December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

[NOISE] Re: Netscape announces position against GAK
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 14 Dec 1995 08:20:46, amp <Alan.Pugh(a)internetMCI.COM> writes (in part): >i'm not entirely satisfied with netscape's response, but then, i >didn't expect to be. i _expect_ weasling from corporations that have >made the 'big time'. this is the way life is i suppose. what i'd like >to see would be more companies that have an interest in the security --snip-- >amp ><0003701548(a)mcimail.com> (since 10/31/88) ><alan.pugh(a)internetmci.com> >Current PGP Key = 57957C9D >December 13, 1995 18:51 i cannot fault you too much for not using capitals, since it is a well know fact that network mci charges extra for their use. however, i do believe that your posts might be taken more seriously were they easier to read. maybe it is time to shell out the extra $$ and buy some capital letters. hooker

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ADDRESS DATABASE?
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Something of privacy interest happened to me yesterday. I phoned a company to ask for a copy of their catalog. The phone clerk asked for my last name and zip code. After receiving that info, the clerk asked me, "Is this your full name and address?" and then gave them both correctly. I was taken aback. I have been at my new address for only a couple of months. Prior to that, I have been couch surfing for a year and a half. Though I called an 800 number, ANI had nothing to do with it since I was calling from work. It may have been from a database associated with a credit reporting agency, a bank or a utility company, but I am not aware of any of these being available on-line for something as mundane as requesting a consumer catalog. The clerk had no idea where the info came from (or so he said). Does anyone know how this trick was done? S a n d y P.S. If anyone is interested in helping to make an adult film, drop me a note. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: ADDRESS DATABASE?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:32 PM 12/14/95 -0600, you wrote: >sandfort(a)crl.com said: >> Something of privacy interest happened to me yesterday. I phoned a >> company to ask for a copy of their catalog. The phone clerk asked >> for my last name and zip code. After receiving that info, the clerk >> asked me, "Is this your full name and address?" and then gave them >> both correctly. I was taken aback. > > Taken aback? Its only going to get worse in the future. As Telcos, credit >card companies, etc., start looking for new ways to make money I think >selling information about you will increase dramatically. I'm in the process of moving and getting new phones, and Pac Bell asked me if it was ok to send my Social Security Number to my long-distance carrier. I told them "no, but you don't have my SSN anyway" "Oh, you're right, we don't; can we have it" "No" "OK. Would you be willing to give us your driver's license number or another form of ID? We've just started asking for this recently." "Is it required?" "No, it's optional, but I have to ask" "No, thanks" Sounds like you're right about them getting into the info-selling business. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281

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Re: Timing Cryptanalysis Attack
by hoz＠univel.telescan.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:42 PM 12/14/95 +0100, Lars Johansson wrote: >>Does the attack work for existing smartcards? >At first glance, smart cards would seem to be the most critical target >to Kocher's timing attack since they usually operate in on-line >environments. Not just on-line, they also operate in untrusted (hostile?) environments. >...the terminal could get a (noisy) measure of the time by > repeatingly use this command to see when the result is available. Might a terminal also be able to monitor power consumption or electromagnetic emissions to obtain a more precise time estimate? >Most smart cards does nevertheless require that the user must first >specify a PIN code before the RSA algorithms are operationable. If I used my RSA card every day, (at a toll booth, for instance), and the "bad guys" pilfered an "exact" timing upon each use, how long before they could forge a signature? >This implies that even if the card gets stolen can't it be attacked >with Kocher's method. That is useful, but if I know my card is stolen, I can presumably limit my liability by reporting it. If I still have my card, but my secret key is stolen, then damage might be greater. On another note, timing attacks would not seem to work against most DES implementations, hardware or software. The time to execute each round does not seem to depend on the plaintext or the key. It could be made to, of course, but unless I'm missing something, the "natural" way to code it, or to construct hardware for it, is not time dependent. Rick F. Hoselton (who doesn't claim to present opinions for others)

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Re: Jim Quinn interview of James Norman
by Ed Carp (ecarp＠netcom.com) 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Wed, 13 Dec 1995 09:49:56 -0800 > From: Martin Janzen <janzen(a)idacom.hp.com> > To: ecarp(a)netcom.com > Subject: Re: Jim Quinn interview of James Norman > > This is the third time you've cross-posted this long and completely > irrelevant message to Cypherpunks. Please stop it! No, sorry, I only ACCIDENTALLY cross-posted it *ONCE*. Any other posts you are seeing are NOT MY DOING.

