December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

No Subject
by nobody＠flame.alias.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Two years ago, I pointed out that getting a single message past > the man in the middle isn't good enough; you have to convince your > readers that the key they received on one channel is more accurate > than the key they're receiving on all the other channels. > But if they'll believe that, they may also believe the man in the middle's > announcement that the key in your name on all the keyservers is > wrong, and the correct key is the one he's putting out. > Can't win either way, but it's still important to get the key out. > > My current key is 0x54696D4D; the fingerprint is > 4D 65 44 75 53 61 21 2F 41 73 55 64 85 6D 21 7F. but this is not Tim May's key, his key is: pub 1024/54E7483F 1992/11/20 Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)netcom.com> 11-20-92 Key fingerprint = 8C 79 1C 1B 6F 32 A1 D1 65 FB 5F 57 50 6D D3 28 And this one is signed by these people: pub 1024/54E7483F 1992/11/20 Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)netcom.com> 11-20-92 sig 0022E52D Eric Hughes <hughes(a)soda.berkeley.edu> sig DDBE0DD5 John T. Draper <crunch(a)netcom.com> sig 8F898631 Scott Collins (512) <Scott_Collins(a)genmagic.com> sig E972F011 E. Dean Tribble <tribble(a)xanadu.com> sig 4C131F57 Tim Oren <oren(a)apple.com> sig F5257117 <tomj(a)wps.com> sig 85197FB5 John Gilmore <gnu(a)cygnus.com> at level two in the web of trust are these people: pub 512/F5257117 1992/09/28 <tomj(a)wps.com> sig B1331439 Randy Bush <randy(a)psg.com> Tom Jennings <tomj(a)fido.wps.com> sig DA0EDC81 Phil Karn <karn(a)unix.ka9q.ampr.org> sig F572C6A7 Jim Cannell <Jim.Cannell(a)f21.n216.z1.fidonet.org> sig 0BD91A2D Phil Karn <karn(a)unix.ka9q.ampr.org> sig F5257117 <tomj(a)wps.com> Tom Jennings <tomj(a)fidosw.fidonet.org, 1:125/111> sig ADF733A9 Jesse David Hollington <1:225/1.1@fidonet.org> sig 4D077463 Steve Matzura <steve.matzura(a)f203.n2603.z1.fidonet.org> sig E7F23D95 Mike Laster <1:170/300.23@fidonet> sig DB910037 Barry Kapke <96:101/33@dharma> sig 5B77854F Depository #1 [Public Keys] sig 08F811DD Marcos R. Della <mdella(a)polyslo.calpoly.edu> sig 212EC54B Guy Martin 1:143/269 (guy.martin(a)f269.n143.z1.fidonet.org) sig F572C6A7 Jim Cannell <Jim.Cannell(a)f21.n216.z1.fidonet.org> sig BDFB1F2D George Gleason <gg(a)well.sf.ca.us> sig DDBE0DD5 John T. Draper <crunch(a)netcom.com> sig 8F898631 Scott Collins (512) <Scott_Collins(a)genmagic.com> sig 0022E52D Eric Hughes <hughes(a)soda.berkeley.edu> sig E972F011 E. Dean Tribble <tribble(a)xanadu.com> sig 4C131F57 Tim Oren <oren(a)apple.com> sig 85197FB5 John Gilmore <gnu(a)cygnus.com> sig DA27EC35 Wes Perkhiser <wes.perkhiser(a)weise.omahug.org> sig E7960501 Paul Schencke <1:135/340@fidonet.org> sig 9DB252DF Mike Riddle sig 734B9A59 Christopher Baker <1:374/14@fidonet.org> sig B1B6B823 GK Pace @ 1:374/26 <gk.pace(a)f26.n374.z1.fidonet.o pub 1024/85197FB5 1992/11/08 John Gilmore <gnu(a)cygnus.com> sig 5ACB1C6D (Unknown signator, can't be checked) sig 15100C27 (Unknown signator, can't be checked) sig DA0EDC81 Phil Karn <karn(a)unix.ka9q.ampr.org> sig 0BD91A2D Phil Karn <karn(a)unix.ka9q.ampr.org> sig 9F9F38BB Mark Eichin <eichin(a)athena.mit.edu> sig 5B415621 Mark Eichin <eichin(a)paycheck.cygnus.com> sig 66CE89B7 Mark Eichin <eichin(a)cygnus.com> sig 0022E52D Eric Hughes <hughes(a)soda.berkeley.edu> sig BDFB1F2D George Gleason <gg(a)well.sf.ca.us> sig DDBE0DD5 John T. Draper <crunch(a)netcom.com> sig 8F898631 Scott Collins (512) <Scott_Collins(a)genmagic.com> sig 0245C435 Dave Krieger <dkrieger(a)netcom.com> sig 4C131F57 Tim Oren <oren(a)apple.com> sig E972F011 E. Dean Tribble <tribble(a)xanadu.com> sig F5257117 <tomj(a)wps.com> sig 71946BDF Phil Karn <karn(a)qualcomm.com> If you knew any of the level 1, or level 2 signatories personally and had exchanged keys face to face, you'd have some assurance. Also this level 3: pub 1024/DA0EDC81 1994/07/25 Phil Karn <karn(a)unix.ka9q.ampr.org> sig ED2354B9 Ulla Sandberg <ulla(a)stupi.se> sig 9C57B951 Peter Lothberg <roll(a)stupi.se> sig C7A966DD Philip R. Zimmermann <prz(a)acm.org> PRZ, as your PGP distrbution is probably signed by this key, unless you've inspected the source personally, you're relying on this key anyway. Level 4 would be a big web as lots of people fan out from PRZ.

