December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

PGPfone and (?) boxes
by Alan Patterson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A couple of months ago, the release of PGPfone got the list started on hardware alternatives to PTN encryption... An associate of mine recently returned from the Consumer Electronics show in Hong Kong and broght me a lot of stuff including a flyer for a telephone scrambler. >From the flyer: Secure your telephone conversations through high-tech scrambling. Never again be concerned with eavesdroppers! Description: With our state of the art Telephone Scrambler you can now discuss confidential business and/or personal matters over the public telephone network without worrying about eavesdroppers. This compact and easy to install unit renders taps and monitors useless by way of rolling code encryption. Eavesdroppers will hear nothing but gibberish, ensuring complete privacy for all your telephone conversations. The Telephone Scrambler allows you to set your own unique code ensuring that only you and the party that you are speaking with can decode the conversation. Two units are required -- one for each end of the conversation. Features: o One-touch scrambling o Thousands of key combinations o "Rollig code" scrambling o Works with Tone or Pulse o Easy connection o LED display o FCC registered o Compact and Portable Specifications: Power: 12 VDC Dimensions: 5 1/2" X 3" X 1" Weight: 6 oz PTN Connection: USOC TJ-11C Keys: 2^12 Company is: P3 Personal Protection Products 405 Park Avenue New York, NY 10022 (212) 421-4757 (212) 421-5024 Fax Well, in itself it isn't very impressive. However, I plan on giving them a call tomorrow and check prices. If they aren't that bad I'll get one and pull it apart. Perhaps it can be at least reprogrammed for more keys and another encryption algo. Hell, at 2^12 keys, all it takes is a few seconds to find which one the conversation is using. Alan Patterson (lep(a)wsnet.com) Fngpt: 41D0F61B496FECC09FABECF686AB2A1C WSNetwork Communications Services, Inc. PGP Encrypted Email Preferred Montgomery, Alabama (334) 263-5505 (800) INET-750 Public Key @ MIT keyserver

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Re: digital cash and identity disclosure
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:48 PM 10/19/95, Bryce wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > Someone claiming to be the nym calling itself tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. >May) wrote: >> >> As Hal notes, there are a lot of issues and attacks to consider. I'm sorry >> that my brief section on Chaumian digital cash in the Cyphernomicon doesn't >> adequately cover the issues (and as the debates here show, confusion still >> reigns, and no doubt some of my points are misleading, wrong, or >> incomplete). > > >Boy, if I were you I would want to fix the inadequacy in C'nomicon in >order to protect my positive rep... To each their own. There's not enough time in my life to fix all the things that are wrong, even if I knew what they all were. My "positive rep," such as it is with certain people, does not depend on producing flawless documents. In fact, there are different kinds of people. Some favor "closely reasoned" arguments (A implies B implies C implies D....), some favor "imaginative leaps." Where I am depends on my mood. - >> it tends to make >> identity-revealing attacks possible (such as the attack I alluded to, and >> that Hal more completely describes), > > >I hesitate to pipe up in such august company, but one of us is >confused. The attack that we have been discussing is possible because >Chaumian Ecash allows the payer to identify the payee. This would be >true whether or not there were any protocols related to >double-spending. (i.e., because the payer knows the actual ID number >of the bill, she can choose to relate it to the bank and then the bank >can identify who turns in that bill. Has nothing to do with >double-spending. If the protocol provided for re-blinding before >depositing the bill then this would not be possible, I think, and >would still have nothing to do with double-spending.) Oh, but it does. Suppose Alice pays out the same piece of digital cash to Bob, Charles, Ellen, Dave, etc. Each thinks they've been paid, each gets to the bank, each finds the bank will not honor the digital cash, as Alice has double spent. (Note: Any schemes for "re-blinding" must still allow "uniqueness"...and must still point back to Alice. Else the scheme/scam above will work. Online clearing, in which only the _first_ to present a digital cash claim gets paid, does not have this problem.) >Announcement: I'm about to fade out from c'punks list for a while, so >be sure and Cc: me if you want me to see your post. I will this time, but people generally should not expect out-of-band cc:ings. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: [NOISE] Re: Postscript in Netscape
