December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: for-pay remailers and FV
by pstemari＠erinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:53 PM 1/9/95, Doug Barnes wrote: > ... Also, there is no reason on earth to take FV for payment under >such a scheme, if one wishes to preserve anonymity, and not have >to deal with the fraud/reversal factors. (The stamp issuer >would not know which blind-signed stamps were issued to the >turkey who reversed all his credit card transactions two months >after buying them -- see various threads on this vis-a-vis >using FV to buy blinded digital cash and why it won't work too >well.) > ... I don't see any reason to get FV involved, unless one were so lame >as to be unable to get signed up directly with the credit card >companies as a merchant -- a process of appropriate complexity >to indicate the posession of at least one (1) clue, which is prob. >desirable in someone who's going to be handling remailer finances MC/Visa require the reversibility of transactions as a condition of their merchant agreements. It's not something peculiar to FV. In fact, under certain conditions it is mandated by federal law. Escort services have a similar problem as far as non-returnability goes, but I don't know how they finesse their way around it. --Paul J. Ste. Marie pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com

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revoked transactions/guerrilla fee remailers
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Paul J. Ste. Marie writes: > MC/Visa require the reversibility of transactions as a condition of their > merchant agreements. It's not something peculiar to FV. In fact, under > certain conditions it is mandated by federal law. Escort services have a > similar problem as far as non-returnability goes, but I don't know how they > finesse their way around it. Two plausible tactics for escort services: [0] Price inflation: treat a revoked transaction rather like shoplifting, by passing the costs on to the customers; escort services are not cheap [1] Embarrassment: tip off family and employers of people who accept escorts, then decide not to pay for them; the perceived threat of publicity should keep plenty of folks in line There's not much that can be done to someone who uses an escort service once, revokes the transaction, and doesn't care who knows about it. How might this apply to remailing services ? Right now, with a fairly small customer base, I imagine price inflation would be impractical, but embarrassment might prove fairly effective. In the developed market we envision, presumably operators could get away with price inflation, but embarrassment would lose much of its potential sting. (I assume that once a critical mass of populace uses remailers, an announcement that Josie Worsham has used a remailer would elicit only yawns.) Do others see the resulting applicability of additional regulations to remailers as an issue in having them charge for service ? Within the category of fee-charging remailers, the distinction between non-profit and for-profit operations may be worth considering. I suppose that the IRS and analogous agencies would be inclined to ask questions about it, for starters. My threat model for the remailer bramble includes, at a minimum, a host of typical government agencies obligated to wrap everything in red tape. Look for anti- trust investigations to be launched against a price-fixing cartel of remailers. - - From what I've seen so far, accepting payment would seem to make anonymous _operation_ of a remailer well nigh impossible. Anonymous operation with revenue would require a corresponding level of anonymity in the transfer of money. Until such time as conversion of funds from a net-liquid form to a conventional form becomes unnecessary (or just commonplace ?), financial traffic analysis can't adequately be thwarted. All this bodes ill, IMHO, for the prospect of guerrilla or quasi-guerrilla remailers charging for service any time soon. There's just too much infrastructure to which they'd need to be tied at the moment. -L. Futplex McCarthy; PGP key by finger or server "The objective is for us to get those conversations whether they're by an alligator clip or ones and zeroes. Wherever they are, whatever they are, I need them." -FBI Dir. Freeh - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLxHeC2f7YYibNzjpAQGhlQP/fkyvN0QqDkbLhgqecGUaeu3cbCstMd4y lgs/XzCeiXVt6EiQ8tmDVbq4G0QYTGntph/3knciJopGrH+Nu6LVmiqWNiRWFxm8 zJBRenCW2SN9nRixJiI4S2n0yQ//v9C7sOEfmu9SToQDYc+U1CBNSUhhJAveT1GN BD4WNFlm/WY= =VY8W - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLxHfcSoZzwIn1bdtAQGyEAGAwKES86hkJ8GkLsYCr+vEAjH1/L2GdrCj jw0b83L7FHA99sUihIYe2zUUxr+Sqb2b =7Aai -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Pornography, What is it?
by Raul Deluth Miller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Pornography is in the eyes of the beholder. [Especially if the beholder happens to be a postmaster in Memphis...] -- Raul D. Miller N=:((*/pq)&|)@ NB. public e, y, n=:*/pq <rockwell(a)nova.umd.edu> P=:*N/@:# NB. */-.,e e.&factors t=:*/<:pq 1=t|e*d NB. prim=:1&=@| 2&^@<: [. large=:>&(2^1024) x-:d P,:y=:e P,:x NB. (d P,:y)-:D P*:N^:(i.#D)y [. D=:|.@#.d

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Pornography, What is it?
by root 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: ravage(a)bga.com To: cpunks the world over Hi all, I am very interested in the data haven issue now that I have my site up. The aspect of pornography is a problem that has to be faced. To this end, I would like to ask that we look at how pornography is defined. >From my own view, I fail to see any way to truly define pornography as anything other than the ravings of a neurotic (both on a personal and a societal level). Every example of pornography I have seen has been put in that category because it contravenes some personal or group taboo. Take care.

