December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.alias.net> alpha pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo hroller alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 12 Feb 96 6:49:07 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ######*#*### :31 99.98% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu --*###*#-### 9:13 99.96% gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org ----..--__. 18:30:36 99.53% gondonym alias(a)nym.gondolin.org *--..--__- 19:44:38 99.50% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ----+-+..-- 3:57:36 99.47% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.alias.net ***+****#* 7:14 99.46% c2 remail(a)c2.org ** ****+*** 17:56 99.41% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net -++-++++++ 56:24 98.99% hroller hroller(a)c2.org ##-##** #.# 7:26 98.64% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org **-******* 6:39 98.64% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net *--+----*** 31:13 98.32% pamphlet pamphlet(a)idiom.com ++++++++++ 42:53 98.25% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org ##*###*### :36 97.66% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl ********** 7:57 95.59% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ---_..--. 20:05:32 93.23% replay remailer(a)replay.com **** *+*** 7:00 93.03% rahul homer(a)rahul.net ***#+# ***## 1:58 99.76% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi __.-_ . * 30:35:19 87.17% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net *#-# ##* 1:22:28 86.88% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de +..-+-+ 4:33:06 57.50% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com 2:46 -3.30% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Free end-to-end encryption code?
by willer＠carolian.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As a side project, to support remote mail and news pickup through the Internet to my company's servers (through a firewall), I've been slowly writing an end-to-end encryption program. Essentially, the idea is that the client program (say, a mail program) connects to a client "reflector", which lives on the same person's machine. The client reflector connects to a server reflector, which perhaps lives on the firewall. The client and server talk to each other, the client is authenticated, and the session key is agreed upon. Then the server reflector connects to the server process (say, smtpd, probably on some machine inside the company's net), and an encypted session is obtained. This doesn't protect against the machine's memory being watched or anything like that, but it does provide a good amount of security for packets over the Internet, just like the end-to-end type of encryption software described in Applied Cryptography. Now, this is my first code with any real encryption in it, and I'm trying to tackle key negotiation protocols and so on, while at the same time utilizing RSA, IDEA and MD5. In my research, I found that a number of firewall vendors have such a system available, either implemented in hardware or software. What I want to know is: Is there any code like this available somewhere on the net that does this stuff? I would hate to have to reinvent the wheel if I don't have to, given my limited amount of spare time.

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Re: Unknown address
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>Message was addressed to: SAMUEL.KAPLIN(a)warehouse.mn.org >> > >Anybody besides me getting these things? Yes! I got that too! JFA

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X509 (was: Strange Sounds of Silence)
by deepthroat＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>implementing the basic encoding rules, used in the PCKS and X.509 - >>can someone give me a pointer to where I can find a >>copy of v3 online? > >It's not available online. ISO specs are hardcopy (and hard currency :) >only. > If you listen closely, you can hear pages of an ISO standard being scanned. DT

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Re: A Cyberspace Independence Refutation
by Tim Cook 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- There is nothing to add. But in summary I warn the net community not to be caught acting like the teenager that has decided that mom & dad know nothing and it doesn't matter that they cared for us all these years. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMR7ZqnZBD5a0GJkxAQHNKQP+O6rAisJgDHYMQW+t5DmEuLO5xjoOIq3Z D2pteLa/9bsgvs9e5nKRLTGYD0AJWrX2uQGqeMmYFNIykchqp6zD52z5IkDi/slk L8Ip4MFc6F17kmbx1I+yq9TeTUSn2SKY4p7fIa1yY4UKI2zD+hCG6xur5D+DIovH kVD3RxXVsRw= =WxNL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Chinese/Indian censorship of alt.sex.* etc. (Was: China)
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 20:03 2/10/96, lmccarth(a)cs.umass.edu wrote: >The CompuServe incident caused a big ruckus because it involved a conflict >between the German govt. and many U.S. users, and (like it or not) users >in the U.S. seem to be the most vocal group on the net. The ruckus was also due to CIS's ignoring the need to be able to suppress access to newsgroups based on the user's Gateway node. If this ability had been designed into the code before it was released, then the German users could have been isolated [without affecting non-German Users] just as fast as the newsgroups were flagged as "Invisible" for display to German Gateways (the current CIS support requires the user to select from a CIS Generated and Supplied list so the list could not display certain NG's names [given the support for this capability]). This need to suppress access to German Users did not suddenly become a requirement with this incident since CIS was on notice for at least 2 years that the German Government felt they were entitled to censor what was supplied by CIS to German Users (that time it was due to a game that used the Swastika). Given this precedence, it would seem to be obvious that there would be the need to tailor the listings based on "Community Standards" (since the German Government is touchy about access to certain types of material such as Revisionism and the Holocaust). In fact, given their laws and mindset, I find it odd that neither of the following were on their list of newsgroups that wanted blocked (I'm sure that I could find more if I scanned the list of newsgroups <g>): alt.revisionism soc.culture.jewish.holocaust

