December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

"Hackers"-- brief review and anecdote...
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I saw "Hackers" yesterday. It's not bad and its political sensibility is very cyberpunk. The ad campaign even uses the tag line, "Their only crime is curiosity." Given that a major studio is spending beaucoup bucks to spread this tag line, I think it is safe to say that cyber issues are very mainstream by now. Still edgy enough to be exciting to many, but definitely comprehendable. The characters are just a bit too cool for school and some of the notes ring false. The evil one, a corporate computer security officer, would have been better served by someone who is not as laughable as Fischer Stevens. I could probably hit the escape key on my computer here and he would cringe. Jeremy Irons or Klaus-Maria Brandaur would have been more inspired. But they can't skateboard. I also stopped by the Department of Motor Vehicles yesterday. The lines were long and I soon found myself grousing along with the guy behind me. He was about 60 years old and not part of the cyberpunk generation in any way. After I said some libertarian thing by wondering aloud about why we even needed to have such a huge bureaucracy centered around cars, he said, "Yeah. Have you seen all the land they have down in Fort Meade. Beautiful land and they just spend their time down their spying on the people." He lumped the NSA in with the DMV. To him, it was just one big bureaucracy. -Peter

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Avoiding weak IDEA keys?
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At the CRYPTO '93 there was a presentation about weak IDEA keys (page 224 of the proceedings). Does anybody know about IDEA implementations considering this and trying to avoid weak keys, e.g. by using the modified key schedule? Hadmut

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unabomber paper
by lethin＠ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

is available on http://www.ai.mit.edu/misc/unabomber

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Re: NYT on Netscape Crack
by Andrew Loewenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back writes: > Posting the code for the random number generator would be an > excellent start. Ian posted the code for the PRNG on August 30th and Stephen Kapp noted that it was similar to one in RSAREF. The PRNG is probably fine. The big flaw here was the collection of seed material. The bottom line is the WHOLE security subsystem should be published for analysis. > Or if that doesn't sit well with copyright interests, how about > writing up an open spec about how the random number generator works? > Then we can critique it. Netscape did this with SSL and what happened was the rest of the industry jumped on it before any analysis was done. Now we are likely stuck with a poor protocol. > An algorithm should be something to be proud of, "it's secure, and > see: this is how it works, here are the design criteria, here is > how you would attempt to break it, and here is the best predicted > attack's cost." The design may be great, but if the implementation is flawed then you aren't much better off. To attempt to evaluate the security of a system you need to be able to inspect the implementation. Period. > is netscape still a progressive startup company with hot programmers > running the show, or has it slipped into stuffy corporate realms > already? Netscape may have hot programmers but so far I believe it has become self-evident that they know little about crypto and implementing cryptosystems. To Netscape's credit, Jeff Weinstein claims that the team implementing the security for Navigator 2.0 is completely new and of course Netscape has hired Tahir ElGamal, who certainly knows what he is doing. Additionally I would suspect that with all the bad publicity they are receiving they would take up Bidzos on RSADSI's offer to analyze the source. So it is entirely possible that Navigator 2.0 will be much better. However, I am not holding my breath. Strong crypto is _hard_ to implement properly. Even if a product is using a well-known algorithm there could be any number of subtle flaws that can destroy any security offered by such algorithm. You can't just toss in RSA, IDEA, RC-4, DES, etc... and claim the thing is secure. andrew

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(Yet Another?) Netscape Crack Web page
by Laurent Demailly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been waiting to see here an annoucement of some web page toward which direct ppl that want more infos on the great (congrats) job from Ian and David, but as I saw none (maybe it's on its way, delay seem pretty high those days on the list mail, in that case, sorry...) and someone asked me more infos, on my sources,... I've set up a small web pages with some infos collected here on http://hplyot.obspm.fr/~dl/netscapesec/ It includes few remote pointers, a copy of the original ian's post, the NYT article, the Wall Street journal one, and... the source file that I received from an european source (and incidently a summary from me in french) Please send me comments , corrections, additional pointers,... (it is not meant to ne exhaustive anyway) Best regards dl -- Laurent Demailly * http://hplyot.obspm.fr/~dl/ * Linux|PGP|Gnu|Tcl|... Freedom Prime#1: cent cinq mille cent cinq milliards cent cinq mille cent soixante sept