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Re: PKP Lawsuit progress report
by patrick＠Verity.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Roger Schlafly sez -=*|| \/ > > (3) There will be a hearing on the patent validity (and a couple of > annoying technical legal issues) at 10:00 am, Dec. 6, 1995, in the > court of Judge Spencer Williams, Federal Bldg, 280 S. First St, > San Jose CA 95113. The US court clerk is at 408-291-7783. It is > open to the public. Thanks for letting us know. I'll be there unless they chain me to my desk at work;) Patrick _______________________________________________________________________ / These opinions are mine, and not Verity's (except by coincidence;). \ | (\ | | Patrick J. Horgan Verity Inc. \\ Have | | patrick(a)verity.com 1550 Plymouth Street \\ _ Sword | | Phone : (415)960-7600 Mountain View \\/ Will | | FAX : (415)960-7750 California 94303 _/\\ Travel | \___________________________________________________________\)__________/

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Re: Man in the Middle Revisited (but not for the last time)
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:38 AM 10/11/95 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >Nope. au contraire, negatory. I *do not* care if the entity calling itself >"Hal Finney" is being surrounded by an MITM. Only "Hal Finney the Key" can >read messages I encrypt to the public key I got from him long ago, so if >the "Hal + MITM" can do so, they are effectively one and the same. Not a new problem BTW as in the old joke: "The Iliad wasn't written by Homer but by another guy of the same name." For the non-classically inclined, this is a joke because we don't really know anything about Homer anyway. Maybe he was a blind poet. Maybe he never existed. DCF "Who wonders why his local B&N StuporStore has 1/2 of one section of one shelf unit dedicated to classics and shelf unit upon shelf unit dedicated to the gender-disabled, to women, to native americans, to new age mysticism, and other garbage. Particularly since those interest areas represent the losers. Who's interested in losers? (We know they're losers BTW because we're *reading* about them in a capitalist store. If they'd won there'd be no reading and no store."

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Re: Netscape & Fortessa
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:12 10/11/95, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >I wasn't aware of that -- I believe that this may have happened >because those of us who cared didn't attend the zoo in Stockholm. The >meeting was a complete joke, with the Microsoft people and others >making it clear that they didn't intend to follow the process. Many of >us who cared decided to do better things with our time instead of >showing up in the aptly named Weapons room for the second session. Unfortunately, I wasn't in Stockholm. I just follow the discussion on the mailing list. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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[Noise] FWD:Want to trade UNIX skills for Laissez Faire Books?