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data havens
by Raul Deluth Miller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The problem with encryption, in general, is that it's an attempt to hide information -- unless the information is trivial, encryption is only a temporary measure. Believe it or not, the government (or, more properly, people associated with the government) is still trying to figure out which industries are Iraqi owned -- one technique being brought to bear is statistical analysis of company activities, with special attention to changes which occurred during the gulf war. The only way to have data havens be acceptable to the U.S. government would be to have them become acceptable to the U.S. population (or some significant fraction of them). This would imply phasing out the DEA and the IRS, at a minimum. [Newspaper article this weekend: how it's so horrible that some people deal in cash and thus are evading the IRS.] More generally, the way to keep a data haven from being located is to make sure it doesn't have a location... This is hard to do without severely impacting latency. -- Raul D. Miller N=:((*/pq)&|)@ NB. public e, y, n=:*/pq <rockwell(a)nova.umd.edu> P=:*N/@:# NB. */-.,e e.&factors t=:*/<:pq 1=t|e*d NB. (,-:<:)pq is four large primes, e medium x-:d P,:y=:e P,:x NB. (d P,:y)-:D P*:N^:(i.#D)y [. D=:|.@#.d

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Privacy markets
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

mkj(a)october.ducktown.org wrote: > Bottom line: Anonymity is the only available tool which puts control > over my own privacy firmly into my own hands, where it belongs, and > does so without infringing on anyone's freedom of speech. Certainly Some months ago I extended this to the concept of privacy markets - where individuals will be able to disclose their 'truename value' to providers of services (such as libraries, publications) whose marketing would benefit, in lieu of cash. I rather think big business is in a better position than government to exploit the 'profiling' fallout of universal use of truenames. In the hope of increasing the declining signal content on the list, I'm reposting my article: ====================== Electric Dreams Weekly column for The Asian Age by Rishab Aiyer Ghosh #35, 31/October/1994: Selling privacy as a commodity It was once said that you should never post publicly to cyberspace what you don't want to see in tomorrow's newspapers. While newspapers are rarely interested in your idle thoughts, others are. Future employers, advertisers and an army of 'user profilers' have begun to exploit the availability of huge data banks of Net traffic, just waiting to be indexed by your names and opinions. It is already possible to buy CD-ROM or tape archives of posts to newsgroups on the Internet. Collecting newsgroup posts as they arrive is trivial. Apart from ordinary Internet connections, all newsgroups are available on one- way, open-access satellite data broadcasts. As traffic flows in, it can be indexed and backed up on extremely cheap storage media such as Digital Audio Tape, for later search and retrieval. While the US National Security Agency is naturally one of the best at hunting for signs of incorrect thinking in cyberspace, several techniques to search large volumes of data by very flexible criteria are publicly available. Electronic writing is one of the best sources for employers to learn the views of prospective employees. The groups people participate in can also form useful inputs to consumer profiles. Some companies have already started offering directory services based on posts to USENET, the semi-official collection of major newsgroups. It is easy to imagine Profiles-R-Us shops that sell dossiers on any individual, detailing political, religious and sexual preferences, and other interesting tidbits - all the nasty things you ever said about Microsoft, for instance! Public discussion is of course just that, and it's ridiculous to attempt to prevent it being put to use for purposes not originally intended. The remedy to an invasion is to build walls; when the invasion is one of privacy, the walls are technological. Some pioneers are already protecting themselves through the use of encryption, digital signatures, and multiple pseudonyms - making it impossible for profilers to associate opinions with real people. In a way, the Invasion Of The Profilers is a good thing - it will make individuals realize what little privacy they have, and teach them the value of privacy. Not everyone will want to seal themselves in private cocoons. Most will not object to some loss of privacy, but in exchange for a (not necessarily monetary) share of the profilers' profits. Individuals will control their privacy and selectively reduce it when it benefits themselves. A particularly useful application of this is in an electronic public library. Once access to data is severely restricted to protect intellectual property rights, the Internet as a source of knowledge for everyone will die, unless libraries are opened to provide information free of cost. Such libraries need not survive on subsidies; rather, they can ask for a copy of any information base in cyberspace from all publishers. By limiting access to individuals who are willing to give up some privacy, the library and publishers will benefit from the sale of users' access records to advertisers. Advertisers will be delighted, as most other inputs for profiling in a privacy- aware society will be unavailable. Finally, users will get free access to information if they so choose, at a cost that they can agree to. While one can be frightened by the ease with which a multitude of Big Brothers can monitor the citizens of cyberspace, technology, as always, has something for everyone. As it becomes easier to search through electronic communications, it also becomes easier to protect privacy to varying degrees. Individuals will be forced to be aware of risks to their privacy. With the opening of markets for profiles, privacy may finally find a concrete value. Rishab Aiyer Ghosh is a freelance technology consultant and writer. You can reach him through voice mail (+91 11 3760335) or e-mail (rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in) --====(C) Copyright 1994 Rishab Aiyer Ghosh. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED====-- This article may be redistributed in electronic form only, PROVIDED THAT THE ARTICLE AND THIS NOTICE REMAIN INTACT. This article MAY NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES be redistributed in any non-electronic form, or redistributed in any form for compensation of any kind, WITHOUT PRIOR WRITTEN PERMISSION from Rishab Aiyer Ghosh (rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in) --==================================================================-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "In between the breaths is rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in the space where we live" rishab(a)arbornet.org - Lawrence Durrell Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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No Subject
by Anonymous User 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Pierre Uszynski writes: > Significant abuse is > that which causes significant problems for the operators: posting > secret religious technology, forging prime minister mail, harrassing a > member of any number of opposite persuasions, etc... on that note, check out this excerpt from the remailer-help file of the q(a)c2.org remailer: > Abuse/Self-Preservation Policy: > Abuse of the Q Mixmaster Remailer consists in those uses of the remailer > which endanger its continued operation. Please don't ruin anonymity > services for those people with legitimate needs for them.

