December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

rsa2d.gif - machine readable rsa for printing in magazines etc
by Vincent Cate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I now have a cute 2 inch wide by 1 inch high graphic that is the 3 line RSA Perl program in a 2D barcode. When printed on anything (postcard, magazine, etc) you have a machine readable encryption program, or to the US government, a munition! http://online.offshore.com.ai/arms-trafficker/rsa2d.html Now what to do with this? Anyone want to place an add in a newspaper or magazine? How about selling munitions postcards? Another T-shirt? Should be fun for something. -- Vince

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Re: Senator, your public key please?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:10 AM 5/18/96, t byfield wrote: > There's no reason that webs of trust of well-signed keys couldn't be >very fluidly incorporated into patronage networks, for example, or that >their incorporation would affect network dynamics in any notable way. One Keys, key signings, and webs of trust can be used in all sorts of ways. And I expect the "burrowcrats" will try to regulate the use. Imagine, for example, if I use a "web of trust" to help me decide who's trustworthy enough to negotiate the sale of my house to. Further imagine that I want to see keys signed by Tom Metzger, my buddy from the Aryan Nations. Guess what? No blacks will have their keys signed, and hence I'll have to tell them, "Sorry, you're just not in my web of trust." (Now, this is a hypothetical, meant to show that use of a web of trust can trigger such decisions, and could thus trigger legal challenges.) The web of trust may not be transitive, but the "web of taint" may be more so. New forms of blackballing, blacklisting, redlining, etc. And I fully expect that who signs one's keys, and whose signatures are found on one's keys, may become a political and legal issue in the coming years. What if, for example, Sen. Leahy _did_ end up in the web of trust for Aryan Nation? Even if he never intended it, this could have some severe PR repercussions. An exciting new world we're entering. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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'Excommunication'
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:54 AM 5/19/96 -0700, anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com wrote: > Cypherpunks is not a political newsgroup. Nor was "excommunication" a political posting: There was no indication in the posting as to whether the Burmese regime was left or right or fascist or whatever. What the "Excommunication" post was about was the fact that good communications undermine the state, and repressive states fear them for that reason. This is exactly the sort of post that should be on cypherpunks. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 18:29 1996-05-15 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: > >I would really like to see a remailer that is somehow blinded. > >I don't know enough about how mail paths are generatered, but is it >impossible to conceal the origin of remailer postings? IP spoofing would do this nicely.Since SMTP doesn't require any significant responses, you can send blind and fake your IP address. To do that you need root access on your mailer machine and an ISP that doesn't sniff and filter its network for spoofing attacks. See ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-95:01.IP.spoofing for a good description of spoofing attacks and defenses. If you're not up to writing spoofing code into your (re-)mailer, then an easier solution is to send everything through anon.lcs.mit.edu after you have removed all headers that point at you. Matts