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Given the large number of non-statists on this list, here is a brief forward FYI: >-------------------------------------- >Date: 10/11/95 0:34 >From: libernet-d(a)Dartmouth.EDU > >I'm looking for someone to help me with the technical aspects of Laissez >Faire Books' Internet presence. I need someone who has knowledge of unix >systems and can modify perl scripts... and has the *time* to do a little >work on our new Web site. Hopefully this would be the start of an on-going >relationship. > >Most importantly, I'm looking for an enthusiastic libertarian who doesn't >mind being paid with book credit and a kind "thank you" instead of cash. :-) > >Know anyone who might be interested? > >Thanks, > >Chris > >----------------------------------------------------------------------- >Chris Whitten Chris(a)Free-Market.com Ask me about... -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: Internet, the cracking machine
by goldberg＠mars.superlink.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wei Dai writes: >factor RSA keys of bit >512: 20 minutes >768: 50 days >1024: 100 years >2048: 1e11 years > >If you are reading this from an archive, divide the brute force numbers by >4**(your current year-1995), and the factoring numbers by 8**(your current >year-1995), for a factor of 2 improvement per year in each of the >following: average CPU power, number of computers on the Internet, and >factoring algorithm. BUT, one must remember that the power of 2 increase is going on during the 100 years effort to break the 1024 bit case, so, by these assumptions, the 1024 bit key will break sometime in the 6th year! Fred G. Jon Goldberg

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Re: NYT on Internet Flaws
by David Berger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just read through the stack of news this was based on (comp.security.e At 05:39 AM 10/11/95 -0400, John Young wrote: > The New York Times, October 11, 1995, pp. A1, D3. > > [Page One] > > Discovery of lnternet Flaws Is Setback for On-Line Trade > > By John Markoff > > > San Francisco, Oct. 10 -- Newly publicized weaknesses in > the basic structure of the Internet indicate that the > worldwide computer network may need a time-consuming > redesign before it can be safely used as a commercial > medium. > > The flaws could allow an eavesdropper or criminal to divert > many types of documents or software programs traveling over > the Internet, examine or copy or alter them, and then pass > them on to the intended recipient -- who would have no easy > way of knowing that the files had been waylaid. Not only > could electronic mail be read in transit or credit card > numbers be copied en route, but special security techniques > meant to protect such transactions could be dismantled > without the user's knowledge. > > That such security flaws exist is not surprising in a > system designed originally as a scientific experiment. But > the recent rush to the Internet by companies seeking to > exploit its commercial possibilities has obscured the fact > that giving the system a new purpose has unearthed > fundamental problems that could well put off true > commercial viability for years. > > "Companies would have you believe this is a trivial > problem," said Eric Brewer, a professor of computer science > at the University of California at Berkeley. "But now there > is a financiat incentive to exploit these flaws and to do > it secretly." > > The problems were described in a posting that researchers > at the university made on Monday to several on-line > discussion groups. While the discussion groups are intended > for computer security experts, they are potentially > accessible to millions of Internet users -- including > break-in artists, who are known to monitor such discussion > groups for tips on new ways to crack computer systems. > > The researchers who described the Internet weaknesses > include two Berkeley computer science graduate students who > noted a security weakness in a popular Netscape > Communications Corporation software program last month. > Then as now, the students' stated motivation in publicizing > the problems was to underscore vulnerabilities facing all > companies and customers wishing to use the Internet for > commerce. > > When the Netscape problems were disclosed last month, the > company said the security flaws would be corrected in the > next version of its software, which users would be able to > download at no charge from Netscape's Internet site. But > the newly publicized flaws in the Internet itself indicate > that even if a user downloaded a copy of the new, improved > Netscape program, a criminal could tamper with the copy > along the way and make it unsafe for use in credit card > transactions. > > The problem is not Netscape's alone; it potentially affects > any organization that operates a computer from which files > or software could be downloaded over the Internet. The > weakness can