by pdlamb＠iquest.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

fc(a)all.net (Dr. Frederick B. Cohen) wrote: >> > The point I have been trying to make that many on this list seem to ignore >> > again and again, is that Netscape makes the security claims. If you don't >> > provide effective protection, don't make the claim. If you want to make >> > the claim back it up with something other than media hype. >> >> We are working on clarifying our security claims. Here is an >> example from the San Jose Mercury news on Aug. 17, 1995: >> >> "We have said for a long time that given the right amount of >> computer power, that a 40-bit key encrypted message could be >> decrypted," said Mike Homer, Netscape's vice president of marketing. > > "We" - I take it you are now speaking officially for Netscape? So how come > Netscape doesn't even know how about Integrity shells and yet claims to > be able to design secure systems for money transfers? <flame=on> Give it a rest, Doc. You give all the rest of us Ph.D.'s a bad rep with this crap. Of course, if you went to that 4-year vocational school to get an M.D., I guess that's understandable. If you are so illiterate that you can't read the ascription (it says right up there, "said Mike Homer, Netscape's vice president of marketing"), then why do you (a) waste bandwidth and our time to go through this drivel, and (b) flame one Netscape employee for not knowing everything you know? If there are all of 5+ refereed publications in this area, how about giving references? It would take up less space than your recurring venom eruption! Or couldn't you understand the papers, given that you couldn't understand the news clip... <flame=off> -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQENAzACleQAAAEH/2+41W3bZPuWU1gv6A0bq3a57bgCiCAbU1QY41f+NI1I8i/+ a/L314RIpCR0iCZhsNMHNI9rVovsbmOQE4Cf9YYL3cClUoE2VAsLOi9LAjlN8qYc kmAqpsGQ39eaKrnlC/0lxJtFZgypT4m9UIsTU986y3gyy+ZTWwxtbDaLBEdsTiH/ e+zosoBiXmwWYY1n+5yvaKLGMUwa20AKdoRCUgqhJQpkW0nAvItU6WhaqxwH6JXp KCNsuP6k8FBmcKZfSSvUphSOIJnARAq9K9UPhj5BeAy1vKZ416jfgeYQUTxHQOMT rTiQOYR/oAR35gBpGYg6p1lu6Ma5eDPtpBPadUUABRG0IFBhdHJpY2sgTGFtYiA8 cGRsYW1iQGlxdWVzdC5jb20+ =DZzp -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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50 attacks on Netscape - please send the check
by fc＠all.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

50 Attacks: a.k.a. Why Not to Run Hot Java in your netscape (or other) browser: Concept 1 - Hot Java code that, once started, takes and retains control of the viewer. It includes hot buttons, etc. that let you use common resources on the net, store favorite places, etc. When you push any button in this window, it simulates Hot Java within its own code, but all reads and writes contain code to restart the program (such as the "remember favorite places" button, etc.). Attack 1 - It records all entries and sends them to an unfriendly. This includes credit card numbers, etc. Attack 2 - It reroutes all traffic through a known site to record information about all of your accesses. Attack 3 - It selectively multiplies dollar values on purchases up by a factor of 10 when you authorize purchases through their store. Attack 4 - It reroutes all purchases through their intermediary and adds 20% for the service, thus becoming the middle person in all your transactions. Attack 5 - It replaces select information from select sites with false or misleading information - particularly about the competition. Attack 6 - It reports certain sites as down, thus damaging the reputation of those sites. Attack 7 - It sends requests to sites and ignores their answers to increase hit rates on key vendors that pay for