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Re: Why the Poor are Mostly Deserving of their Fate
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:32 PM 5/18/96, Sean Gabb wrote: >On Sat, 18 May 1996, Duncan Frissell wrote: > >> It was understandable to be poor when all the world was poor. It is >> understandable to be poor in those nations today that make the >> accumulation of wealth a crime for most people. It is not understandable >> to be poor (for long) in the US where one can reliably get out of poverty >> simply by doing three simple things: >> >> 1) get a high school diploma >> 2) get married >> 3) get any job >> >> Only about 2 tenths of 1% of those who satisfy those three requirements >> incomes below the official poverty line. >I've done all these things - and rather more in the way of education. But >while I don't fall on or near the poverty line, I'm still poor as a church >mouse. What am I doing wrong? * Point Number One: Sean Gabb <cea01sig(a)gold.ac.uk> ^^ * Point Number Two:"...not understandable to be poor (for long) in the US" ^^ Q.E.D. Actually, I think Duncan's "high school + marriage + any job" point is a bit simplistic, and I'm surprised about the ".02%" estimate. As someone else noted, there are a lot of folks in the rural South, Appalachia, and other places, who graduated from high school, are still married, and have some sort of job, and yet who make $6-8 an hour or less. I think more is needed. I would have added "savings/investment" and "hard work." Those who can force themselves to set money aside for investment get the compounded returns later on. And of course hard work--including taking a second job, having the extended family work, etc.--is also key. (Many immigrant Asians arrive penniless in the U.S., then get help from immigrant Asian who arrived earlier, live in crowded houses and apartments, have 4-6 wage-earners in a household, save as much as they can, and then open a small business. Success is almost inevitable. Hence the cycle continues. This tradition of the various Asian subcultures is almost completely lacking in certain other subcultures in America. More's the pity.) Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re:
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:54 AM 5/19/96 -0700, anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com wrote: >Cypherpunks is not a political newsgroup. ROTFLMAO!!! Since *WHEN*? (Actually the above is right -- sort of. This is not a newsgroup, it is a mailing list.) One of the reasons I read this list is for the political content. The quoted article was information I was interested in reading, and as far as I am concerned (as if anyone cares), on topic. You are new here, aren't you... ]:> --- | Remember: Life is not always champagne. Sometimes it is REAL pain. | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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Re: The Crisis with Remailers
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:00 PM 5/18/96 EDT, dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr. Dimitri Vulis) wrote: >> 2. there is no good way to deal with spams or other so-called "abuse" >Nor should there be. What's one person's abuse is another person's >free speech. Internet traffic should not be censored based on contents. I disagree - when I was running a remailer, I found several varieties of abuse, and some of them were worth blocking. Usenet, in particular, is divided into newsgroups so material can be directed to the groups where the readers want to find it, which is filtering, not censorship. * The most common was spammers sending lots of mail to a specific person who didn't want it; that's easy to block, and keeping up with that was a major part of traffic on the remailer-operators news groups. * Another was spammers who were sending out large volumes of spam; my remailer would shut down if it got too much volume (operator-settable), but usually I blocked senders like this based on remailer-operators notices from other remailers that were being spammed through. * Another was inappropriate news postings; most of the complaints I got were from phone sex ads in the pictures newsgroups, where they're unwanted (as opposed to misc.forsale or other group where they're in scope). They're a minor annoyance, and I didn't censor them; there'd probably be less of them from 2-way remailers, since people who objected could spam back. In general, these were posted to many newsgroups, and reducing the number of newsgroups that a message could be crossposted to would probably have helped, though it might have just resulted in multiple postings. * The nastiest spam, which I wasn't able to block, was to sign someone else's name on flamebait hate postings. Blocking by content (e.g. blocking postings with the address of someone who had complained) would cut down on repeat postings, but it only takes one or two postings to get thousands of flames sent to the victim. The damage could be reduced by putting disclaimer notices at the beginning and end of the text, reminding the reader that it may be a forgery, etc.; simple mail headers don't seem to get the attention of enough readers, even those whose newsreader software doesn't discard them. Similar spams can be done to mailing lists... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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Re: Remailers vs Nyms - conflicting assumptions?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Refreshing deals with the long-term problem, but not with the short-term >one. Maybe I need to settle for a higher level of mail loss than I'm >comfortable with, but precisely because I'm not comfortable with it, I do >remain interested in alternatives. The alternative is constant monitoring, though of course this risks traffic analysis. If you ping yourself daily, using some random-path random-delay chain of encrypted remailers, then you can tell if your nym still works. To reduce traffic analysis, the remailer system needs lots of remailers and lots of cover traffic, and you need to use the remailers a lot so your mail to them doesn't look regularly scheduled. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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Re: crosspost re remailers
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:00 AM 5/16/96 -0700, Rich Graves <llurch(a)networking.stanford.edu> wrote: >The entry points into the system, though, have value. You need to be able >to locate and trust them. Remailer reputations are valuable. Otherwise, >you're liable to send your message into the NSA-remailers-are-us system. >You need a web of trust among remailers at the very least, which means >some level of exposure (at least by "social analysis" by observing the >relationships among the various remailer nyms). There are two ways around this problem - chaining remailers, and encryption. As long as one remailer on the chain from your source to your destination is not compromised, you can send mail encrypted to each remailer in the chain (i.e. send Alice's Remailer the message E(Alice, E(Bob, E(Carol, message)))) and the message won't be compromised, though it may be blocked. For reply-style remailers, chaining is much harder, at least if you use a non-stealth encryption system like PGP or RIPEM which reveals the recipient's public key in the headers, and if the remailers don't include a public key to encrypt the message contents with as well as a key to encrypt the connection to the next remailer with. (Otherwise, if the sender encrypts a message to NymA@Alice, and Alice encrypts it with Bob's key and sends it to Bob, Bob decrypts it, encrypts with Carol's key, and sends.... Zed decrypts it, encrypts it with your key, and sends it to you, then any node compromised by Bad Guys will see a message encyrpted to NymA. >Chaos within the system is good. Moving remailers around could be good, >provided that a service location infrastructure is established. >Raph's list is a good start, but it needs to be more automatic and dynamic -- >which to me (perhaps wrongly) suggests formalization, which means points >of failure. It would be much easier if there were a DNS hack that lets you connect to dns.remailer.net:registry, which takes your IP address and serves it as remailerN.remailer.net until you log off (using a short DNS expiration time). This does provide a large number of interesting attacks on the system - denial of service is easy (make lots of connections, filling all ports), and it's easy to add subverted remailers (just connect!) It also doesn't spoof reverse lookups unless your system is able to handle multiple IP addresses (which requires cooperation from your ISP's routers, unless remailer.net is also running a packet laundry, which increases its targetness.) Signed DNS responses would help some attacks, once that's standardized. Does anyone have any ideas on how to do this correctly? # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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Burmese Excommunication
by camcc＠abraxis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 10:54 AM 5/19/96 -0700, you wrote: >Cypherpunks is not a political newsgroup. > I agree; I am concerned, however, when I read that any government, theirs or ours, acts or prepares to act to stop or stifle the free traffic of information. Your point is well taken; my post was intended for information and perhaps discussion value. Take it as you choose. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMZ/M2CKJGkNBIH7lAQHZZAP+KVLlk6REEaL4sskjV7mM28uMOOzGLxxf 3lf3UZGheizpgx6Ms3QpOyJpAADg365R4Lsgusynih49PM2EF+LLs1fNu6dUxbTm beXwK1UJBiBQhglL6pG5tKbjf8vQTdZWOBkEIVLjw4vsPQJlsRlAc8jkijJ/sq/+ uYd0Rof3boY= =adoY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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