December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

DCI_kgb
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The 12-20-95 WPost reports the Deutch/Perry move to kremlinize finance of the 13 spy agencies under the DCI -- to transform the "vaguely associated medieval guilds into a modern corporate team" -- and palmly slather $29 billion IC grease: National Forward Intelligence Program (CIA, NSA, DIA, NRO, parts of three G2s, DOE and FBI): $16bn. Tactical and Related Activities (warfighting support): $10bn. Joint Military Intelligence (cryptology, aerial recon, counter-narc and mapping): "Several billion." DCI_kgb (6 kgb)

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No subject
by an170150＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, excuse me for interrupting your conversation with a different subject, but I am not on the list (any longer, due to the bandwidth) so please reply "directly" to me at an170150(a)anon.penet.fi ...my question is: Are there any other anon servers running the same software as the one @alpha.c2.org? --****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--***ATTENTION*** Your e-mail reply to this message WILL be *automatically* ANONYMIZED. Please, report inappropriate use to abuse(a)anon.penet.fi For information (incl. non-anon reply) write to help(a)anon.penet.fi If you have any problems, address them to admin(a)anon.penet.fi

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Please cut the "tude"!
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The "tude" level is getting a bit out of hand. Please take your personal attacks elsewhere. Moderator, please beat them silly with a banana until they stop! Thanks! Ern

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Surprise telecommunications bill?
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

While watching the national news (NBC, I think) they mentioned that there had been a "surprising agreement on a telecommunications bill". From the sparse description, it sounded pretty nasty. Does anyone have any additional information on this? | Remember: Life is not always champagne. Sometimes it is REAL pain. | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmerman unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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Re: 900mhz digital phones - how much to trust ?
by andr0id＠midwest.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >Whats the current thinking on the security level of 900Mhz digital spread >sectrum cordless phones? Clearly it's not a basic scanner job but how much >more equipment is needed to monitor one ? Well when you listen into a spread spectrum conversation what you will hear is open squelch white noise. The spread spectrum radios that I know about send information on several deffrent frequencies throughout the conversation. Unless you have a system to receive the encoding bit that signal what frequency is next you can't easily find the next freqency before it changes again. This change happens several time a second. The information is "packet-like", that is why you are able to use so many spread spectrum units at once. Example, Lynx spread spectrum T1 information signal (data) is combined with a high rate spreading code (chip sequence). A multiplier performs the combination. Because the spreading code is pseudo-randomly generated, the combined signal occupies a significantly expanded bandwidth with a lower uniform power density. At the receiver, a locally generated, synchronized replica of the spreading code recovers the information signal, through a second multiplication. The same code sequence must be used in the transmitter and receiver to avoic losing the information. The coding is direct sequence, 16 x spreading rate, the number of codes is a 9 DIP switch selectable. Intresting is taht the radio acquisition time is 500 msec, typical. If this a security hole I don't know. Note this is typical of a Spread Spectrum Microwave radio, a lot of the same applies to 900MHz T1 and cordless phones. As soon as I have further info on encryption of signal/Freq. destination I'll post it. Dr0id ( Computer Consulting & Management ) (P.O. Box 421 Cambria, IL 62915-0421) -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQENAzCsIi4AAAEH/1hb5+tO/n99Nbppf0ImLJ6AaVZ3NlZP0ZHwRQor00uA129i d4zWixNXxc8t2auaqN+asV99LpIip3/nQzBnjydiumeBdGLF2PR9+6X8X/RrqKa1 dVIukxM5Agg2eM6ih+0J38hgKJ3qzKXSz6sjYmpaxvbXZoHHOLUk/ZtHUKvvEyPw hnJEYnut8NUnIeK56lqeqRw86yoeRKymbfCdjdpgeY2aRwK2FJts8sbb7Fs10s4y jgxWIxIipBznbGUTh1hb2XrLGPENwk3E/qqXQJEsrySbtwdl6VgTVQjhDDEJMitL DYeiQ3W5EgxfcdbM1j2FwYu3P/dM6Y0I8xLMYT0ABRG0NmFuZHIwaWRAb2ljdTgx Mi5jb20gKG9pY3U4MTIuY29tIHN5c3RlbSBhZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yKYkBFQMFEDCs LO90C7R/GkJcSQEB01cH/0KC3sd+u4OxMku5378SJktoN6QIQYLJ7uVbuV4S51yK NAotCGf4Wl6wwjynzZvXKU0H87oDuMiq7FybgMNL2n+4bQIZi0iz0lIuzwoMDu63 NrHUW9Kz42pOnhrEhrdkHhHL9O5GgD1yc40fJ3qw5h7LQEjDxgypyw0IFILFc34u LeRLliNibxKp8JwAxXNHWSgxu28TQvmnkHi0AHP6tJ/uZYe+4dqJtrMMsYFjzZaz DPmxD+dzbTwlQKtJaP1ZkDI0Sr072wrZDv+G86GyGBMX2lpSafpRitnxuUttjU9o wsQ9Qo5xiH1nZRCs/bDzJe/gng+GHzevixDIITurtNA= =SgPT -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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NTT & electronic "cash"
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This qualifies as one of the most uninformative news items I've seen from Reuters. Anyone know any substantive info on their process? -Allen --------------------- Reuters New Media _ Wednesday December 20 2:04 PM EST _ NTT Says Develops Secure Electronic Cash System TOKYO- Nippon Telegraph and Telephone said today that it has developed a secure electronic cash system which can be used for settling transactions on the Internet and in daily life using smart cards. "The system has very secure algorithms, and that makes fraudulent uses of the system very difficult," NTT researcher Mikio Suzuki told Reuters.