their W3 sites based on usage. Attack 8 - It gets dirty pictures using your credit card information and sends it to another recipient. Attack 9 - It implements an anonymous remailer for smut, thus making you the smut capital of the network. Attack 10 - It waits till you save another Java code from the net and replaces the code with its own code and a pointer to the code you thought you got. Attack 11 - It waits till you save a file and overflows your disk with garbage. Attack 12 - It sends displays that flash on the screen at a rate that causes epilectic seizures. Attack 13 - It puts up subliminal messages to cause you to accept its subsequent request to overwrite a .com file onto your disk. Attack 14 - It analyzes your typing style to determine psychological factors and stores that information in a database. Attack 15 - It analyzes your typing style to determine psychological factors and, if you are a child, connects you to child pornography rings. Attack 16 - It sends requests for URLs to numerous addresses on your network, records results, and returns a network map to the attacker. Attack 17 - It uses spare time when you are not computing to participate in codebreaking activities, including the breaking of netscape codes. Attack 18 - It sends massive quantities of email to mailing lists creating the impression that you are not a nice person (a spammer) Attack 19 - When it recieves incoming email, it sends copies to newsgroups who now have access to all your personal incoming mail. Attack 20 - When you send outgoing email, it sends copies to newsgroups who now have access to all your personal outgoing mail. Attack 21 - When you send outbound email, it adds insulting or abusive humor to the end of your signature line. Attack 22 - It is used to send and receive email as part of a right wing group's coordination activities aimed at overthrowing the government. Attack 23 - It slowly fades your screen till you think the display is going bad, forcing you to buy a new display. Attack 24 - It slowly degrades performance causing you to think you need a faster computer. Attack 25 - It sends threatenning email to the President under your name, getting you arrested. Attack 26 - It sends embarassing email to the New York Times getting you fired. Concept 2 - Hot Java code that sends all of your messages through my computer and gets the results back from my computer by rewriting URLs on-the-fly. Attack 27 - Attack 3 from above, but with more intelligence so that amounts are changes less obviously. Attack 28 - Attack 4 from above, but it also changes the costs on incoming information so that you can't detect the price change in the process. Attack 29 - Attack 5 from above, except that it is more sophistocated - like creating misspellings or poor formatting or moving the locations in maps so that when you push on one part of a map, it sends a different part to ther server. Attack 30 - Attack 6 from above, except that instead of reporting servers down, it makes them seem very slow, or misses lines of pictures, etc. to make them look bad but without causing trouble reports. Attack 31 - Records all credit card transactions and forward information to services that pay to know what you buy. Attack 32 - Determines whether you look at dirty pictures and, if so, sends the information to criminals to use against you in shakedowns. Attack 33 - Replaces legitimate calls to children's pages with child pornography - including solicitations for where you can become a star. Attack 34 - Adds subliminal messages to sound files that cause you to enter a murderous rage (as in the claims about acid rock a few years back). Attack 35 - Adds dirty pictures to video files causing you to become sex-crazed and commit sex crimes and have bad dreams. Attack 36 - Causes simulated waviness on the screen, resulting in dizziness and increased sick time at work. Attack 37 - Introduces high frequency buzzing that irritates people and causes them to become more violent and less cooperative. Attack 38 - Introduces low frequency beating (similar to the tactics used against the Branch Dividians and in Viet Nam) to weaken your resolve and then asks you to confirm the upload of a program. Attack 39 - Creates subliminal feedback to your use of the Web to get you to tend toward particular services