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The Emotional Killer (or out of the frying pan and into the electric chair?)
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I want to write on the theme posted to the list in the message below where J. Bell wrote "It is their ACTIONS that I feel violate my rights; that is what justifies my seeking their deaths, should I choose to do so." First, one thing that marks the sane adult from the child and the floridly psychotic adult is the sane adult's knowledge that "feelings" and "facts" are two different things. It is one thing to "feel," as J. Bell or all of us might, that our rights have been violated. It is another thing to maintain, as J. Bell uniquely appears to do, that the "feeling" gives him the right to seek another person's death. This and other posts by J. Bell and other lib'bers lead me to believe that their claimed interest in human freedom for everyone is little more than a cover for a set of authoritarian expectations that they can do whatever they want, free from any control, responsibility, or accountability. The argued centrality of J. Bell's "feelings" over other people's lives is something that puts him in the god category. (Thankfully J. Bell is not one of the dreaded tax collectors or "socialist statists.") Should J. Bell act on his "feelings" as he seems to think he has the right to do, he may find that his "right" is little more than another "feeling" not reflective of reality. He might also "feel" his rights are violated when a dreaded tax-collecting socialist-statist called a cop detains him, another dreaded lawyer called a prosecutor says nasty things about him in a court, a jury says "guilty," and another dreaded socialist-statist chowing-down-on-tax-money figure called a judge says "death." This is also likely to produce an even greater "feeling" that rights are violated immediately before another figure living on tax money called an executioner pulls the switch. Death is sometimes Nature's way of telling us that our "feelings" were out of sync with reality. But by then it is too late to do much about it. --tallpaul On Feb 10, 1996 17:41:30, 'jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com>' wrote: > >At 08:13 PM 2/6/96 -0600, Jim Choate wrote: >> >>Forwarded message: > >>> A few months ago, I had a truly and quite literally "revolutionary" >>> idea, and I jokingly called it "Assassination Politics": I speculated on >>> the question of whether an organization could be set up to _legally_ >>> announce either that it would be awarding a cash prize to somebody who >>> correctly "predicted" the death of one of a list of violators of >>> rights, usually either government employees, officeholders, or >>> appointees. It could ask for anonymous contributions from the public, >>> and individuals would be able send those contributions using digital >>> cash. >>> >> >>If the intent is to motivate others to kill or otherwise harm others simply >>because you don't agree with them or their actions is reprehensible and >>moraly or ethicaly undefensible. > >That's a misleading statement: You said, "simply because..." As should >be abundantly clear from my other arguments, I wouldn't wish to see anyone >killed "simply because" of the fact I "don't agree with them." It is their >ACTIONS that I feel violate my rights; that is what justifies my seeking >their deaths, should I choose to do so. > > >>> On the contrary; my speculation assumed that the "victim" is a >>> government employee, presumably one who is not merely taking a paycheck >>> of stolen tax dollars, but also is guilty of extra violations of rights >>> beyond this. (Government agents responsible for the Ruby Ridge incident >>> and Waco come to mind.) In receiving such money and in his various >>> acts, he violates the "Non-aggression Principle" (NAP) and thus, >>> presumably, any acts against him are not the initiation of force under >>> libertarian principles. >>> >> >>Every citizen of this country is a 'government employee' in one sense or >>another. > >That's about the weakest argument I've heard in a long time. I'm amazed >that you weren't too embarrassed to post it to the list. While I don't know >precisely what your definition of the phrase "government employee" really >is, I "every citizen" is a "governement employee" then you must have a >REALLY weird definition of that. > >Somehow, I think that this is where your argument fails, and it fails >miserably. > > >>By resorting to violence you are no better than the ones you proport to >>protect us against. > >Sorry, I disagree. Now, I am certainly aware of the classic "Gandhi-type" >total non-violence principle, but it turns out that very few people actually >believe in that. Most people seem to think that they are entitled to >protect themselves from violations of rights. The fact that these >violations of rights may be done by "government employees" is at most >irrelevant, in that this doesn't justify it. Anybody who feels entitled to >use violence against a burglar, rapist, or murderer is correct; attempting >to deny me the right to protect my property from GOVERNMENT people is, in >itself, a violation of my rights. > >Are you a statist? > >