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Response to CBS News "drive-by" attack on the internet
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

January 10, 1995 Eric Ober President, CBS News 524 W. 57th Street New York, NY 10019 Dear Mr. Ober: In its 1/9/95 evening news broadcast, CBS aired a segment presenting a number of people who argued that the content of school libraries, written communications, and electronic communications should be censored for the common good. Since CBS did not present anyone with an opposing point of view, I assume the position presented is believed by CBS to be correct and not controversial. At first I was concerned about your network's apparent lack of support of first amendment rights to freedom of speech and of the press. Then I realized that these freedoms are only to discuss topics which could not result in physical or moral harm to anyone. I have some friends who share your concerns. They have been trying for years to reduce availability of morally dangerous materials like _The_Catcher_In_The_Rye_ and _Heather_Has_Two_Mommies_. They will be so excited to hear that you are now on their side. Sincerely, Brad Dolan bdolan(a)well.sf.ca.us

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Re: Anonymous videoconferencing applications
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Alan Bostick writes: > I thought so too, at first; but then I thought of this obvious application: [lurid details omitted ;] "Ever seen your children bound and blindfolded from across the globe ? You will...." > Whether technology is going to be developed for the convenience of > kidnappers and terrorists is an open question. I'd answer, "Undoubtedly," but I wonder just how readily available such technology would be to, uh, the rest of us. > But there is clearly > at least this one clear use for anonymous video conferencing. Perhaps headhunters would find it handy for anonymous job interviews with candidates who prefer to remain nameless, but not jobless.... -L. Futplex McCarthy - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLxIrqmf7YYibNzjpAQGE9AQAlSGdkOEWsbXICCygoa4Sr+Gj9y91xHeS 3YpA40lODXDmvAoIxWRtpOt2k3a1G381xwxaSCh7b+Wh90V4dknS/ysvu/VLLdUG k1H/eGttn+TzcVPARc0fxExDV5yNxueDRaqil1sDnsgtVyBMzCmu6jdHKL4molku 5zN0SLh2RLY= =zmcz - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLxIstCoZzwIn1bdtAQFiIQF9Ho6rMKp+ii7kSgFalxf8j+05ZHTFkxCc /LQUDOvxy1jXK5+EpaOwP/LyI5fru7YQ =ZD2g -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Data Haven problems
by pstemari＠erinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:25 PM 1/9/95, dfloyd(a)io.com wrote: > ... Of course, the DH will be hidden by a good remailer (anon.penet.fi), but >it is trivial to use traffic analysis to find where the DH lies. Just >monitor traffic from/to the remailer and do a series of store/retrives. >Then for confirmation, forge a mail from the dh site to the remailer with >the password (obtained from sniffing) to yourself. ... Hmm, hmm. Using c'punk remailers with encrypted send blocks fixes one problem, especially if the c'punk mailers do some sort of file splitting and reassembly along the lines of what happens to IP packets that are too large for a given link. What would also help would be a mechanism for randomly varying the encrypted send-to block. The password replay attacks can be fixed by encrypting the transmitted password along with a timestamp/sequence number. One problem that remains would be a trail left by the increased traffic to/from a DH vs a normal user. That could only be fixed by a multitude of DH sites. --Paul J. Ste. Marie pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com

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