and away from others. Attack 40 - Adds background advertising to all your pictures. Attack 41 - Replaces the background information provided by Web sites with the attackers background advertising. Attack 42 - Shifts frequencies of sound files from select other sites so they seem off-pitch and don't reflect well on those companies. Attack 43 - Reroutes all of your Web requests through the NSA and CIA so they can do better intelligence. Attack 44 - Causes select Web sites to require User ID and Password information before use (particularly company Web sites) so as to get you to reveal your UIDs and passwords. Attack 45 - Renames Web sites so that your remembered sites only work for a few days and then the pointers appear to go away. Attack 46 - Puts a lot of really interesting things on your screen, thus making you believe that the Web is really great, and then removes them from accessibility when you try to get them again. Attack 47 - Universally replaces the work AND with OR in all Web information. Attack 48 - Randomizes all 5-digit numbers sent via the Web, thus confusing all zip codes contained in address fields. Attack 49 - Sends a series of high frequency sounds combined with screen flashes designed to cause permanent brain damage. Concept 3 - There is a chosen plaintext attack against the RSA (published in the 1980s in a Crypto conference (IACR?). Attack 50 - Use your Hot Java capability to sign selected message after message till the attacker derives your private key. I think this takes one or two messages per bit of private key. Bonus Attack (no extra charge) - If they use your PGP random number information, they get your PGP key too! Netscape: Please send your check for US$50,000 to the address below. -- -> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236

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Re: The NSA Visits Compendium
by daw＠quito.CS.Berkeley.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <Pine.SOL.3.91.951017102059.25411F-100000(a)eagle.nexor.co.uk>, Andy Brown <asb(a)nexor.co.uk> wrote: > On Mon, 16 Oct 1995, Peter Wayner wrote: > > > [...] > > The most interesting thing that he mentioned was thatthe company had to > > guarantee that the data would never be encrypted sequentially by two > > _different_ algorithms. Apparently double encryption by 40-bit RC-4 was > > okay, but using different algorithms was verboten. > > Very interesting indeed. With RC4 the bulk of the time is in key setup, > so if they could do two setups in parallel then the total time to search > a double-encrypted 40 bit keyspace would not be that great. > Hold on -- was the NSA rep talking about double encryption *with two different independent keys*, or talking about double encryption with the same key? Somehow I doubt the latter: for starters, double encryption with the same key with a stream cipher is generally a Bad Idea. (Remember Robert Morris's suggestion to ``always look for plaintext?'') <grin> In any event, double encryption with the same key is never gonna be much more secure than single encryption, because it doesn't increase the key space. But if the NSA ref was allowing RC4 double encryption *with two different independent secret keys*, then this *is* interesting! There are well-known meet-in-the-middle attacks on double encryption (with independent keys); but the standard one requires lots of storage (2^40 storage -- this can't be precomputed if you use 88 extra non-secret salt bits in the key like SSL); a less well-known more recent attack doesn't need the storage, but takes a bit longer (probably a few hundred times longer) than brute force search of single encryption. van Oorschot & Wiener have a paper on this subject. So did you use a SSL-like construction with lots of non-secret salt bits in the key? If not, then the 2^40 bytes of storage could be precomputed, and I'd guess that this NSA position might mean that the NSA has some Exabytes full of precomputed RC4 output for all possible 40 bit keys. :-) Curious, Dave Wagner - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBEAwUBMIbr9SoZzwIn1bdtAQGWOAF0DdBaTogLiH0QDSxjAI8iGeiXFLnPg8pT 2H0cv6rcSSo+23lqB3zZw3UP4uHGeZk= =3KwF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: airport security
