December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: "trust management" vs. "certified identity"
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:40 1/7/96, Frank O'Dwyer wrote: >But it is usually easier to >determine (and vouch for) who a stranger is than how trustworthy >they are, if only because there are quick and easy real-world >mechanisms for this (driver's licence, passport,etc.). That's all >I meant. Though it may seem that way, I am not so sure that it is true. I am told that you can buy a CA driver licence in the hispanic part of San Francisco for about $50. Hologram and all. Reputations can take years to establish. I am would feel more comfortable to sign certain statements about the (on-line) character or technical skills of some people on this list whom I have never met, than to sign the PGP key of an utter stranger that shows me his Alabama ID card. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: "Re: NSA says strong crypto to china??
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:50 PM 01/07/96, Timothy C. May wrote: >As when the Cossacks who fled the U.S.S.R. after the war and pledged to >help the West fight Communism were returned by the British to Stalin, where >they were executed. (I was reminded of this by the latest Bond movie, where >Bond avers, "Not exactly Britain's finest moment.") The Kurds in Iraw during the Persina Gulf war is an analagous situation. The Kurds supported and assisted the U.S. government during the war. Really pro-U.S.. At some point near the end of the war, though, the U.S. just started ignoring them, and Hussein started bombing them and killing huge numbers of them.

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[Fwd: Re: ABOI: Desperate User Support]
by Shri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Seen on Alt.best.of.internet. Would love to find out if this is true! Shri > > Origination: alt.sysadmin.recovery > > Originator: jerry(a)worf.tcs.com (Jerry Carlin) > >Original Subject: support call - urban legand or fact? > > Date: 27 Jul 1995 16:44:18 -0700 > >... (many forwards deleted)... > > >This falls into the "Why did it have to happen on *MY* shift?" category. > > >A friend of mine is a chief engineer at SuperMac, and he related this > >story to me. > > >SuperMac records a certain number of technical support calls at random, > >to keep tabs on customer satisfaction. By wild "luck", they managed to > >catch the following conversation on tape. > > >Some poor SuperMac TechSport got a call from some middle level official... > >from the legitimate government of Trinidad. The fellow spoke very good > >English, and fairly calmly described the problem. > > >It seemed there was a coup attempt in progress at that moment. However, > >the national armoury for that city was kept in the same building as the > >Legislature, and it seems that there was a combination lock on the door > >to the armoury. Of the people in the capitol city that day, only the > >Chief of the Capitol Guard and the Chief Armourer knew the combination to > >the lock, and they had already been killed. > > >So, this officer of the government of Trinidad continued, the problem is > >this. The combination to the lock is stored in a file on the Macintosh, > >but the file has been encrypted with the SuperMac product called Sentinel. > >Was there any chance, he asked, that there was a "back door" to the > >application, so they could get the combination, open the armoury door, > >and defend the Capitol Building and the legitimately elected government > >of Trinidad against the insurgents? > > >All the while he is asking this in a very calm voice, there is the sound > >of gunfire in the background. The Technical Support guy put the person on > >hold. A phone call to the phone company verified that the origin of the > >call was in fact Trinidad. Meanwhile, there was this mad scramble to see > >if anybody knew of any "back doors" in the Sentinel program. > > >As it turned out, Sentinel uses DES to encrypt the files, and there was > >no known back door. The Tech Support fellow told the customer that aside > >from trying to guess the password, there was no way through Sentinel, and > >that they'd be better off trying to physically destroy the lock. > > >The official was very polite, thanked him for the effort, and hung up. > >That night, the legitimate government of Trinidad fell. One of the BBC > >reporters mentioned that the casualties seemed heaviest in the capitol, > >where for some reason, there seemed to be little return fire from the > >government forces. > > >O.K., so they shouldn't have kept the combination in so precarious a > >fashion. But it does place, "I can't see my Microsoft Mail server" > >complaints in a different sort of perspective, does it not?

