December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

(cpx) Re: Why can't I get PGP from MIT (fwd)
by David Vincenzetti 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >I believe I had a problem when I wanted to get PGP coming from > >internexus.net (New Jersey). I just e-mailed them about it and I think > >they just added the site to their 'acceptable' list. I did a traceroute > >to why.net and noticed that it is very close to me, coming off of > >SprintNet... probably the same situation. > > Internexus.net has been added to the list. The heuristic that the MIT site > enforces is as follows: > > o To get access you must properly answer some questions regarding export control > law and licensing. > > o Your host must have an "inverse" DNS mapping so we can learn its name. > > o Your host's name must end in either ".EDU", ".COM", ".MIL", ".GOV", ".US", > or ".CA". > > *or* > > Be on our exception list. > > All the ".NET's" and ".ORG's" need to be "excepted." *or* just get it from ftp.dsi.unimi.it! Use the ftp INDEX command upon being connected. Most of US's crypto software, in fact, has already been exported to Europe and is *freely* available at ftp.dsi.unimi.it Ciao, David

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo hroller alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: all of the "ek" tags have been verified correct. Apologies to those who were inconvenienced by incorrect "ek" tags in the past. Last update: Mon 8 Jan 96 6:47:57 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- replay remailer(a)replay.com *+****+***+* 6:11 100.00% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu #++*##*++#+# 2:43 99.99% hroller hroller(a)c2.org .-#*#--#-### 12:12 99.98% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net +-++++++++++ 1:14:40 99.98% pamphlet pamphlet(a)idiom.com --++++++++++ 48:13 99.98% c2 remail(a)c2.org .-***--*-+** 29:43 99.97% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com ########### 3:46 99.95% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com --+-------- 3:03:29 99.95% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com *#*#__-+#### 5:22:45 99.93% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com ------+--+-+ 3:32:22 99.90% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org #___.#**#### 9:32:42 99.88% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl ****** ***+* 8:42 99.83% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ++++++----- 4:54:49 99.74% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net - -**-++*+* 37:22 99.59% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de --++++..--. 10:22:10 99.58% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *-- # -+*+*# 13:39 99.47% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com #- ######## 5:54 99.42% spook remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net --.-+ --.-* 4:03:17 98.30% wmono wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net *** * 17:40 93.55% rahul homer(a)rahul.net +####+###### 1:29 99.99% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com -------- 4:58:18 72.87% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net +++- -+ 2:02:20 63.07% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: NSA says strong crypto to China?
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:23 PM 1/7/96 -0600, Alex Strasheim wrote: > But I don't necessarily look at the > NSA as an enemy. Right now we're on opposite sides of an important issue, > and I think they're doing a lot of damage. But I tend to think that they > believe what they're doing is in the national interest. They're trying > to defend democracy -- our democracy, at least. I see no sign that NSA is capable of distinguishing between the interest of the state and the interest of the nation. It is perfectly clear that the threat that NSA is primarily concerned with comes from within, not from without. > So the question we ought to be putting to the NSA is this: isn't it in > the best interest of the United States and the other capitalist Western > democracies to impose the first ammendment on the rest of the world? There is this big myth, spread partly by the US government, and partly by the radical left, notably Chomsky, that the US has been protecting the world against socialism: This is a load of old bananas. The US government has been pro socialist -- not as pro socialist as the IMF, and the IMF has not been as pro socialist as the Soviets -- but the US has still been shoving socialism down peoples throats in a heavy handed way, because they could get away with that kind of stuff abroad, when they cop hell for it at home. The nastiest piece of socialism was arguably the land reform scheme in El Salvador, which converted the peasants from tenants of a few powerful rural landlords, to serfs on state run collective farms. This screwed up agriculture big time, and the peasants detested it. If you want to use land reform to make peasants into anti communists, you use the method so successfully used in Taiwan. You make it possible for the peasant to buy land, and encourage him to buy land, and once he has some land of his own, and has sacrificed in order to obtain it, you can then trust him to resist communism. If there are communist guerrillas around, you should give him a shotgun. The US government followed a very different strategy in El Salvador, from which we may conclude that just as the South Vietnamese government considered that robbing the Montagnards, and rendering them powerless and afraid was more important than resisting North Vietnamese communism, the US government similarly considered that suppressing private property, was more important than resisting communist infiltration in El Salvador. El Salvador was vulnerable to communism because only two hundred families owned everything worth owning. If you want to prevent communism the kind of land reform you need is land reform that allows more people to acquire individual property rights. > I don't think the NSA is out to suppress our liberties. > [...] it is a mistake to think of them as evil, as people who > will tell any lie to get what they want. I disagree. Two government officials, one of whom is a communist, have more in common than two communists, one of whom is a government official. The NSA is on the same side as the Chinese government, and if Chinese dissidents used crypto with US GAK, this information would be exchanged with the Chinese government. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Cite for Toad Hop
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There have been inquiries on the source of the "Toad Hop" material, some from places to which it was forwarded. As noted on cypherpunks earlier, the material is directly from: Jonathan Littman, an investigative reporter, has published "The Fugitive Game: Online With Kevin Mitnick," Little Brown, 1996. 381 pp. $23.95. ISBN 0-316-52858-7. It is a dramatic recount of Mitnick's exploits; the pursuit by Shimomura, Markoff, telcos and Feds; the bust and Markoff's tales; The Well controversies and disputes about what really happened; suspicions of Shimomura and Markoff - their complicity with TLAs, their movie and book dealings, their disputes with hackers and journalists. What Mitnick was telling Littman while a fugitive.