be traced to the technical underpinnings of > the network, which was set up more than a quarter-century > ago not as a medium for conducting business but as a way > for academic and scientific researchers to exchange > information. > > The disclosure of the flaws casts doubt on the aspirations > of companies like Netscape, which last summer had one of > the most successful stock offerings in Wall Street history > based on the promise of the impending arrival of a > full-fledged on-line marketplace. > > "Companies should take a step back and think about this a > little more," said Ian Goldberg, one of the Berkeley > students. "If it takes a bit longer but comes out more > secure, we will all be better off in the long run." > > The way many Internet systems are set up -- especially the > Internet's increasingly popular World Wide Web service in > which software images and even video and audio clips can be > easily downloaded -- information is stored on a computer > called a file server and then transferred to a user's > computer when it is needed. > > The newly publicized weakness occurs in a widely used > Internet protocol -- or technical standard -- known as the > Network File System, or NFS. Because NFS does not have any > means for allowing the recipient of a program or document > to verify that it has not been altered during transmission > from the file server to the user, any interception or > tampering would go undetected. > > "The Internet protocols have been insecure since day one," > said Jeffrey I. Schiller, the manager of computer networks > at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and director > of an industry task force that is trying to design a new > secure version of the Internet. > > But the group's timetable is uncertain, and even when it > does have recommendations ready, Mr. Schiller is not > optimistic that the industry will be willing to devote the > time and money to put them into effect. > > He said that many technologies already exist for improving > commercial security on the Internet, but many of them > require too much technical sophistication on the part of > computer users. He criticized makers of hardware and > software for not moving more quickly to make easy-to-use > security features a built-in part of the technology used on > the Internet. > > "The people who should be the leaders in offering security > have been too busy counting their money to build these > features in to their products," Mr. Schiller said. > > Some commercial Internet merchants have tended to play down > the potential for harm from an illegal interception of > credit card information over the Internet. They point out > that consumers routinely make their credit card numbers > available in transactions done by mail or telephone and > that the law puts limits on a consumer's liability in cases > of credit card fraud. > > But Mr. Brewer, the Berkeley professor, said that the > crucial difference in the proposed Internet commerce > systems was that for the first time it would be relatively > simple for a criminal to collect hundreds or thousands of > credit card numbers. Then a thief could use each credit > card only one time, making detection much more difficult. > > Sensitive to heightened concerns about security, Wells > Fargo, the large California bank, which earlier this year > began permitting customers with personal computers to view > their account information with the Netscape software, > suspended the service in September after the Berkeley > students reported the flaw in Netscape. > > After Netscape followed with an improved version of its > software, Wells Fargo officials found it secure enough that > they planned to resume the service later this week. The > bank will, however, require customers to use the corrected > version of the Netscape program. > > Even then. Wells Fargo customers will be able only to view > account balances and other information, but not transfer > money or conduct other transactions of the type that might > leave them vulnerable to the Internet NFS weakness. > > "We still hope to be able to offer transactional > capabilities next year, but this has slowed us down a > little bit," said Lorna Doubet, a Wells Fargo spokeswoman. > "Many of our customers feel that security is absolutely > essential and we have to be cautious in this regard." > > Executives at Netscape said yesterday that they were aware > of the security issues surrounding NFS and would make > changes in the next release of their software expected > before the end of the year to permit a recipient of a > downloaded program to check it for signs of tampering. > > And hoping to take advantage of the fault-finding talents > of the Berkeley researchers and other like-minded software > experts, the company announced a contest today called > Netscape Bugs Bounty, in which Netscape will award prizes > to users who find bugs or security loopholes in its > software. > > Some Internet experts said they expected that many security > weaknesses like the one the Berkeley group had demonstrated > would be found, because the Internet was simply not > designed to insure secure commerce. > > "Imagine a walled town or a house," said Noel Chiappa, a > member of the Internet Engineering Task Force, a > standards-setting group. "It doesn't matter if 99 windows > are tight as can be -- if the 100th is wide open, the bad > guys will bypass your security. " > > [End] > > > > > > > > > > >