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Availability of high-speed DES chips.
by Mark Aldrich 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've got a networking application upon which I'm working that requires high-speed DES capability that can be clocked up to around 20 megabytes/second. We're going to have to do circuit board level design, so I can't plug a stand-alone box on the ass-end of the network device - it's got to be planted into our network controller. This thing is going to provide ATM/SONET communications. Does anyone know of any chip sets that can run at this speed? Input regarding either commercial or R&D sources would be appreciated. I know that two years ago at the Internet Security meeting in San Diego we saw a parallel processor configuration of DES chips, but I can't remember which University in North Carolina was working on this. If anyone knows if this research went anywhere, I'd appreciate hearing about that as well. Thanks for the help! ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |So, I went walking through the street. |Mark Aldrich | |I saw you strung up in a tree. |GRCI INFOSEC Engineering | |A woman knelt there, said to me, |maldrich(a)grci.com | |Hold your tongue, man, hold your tongue. |MAldrich(a)dockmaster.ncsc.mil | |_______________________________________________________________________| |The author is PGP Empowered. Public key at: finger maldrich(a)grci.com | | The opinions expressed herein are strictly those of the author | | and my employer gets no credit for them whatsoever. | -------------------------------------------------------------------------

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RE: Encryption software
by Pete Loshin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Medea writes: > I was telling a friend that I was going to buy a program similar to PC Anywhere to be able to >communicate between my computer at home and the one at the office. He suggested trying to find a >similar program which includes encryption. > Anyone know of such a program? Norton pcANYWHERE and Stac ReachOut both claim to use encryption though I don't have any details of what that encryption is. However, if you use a direct telephone link to communicate, your need for encryption would mostly be in the event that your telephone lines were being tapped (though these products can also be used over most network protocols including IP and IPX). btw: In general, when I speak with PC software vendors (product managers) they almost always talk about how secure their products are but never have the details (either, "oh, that's proprietary" or else "I'm not sure, I'll have to get back to you on that...") -Pete Loshin pete(a)loshin.com

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Firewall USA to Firewall China
by sophi＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At the meeting on saturday the idea of a Firewall USA was discussed. Here's a quote from Jim Clark CEO of Netscape on the idea of a Firewall China, just for comparison. Q: The Chinese government has declared its intention to filter out what it considers to be objectionable material from the Internet. If you were a consultant for the Chinese government, what technology would you recommend that they use to do that? A: A lot of people think that's not possible. It's difficult to enforce, but it's certainly possible. A corporation has a so-called fire wall -- a single point of entry into the corporate net. You can have a country that has a single point of entry into its "country net." It's doable. All you need, though, is one breach of security, and there's a leak. A fire wall is a filter -- it filters and doesn't let certain people come in. You can only come in if you have the right permission. So you could easily set that up so that it would filter out your objectionable material. this is a temp .sig

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