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Microsoft white paper on Access "security"
by Richard Charles Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Apparently the file name of the official position on Access security is wx1051.exe. It should be on CompuServe and www/ftp.microsoft.com. Among other wondrous things, Peter Miller writes in article <4crdu2$gua(a)news-e1a.megaweb.com> in comp.databases.ms-access: BTW, there's a typo in the White Paper. Where it says Access security relies upon 'RSA4 data encryption', they meant to say 'you not knowing the difference between a secure database application, and one that just contains a bunch of security dialogs that confuses the average user, but fails to protect either your code or your data'. I bet someone's going to have a lot of fun with this one!!! -rich

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Re: phone calls from hell
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:48 AM 1/9/96 +0100, Anonymous wrote: >Media reports said that the explosion was set off by >remote control when Ayyash answered a call to him. It is >not known how the identity of Ayyash was ascertained. NBC News reported Monday that it was a Motorola phone, that Israel cut the landlines to the house to encourage cellular use, that *the* call came from the Engineer's *father*, and that an Israeli aircraft overhead triggered the blast after assuring itself (by voice info) that the Engineer was using the phone. DCF

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Re: "Microsoft.com" added to my KILL file
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim and Lucky were talking.... >>embedded spreadsheets and embedded graphics. And as for attachments, such >>as attaching programs for running on a machine, mailing list messages are a >>very poor way to distribute such programs, for many reasons. To say nothing of the risk of some nasty Word virus or other malicious executable. _______________________ Regards, Truth can never be told so as to be understood, and not be believed. -William Blake Joseph Reagle http://farnsworth.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu 0C 69 D4 E8 F2 70 24 33 B4 5E 5E EC 35 E6 FB 88