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"Denial of Clueless Service" Attacks
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:18 PM 10/11/95, Anonymous wrote: >> Two years ago, I pointed out that getting a single message past >> the man in the middle isn't good enough; you have to convince your >> readers that the key they received on one channel is more accurate >> than the key they're receiving on all the other channels. >> But if they'll believe that, they may also believe the man in the middle's >> announcement that the key in your name on all the keyservers is >> wrong, and the correct key is the one he's putting out. >> Can't win either way, but it's still important to get the key out. >> >> My current key is 0x54696D4D; the fingerprint is >> 4D 65 44 75 53 61 21 2F 41 73 55 64 85 6D 21 7F. > >but this is not Tim May's key, his key is: > >pub 1024/54E7483F 1992/11/20 Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)netcom.com> 11-20-92 > Key fingerprint = 8C 79 1C 1B 6F 32 A1 D1 65 FB 5F 57 50 6D D3 28 > > >And this one is signed by these people: > >pub 1024/54E7483F 1992/11/20 Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)netcom.com> 11-20-92 >sig 0022E52D Eric Hughes <hughes(a)soda.berkeley.edu> >sig DDBE0DD5 John T. Draper <crunch(a)netcom.com> .... Indeed, this is not an effective MITM attack. The spoofer certainly cannot read messages encrypted to my public key (though he can read messages encrypted to the public key offered above in his message...not a new situation). And he cannot sign messages that others can match to the keys I gave them, or that got put into the web of trust. So, what is it? Is it a "denial of service" attack? Not really. It's a "denial of clueless service" attack, in that anyone who tries to use that key and then send me stuff gets to have their stuff _thrown away_, which is always helpful in the war against cluelessness. Good riddance. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Banque des Cypherpunks
by cman＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>aba(a)atlas.ex.ac.uk writes: >>Technologically it would be possible to have multiple ombudsmen, or >>even have the recovery key be secret share split amongst ecash users >>in such a way that some chosen percentage of agreement would be >>required before cash could be traced, or revoked (made worthless). > I need to make the legal situation plainer: This is an all or nothing situation. Dirty money is dirty money. If the host government(s) decide that your institution was willfully blind to the transmission of dirty money, they can seize substitute assets. I'm not saying _should_, I'm not saying that there aren't fairer ways, but any and all assets in "cooperating" countries _will_ become fair game if the government decides you've let your institution be used for money laundering. This property may be transitive -- if another institution knows or should have known that your institution knows or should have known that the money was dirty, _they_ may find their assets in cooperating countries seized. Furthermore, as I mentioned in Part the Second, countries are blatantly paid off for cooperating. In fact, Munroe mentioned after his talk that the Swiss are among the very quickest to freeze assets, although they are very slow to unfreeze them.... I'm not saying there aren't clever ways around this -- it's an arms race, and one that bankers, regulators and LEAs perceive themselves to be losing. Nevertheless, I don't think that anyone, regardless of their intentions, should get involved in international money transmission unless they are fully aware of the tools and techniques that may be brought to bear against them.

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Checksums for current beta versions of Netscape Navigator
