December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

question re. PGP CharSet
by max.muzi＠altair.it 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Apparently, the mechanism for overriding PGP configuration settings by means of command-line arguments does not work properly with the option "charset" (at least with version 2.6.1i). Anyone know why? Actually, PGP does understand the option "+charset", as it does not yield an "invalid argument" error message, but it looks like it does not take that option into consideration. While I know most people need not switch from one charset to another every day, some of them (like me) do not have completely migrated to Windows yet and would still like to use the MS-DOS standard charset (cp850) from time to time without having to re-edit or substituting the PGP config file each time. But I guess it's not possible, is it? Thanks, Max PS: [off-topic] Anybody know how one can have the MS-DOS keyboard driver use the standard Windows char table (LATIN1 aka iso-8859-1)? ~~ Massimiliano Muzi ['mu:tsi] <max.muzi(a)altair.it> http://www.geocities.com/Athens/2027/max-muzi.html PGP public key available on keyservers. "Eternal nothingness is OK if you are dressed for it" msg date/time: Friday 8 March 1996, 12:38 GMT+1

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Re: Web of Trust vs other models
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> > > Meanwhile, Don Kitchen at one point collected all the data off the > MIT keyserver for analysis, which is a much different problem than > random signatures. I found that the chain from some middle point, > such as Phil Zimmermann's or Derek Atkins's key was about 12-14 levels > deep, averaging about 6, which compares interestingly with the > default PGP depth limit of4. From my key, it was pretty deep, > especially since my certification from Phil Karn was from one of > his older keys, which is why I asked Derek to sign my key... Let's not forget that the web of trust only works if you personally know and trust the next-to-last person in the chain (the one who signed the key you are interested in). Chain length doesn't matter if you've never heard of the last signer. Hal

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steganographic trick
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

here is an interesting trick/algorithm that I've not seen before, although I admit I'm not intimately familiar with all the crypto formulas that others here may be aware of, so this may have been toyed with before. in pondering steganography, it seems to me there could be made a distinction between two types. in the "classic" type, say hiding data in the low bits of a digitized image, the whole existence of an encrypted "covert" message is totally concealed. that is, not only is the message concealed but the existence of it is as well. now consider a different kind of steganography, in which it is clear there is an encrypted piece of data. the problem with all steganographic crypto is that to use your data, you have to have your stego tools handy, and the "feds" could see these tools and accuse you of hiding data. imagine an application where you freely admit that you have your cryptographic tools, and that you are even willing to tell the "feds" the key for your data. they run the crypto program, and indeed the file decrypts. however, unknown to them, you have given them a key that decrypts the file into something meaningful yet benign, such as a cookie recipe, not your plans for the overthrow of the state. in other words, "interlaced" or "coincident" within the same file is your secret data. given one key, it decrypts into one set of data, and given another key, it decrypts into another set of data. there are probably many different ways to do this. of course the distinction of what I am proposing and two different files, each with different keys (which is already feasible), is not all that crisp. anyway, I pursued this anyway to come up with an algorithm. pick a large prime, P. now pick two other large primes that are less than sqrt(P), P1, P2 (actually all that is required is that P1*P2 < P). the data in the file is organized into blocks of information modulo P. P1 is the "harmless" key for message 1 (M1), and P2 is the "real" key for message 2 (M2). now the trick is to put data into your file one "piece" at a time such that it decrypts into either the corresponding "piece" of M1 given decryption by P1, or M2 given P2. I think some people can anticipate what comes next: the encoding of the data for M1 is contained in the "segment M" modulo P1, and M2 is contained modulo P2. the chinese remainder theorem lets us find the unique number N such that N mod P1 = M1, and N mod P2 = M2. "N" is the data that is stored in the file. I'm being a little sloppy in notation here: the overall message is broken into segments mod P-- the above algorithm is simply repeated over each "segment". given all the caveats about complexity of factoring etc., if P1, P2 are large and not "close" to each other (i.e. one could find P1 by searching in the "vicinity" of P2), this would be a secure algorithm as far as I can tell. to decrypt, the file is broken up into pieces mod P, and then each of these pieces has a value mod P1 or mod P2 that is used as the value of that piece. hence, we have an algorithm in which data is stored "coincident" or "adjacent" in a file. the feds could potentially observe that the key you give them, P1 < sqrt(P), and realize that there is "room" left over to store a secret message. but if you store all your files that way, they have nothing to go on. in fact you could assert, "yes, that was once a file with two messages in it, but I deleted the other one. it's key used to be Px". Px is a random number. of course, this method could be expanded so that any file has any number of secret pieces interspersed in it, each only available given knowledge of its secret key. again, the same thing can be accomplished by concatenating multiple files, each with a different key, or even alternating bytes or bits in a file, but I thought it would be interesting to find something that had this "coincident" or "adjacent" property based on the modulo and large prime properties used everywhere in modern crypto.