by Dan Veeneman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Bob Bruen, MIT Lab for Nuclear Science" <BRUEN(a)mitlns.mit.edu> writes: > Without actually agreeing with the FAA, the reason you can't have a name > other than your own on your ticket, as well as why you are required to > be in your assigned seat on take-off and landing is because if there is > a plane crash, they need to be able to identify an otherwise difficult > to identify body. This is *not* how crash victim identification is done. The FAR requirement is only that passengers be _seated_ during takeoff and landing, not that they be seated "where they're supposed to be." In fact, many airlines do not assign seats at all. First come first serve for airlines like Southwest, ValuJet, Western Pacific, etc. Actual victim identification varies from mundane (do they have a wallet on their person, etc.) to rather more gristly methods. > Sorry about this, Don't be sorry. > Bob Dan -- system(a)decode.com (Dan Veeneman) Cryptography, Security, Privacy BBS +1 410 730 6734 Data/FAX

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Ginetta Sagan to give Jing Lyman Lecture at Stanford
by todd＠lgt.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My apologies for cross posting this but she is really a great speaker... Todd >Date: Thu, 19 Oct 1995 17:38:43 -0700 (PDT) >From: Samson Tu <tu(a)camis.stanford.edu> >Sender: Samson Tu <tu(a)camis.stanford.edu> >Subject: Ginetta Sagan to give Jing Lyman Lecture at Stanford >To: aiusancal(a)camis.stanford.edu, aiusagr19(a)camis.stanford.edu, > amnesty(a)lists.Stanford.EDU >MIME-Version: 1.0 > >Jing Lyman Lecture on Visionary Women > >Women in the Resistance During World War II and After > > Ginetta Sagan >Honorable Chair, Amnesty International USA Board of Directors > >Time: Noon-1pm, Wednesday October 25 >Place: Oak East, Tresidder Union > Stanford University Campus, Stanford >Sponsored by: Institute for Research on Women and Gender > >end official announcement and begin personal plug: > >For those of you who don't know, Ginetta Sagan, a participant in the Italian >Resistance during the WW II, is the godmother of Amnesty activities in the Bay >area and beyond. She is a spunky, dynamic woman, and a great storyteller. Even >though the title of the talk is about the past, she promises to mention >Amnesty's current concerns. When I last talked to her, she was on the phone >with the IS researcher on Algeria, getting the latest scoop. I especially urge >Stanford Amnesty members to come and see a local celebrity and a great human >rights activist. (Her husband, Dr. Sagan, is a consulting professor at >Stanford.) > Regards, T. S. Glassey Chief Technologist Looking Glass Technologies todd(a)lgt.com (415) 324-4318 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQB1AwUBMFu5E6gNRnWhagU5AQHI+gL+Mwpcd3lAWd8FF06qcG6rnLhIYveHW71a XC7xh1T0uu8qnYX31yMp17OG28jWpKUbWec1IM9/eXOi+gInA7rKICWczV8zo9Z0 0puxjRRN7yO4KfRb3cPpk+r0p6pDg01Y =bTYb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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PARTY! Nov. 18th, sponsored by Community ConneXion
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: PARTY! Nov. 18th, sponsored by Community ConneXion (Apologies if you receive this multiple times) Mark your calenders... Community ConneXion: the Internet Privacy Provider is having a party! We're partying to celebrate the spread of privacy on the net, through the increased security of internet products, as well as the growth of our services. (Many new services and new features on existing services will likely be announced before the party. Stay tuned.) We're inviting all our customers and other potentially interested parties, which includes you, if you've received this note. So please join us, and send a copy of this invitation to anyone else you may know who would be interested in attending. Where: Icon Byte Bar & Grill 299 9th Street (at Folsom) SF CA 94103 When: Sat. Nov. 18 1995 7:00 PM This is a good chance to meet and network with the people who are making privacy on the internet a reality. Find out more about the HackNetscape and HackMicrosoft contests. Learn about our specialized web services, found nowhere else but at Community ConneXion. Hear about the anonymous and psuedonymous servers here and what we're doing to improve them. There will be catered snacks and a no-host bar.