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Re: phone calls from hell
by Simon Spero 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey - he spent so much time training suicide bombers maybe the phone was set to blow if anyone dialed the, er, Samaritans. Simon (defun modexpt (x y n) "computes (x^y) mod n" (cond ((= y 0) 1) ((= y 1) (mod x n)) ((evenp y) (mod (expt (modexpt x (/ y 2) n) 2) n)) (t (mod (* x (modexpt x (1- y) n)) n))))

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Re: Microsoft continues to mislead public about Windows securitybugs (a bit long, with references)
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 0:37 1/9/96 -0800, Lucky Green wrote: > >Very true. But why does it always seem to take an exploitable crack before >companies pay attention to security flaws? Is it because they are unable to >admit that they have made a mistake? Everybody makes mistakes. What's the >big deal? I really don't understand it. Any psychologists on this list? Having, in the past, attempted to sell an Operating System with high security features, and failed, I think I can give you some insight. Security does not sell an OS to anyone, even the Department of Defense. People buy OSs to run applications. The only thing a lack of security in an OS will do is allow someone in an obscure department (perhaps called Corporate Security) to say no. Security is a checkoff item, and if you can convince a retired major that the OS is secure, then he will approve it. He is not going to check the details. His expertise is in guard stations and chain link fences. However, if someone, e.g. the trade press, rubs his nose in the fact that an OS's security can be breached, then he will take action. He will pressure the publisher to release a fix that they say will fix the problem. When they do, he will be happy. Microsoft particulary, is oriented to selling product, not pride in workmanship. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: Why can't I get PGP from MIT
by jis＠mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >I believe I had a problem when I wanted to get PGP coming from >internexus.net (New Jersey). I just e-mailed them about it and I think >they just added the site to their 'acceptable' list. I did a traceroute >to why.net and noticed that it is very close to me, coming off of >SprintNet... probably the same situation. Internexus.net has been added to the list. The heuristic that the MIT site enforces is as follows: o To get access you must properly answer some questions regarding export control law and licensing. o Your host must have an "inverse" DNS mapping so we can learn its name. o Your host's name must end in either ".EDU", ".COM", ".MIL", ".GOV", ".US", or ".CA". *or* Be on our exception list. All the ".NET's" and ".ORG's" need to be "excepted." Maintaining the exception list has turned out to be a serious problem. I receive roughly 20 messages a day from people needed to be added. To make matters worse the exception list has to be maintained in two different locations in two different formats. I just broke down today and automated the management of the lists. Unfortunately the only thing I can do for people whose machines do not have an inverse DNS mapping is to send them personal copies via e-mail. However, I have been too swamped to do this. I am looking into alternative approaches of guarding the FTP site (possibly doing a traceroute or something similar) in a better way that still meets the requirements of maintaining export restrictions. Please remember that I maintain the MIT FTP site in my all too rare spare time. Thank you. -Jeff -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMPBCFcUtR20Nv5BtAQEUhAQAnzPlxiXo33DqX0X1m39Xh1I0e7ND332n L4vZlf7T3VDU0jYv1IB/6D3aNvMXo0l8JpsXIxqzaxP5nYgVgm1idx06IgY7T1rJ vVRCIqfFleUFPTS/ndo7jznzr+w7Dq1+5wRU2Oa+ymRICBNHCeEnaxcmx3zs4R6a VEBmc/6w8TQ= =vFSt -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Book on Electronic Commerce