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W 4:15 ** Markoff and Shimomura on the pursuit of Kevin Mitnick, ComputerCriminal
by ee380 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Highly edited announcement perhaps of interest to SF Bay Area cpunks. My appologies to those that are not interested in the subject. - Bill Frantz EE380 Computer Systems Colloquium Date: Wednesday, Jan 10,1995 Time: 4:15-5:30 pm Location: Skilling Auditorium, Stanford University, Stanford, CA Speakers: John Markoff, New York Times Tsutomu Shimomura, San Diego Supercomputer Center Title: Takedown: The Capture of Kevin Mitnick Abstract Shimomura and Markoff will talk about the pursuit and capture of Kevin Mitnick, a 32-year old computer programmer who was arrested in Raleigh, N.C. last year by the FBI, after Shimomura, working on behalf of several Internet service providers, traced him to an apartment complex on the outskirts of the city. Shimomura and Markoff have cooperated to write a soon to be released book about the pursuit, Takedown (Hyperion 1996) ************************************************************************ * EE380 is the Computer Systems Laboratory Colloquium. The Colloquium * * meets most Wednesdays throughout the normal academic year. * * * * For information on the class send e-mail with a subject line * * mentioning "info" in the subject line to ee380(a)shasta.stanford.edu. * * * * WWW Page: http://www-leland.stanford.edu/class/ee380 * ************************************************************************

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Key Expiration (was: Revoking Old Lost Keys)
by olbon＠dynetics.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Numerous people over that last few days have suggested key expiration dates. Viacrypt advertises this for their commercial version of pgp. Has anyone used this feature or know how it works (i.e. how does it remain interoperable with other versions of pgp, or does the expiration feature only work with other viacrypt users?) Clay - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Clay Olbon II | olbon(a)dynetics.com Systems Engineer | ph: (810) 589-9930 fax 9934 Dynetics, Inc., Ste 302 | http://www.msen.com/~olbon/olbon.html 550 Stephenson Hwy | PGP262 public key: finger olbon(a)mgr.dynetics.com Troy, MI 48083-1109 | pgp print: B97397AD50233C77523FD058BD1BB7C0 "To escape the evil curse, you must quote a bible verse; thou shalt not ... Doooh" - Homer (Simpson, not the other one) - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMPFTWAS4mEMx6xUNAQFn+AP+KANJoiLTbbeuqvkHsrnHm1o7vVeXYmXr 9Rjnr6HAuOLL1JJRqd2D2csKC6MaWXkwWbfihdqiPbQJT8MfNwevYBzVVXEmALRI Ic2uFkESHnHdcht7IVNInCiqlt6Bm17t9ZGlPWSk8aeENaP5bKI3AqJ8AqLROovx 8EK2NHvNPjo= =VCui -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: phone calls from hell
by Alan Horowitz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I almost hate to start a thread about something that will inevitably implode into a middle-east-politics flamefest, but this reminds me of the time the newswires reported that 10% of Israel's population had attended that peace rally in Tel-Aviv. Was it right after the Sabra-Shatilla massacre? Anyway, the followup news (which of course never made the news) was that it would not be physically possible for a third of that many people to all be in that place (Kikar Square?) all at once. The original numbers were published by the Israeli "peace camp", who would have liked for there to be that many people there. 100,000 people at a funeral? I don't doubt that there were 100,000 people who would have liked to be there, but I am skeptical that there's enough vehicles in Gaza to assemble 100,000 people to a funeral within a few hours. It doesn't matter does it? Everyone is willing to lie when they write press releases; newspapers are willing to not check ridiculous claims (if the claim comports with the publisher's outlook); and setting the record straight doesn't help sell advertising, publishers really care how lazy journalists are. I saw a great interview with the man who invented the phrase "ethnic cleansing" - a PR-agency guy in Boston under contract to the Bosnian Government. He openly stated, that he doesn't get paid to write the truth into press releases; he's paid to get his client's press releases into opinion-molder's fax machines FIRST. The first press release always wins. He also openly stated that he didn't know and didn't care if the Bosnian-Serb militias were operating concentration camps or not; the important thing was to fax the story to the American Jewish groups; he knew that the very *word* concentration camp would catch their eye and push them into agitating against the Serbs. He specifically stated, that he was so proud of his cleverness, because the Croatian President (foe of the Serbs) has a book under his belt ("Wastelands of Historical Reality") that is packed full of some very hot anti-Semetism. Alan Horowitz alanh(a)infi.net

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