December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 alpha) (flame replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 20 May 96 6:47:47 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu ++++++++++++ 39:10 99.99% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org +++++-*-++-+ 1:14:55 99.99% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com +****+****** 4:01 99.99% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++++++++-++ 2:00:18 99.99% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net --++*--*#### 45:13 99.98% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net +-++++++++++ 1:33:36 99.94% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com **##**--*#*# 22:41 99.92% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ##########+ 4:00 99.90% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org +## ##*-#### 9:39 99.89% c2 remail(a)c2.org ++++* +-++-* 1:08:50 99.83% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com ---+++----+ 4:41:28 99.75% replay remailer(a)replay.com ***+**+*+*** 5:18 99.65% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *#####*##* + 4:36 99.56% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net +--..+---+-+ 2:53:30 99.47% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi . __-_ -_ 54:09:03 98.83% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ____-* .. 26:11:30 80.57% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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No Subject
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I like the idea about bed hopping. But have we worried about AIDS (VIRUS)? >Hi. > >Pardon my ignorance, but I had a few questions haunting me since a >while. > >Is there a way to have a remailer de-localize itself and relocalize >itself over the internet? > >For example, could there be several machines around the worlds that, >when you send an e-mail to it, is routed to differents physical >places of the world depending on where the actual remailer process is >actually running? Could there be such a thing as a virtual machine >runing a remailer that gets to hop from physical machine to physical >machine around the world? > >Just an idea to avoid jurisdiction problems. > >Just asking, probably quite futilely... > >Thanks > >JFA > > DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee; Limoges porcelain, silverware and crystal > JFA Technologies, R&D consultants; physists, technologists and engineers. > > PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon > ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 > Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h > Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- > cepted the above mentionned terms. >

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RAC_ket
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

5-19-96. WaPo: "From Out Of the Shadows." Book review. Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors By Amy Knight Princeton University Press. 318 pp. $24.95 Knight suggests that Russia's new security forces are not only continuing the same kinds of skulduggery as they undertook in the past but are now also expertly manipulating public opinion in Russia and the rest of the world to obscure and disguise what they do. What Knight suggests is that the old client-master relationship between Russia's elite and the KGB has not only been reversed but may even have vanished, because these "children of the KGB" have subsumed large chunks of Russia's economy and government. If *Spies Without Cloaks* is correct, much of Russia today is little more than a mutant KGB, the communist ideology it once served now replaced by ruthless devotion to great-power politics and bottom-line capitalism. The book is worth reading for its applicability to the transformation of the US and international intelligence "communities" into free-market racketeering of espionage technologies and expertise and insider secrets -- as WaPo reported May 2 on high-tech intel patrons Perry and Deutch. RAC_ket

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Feds Web Crypto
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Washington Post, May 20, 1996 Feds on the Web Federal agencies' efforts to link up with the citizenry over the World Wide Web take a step forward today. Officials plan to announce a pilot program in which 1,000 to 2,000 people will try their hands at secure Web transactions with federal agencies. It's set to start later this month. The vision for the "Paperless Transactions for the Public Project": a taxpayer files a return to the Internal Revenue Service over Web links that use advanced cryptography to confirm to the agency that the return's really coming from the right party. Or, a retiree goes into a Social Security Administration computer to check benefit information. VIPs, civil servants and ordinary folks are to be issued special "key cards" to take part in the test, which will use cryptography from Frontier Technologies Corp., a Wisconsin networking company. Officials promise the vision is not that far away. --

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Ooops
by Rev. Mark Grant, ULC 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I see my brilliant idea has already been suggested. Remind me never to post when I'm a hundred messages behind in future... Mark

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Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:08 AM 5/20/96 -0700, tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) wrote: [snip] >And the issue of CoS seeking legal actions against those they claim are >violating their copyrights is separable from their religious status. Not at all. Their actions are based on their religious doctrines, as passed down by Hubbard. "Always attack, never defend." Their claims of copyright violation are part of an ongoing effort to silence those who criticize their illegal and immoral practices. They should be examined in that context. > As I >have said many times, "Newsweek" would likely take similar actions in >similar circumstances.) AFAIK, "Newsweek" does not file lawsuits just for the purpose of harassment, as Hubbard counselled his followers to do. AFAIK, "Newsweek" does not hire PIs to harass those who criticize them. Tim, do you think "Newsweek" articles have ever been posted to the Net? If so, did the magazine sue everyone who posted them? The "Church" doesn't even want to admit that fair use is a possibility. "Newsweek" is also not a non-profit coporation. Not only is CoS tax exempt, but they claim to have "trade secrets" as well. That's having your cake and eating it... Rich ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb See my Blue Ribbon Page at http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/blueribbon New EF zine "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

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Long-Lived Remailers
by Rev. Mark Grant, ULC 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

With regard to the problems of remailers being shut down when we want long-lived addresses, wouldn't seperating the input and output be one possibility? That is (like Hal's Alumni remailer) you'd send mail to 'remailer(a)anon.ai' and it would be forwarded via a disposable account elsewhere. All messages would appear to come from 'disposable(a)foo.com' and if that account was shut down a new one could be opened to replace it while incoming mail simply backed up at the main remailer account. The only potential problem I could see would be that the disposable ISP might have logs which could track the outgoing messages back to the other account. You'd also obviously need to open the disposable account anonymously or using an ISP who'd protect your identity. Mark