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu" 7-JAN-1996 08:47:56.17 Date: Sat, 6 Jan 1996 12:32:20 -0600 (CST) From: "Andrew B. Whinston" <abw(a)uts.cc.utexas.edu> To: misfaculty(a)moe.cc.utexas.edu Subject: Electronic Commerce Hi: We are pleased to announce the publication of a new book on electronic commerce titled: FRONTIERS of ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (868 pages). The publisher is Addison-Wesley (1-800-822-6339) and the ISBN no. is 0-201-84520-2. For more details -- Preface, Chapter 1, Research issues in Online Banking Syllabus of course using the book, Tranparencies of talks on Electronic Commerce -- see: http://commerce.ssb.rochester.edu/book.html ================== Table of Contents: ================== Frontiers of Electronic Commerce Ravi Kalakota, University of Rochester and Andrew B. Whinston, University of Texas at Austin ISBN: 0-201-84520-2, 868 pp., softcover, 1996. Preface 1 Welcome to Electronic Commerce 1.Electronic Commerce Framework 2.Electronic Commerce and Media Convergence 3.The Anatomy of E-Commerce Applications 4.Electronic Commerce Consumer Applications 5.Electronic Commerce Organization Applications 6.Summary 2 The Network Infrastructure for Electronic Commerce 1.Market Forces Influencing the I-Way 2.Components of the I-Way 3.Network Access Equipment 4.The Last Mile: Local Roads and Access Ramps 5.Global Information Distribution Networks 6.Public Policy Issues Shaping the I-Way 7.Summary 3 The Internet as a Network Infrastructure 1.The Internet Terminology 2.Chronological History of the Internet 3.NSFNET: Architecture and Components 4.National Research and Education Network 5.Globalization of the Academic Internet 6.Internet Governance: The Internet Society 7.An Overview of Internet Applications 8.Summary 4 The Business of Internet Commercialization 1.Telco/Cable/On-Line Companies 2.National Independent ISPs 3.Regional-Level ISPs 4.Local-Level ISPs 5.Service Providers Abroad 6.Service Provider Connectivity: Network Interconnection Points 7.Internet Connectivity Options 8.Logistics of Being an Internet Service Provider 9.Summary 5 Network Security and Firewalls 1.ClientÜServer Network Security 2.Emerging ClientÜServer Security Threats 3.Firewalls and Network Security 4.Data and Message Security 5.Challenge-Response Systems 6.Encrypted Documents and Electronic Mail 7.U.S. Government Regulations and Encryption 8.Summary 6 Electronic Commerce and World Wide Web 1.Architectural Framework for Electronic Commerce 2.World Wide Web (WWW) as the Architecture 3.Web Background: Hypertext Publishing 4.Technology behind the Web 5.Security and the Web 6.Summary 7 Consumer-Oriented Electronic Commerce 1.Consumer-Oriented Applications 2.Mercantile Process Models 3.Mercantile Models from the Consumer's Perspective 4.Mercantile Models from the Merchant's Perspective 5.Summary 8 Electronic Payment Systems 1.Types of Electronic Payment Systems 2.Digital Token-Based Electronic Payment Systems 3.Smart Cards and Electronic Payment Systems 4.Credit Card-Based Electronic Payment Systems 5.Risk and Electronic Payment Systems 6.Designing Electronic Payment Systems 7.Summary 9 Interorganizational Commerce and EDI 1.Electronic Data Interchange 2.EDI Applications in Business 3.EDI: Legal, Security, and Privacy Issues 4.EDI and Electronic Commerce 5.Summary 10 EDI Implementation MIME, and Value-Added Networks 1.Standardization and EDI 2.EDI Software Implementation 3.EDI Envelope for Message Transport 4.Value-Added Networks (VANs) 