December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: PC disk wipe software
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199510091318.JAA24166(a)jekyll.piermont.com>, perry(a)piermont.com ("Perry E. Metzger") wrote: > I thought I'd ask here, since its related to a lot of the stuff people > have written for the PC platform in these parts. I need to securely > wipe a bunch of data from an MS-DOS hard drive, so that it can't be > recovered. Are there any readily available utilities for this? Will > any of them selectively erase only data that isn't allocated to > existing files? Whatever you use, check its claims with a disk editor. None of the various wipe utilities for the Mac that I am aware of (Norton, Burn) work as advertized. They all invariably fail to wipe the slackspace at the end of allocated, but not fully used blocks. Consequently, several kB of data left behind in said slackspace by previously deleted files will be missed on your average drive. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMHmgGioZzwIn1bdtAQFEsQF8CYfksEosFfBJoQckOM390b7CBeupCtrf T2Var/yEUwuT5lxH7xJ6y9p69wfaljtz =Hkkv -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Hal's Third Challenge?
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Any movement towards a third cracking session. I know poor Netscape seems like old hat but it might be good to do one more to establish a working server (if we have one). My interest arises out of the new Pentium 120 that has come my way and the 40,000 keys/second it gets running the 32-bit version of the Brue code. Since my ISP is a local call, I might even be able to get away with an 8 hour PPP session to try the WIN95 client. What's going on? DCF "Take your Writ of Ne Exeat Republica and shove it." --- words to keep around to really impress the opposition with.

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Announcement: Alert Mailing List
by Christopher Klaus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Announcing a new security mailing list - The Alert. The Alert will be covering the following topics: - Security Product Announcements - Updates to Security Products - New Vulnerabilities found - New Security Frequently Asked Question files. - New Intruder Techniques and Awareness To join, send e-mail to request-alert(a)iss.net and, in the text of your message (not the subject line), write: subscribe alert To remove, send e-mail to request-alert(a)iss.net and, in the text of your message (not the subject line), write: unsubscribe alert This is a moderated list in the effort to keep the noise to a minimal and provide quality security information. If your site is interested in network security, we put out several FAQes (Frequently Asked Question) that cover the following main areas of topic: Vendor Contacts - Who is the security contacts at IBM, HP, Dec, Motorola, etc. - Web page at: http://iss.net/iss/vendor.html Patches - List of all security related patches catergorized by OS type. - Web page at: http://iss.net/iss/patch.html Compromise - Check list of things to do if your machines are compromised. - Web page at: http://iss.net/iss/compromise.html Anonymous FTP Security - How to correctly set up FTP and check for vulnerabilities. - Web page at: http://iss.net/iss/anonftp.html Sniffers - What they are. How they work. How to detect them. And solutions. - Web page: http://iss.net/iss/sniff.html Security Mailing Lists - A comprehensive list of security mailing lists. - Web page: http://iss.net/iss/maillist.html If possible, it might be a good idea for you to add links to the above web pages on your own Web server and point people who need to know some of the network security issues to the web page. It is possible to point to all of the FAQ pages at: http://iss.net/iss/faq.html -- Christopher William Klaus Voice: (770)441-2531. Fax: (770)441-2431 Internet Security Systems, Inc. "Internet Scanner lets you find 2000 Miller Court West, Norcross, GA 30071 your network security holes Web: http://iss.net/ Email: cklaus(a)iss.net before the hackers do."