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Re: The Crisis with Remailers
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:01 AM 5/20/96 -0400, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >From: IN%"frantz(a)netcom.com" 17-MAY-1996 15:56:36.35 > >>Perhaps what is needed is a non-profit, charitable 501c foundation to >>encourage anonymous communication. Those who support the idea could make >>tax deductible contributions which would be used for grants, public >>education etc. etc. to encourage anonymous communication. It could be >>called, "The Federalist Foundation" because the Federalist Papers were >>published anonymously. > > Hmm... I wonder if it would be good for this Foundation to itself >operate some for-pay remailers, in order to make some money from sources >besides contributions? Possible disadvantages: > A. It could get sued, and thus lose funds > B. If its prices were set too low, it could wind up driving other >remailers out of the market (combination of low price with likelihood to still >be there), and thus become a vulnerable point. In general, I think this foundation should limit itself to: (1) Supporting the creation of techniques for anonymous communication (e.g remailers, nym servers etc.) This could include grants for theoretical work and grants for the production of out-of-the-box public domain systems. (2) Public education on the need and value of anonymous communication. (3) Demonstration projects to help create a market where none exists. Whenever there is a market, the foundation, like governments, should not participate as a competitor. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: AP
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 20 May 96 at 10:28, Jim Ray wrote: > >A long time ago (few hours) JFA replied to Vlad Z. Nuri (but > >Jim Ray seemed to indicate that >his other name was L. > >Detweiller) : > >I think that you are writing way out of context. > > >First, wether or not the AP scheme is used for the control of > >government, as Jim Bell pushes it, does not mean that it will not > >be implemented for other purposes, such as killing successful > >businessman or your neighboor's son who is screwing your wife > >(noticed that she smiles all the time since a while? ) . > >Second, > >everybody like Jim Bell who is pushing the AP scheme is >doing so > >on ethical basis: that the coercion the government imposes >on to > >the individuals by regulations, and guns backed taxation >justifies > >the killings. I have to see yet any cypherpunks who >seems to > >agree with AP that envision another use than govt control. > > > I disagree BECAUSE of the other likely uses, & see below. Just the one I pointed out in theses two paragraphs. I don't like the scheme either. > >And you'll also note that the anonymity issue generate more > >interest from more CPunks because it (hopefully) will acheive the > >same goal without any killing. > > our > anonymity-baby threatens to have govt. kill it in the crib, It is not yours, it only *is*. > with the support of the people. Here, again, Jim Bell would probably say that this sentence proves him right... > I have not respected a US > president in my lifetime, yet I get _pissed_ when they get > shot/shot at. I somehow agree with you here. > Killing seems to be a first resort for some, > and IMO ends do not justify means. Well, here, you are threading on a very difficult path. Of course, the ends does never justifies the means in an *uncoerced* context. But what JB says, is that AP would be a justified "self defense" against coercion. It is only that the self-defense uses statistics. You'll note that the psycho-epistemology necessary to commit murder is quite close to the one necessary to coerce poeples to pay taxes. Thus, he might pretend (JB) to only turn the living expression of an idea against itself. Personnally? I still was not able to sort it out... Ciao JFA DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee; Limoges porcelain, silverware and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants; physists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

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The Ontology of Nyms, Trust, Belief, etc.
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I've changed the thread name from "Sen. Leahy..."] At 10:50 AM 5/20/96, bryce(a)digicash.com wrote: >Indeed we have, and it verged on philosophical territory, and >I would really enjoy discussing the issue again with you >sometime, although perhaps we've gotten about as much as we can >get out of it in e-mail. Yes, I also enjoyed the MITM ontological debate--up to a point. Technology reifies what were once philosophical abstractions, and brings them to the fore. >Unfortunately PGP 2 only allows one kind of certificate. The >"key-signature". To PRZ and most other people, it is a >certificate asserting a mapping between a key and a true name. >To me it is as I described above. To TCMay, it is a kind of >endorsement. It's just too bad that PGP 2 doesn't have >different _kinds_ of certificates to represent these different >assertions. Until a certificate technology like that is >implemented, and probably even after that time, we need to >avoid confusing these various meanings for "key-signatures". I agree with this point, that the "scalar" nature of key-signings is not very rich. A Digression on Tensors: The next step up would presumably be "vector" signings, where one has multiple attributes, just as with ratings, reviews, etc. And the step after that would be "tensor" signings--it's perhaps a leap into the abyss, but tensors have an interesting property that a value in one direction, for example, and a value in another direction, say, do not "vector add" to some resultant value. While "wind" acts as a vector field, with a north wind and and a west wind giving a northwest resultant, think of "stress" (as in a crystal, a piece of glass, a structural member): stress in one direction is independent of stress in another direction, and they don't add as vectors do. Hence, the "stress-energy tensor" is needed to describe the stress in a material...or the gravitational field! (This is just a conjecture that this model might be useful at some point. Near term, I think even having "user-defined" belief fields would be a useful step. And I don't think it needs to be hacked into a next version of PGP...it seems better to add these things on later.) >Now more seriously, the alacrity with which I bring up >disagreements with Tim should in fact be construed as a measure >of my _respect_ for his opinions and for his mind, rather that >as a lack of respect for same. Thanks, and I promise I'll respect you in the morning, too. (g) That several of us (and probably many of those who aren't commenting) have differing interpretations of key signings, trust, belief, identity, proof, etc., is not surprising to me. (I didn't put "Licensed Ontologist" in my .sig for nothing. Actually, it's also meant as a tweak of some local Santa Cruzans who want professions licensed by the State and ordered to report various forms of physical, psychic, and existential "abuse" to the proper licensing authorities. I get a great rise out of them (in scruz.general) by announcing that "my clinic" refuses to narc out its patients to the authorities...I love getting threats from them saying that they plan to contact Sacramento to "have your license revoked." Predictably, and sadly, I've never gotten a call from any state authorities on this...I can always hope.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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