5.Internet-Based EDI 6.Summary 11 Intraorganizational Electronic Commerce 1.Internal Information Systems 2.Macroforces and Internal Commerce 3.Work-flow Automation and Coordination 4.Customization and Internal Commerce 5.Supply Chain Management (SCM) 6.Summary 12 The Corporate Digital Library 1.Dimensions of Internal Electronic Commerce Systems 2.Making a Business Case for a Document Library 3.Types of Digital Documents 4.Issues behind Document Infrastructure 5.Corporate Data Warehouses 6.Summary 13 Advertising and Marketing on the Internet 1.The New Age of Information-Based Marketing 2.Advertising on the Internet 3.Charting the On-Line Marketing Process 4.Market Research 5.Summary 14 Consumer Search and Resource Discovery 1.Search and Resource Discovery Paradigms 2.Information Search and Retrieval 3.Electronic Commerce Catalogs or Directories 4.Information Filtering 5.Consumer-Data Interface: Emerging Tools 6.Summary 15 On-Demand Education and Digital Copyrights 1.Computer-Based Education and Training 2.Technological Components of Education On-Demand 3.Digital Copyrights and Electronic Commerce 4.Summary 16 Software Agents 1.History of Software Agents 2.Characteristics and Properties of Agents 3.The Technology behind Software Agents 4.Telescript Agent Language 5.Safe-Tcl 6.Applets, Browsers, and Software Agents 7.Software Agents in Action 8.Summary 17 The Internet Protocol Suite 1.Layers and Networking 2.Internet Protocol Suite 3.Desktop TCP/IP: SLIP and PPP 4.Other Forms of IP-Based Networking 5.Mobile TCP/IP-Based Networking 6.Multicast IP 7.Next Generation IP (IPng) 8.Summary 18 Multimedia and Digital Video 1.Key Multimedia Concepts 2.Digital Video and Electronic Commerce 3.Desktop Video Processing 4.Desktop Video Conferencing 5.Summary 19 Broadband Telecommunications 1.Broadband Background Concepts 2.Frame Relay 3.Cell Relay 4.Switched Multimegabit Data Service (SMDS) 5.Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) 6.Summary 20 Mobile and Wireless Computing Fundamentals 1.Mobile Computing Framework 2.Wireless Delivery Technology and Switching Methods 3.Mobile Information Access Devices 4.Mobile Data Internetworking Standards 5.Cellular Data Communications Protocols 6.Mobile Computing Applications 7.Personal Communication Services (PCS) 8.Summary 21 Structured Documents 1.Structured Document Fundamentals 2.Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML) 3.Summary 22 Active/Compound Document Architecture 1.Defining Active Documents 2.Approaches to Active Documents 3.Object Linking and Embedding 4.OpenDoc 5.COBRA: Distributed Objects 6.Summary References Index -- Ravi __________________________________________________________________________ Ravi Kalakota POTS: (716) 275-3102 Fax: (716)273-1140 Xerox Assistant Professor of Information Systems Simon School--University of Rochester Rochester, New York 14627 e-mail: kalakota(a)uhura.cc.rochester.edu __________________________________________________________________________

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Re: Another Internet Provider Censors Access (fwd)
by Tim Cook 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> The reason I bring this up is to point out that the removal of the > alt.* groups does not necessarily mean the people removing those > groups are trying to censor anything, but may just be trying to > reduce the resources eaten by news on their systems and network. > That is a good point Mike. From a smart business perspective though you would want to ask current customers to send a list of the ones they read BEFORE you start dropping them. Tim Cook <twcook(a)cts.com> Linux Expert (wannabe!)

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Re: The LOGIC of Navigator 2.0 ?