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Potential defense against timing attack on Diffie-Hellman
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The timing attack on Diffie-Hellman depends on assumptions about what multiplications are being made, and in what order. But you don't need to do them in order. The standard approach to calculating Y**x mod m is to calculate Y[1] = Y, Y[2] = Y**2, Y[3] = Y**4, .... Y[logx] = Y**(logx), and while you're doing this keep a running total r[i], where r[i] = (bit[x,i]) ? (r[i-1]*Y[i]) : r[i-1] all arithmetic modulo m (and all indices possibly off by one :-) This may be a bit memory-intensive for a smartcard, but there's no need to calculate these partial products in order; precompute the Y[i], pick a random permutation of 1..(logx), and compute the partial products in that order. This still leaks the number of 0 and 1 bits in x, but it doesn't say what they are. You probably still should multiply r[i-1]*Y[i] whether you're going to need it or not; I don't think the method hides enough information otherwise, but that needs more analysis. Cost - mostly administrative, plus the memory, since keeping track of permutations of small integers is cheap relative to bignum multiplication and modulo calculations. You also need a random number generator of some sort; LFSRs seem to be an easy way to do permutations on the fly, so seed them with something decent. How effective is it? I'm not sure - I'd need to do a lot more analysis than I've done so far, and the long version of Paul's paper would help :-) But at first glance it looks like it makes it much harder; no two calculations are in the same order, so feeding the system related Y = g**y mod m each time doesn't tell you much. As a further annoyance to the listener, split the permutation at random into two or three pieces, compute their products separately, and then multiply those partial products together. (Don't try this at home without analyzing whether it may leak more information than it conceals...) At very minimum, take two numbers you've got lying around and multiply them every once in a while :-) #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281

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Re: ADDRESS DATABASE?
by John Pettitt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:32 PM 12/14/95 -0600, turner(a)TeleCheck.com wrote: > >Just think, with new and improved "interactive TV" you will be able to >get commercials tailored to your purchasing habits (A doctor would get >an commercial for an expensive car, while Joe Sixpacks would get the Ford >Fiestiva). > > I'm doing it now - software.net serves distinct ads to Mac, Windows, Text and Unix based browsers. On the name database side the PO runs somthing called National Change of Address which tracks who moved where and allows direct marketing companys to clean their lists. Almost everybody sells address change data (utilities, the PO, credit companys) - I'm getting tons of "welcome to the neighbourhood" mail since I moved. John Pettitt jpp(a)software.net "why not, and who said so?"

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Re: e-mail forwarding, for-pay remailers
by John Pettitt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rich Graves wrote: [ about AOL ] > >They didn't check it very thoroughly last week. I think they just do some >kind of checksum or maybe an assigned-numbers list lookup; it's too fast >to be anything else. It takes 6 seconds to to pre approve a card for $1 and do an AVS (Address Verification). If you don't have a dedicated line to your accepting bank it takes ~25 secods with the dial up. Well within the time it take AOL to validate an account. John Pettitt, jpp(a)software.net VP Engineering, CyberSource Corporation, 415 473 3065 Favorite quote: "Security is mostly a superstition. It does not exist in nature, nor do the children of man as a whole experience it. Avoiding danger is no safer in the long run than outright exposure. Life is either a daring adventure, or nothing." - Helen Keller

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Re: ADDRESS DATABASE?
by Lynne L. Harrison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The best way to circumvent something like the below occurring is to have your home phone number listed under a pseudonym with no street address listed - and block out *69 and caller-id. If some entity wants your phone number, give them your business number. >>Something of privacy interest happened to me yesterday. I phoned >>a company to ask for a copy of their catalog. The phone clerk >>asked for my last name and zip code. After receiving that info, >>the clerk asked me, "Is this your full name and address?" and >>then gave them both correctly. I was taken aback. >>Does anyone know how this trick was done? > > What trick? For ~$150, you can buy a CD-ROM-set DB with every listed >>phone number in the U.S. on it, faxes too; > ******************************************************* Lynne L. Harrison, Esq. | "The key to life: Poughkeepsie, New York | - Get up; E-mail: | - Survive; lharrison(a)mhv.net | - Go to bed." *******************************************************

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Re: e-mail forwarding, for-pay remailers
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"gbroiles(a)darkwing.uoregon.edu" "Greg Broiles" 13-DEC-1995 03:40:50.49 >I don't have much faith that the people who are currently doing the DNS for my domain name (goldenbear.com) are going to do anything about the current bouncing-messages phenomenon anytime soon, so I'm looking into other ways to get & send E-mail (e.g., more persistent than this address which will disappear when I'm done with school in ~ 6 months). I've found a few services which may be of interest to C-punks because they're useful for creating/maintaining persistent cyberspace identities with no necessary connection to a "real name". [...] netbox.com ( http://www.netbox.com ) provides web pages and E-mail storage or forwarding for people; they let you sign up for a trial month for free. They ask for name/address/phone (which could easily be a Mailboxes Etc address and a voicemail from Mailboxes Etc or whatever) and accept payment by check or credit card. They'll store incoming email or forward it to another account. They'll do header rewriting (similar to the anonymous remailers) so that outgoing mail looks like it came from this address. -------------------- There's one problem with this in regards to the "no necessary connection," and that 's the governmental requirement for mail forwarding. MBE and any legal other one will want to see at least two forms of ID including one photo, and have a form that they fill out using that and send to the local post office. Anyone have a way around this problem? -Allen

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