaptation of emerging technologies to criminal ends. Officials think newly developed "smart cards" will be particularly appealing to criminals. Smart cards could be used to download cash from bank accounts, then used to make payments or deposits anywhere in the world. All without anyone knowing who holds the smart card, because encryption guarantees anonymity. Says Stanley Morris, director of FinCEN, "The only way we can adequately assist our federal law enforcement counterparts in following the trail of the multinational money launderer is through our linkages with multilateral arrangements such as ... [Clipper 3]." 5-23-96. FiTi: "Japanese recruit 2,000 spies to monitor Asia crises." Their main source of official information will be material gathered by six electronic listening posts stationed across Japan. CLI_pr3 (for 2)

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The National Research Council Study of National...
by CRYPTO 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: The National Research Council Study of National Cryptography Policy (An incorrect web page/URL locator was posted in the previous message; apologies. If you found your way to the right page anyway and signed up for information, you don't need to do it again.) Please post this message widely I am writing to let interested parties know about the imminent release of the NRC's study of national cryptography policy. If all goes well, we hope to release it on May 30, 1996. However, prior to that time, we won't be able to comment on its contents. For current information on release, visit the web site http://www2.nas.edu/cstbweb/notifyme.html When you visit that site, you'll have the opportunity to be put onto a mailing list so that we can inform you by e-mail when the report is available in print and/or electronically, as well as any public events associated with the report (e.g., public briefings). Herb Lin Cryptography Policy Study Director Computer Science and Telecommunications Board National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council 202-334-2605

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