by James M. Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Steve, I posted a message, The LOGIC of Navigator 2.0 ?, to the list on 01 08 96. That message quoted a couple of paragraphs from a Bloomberg news agency newsstory. The story is headlined, Netscape Will Release an Updated Internet Browser in Two Weeks. The story's datelined Mountain View CA. Your 01 08 96 followup message characterized my original message as "garbage." You posted your message via Best Internet Communications Inc in Mountain View CA... Whatever the significance of that may be, there's the additional matter that you may not understand the significance of the phrase GOVERNMENT LOGIC which I used in my original message. I hope the following provides you sufficient context-- In 02 96 Internet World, science fiction writer Vernor Vinge is interviewed: Suddenly [about 1984] people realized that if a 100 million people each had computers that were one-tenth of one percent as smart as the government's computers, they had much less to fear about government. Now we've entered an era where the government understands this. On the one hand, police forces are legitimately [?] frightened; law enforcement could become much more difficult. But at the same time --with some new laws and technology-- police powers could be much greater than before.... You've heard of ubiquitous computing, but how about UBIQUITOUS LAW ENFORCEMENT? Developing that line of thought, Vinge says: ...the old Clipper chip proposal recommended that GOVERNMENT LOGIC be present in certain communications equipment. For the future I think this aspect of Clipper was as significant as the crypto issues. What would it be like if a certain amount of GOVERNMENT LOGIC were mandated in the design of every host in a country? And Vinge concludes: WE COULD HAVE REAL-TIME TAXATION. and ...very fine-grain CONTROL would be possible. Capitalization in the above excerpts is mine. The whole interview is worth reading. Its title is: Reality & Fiction. It starts at page 82. Jeff Ubois asked the questions. Every HOST in a country? As Larry Ellison says in 12 26 95 / 01 02 96 Computerworld 41: The ideal operating system arrives across a network when you turn your computer on. The GOVERNMENT LOGIC arrives too... Cordially, Jim INCLOSURE: Date: Mon, 8 Jan 1996 16:03:06 -0800 (PST) From: Steven Weller <stevenw(a)best.com> To: "James M. Cobb" <jcobb(a)ahcbsd1.ovnet.com> Subject: Re: The LOGIC of Navigator 2.0 ? Please refrain from posting such garbage on the cypherpunks mailing list. You are not a friend, you are a pest. On Mon, 8 Jan 1996, James M. Cobb wrote: > > > Friend, > > > 01 07 96 the business news agency Bloomberg reports: > > Netscape Communications Corp. said it will release in two > weeks a new version of its popular browsing software, de- > signed to keep the Internet software company ahead of rival > Microsoft Corp. > ... > > The [new] browser can use programs that are stored on cen- > tral computers on the Internet, making a personal computer's > operating system less important. > > > And thereby making GOVERNMENT LOGIC more important? > > > Cordially, > > Jim > > > > > NOTE: The newsstory's headline? NETSCAPE WILL RELEASE AN > UPDATED INTERNET BROWSER IN TWO WEEKS. Its dateline? > MOUNTAIN VIEW, Calif. (Jan 7, 1996 4:16 p.m. EST). Its > Nando News online filename? biz7_1087.html > > >

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RE: NSA says strong crypto to China?
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Alex Strasheim[ (...)But I don't necessarily look at the NSA as an enemy. Right now we're on opposite sides of an important issue, and I think they're doing a lot of damage. But I tend to think that they believe what they're doing is in the national interest. They're trying to defend democracy -- our democracy, at least. "The" NSA is not a constant, a body which remains the same regardless of the individuals working within it. The character of the agency, I expect, would change with the individuals. The agency is not designed to be dangerous to citizens. But their mileage could vary depending upon the leadership, upon their grasp of its purpose. That's what this list is all about: we're trying to impose certain civil liberties on the world using a strategy that's based on anarchy theory. That theory tells us that if we can distribute tools and establish standards we'll secure privacy and free speech rights regardless of what governments do. That's a very startling idea, and I believe it's sound. I believe that it's possible to impose the first ammendment on the entire world by distributing crypto software. But realize that these software tools and what they make possible (first amendment ideas, anarchy) are not being "imposed" - they're being selected/accepted by the users by a process of conscious individual decision, not by a blanket policy imposition handed down from 'above' (you *will* use crypto, and you *will* like it). I don't think the NSA is out to suppress our liberties. They're trying to protect the nation. Their problem is that they're operating under an old, obsolete paradigm. (.......) But the question is, why are they operating under obsolete paradigms? Why aren't they paying attention to what they are doing, to what is intelligently appropriate, to the philosophical ideals of the nation they're representing? (and therefore who or what are they *really* trying to protect) .. Blanc

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