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Verification of Random Number Generators
by Erik E. Fair 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:20 9/19/95, Eric Young wrote: >Now I had not noticed this, my library runs like a charm and things >appear random from the random number generator. This sort of error can >only be checked by reading the code and specifically looking at critical >routines like this the RNG seeding routines. The advantage of my code >being public is that some-one like Mike can have a look and pick up >problems like this. >The moral of the story I suppose is to be >paranoid about checking routines relating to RNG. Just an idle thought: it might be possible to do a probabalistic verification of a RNG by sampling it over some number of samples, and statistically analyzing the sample space. This would be analysis under the model of "RNG as black box" as opposed to (or rather, if you're smart, in addition to) code inspection & review. Any statisticians among us? Erik Fair

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Encryption algorithms used in PrivaSoft
by lmccarth＠cs.umass.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear PrivaSoft- Your Web page, "What is PrivaSoft ?" (http://www.megasoft.com/privasoft/about.html) says: > How does it work? > > PrivaSoft scrambles and descrambles an image of the document using Bitmap > encryption. When scrambling, PrivaSoft divides the document into tiny tiles > and shuffles them pseudo-randomly using your secret key as part of the > encryption algorithm. This is an extremely general description of encryption and decryption. I am interested in learning more about the cryptographic algorithms used in the PrivaSoft product. Where should I look for further details ? Are there technical contacts within your organization who would be willing to discuss this in email ? References would be greatly appreciated. Sincerely -L. McCarthy <lmccarth(a)cs.umass.edu>

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ASCII unabomber paper attribution and FTP address
by lethin＠ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

N.B. unabomber paper is is via JYA_lbr. Also available via FTP ftp://ftp.ai.mit.edu/users/misc/unabomber

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Re: Verification of Random Number Generators
by droelke＠rdxsunhost.aud.alcatel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Just an idle thought: it might be possible to do a probabalistic > verification of a RNG by sampling it over some number of samples, and > statistically analyzing the sample space. This would be analysis under the > model of "RNG as black box" as opposed to (or rather, if you're smart, in > addition to) code inspection & review. Any statisticians among us? > In a word - no. In a longer description - you can black box test the *pseudo-RNG in one of two ways. One, input a key, and then keep asking for numbers. The numbers should be statistically distributed, and should have a very long repeat cycle. (i.e. basic "good" pseudo-random number generator theory) Two, input different keys, and then ask for a number. Again, the numbers should be statistically distributed, even for small changes in the input numbers. What *both* of those methods don't test, is the key(seed) generation, which is what was attacked on Netscape. The seed number must be truely random, and unknowable to the attacker, otherwise they can duplicate the random number generator. Remember that all random number generators in software are really pseudo-random number generators, and rely on having seed value. BTW: In some ways, I feel sorry for Netscape being nailed by everyone including the press like this. BUT - they must also accept that with being popular, that they will be subject to intense scrutiny. Besides - if you are going to attack a cryptosystem, why not get your 15 minutes of fame out of deal while you are at it ;-) Dan ------------------------------------------------------------------ Dan Oelke Alcatel Network Systems droelke(a)aud.alcatel.com Richardson, TX

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NSA and Netscape Crack (Re: NYT on Netscape Crack)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:00 AM 9/19/95, John Young wrote: > The New York Times, September 19, 1995, pp. A1, D21. > > > Security Flaw Is Discovered In Software Used in Shopping > > By John Markoff > The discovery is the second reported security weakness in > the Netscape program to be posted on the Cypherpunks list > in the last month. In August, Damien Doligez, a student at Seriously, where's the NSA when you really need 'em? If the "flaws" are being found by our group, as John notes, just what is the NSA doing in the _second_ role it is supposed to have, it's "COMSEC," or communications security, role? (Note: As outlined by Bamford, and others, the Agency has a dual role: penetrating communications it is chartered to penetrate, and helping to secure communications it is chartered to help secure. Traditionally, the penetrating side is called SIGINT or COMINT, and the securing side is called COMSEC. The names may have changed by now.) Personally, I don't actually _want_ them vetting the work of others, but I think this whole series of events with Netscape makes it abundantly clear that the supposed "dual role" of the NSA in both breaking ciphers and in ensuring higher security is a farce. If the NSA had not found the flaws our two Berkeley grad students found, we've grossly overestimated them as a threat. And if they found the flaws but said nothing, what does this say about their claimed COMSEC benefits to American interests? (Granted, not all of us are Americans, but I think you understand my point about the NSA claiming it has a role, then doing nothing concrete, and even being misleading in its plans and programs.) If the NSA _really_ wants to really help secure communications against fraud, eavesdroppers, and foreign intelligence agencies, it can do so by immediately relaxing the restrictions on crypto export. While this may not stop things like weak random number generators, it moves us to an era of "strong" crypto and away from the "toy" crypto the NSA seems to want us to have. I think, however, it's clear by now that they have little interest in helping to secure communications and that weak "toy" systems are their preference. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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