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Re: Leahy bill nightmare scenario?
by Dan Weinstein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 8 Mar 96 at 9:24, you wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > At 06:14 AM 3/8/96 GMT, Dan Weinstein wrote: > >On Wed, 06 Mar 1996 16:59:36 -0800, you wrote: > > > >>At that point, Bob is GUILTY of violation of the Leahy bill, > >>because his encrypted anonymous remailer: > >> > >>1. Uses encryption to thwart message tracing, and thus the > >>"criminal investigation." > >> > >>2. Bob has already been informed that his system will be used for > >>illegal purposes; the cops have the messages to prove he has been > >>told. He's GUILTY GUILTY GUILTY, he will definitely lose the > >>system and possibly whatever residence it runs in, and will > >>probably have to pay a huge fine to boot. > > > >This is not my understanding. I believe that Bob has to be > >commiting a felony himself before they can get him under the > >current phrasing. > > Well, first, the section's phrasing is screwed up. Whether this is > the fault of VTW, who posted the text, or the original bill I do not > know. I have yet to see the original bill myself, it is not posted on Thomas yet, but I too have ready the VTW version. > Second, if what they're charging is the hindrance of an > felony investigation, it isn't clear to me why they would be > limiting the charging of that "crime" to only those actually who > have committed a felony. (logic isn't the normal mode of thought for > a government employee, you realize.) I agree with your concerns here, but I find it hard to believe that the courts would allow a broader interpretation. > Third, all they have to do is to "suspect" the person of a felony, > and a > "felony investigation" starts. That would presumably make him > guilty of the Leahy bill's provision, regardless of whether he is > actually participating in the crime supposedly being investigated. Here you are dead wrong, the bill specifically states: "in furtherance of a felony." Its like those laws that let them charge someone with murder in the first if someone dies while you are commiting another felony. They must prove the original felony before they can get you on the murder one. The real purpose of this provision, as I read it, is to give longer sentences to criminals that use crypto. > Fourth, I gave what I considered to be a clear example of the > hypothetical misuse of an encrypted remailer by the cops, one that > would arguably make the remailer operator guilty of some > "reasonable" anti-kiddie-porn statute. At that point, _he_is_ the > target of the investigation. Unless you can show that this kind of > action by the government is impossible, I consider it to be not > merely possible but almost certain to occur. Again, the problem I see with your scenario is that I don't believe that the courts will interpret it that way. My interpretation is that if they serve a warrent and I don't decrypt for them and they can prove a felony, then I will be subject to the listed punishment. > Fifth, it isn't clear what amount of knowledge is necessary to > "trigger" this clause, especially in its current flawed state. > Since ISP's and encrypted remailers might know, in general, that > their systems can and probably are being used for SOME criminal > activity, even if they can't identify it or the user, or decrypt it, > etc, a broad interpretation of the resulting law could easily > de-facto prohibit any business practices (i.e., allowing users to > use encryption) that prevents full-scale monitoring and/or tracing. I disagree, it states you must "willfully endeavor" to use the encryption as a means of obstructing the investigation. To me, this means that it is the motivation for using the encryption. If I set up an encrypting remailer for the purpose of allowing free exchange of ideas, I don't believe I would be liable under this law. The only way I could see a remailer charged under this is if he had solid evidence that a specific user was violating the law, and took no action. > This is only the beginning of the problems with this section. If > you can explain why nothing I've described could possibly occur, I > welcome a contrary explanation. I see some real problems too, but I do not see the problems with this provision to be enough to condemn the entire bill. I would like to see this portion of the bill ammended to make it clear that only those actually involved in commiting the felony would be held responsible. > But I would also ask this: Why, exactly, do we need this section? > We've already been told that the opponents of this bill will fight > it tooth-and-nail under its current wording; if that's the case then > the presence of this section is inadequate to appease their > unhappiness. Therefore, we shouldn't include it in the bill at all; > it does no good. > > Any explanations, Dan? You are talking about the fringe, this, I think, was added as an attempt to bring in those that are in the middle. That is, Those that see the need to prevent the use of encryption as a means of obstructing justice, but feel that we should also have a right to privacy. To say that there is no delema here is ridiculous, crime is a serious problem that we are already having a terrible time dealing with. I think Leahy realizes that this provision will be about as useful as the "use a gun, go to jail" laws, but wants to give those in the middle to say that they bill will help prevent crime. > BTW, I'm not the source of those recent anonymous notes on > Cypherpunks criticizing you for the support of this bill. As you by > now have guessed, I'm not at all reticent about standing up and > being counted and identified. > > Jim Bell > jimbell(a)pacifier.com > > Klaatu Burada Nikto Good movie. Dan Weinstein djw(a)vplus.com http://www.vplus.com/~djw PGP public key is available from my Home Page. All opinions expressed above are mine. "I understand by 'freedom of Spirit' something quite definite - the unconditional will to say No, where it is dangerous to say No. Friedrich Nietzsche