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Re: java security concerns
by cmcmanis＠scndprsn.Eng.Sun.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Sendmail is about 29K lines of C code -- not significantly larger by >my standards -- and has proven nearly impossible to secure. Good point. >Sendmail performs a much simpler task and has not proven secure. I don't necessarily agree. The core java interpreter is simply: while (1) { get_next_opcode switch(x) { } } > ... Marcus Ranum has noted that you can't >trust a program thats bigger than a couple of pages long, and I >believe he's right. Its a useful metric. But the concept of trust isn't defined. If you write in pure Java code (that is no references to any native methods) we should be able to do much better than that. And since Java doesn't have "programs" it just has "classes" and many of those fit on two pages where does that leave us? Would it be reasonable to say that if I want to write a Java class I trust I should keep it under two pages? If I then write another class that uses that class, that is also under two pages have I met the requirement? Can this aggreagate four page Java class be trusted? >As an aside, have you tried breaking your own program? Spend a week on >it some time. Its usually an educational experience and it breaks you >out of the mindset you have fixed in for a while. Many times. >As people have found out, it has proven possible to core dump the Java >interpreter. That means that your implementation has contained flaws >that potentially permitted people to do unplanned things to the state >of the interpreter. I agree. >By the way, I suggest that Sun should offer a large money prize for >the first significant security hole found the Java implementation. Its >a tiny price to pay for security. I don't think the lawyers would let us. Would anyone be interested in a Java daemon that one could send arbitrary classes to in an attempt to subvert the runtime? I once thought this would be a good way to give safe exposure to the system in general. You know sort of "here's a program that can feed classes to a Java runtime on a system which is known to have a file X on it. Try to return the contents of X." It probably wouldn't be to useful beyond that, and it would only validate the classes you have access to, not necessarily the full set in a release. (hence my not doing it given its utility only in testing the core runtime) --Chuck

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut reord mix post"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash mix cut ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"crown"} = "<mixmaster(a)kether.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut mix ek reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)spook.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mixmaster(a)gondolin.org> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)gate.net> cpunk"; $remailer{"precip"} = "<mixmaster(a)mix.precipice.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<remail(a)ecafe.org> cpunk"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)spook.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- ecafe remail(a)ecafe.org *******#--** 30:29 99.96% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com +#*##**#-### 4:12 99.95% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com .---.----.- 8:14:14 99.94% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net **+**+++-**+ 28:29 99.93% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com -------..-- 8:34:49 99.79% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu +#*##** -**# 4:44 99.79% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net + +***+*-+** 15:35 99.77% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu ***-##* -#+# 12:48 99.77% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ---+ +-+--+ 1:03:29 99.65% replay remailer(a)replay.com +*++***+-** 13:22 99.43% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl **+** *+-** 14:31 99.38% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com + ++ ++-+- 59:29 99.16% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi --++ ---- ++ 3:15:48 98.47% wmono wmono(a)spook.alias.net ****++*-+ * 14:26 98.12% spook remailer(a)spook.alias.net ---- +++- +* 1:19:36 94.96% rahul homer(a)rahul.net +### #+ # + 4:11 98.84% robo robo(a)c2.org +#*#### -# 24:26 80.99% c2 remail(a)c2.org + +++-++-+ 54:15 76.59% syrinx syrinx(a)c2.org ----+-++-+ 48:35 75.76% crown mixmaster(a)kether.alias.net +-+---++ 1:03:56 59.66% gondolin mixmaster(a)gondolin.org +*--+ + 1:19:10 44.00% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de *+ 6:37 10.73% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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[NOISE] was Re: java security concerns
by Frank Stuart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a bit off-topic, but hopefully interesting. Rather than trying to prove a program to be correct (which I agree is doomed to failure for the forseeable future for all but trivial programs), perhaps it would be useful to have an automated therom-prover to try to deduce "interesting things" about certain programs such as "this program always bounds-checks its input", "this program allows writes to arbitrary files on lines x, y, and z", "this program halts". (:>) Obviously (as the last example illustrates), this isn't perfect because something can be true without being provable. Further, it's likely that assumptions must be made about system calls, libraries, and the ways in which they interact. There's also the problem of "who proves the prover". However, I think such a tool would be useful because it may quickly point out things not obvious to (most) humans and getting some idea of what can't be deduced and why would be instructive. | (Douglas) Hofstadter's Law: Frank Stuart | It always takes longer than you expect, even fstuart(a)vetmed.auburn.edu | when you take into account Hofstadter's Law.