by Jeff Weinstein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This file contains checksums for the Netscape Navigator 2.0 Beta 1 distribution files that are available on the Netscape ftp site under the directory ftp://ftp.netscape.com/2.0beta/. This file has been digitally signed using PGP to assure its authenticity. The version of PGP which was used to create the digital signature on this document was obtained from http://bs.mit.edu:8001/pgp-form.html/. This file was signed using my private key. It can be obtained from my web page using this URL: http://home.netscape.com/people/jsw/my-pgp-key.txt or by searching for 'jsw(a)netscape.com' from the PGP key server at mit: http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-commands.html#extract There are three sets of checksums in this file. The first set of checksums uses MD5 to create 128-bit checksums that can not be forged. The second and third sets of checksums were generated using the two forms of the unix 'sum' command. The 'sum' command creates a 16-bit checksum, which can be used detect accidental corruption during download, but is too small to protect you from malicious tampering. There are two version of the checksums for the unix 'sum' command because unix vendors follow two different standards. I have labeled the checksums with the systems that they are good for. If you are performing the checksum operation on a unix system that is not listed, check both lists and make sure that one matches. --Jeff ============================================================ These MD5 checksums were generated with the 'md5sum' program from the PGP2.6.2 distribution, which was obtained from http://bs.mit.edu:8001/pgp-form.html/. e4d757027c1178aecc06c145f20ab204 mac/netscape-2.0b1.hqx 5d52a03be4a624290203bc039dd28349 unix/netscape-v20b1-export.alpha-dec-osf2.0.tar.Z f0f31cddacccbbfcdd8246ced2e7617a unix/netscape-v20b1-export.hppa1.1-hp-hpux.tar.Z d1e3aeda9f5f420f60a490f542e79afb unix/netscape-v20b1-export.i386-unknown-bsd.tar.Z 50b9ebbefd85d6aec7148bc1bbce98ba unix/netscape-v20b1-export.i486-unknown-linux.tar.Z 0c36e244198f9bff06773bdfee9af0f9 unix/netscape-v20b1J-export.mips-sgi-irix5.2.tar.Z c96cb263338b41b9ea760b51924ad6ec unix/netscape-v20b1J-export.sparc-sun-solaris2.3.tar.Z f07c96bb55082e5f55673db802eef3aa unix/netscape-v20b1J-export.sparc-sun-solaris2.4.tar.Z 4608ad65f84d9cf348c80c5daaf7d1a3 unix/netscape-v20b1J-export.sparc-sun-sunos4.1.3_U1.tar.Z 2da4eb8323ff129cf45916d79ebf6786 unix/netscape-v20b1N-export.mips-sgi-irix5.2.tar.Z cb24fe8fdf8cd80fcaf38cb04ba58c09 unix/netscape-v20b1N-export.sparc-sun-solaris2.3.tar.Z 3d774018b74a829eb8e9c0d4b275c70e unix/netscape-v20b1N-export.sparc-sun-solaris2.4.tar.Z 6855b8b433a6c399fe648980b366ca17 unix/netscape-v20b1N-export.sparc-sun-sunos4.1.3_U1.tar.Z 9eb68bb9a253590db4c2b33ef5622857 windows/n16e20b1.exe 6b2ad80bab5e088c7ca1490180639a54 windows/n32e20b1j.exe 6d28d97b070047952cbef8c41e8f9969 windows/n32e20b1n.exe ============================================================ These checksums were generated using the Unix 'sum' command. These checksums are for the form of the sum command that is on SGI IRIX and HPUX systems. 42079 4073 mac/netscape-2.0b1.hqx 34756 3895 unix/netscape-v20b1-export.alpha-dec-osf2.0.tar.Z 51925 5265 unix/netscape-v20b1-export.hppa1.1-hp-hpux.tar.Z 2999 4176 unix/netscape-v20b1-export.i386-unknown-bsd.tar.Z 27660 4140 unix/netscape-v20b1-export.i486-unknown-linux.tar.Z 31887 4380 unix/netscape-v20b1J-export.mips-sgi-irix5.2.tar.Z 42699 5045 unix/netscape-v20b1J-export.sparc-sun-solaris2.3.tar.Z 13440 3493 unix/netscape-v20b1J-export.sparc-sun-solaris2.4.tar.Z 42771 10436 unix/netscape-v20b1J-export.sparc-sun-sunos4.1.3_U1.tar.Z 65334 3395 unix/netscape-v20b1N-export.mips-sgi-irix5.2.tar.Z 4778 4163 unix/netscape-v20b1N-export.sparc-sun-solaris2.3.tar.Z 19694 2631 unix/netscape-v20b1N-export.sparc-sun-solaris2.4.tar.Z 18032 9123 unix/netscape-v20b1N-export.sparc-sun-sunos4.1.3_U1.tar.Z 43870 3795 windows/n16e20b1.exe 57104 5160 windows/n32e20b1j.exe 15350 4031 windows/n32e20b1n.exe ============================================================ These checksums were generated using the Unix 'sum' command. These checksums are for the form of the sum command that is on Sun, DEC OSF/1, AIX, BSDI, and Linux systems. 55511 2037 mac/netscape-2.0b1.hqx 33305 1948 unix/netscape-v20b1-export.alpha-dec-osf2.0.tar.Z 11463 2633 unix/netscape-v20b1-export.hppa1.1-hp-hpux.tar.Z 20324 2088 unix/netscape-v20b1-export.i386-unknown-bsd.tar.Z 00757 2070 unix/netscape-v20b1-export.i486-unknown-linux.tar.Z 40936 2190 unix/netscape-v20b1J-export.mips-sgi-irix5.2.tar.Z 02777 2523 unix/netscape-v20b1J-export.sparc-sun-solaris2.3.tar.Z 02868 1747 unix/netscape-v20b1J-export.sparc-sun-solaris2.4.tar.Z 20826 5218 unix/netscape-v20b1J-export.sparc-sun-sunos4.1.3_U1.tar.Z 57613 1698 unix/netscape-v20b1N-export.mips-sgi-irix5.2.tar.Z 20105 2082 unix/netscape-v20b1N-export.sparc-sun-solaris2.3.tar.Z 34742 1316 unix/netscape-v20b1N-export.sparc-sun-solaris2.4.tar.Z 49054 4562 unix/netscape-v20b1N-export.sparc-sun-sunos4.1.3_U1.tar.Z 35104 1898 windows/n16e20b1.exe 07688 2580 windows/n32e20b1j.exe 26580 2016 windows/n32e20b1n.exe -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMHuLwawWZfp0yzT1AQHBIAQAveA07AVIwD2AbeLiwGhP36MArzbYE91j A+eB10U5asUND9Y0RlcnP0Mrlwt6as6qUhC0n3OLlUFgXdijyXAUBDmCMA3XUBzg V0vIkYP5FaJh/AAPj0CMT0NPipMJDdlv679PTIEttx7jW8Wa9ZF8pholmcsE5mFQ 0vNOdeeA/mU= =OHV8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Jeff Weinstein - Electronic Munitions Specialist Netscape Communication Corporation jsw(a)netscape.com - http://home.netscape.com/people/jsw Any opinions expressed above are mine.

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