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Re: TCP/IP Stego (was CU-SeeMe)
by mccoy＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

JonWeinke(a)aol.com writes: > >> -It can be applied by two routers which are in the middle >> of the connection. [...] > >You seem to be oblivious to the fact that this technique is only useful for >ISP's, corporate networks, etc. that the average home computer user will >never have access to. I know that, I was just pointing out advantages you overlooked. I guess that the fact that I probably know more ISP operators and techs then non-geeks who use the net made this part more obvious to me. The original technique of doing stego on packets is still valid, and by adding it in to a WinSock lib or linux tcp/ip implementation the user can send hidden messages just by connecting to a friendly stego-enhanced web server out on the net and doing some casual browsing. The difference between the two methods is, as I said before, exactly the same as the difference between TCP/IP and UUCP. Hiding info in images or sound files works fine for "email" or file storage but has no chance of being an interactive protocol, sometimes you need to get things done in real-time. > If I want to send a WAV file of my 2 year old son >saying "Hi, gramma" (or a 24-bit color TIFF of him practicing nose-picking >techniques) to my relatives, that is not overtly suspicious behavior, even if >it has a slight amount of background noise (or graininess). But your relatives are not the people who you need to communicate secrets with securely. These gross stego hacks to sound and image files are best used to make postings to various binary Usenet newsgroups. Broadcast the message and then put it in a place where many people will download it but only a few will know that it contains the hidden info. Sending this stuff via email is just begging for traffic analysis at the very least... >As long as I >don't stego too many bits in the file, and I strip out any overt "I'm crypto" >headers, it will be impossible to prove that stego techniques were used on a >file. Finding random bits where random bits normally live cannot be used to >prove anything. Provided the bits are random in the way that they should be... The low-order bits in such files were chosen by implementors of stego programs because modification would not be noticed by the person viewing or listening to the file, not necessarily because there was actually randomness at this level which could be replaced. Does anyone know of a survey of images or sound files which tested the statistical randomness of these bits? They may not be as random as people think they are. jim

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Re: new netscape servers
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:14 PM 3/7/96 -0500, Michael Froomkin wrote: >What law applies to a certificate used in a multi-jurisdictional >transaction is less obvious to me than I would like. I think I have >talked a student in my seminar into writing a paper to educate me. Are your concerns international, interstate, or (it seems unlikely) intrastate? Regards - Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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WARES - random generator
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This may be of interest to people on the list... >Keywords: madison hawai obsceni prising ridblood ribiliss >Subject: WARES - random generator >Reply-To: email(a)fringeware.com (FringeWare Inc) >Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 11:06:20 -0600 >Apparently-To: fwlist-daily(a)fringeware.com >X-UIDL: 4751f2738fffe6a83cf40be20fcd79a5 > >Sent from: email(a)fringeware.com (FringeWare Inc) > >A certain vendor of ours has approached FringeWare with an offer for >exclusive distribution a new product, which may be of general interest >to people reading this list. > >The product line is called Perfect Crypt Products and the new item >being considered is a random number generator which plugs into the >serial port of your PC/Mac/Sparcbook/Cray/etc., and pours out a stream >of random numbers. The process is based on thermal radiation, the >randomness looks quite good, and the product would retail for about us$50. > >If you have an interest in such a product, please let us know here >at: email(a)fringeware.com and we'll add it to our catalog. > >One-time pad enthusiasts and PGP officionados might consider this >offer especially. > > >----------------------------------------------------- >pxn * FringeWare Inc. * http://www.fringeware.com > > > > > --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon "I, Caligula Clinton... In the name of the Senate and the people of Rome!" - Bill Clinton signing the CDA with the First Amendment bent over.