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Re: airport security
by Dana W. Albrecht 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: futplex(a)pseudonym.com (Futplex) > > DCF writes: > [re: shwoing picture ID to board commercial flights in the U.S.] > > I wonder how many have challenged this. > > During the California-wide Unabomber scare a few months back (before the LAX- > specific scare), someone on the list said they planned to test it at SJC. I > think it was Dana Orfeo. The trip report has never surfaced, though. > > (Dana ? Are you there ?) > [ Snip ] I'm here. And I apologize for failing to write the promised report. In any case, better late than never... I flew out of the San Jose "International" Airport (SJC) over the July 4th weekend to visit a friend of mine. Many of you may remember this weekend corresponding with the California-wide Unabomber scare. I flew on Delta airlines. My intention was to create as much trouble as possible with the I.D. bit, though to ultimately capitulate (if necessary) as I _did_ want to get where I was going. Private email from Futplex, quoted with permission: > I suggest acting very innocently at the start, as though you don't suspect > they might try to card you. Try just having some cash in your wallet -- > put anything that might conceivably identify you in a separate pocket, apart > from the ticket itself. When they ask you for ID, mildly claim that you > aren't carrying any. When they insist, show off your anonymous wallet. (You > might want to claim that a friend dropped you off at the airport, and another > friend is picking you up at the other end, to explain why you're not carrying > a driver's license. Maybe you could say you'll be at a convention in a hotel > for several days, and won't be leaving except walking or by taxi.) Get them > to explain very precisely just what gives them the legal authority to > refuse you entry to the plane. (I'd be interested in hearing the answer > myself !) I expect this will work better if they're checking IDs at the > gates, rather than the general X-ray/security post, so that you're dealing > with plastic-smiled airline personnel. I removed all picture identification from my wallet (my CA driver's license) and packed away my U.S. passport (though I was not leaving the U.S.) deep inside my luggage (just in case.) I actually took a Taxi to the airport and was not planning on driving at any time over the course of my trip. I could actually truthfully make these claims, which was useful as I'm not a very good liar. Unfortunately, I arrived at the airport much later than I had intended. I checked my bags at curbside, where I was asked for identification. Not wanting to miss my flight, I merely looked and acted miffed and dug my passport out of my baggage. I then put my passport back into my baggage, which was then checked. I hurried to the gate, where I discovered that the flight was delayed by a good hour. Damn. If I had known that, I wouldn't have checked my bags at the curb. Oh well. However, I hadn't been given a boarding pass and still needed to check in at the gate for that. Delta wanted I.D. again. At this point, I was actually not carrying any picture identification. The plastic, smiling Delta employee behind the counter at the gate was not happy, mostly because she looked to be having an otherwise rough day and obviously didn't want to deal with anything out of the ordinary. I told her that I had only a U.S. passport, and that it was in my already checked baggage. I was hoping the problem would be escalated to management, where I could start asking about their legal authority for denying me boarding privileges, but she (probably without authority) essentially said "to hell with it" and gave me my boarding pass, adding a comment that the rank-and-file Delta employees thought that the ID requirement was a bad idea anyway. There was no verification that I was telling the truth about having checked my baggage (though I was) so that I could have actually gotten on the plane without showing my identification. I've flown twice since then (on SouthWest), without being asked for any identification. Dana W. Albrecht dwa(a)corsair.com

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Re: digital cash and identity disclosure
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:41 PM 10/19/95, Hal wrote: >There is an attack here, but the text doesn't go into detail about it. >You have to assume that (as with the current ecash implementation from >Digicash) people have non-anonymous accounts with the bank. If Alice >wants to know Bob's identity she can collude with the bank to find >out. As Tim describes, she gives Bob some money, then quickly deposits >the coins herself. In effect, she intentionally double-spends (with >the bank's permission). When Bob makes his deposit, his coins are >recognized as matching those which Alice double-spent. So if Alice >was, say, an agent involved in a government "sting", and bought bootleg >software from Bob, his identity can in fact be learned when he deposits >the money. > >Actually with the DigiCash system and in fact all of the ecash systems I >know about, you don't have to get so fancy; Alice can simply give the >bank a record of her transaction with Bob (the coins she sent him) and >these will be recognized when Bob deposits them. > >Lucky Green has been discussing ways in which people could exchange coins >anonymously even with DigiCash's ecash in order to provide some immunity >from such attacks. As Hal notes, there are a lot of issues and attacks to consider. I'm sorry that my brief section on Chaumian digital cash in the Cyphernomicon doesn't adequately cover the issues (and as the debates here show, confusion still reigns, and no doubt some of my points are misleading, wrong, or incomplete). "Double spending" detection is a REAL MESS. That's my basic conclusion. It tends to require schemes for going after double spenders, it tends to make identity-revealing attacks possible (such as the attack I alluded to, and that Hal more completely describes), and it's INELEGANT. "Immediate clearing" is much more elegant, and is, I think, truer to the spirit of "annonymous digital cash" than most of these other schemes are. (Grep the FAQ for "online" or "online clearing" or "clearing" and you should find some stuff. Also, several articles--including one recently by me, about a month ago--go into the differences between the types of clearing.) --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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