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Ruby Block Cipher
by Michael Paul Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Ruby Block Cipher has just been published. It is not a general block cipher in that it cannot be used in Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode. It is more like a cryptographic hash function with a block size of only 64 bits. Of course, 64 bits is too short for a cryptographic hash function intended for digital signature use, but it is just fine for a quick block cipher. This may be a good reference for those folks who want a quick & easy encryption algorithm that need not withstand nuclear attack but can provide something better than common weak encryption methods in use in the software industry. Your comments and suggestions on this rather strange little cipher are welcome. Information on the Ruby Block Cipher is available as ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/ruby_m4.ps and, if you are in the USA or Canada, a reference implementation is in ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/mpj/rubycode.zip where the ??????? is revealed in ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README rubycode.zip is also available on the Colorado Catacombs BBS at 303-772-1062. Note: this is not a product for sale (it is free and probably worth at least as much as you pay for it). It is also not a prepublication (it is THE publication in electronic form with no paper publication anticpated in the near future). ___________________________________________________________ | | |\ /| | | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-772-1062 | | \/ |o| | PO Box 1151, Longmont CO 80502-1151 USA Jesus is alive! | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.net aka mpj(a)netcom.com m.p.johnson(a)ieee.org | | |||/ /_\ | ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ CIS: 71331,2332 | | |||\ ( | http://www.csn.net/~mpj -. --- ----- .... | | ||| \ \_/ | PGPprint=F2 5E A1 C1 A6 CF EF 71 12 1F 91 92 6A ED AE A9 | |___________________________________________________________| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7.1 iQCVAgUBMNiaP/X0zg8FAL9FAQHe0AP+N+tBxoaIdny3CEgxdA8LO9+5VyYiOety qYBc9aCrCbw4TpsFTcsg5bosPlkm3H+VwpWVGOshfl5p69J893jrma07xRamEvM0 /1Mro3X/Ga4SQ7rjHPSdPCBR3YxSA7UoIx27gldTBty2k8WAAeH0BTbn/5s1bGrf ej9ab/rd7Jc= =QRjc -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- P. S. -- I don't normally read this list, so please send a copy of follow-ups directly to me. Thanks!