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2nd request for links, etc.
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- After too much coffee and not enough sleep, it looks like the (soon-to-be-named) shellback.com site will be going on-line on Monday, 11 March. Until InterNIC comes back and blesses us with permission to use the name, we'll be running as 204.177.232.150 I'd like to again ask anyone on the cypherpunks list that has a site, link, file, or other bit of info that they're willing to have us include please let me know via email. I've got some links from my (soon-to-be-former) home page, but I'd like to include a *lot* more stuff. To repeat an earlier offer, as postmaster, I'm offering the use of our email system for crypto/coder/privacy-related mailing lists, and our drives to store related files/archives. Dave Merriman postmaster(a)shellback.com, webmaster(a)shellback.com, janitor(a)shellback.com, and frazzled(a)shellback.com :-) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMT/aUsVrTvyYOzAZAQEK8wP9GvQtT3PF91xW38jKL7qWsH75fA0AJXVi fM4pVCDznFUk0DPla8tnBCzyBGQzklZH/217Yct26VvUZN4ZQ+BHkE/ZSkxkk1KQ i1PE1fzhGcVFhfySIMWi3o7+WeZoYOmdtFkMGEcTAsQkhR9FHvHm3oJlS7GY/R/p 2Hm3Wzjgabc= =c6ab -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------- "Giving money and power to government is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenage boys." P. J. O'Rourke (b. 1947), U.S. journalist. <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> For privacy tools: http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/1148

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Re: Vexatious Litigants (was: SurfWatch)
by Martin Diehl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Henry Huang <hwh6k(a)fulton.seas.virginia.edu> at INTERNET-USA wrote: > On Mar 7, 22:29, Timothy C. May wrote: > > At 2:38 AM 3/8/96, Bill Frantz wrote: > > >At 6:59 PM 3/7/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: > > >>If SurfWatch can be sued for a "bad review," then Siskel and Ebert > > >>had better find a new line of work. > > > > > >As long as a reviewer corrects errors, as SurfWatch seems to be > > >willing to do, I think they are relatively suit-proof. If they don't, > > >well - anyone can be sued for anything. I'll let the lawyers comment > > >on the possibility of success. > [snip] > Thanks for the clarification. However, this line of argument applies > only to "third-party" ratings systems. Right now, > Microsoft/RSAC/SurfWatch and SafeSurf/Cybersitter/etc. are setting up > competing standards which would essentially force people to > "self-rate" their own sites, or else be blocked out by browsers > configured to reject unrated sites (a feature Microsoft plans to add > to its Internet Explorer). > The question I have is if these systems were widely implemented, could > an Web page author or provider of content be sued for "mislabeling" > their page? If so, under what circumstances? Could the RSAC attach > legal requirements to the use of their system, and open up such a > loophole (similar to how Sun attaches conditions to the use of its > "Java" logo)? Seems to me that if the Web page author labels his page conservatively, i. e. "materials may be unsuitable for non-adults; may contain controversial material, may contain views different from your own, etc.". How can the author be liable for mislabeling? Martin G. Diehl

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Review Litigation
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:59 PM 3/7/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >We need to be very careful here. A service like "SurfWatch," voluntarily >used by others, has entered into no contracts with sites to meet defined >standards of what should and shouldn't be blocked. It is essentially a >"review" service, like a reviewer of books, movies, restaurants, etc. Sure, >some books, movies, and restaurants are "hurt" by negative reviews, but >this is life in a free society. It has not yet reached the point in these >Beknighted States that a bad review can be the basis of a tort (though I >could be wrong...nothing would surprise me these days). There was a recent case of a restaurant suing over a bad review that did go to trial. The reviewer won. There has also been litigation against someone who wrote a letter to a scientific journal attacking someone else. The letter writer won. Of course both the letter writer and the reviewer had legal costs because they were unwilling to proceed in forma pauperis. DCF

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