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TSB_pbs
by adwestro＠ouray.cudenver.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - From The Economist, Oct. 7, p.78: TSB, a British bank, held a launch party in August at Cyberia, London's first "Internet cafe", for its Digital Trip home page, aimed at attracting student customers. I assume this refers to TSB Bank Channel Islands Limited, 8 David Place, PO Box 597, St. Helier, Jersey (NOT Joisey!), JE4 8XW. When I last checked (a couple of years ago), TSB offered Offshore Premium Accounts -- interest-bearing checking accounts that pay 11.5 percent interest per annum on a minimum deposit of 2000 pounds, as well as providing a VISA debit card. TSB is said to be the tenth largest bank in the world. Quite an interesting addition to the Net...anyone checked out their home page? BTW, the American PBS "Frontline" show on Tuesday, Oct. 31 (in the Denver area, anyway) will discuss "High Stakes in Cyberspace -- the business rush to stake claims in cyberspace, otherwise known as the Internet, may someday create a cyber-revolution." Hopefully it will be a worthy successor to their show about Caribbean money laundering, though the blurb's conflation of cyberspace with the Internet is not encouraging... Alan Westrope <awestrop(a)nyx10.cs.du.edu> __________/|-, <adwestro(a)ouray.cudenver.edu> (_) \|-' 2.6.2 public key: finger / servers PGP 0xB8359639: D6 89 74 03 77 C8 2D 43 7C CA 6D 57 29 25 69 23 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMIDwuFRRFMq4NZY5AQECOgQAm1FJQyni4U7ulKvT8Zd3P1pEBieKXeqo rxaCA14K/MhaTnaCcWix0vvPYzFjgnspxUpc7PtuP46w++ilrfZiYDM1BZ1+HpkZ MZaSiH8W+cUkQAxDTuAVNve9PM8zj8Qv+CQ7mABqLu5+f93GubUQtMElEmikR69J kL/2ewMllI4= =O2Py -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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DUM_not
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

10-15-95. NYPaper, longish Page One semi-rehash, semi- disinfo of LATimes of July 23: "Emerging Role For the C.I.A.: Economic Spy." During the Clinton Administration's tense negotiations with Japan last spring Mickey Kantor received inside information gathered by the C.I.A.'s Tokyo station and the electronic eavesdropping equipment of the N.S.A. "But in the end, did it help much? Beyond some valuable detail we could not have gotten elsewhere, did it tell us much about which way Hashimoto would go? It would be hard to make that case." Many Administration officials suggest that the agency simply does not have the talent for such analysis. "The best graduate students don't go there and who can blame them?" said one of the Administration's top economic officials. "And yet, when you sit in a meeting, the views of the C.I.A. are often given more weight than the Council of Economic Advisors. Go figure." Allan E. Goodman, a former C.I.A. official and academic dean of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, said "We don't have the sources, we don't have the expertise. To develop an understanding of the people who trade currencies, their motivations, their lifestyles, you'd have to send your people to Harvard, Stanford and Wharton for years. Currency traders keep secrets very, very well, and to penetrate that would be the equivalent of cracking all the Japanese codes in World War II." DUM_not (14 kb)

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bouncing mail
by s1018954＠aix2.uottawa.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can anyone anyone get in touch with the bouncing mail guy, Jason P Jones <jonesj(a)ala.usmc.mil> ? He needs to wipe that mailbox of his. ( I just tried to unsub him, I guess it's reassuring you can't get away with it without forging headers, which I can't do.) rom owner-cypherpunks Sun Oct 15 05:19:24 1995 Return-Path: <owner-cypherpunks> Received: by toad.com id AA09946; Sun, 15 Oct 95 05:19:24 PDT Received: from panix.com by toad.com id AA09937; Sun, 15 Oct 95 05:19:20 PDT Received: (from frissell@localhost) by panix.com (8.7/8.7/PanixU1.3) id IAA25104; Sun, 15 Oct 1995 08:19:18 -0400 (EDT) Date: Sun, 15 Oct 1995 08:19:18 -0400 (EDT) From: Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> To: Alan Westrope <adwestro(a)ouray.cudenver.edu> Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: TSB_pbs In-Reply-To: <BBPgwkkAsmsM085yn(a)ouray.cudenver.edu> Message-Id: <Pine.SUN.3.91.951015081704.22935B-100000(a)panix.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk On Sun, 15 Oct 1995, Alan Westrope wrote: > I assume this refers to TSB Bank Channel Islands Limited, 8 David > Place, PO Box 597, St. Helier, Jersey (NOT Joisey!), JE4 8XW. > No, I would assume that it refers to the parent company TSB on the mainland UK. It has an extensive branch network in the UK. DCF

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Re: Yes, indeed the PA law is for real!
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Historic comment: ... "You read it here first." Nostradamus said it way before you. This kind of dredging up old posts in order to claim certain foresight intellectual properties is kinda silly. Watcha gonna do, patent it? It's gonna rain tomorrow. You heard it here first. Of course, I don't plan on doing anything about it other than tell you all...

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