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KGB_cia
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-21-95. WPutz: "In an unusual interview Yevgeny Primakov, head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, discussed problems and challenges facing his intelligence agency in terms that often sounded like testimony that CIA Director John M. Deutch gave the House intelligence committee Tuesday. In comments that echoed those of his U.S. counterparts, Primakov charged that some post-Cold War budget cuts in his agency developed 'because the [Russian] press ganged up on us [and] many newspapers wrote absurd things about us, including statements that foreign intelligence was no longer necessary at all.' His remarks about media coverage were similar to recent statements by Deutch and his predecessors, R. James Woolsey and Robert M. Gates." KGB_cia (5 cia)

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Alta Vista caches queries
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Here's one more reason to worry about the implications of web search engines: I just stopped in on Digital's new Alta Vista page, and was surprised to find that the query field was filled in--with a search I ran 3 or 4 days ago. I doublechecked my end pretty thoroughly (scrubbing all the files that Netscape 2.0b3 [Mac] generates--caches, global history, etc., and eventually reinstaling Netscape from scratch). And it look an awful lot like Alta Vista cached by query according to my IP address. Maybe dynamically assigned IPs ain't such a bad idea after all... Hieronymous -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMNoVRb3g0mNE55u1AQEWxAIAiknajMTLiPzKxl4Wz3hoJsE4ntsXQJiV zNoz9LAW16+7+oFKKPwcjQCTi7heMstT9dP0GjCHmYuCl2cFcmQRbQ== =HQ12 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: What ever happened to... Cray Comp/NSA co-development
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- First, thanks for the obvious 'kind' thoughts Tim... It's heartening that you took the time to add some substantial info to the thread. However... > On 12/18/95 At 12:36 AM -0500, Timothy C. May wrote: > >What caught my attention was the architecture. > > > >A "hybrid design linking two supercomputer processors with an > >array of HALF A MILLION inexpensive processors" that were > >designed by the U.S. government laboratory affiliated with the > >NSA. The same chip house that brought us Clipper. > First, half a million chips is not that big a deal...the Connection Machine > had up to 64,000. Very few cryptographic problems of interest to us will be > affected by a mere factor of a million or so. O.K. Just a factor of 16 increase over the CM architecture right? Not knowing the computational capabilities of the individual processors, it might be difficult to say what the machine is capable of. Wouldn't that have some bearing? > Second, there was work on a "processor-in-memory" architecture, in > conjunction with a Bowie, Maryland spook-connected company. Perhaps this is > what you are thinking of? I didn't mention a 'processor-in-memory' architecture and neither did the NYT article. Don't know about any other company involvement, just CCC and NSA. > Third, all avenues of continued funding having fallen through, Cray > Computer (not Cray Research, of course) was shut down and assets > liquidated. I haven't heard what's become of Seymour, though. (He is > undoubtedly an asset, buy I doubt the Agency would have him liquidated.) You mean the avenues that are of PUBLIC record. The possibility could always exist that the development continues 'in-house'. It wouldn't be the first time that sort of move has been played. > >I've not kept up with the "ultimate" demise that eventually > >befell Cray Computer Company, but the October 16 FBI filing > >on capacity for Digital Telephony got me thinking back to this > >article. 1% seems like a rather huge need for horsepower. And > >what if GAK doesn't fly? And the widespread use of hard crypto > >just keeps increasing? > The tightly-coupled supercomputers are hardly needed for these sorts of > problems. You mean the problem of data collection? Well, it's true that this would be a misuse of a supercomputer's specialized talents. > >This kind of machine could, in theory: > > > >1) Implement ALL Clipper(II) based Key Escrow functionality in > > silicon (the easy part) AND allow for simultaneous decrypt and > > surveil of 'who knows how many' Clipper based data streams. > Huh? First, what evidence do you have for this claim? Second, who cares? > Implementing Clipper in a Cray Computer machine--why bother? [Rant mode on] Speculation Tim... I'm SPECULATING. Could, in theory... AND my kind of theory probably has holes you could drive a FLEET of Mack trucks through. I have NO evidence. I'm not sure WHO would care. I'M A PARANOID DILLUSIONAL PSYCHOPATH! O.K. well maybe not that last part... but I'm asking the questions, remember? I said I'm new here, so if your going to blow holes in my pet theories, then do me the 'kindness' of using an accurate weapon... that's why I posted... > As to the claim that a million-processor machine could do this, you need to > work out the math. (If a backdoor exists, or the LEAF has been gotten, a > supercomputer is not needed....) Again... I claimed NOTHING! SPECULATED MUCH! Now it's your turn... Why would YOU build a machine like this? What could POSSIBLY be it's capabilities? Speculate with me for a moment... *_take a chance_*. > >2) Implement general RSA based Prime Factoring functionality in > > silicon (the not so easy part) AND allow massively parallel > > decrypt and surveil of 'who knows how many' RSA/etc. based > > data streams. > Prime Factoring? Primes are easy to factor, of course. (Hint: Every prime > has two factors.) Yes, my terminology sucks! But you get the drift don't you? Math is not a strength of mine, I only know in very general terms what is involved (why, then, am I even bothering to bring this up?). Because I AM however, VERY concerned in the continual erosion of privacy rights in all forms communications, electronic and otherwise. [Rant mode off] > If you mean using supercomputers to brute force the general factoring of an > RSA modulus, this is nonsense. While there may be math shortcuts we don't > yet publically know about which make factoring easier than we currently > think it is, a mere million or even a billion processors will not make a > dent in the factoring of, say, a 700-digit modulus. See the tables in > Schneier and elsewhere for some estimates of factoring efforts needed. Nonsense? Is that 700 decimal digits or 700 binary digits? I don't have the tables that you refer to. Where may I find them? (LOL) > >3) Implement it all, AND 'on-line' transaction based surveillance > > via the FBI's 1% capacity infrastructure. > Let's see some numbers. (On second thought, let's not.) No, I've already said that math is not a strength I possess. I've wondered about the ability of the FBI to count on ten fingers and ten toes given some of the justification that I've read for this capacity figure... > >Chilling... Who needs key escrow (or RSA private keys) when > >you've got a massively parallel prime factoring machine. What if > >GAK was to become a 'non-issue'? How fast do you think a machine > >such as this could factor RSA 129? > Well, do the math. The MIPS-years for the RSA-129 crack were publicized, so > the computation for a million SPARC-equivalent (or even > UltraSPARC-equivalent) can be done. Sorry... I asked the question... and your speculation is (I would hope) MUCH more accurate than mine. Again, math is not a strength of mine. > When you've done this, and concluded that RSA-129 could be done in, say, X > minutes, then move on to RSA-384 (the BlackNet key cracked by the MIT > group), and on to the 1024- and 2048-bit keys. Tell us how many years or > centuries it will take. (Hint: Rivest and Schneier have done these > calculations....) Yes, I believe that I've read Rivest's paper on the statistical probabilities. I've never really believed in statistics, AND I'm sure you don't have the time to convince me Tim (I'm sorry if I've been less than reverencial about this, but I'm from Illinois which is right next door to Missouri). > --Tim May, who fears that he's just been trolled by Derek Atkins No Tim, you have not... but on another note... > It'll be _many_ years before a 384-decimal-digit number is factored, I > suspect. Let alone a 600-digit modulus, with or without the mysterious > "transphaser" technology mentioned by Anitro. The "transphaser" is an optical equivalent to the transistor. It is a quantum threshold optical switch, but it is not a 'mystery'. You should read Scientific American more often ;> O.K. I'm done with this line of discussion, you may however, continue to elaborate as I will, no doubt, continue to read... Anitro "I have a little shadow that goes in and out with me, And what can be the use of him is more than I can see" R. L. Stevenson - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMNiv8SoZzwIn1bdtAQHyewF+OXlM8KueHrCynKGhjqXy8eHLSonn12Df vcAdDoaajoi5t7CfY9lP/+FNeO2JKE+v =SIKC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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