December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Don't trust the net too much
by rfreeman＠netaxs.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Shostack <adam(a)bwh.harvard.edu> wrote: > I hate to join any thread which talks about blowing up rooms >and killing security guards, but I'll point out that for a few >hundered dollars worth of transmitter parts, you can cause transient >failures with EMF pulse weapons, and for a bit more, you can fry all >the electronics, then drive away before they have any idea that their >company has been destroyed. > > Killing people is a stupid way to accomplish things. I would have to agree, and since this whole thread seems to be one of those conspiracy things, it is completely unnecessary to cause much at all in the way of physical damage. No matter who rents the T1 lines and other forms of communication that unite an ISP with the rest of the world, sooner or later they have to enter some sort of communications node. This could be a satellite or some huge telephone routing center, or any number of things. If the government wanted you shut down, all they have to do is find one of these things for each redundant line to an ISP and cut them all simultaneously. I am sure a court order could be obtained very quickly to arrange such a thing, and even this may not be necessary. I read in some magazine about ten years ago that all US-launched communications satellites contain software that allows the government to ascertain direct control over their functioning. The purpose stated was that in the event of war the US is highly dependent on commercial satellites for non-military communications and can not afford to have the Soviets (or whatever foreign power) trying to reprogram our satellites utilizing security loopholes on the part of the owning company. In any case, unless the ISP is actually expecting some terrorist group to attack their center and has taken deliberate steps to protect themselves (an absurdly expensive proposition for just about anyone except the military), I doubt there is much that could prevent even a private citizen from taking them out, let alone a well-organized group. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Richard T. Freeman <rfreeman(a)netaxs.com> - finger for pgp key 3D CB AF BD FF E8 0B 10 4E 09 27 00 8D 27 E1 93 http://www.netaxs.com/~rfreeman - ftp.netaxs.com/people/rfreeman

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Moby ints [Re: Num Rat]
by Jim Gillogly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> pjm(a)ionia.engr.sgi.com (Patrick May) writes: > This invocation of the name of the diety reminds me of a question > I've been meaning to ask. Is Knuth still a good source of algorithms > for implementing large integers or do more recent books exist that > contain superior methods? While Knuth is now and forever the algorithm deity in general, Arjen Lenstra is as close to godhood as one can get in moby ints these days. I'd look at the Lip package Lenstra wrote; it's used in his state of the art factoring programs. It's available with masses of PostScript documentation from ftp.ox.ac.uk. Studying the code and docs might remind you of some issues that aren't obvious... and, of course, you might decide you don't need to write a moby int package, but could just use his library. Jim Gillogly Hevensday, 18 Afterlithe S.R. 1995, 18:48

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proxy down?
by nobody＠valhalla.phoenix.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Recent attempts to use the AOL proxy service have failed (it used to work perfectly). Anybody else notice this? Is anybody running a proxy2proxy setup?

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My Experience with Moderated Lists and Groups
by Phil Fraering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Forgive me if you've seen this twice... I got disconnected the first time). From: tcmay(a)sensemedia.net (Timothy C. May) Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk I've been on several moderated mailing lists. There are those who moderate very lightly, moderately, and heavily. I guess the first uses regular water as the moderator, and the latter some sort of deuterated water. My nuclear physics is a little rusty, though, so I have to ask: does the "moderately" moderated system use liquid sodium? Phil

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Re: My Experience with Moderated Lists and Groups
by Dave Horsfall 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 11 Jul 1995, Bill Stewart wrote: > Remember when the alt.network got started? One of the first two groups > that led to its founding was alt.sources [...] > The other was one of the recipes newsgroups, where there was a bit more > controversy. I thought one of them was alt.drugs? -- Dave Horsfall (VK2KFU) | dave(a)esi.com.au | VK2KFU @ VK2AAB.NSW.AUS.OC | PGP 2.6 Opinions expressed are mine. | E7 FE 97 88 E5 02 3C AE 9C 8C 54 5B 9A D4 A0 CD

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Re: Speedup of bruterc4.c
by Timothy L. Nali 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For linux boxes (or perhaps 486 and pentium machines in general), try adding the flag -funroll-all-loops to the compile line. gcc -O2 -funroll-all-loops -m486 -o brute bruterc4.c Here are my results on a Linux 486/33 Original code (Adam+Tatu) : 5405 keys/sec Original code with -funroll-all-loops : 5991 keys/sec Original code with Russell's changes and a couple of my own and -funroll-all-loops : 6393 keys/sec Here are the changes I made: If we assume that the length of the cyphertext and known text is less than 256 bytes, then the following works. This gives you a whopping 40 additional keys/sec. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- int rc4_eq(unsigned char *buffer_ptr, unsigned char *known, unsigned char *cypher_txt, int buffer_len, rc4_key *key) { unsigned int t; unsigned int y = 0; unsigned char* state; unsigned int xorIndex; unsigned int counter; state = &key->state[0]; for(counter=0;counter < buffer_len;counter++) { y = (state[counter+1] + y) & 0xFF; swap_byte(state[counter+1], state[y]); xorIndex = (state[counter+1] + state[y]) & 0xFF; buffer_ptr[counter] ^= state[xorIndex]; if (known[counter] != buffer_ptr[counter]) { memcpy(buffer_ptr,cypher_txt,counter+1); return 0; } } return 1; } -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Also, I could not get Russell's changes to work exactly as he posted them (I suspect it's because I'm using a very old linux system). Here's my prepare_key function. I basically took out the counter++ parts. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- /* excellent optimised prepare key by Tatu Ylonen ylo(a)cs.hut.fi */ void prepare_key(unsigned char *key_data_ptr, int key_data_len, rc4_key *key) { unsigned int t; unsigned int index2; unsigned char* state; unsigned int counter; unsigned int k0, k1, k2, k3, k4; state = &key->state[0]; memcpy(state,sequence,256); index2 = 0; k0 = key_data_ptr[0]; k1 = key_data_ptr[1]; k2 = key_data_ptr[2]; k3 = key_data_ptr[3]; k4 = key_data_ptr[4]; for(counter = 0; counter < 255; counter+=5) { t = state[counter]; index2 = (index2 + k0 + t) & 0xff; state[counter] = state[index2]; state[index2] = t; t = state[counter + 1]; index2 = (index2 + k1 + t) & 0xff; state[counter + 1] = state[index2]; state[index2] = t; t = state[counter + 2]; index2 = (index2 + k2 + t) & 0xff; state[counter + 2] = state[index2]; state[index2] = t; t = state[counter + 3]; index2 = (index2 + k3 + t) & 0xff; state[counter + 3] = state[index2]; state[index2] = t; t = state[counter + 4]; index2 = (index2 + k4 + t) & 0xff; state[counter + 4] = state[index2]; state[index2] = t; } t = state[255]; index2 = (index2 + k0 + t) & 0xff; state[255] = state[index2]; state[index2] = t; } ------------------------------------------------------------------------ _____________________________________________________________________________ Tim Nali \ "We are the music makers, and we are the dreamers of tn0s(a)andrew.cmu.edu \ the dreams" -Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory

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Denver area meeting, Saturday, 7/15, 2 pm
by adwestro＠ouray.cudenver.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Once again, we'll congregate in the food court at the Tivoli, adjacent to the Auraria campus, and possibly wander elsewhere. We'll probably get updates on the David Triska and New Order prosecutions, which have interesting 1st and 4th Amendment ramifications, but there's no specific agenda. Send email for directions, etc. Oh yeah, this goes out to "Louie da Misnamed" Freeh and the Overseers of Freehdom, for their unceasing vigilance regarding the transnational dissemination of Politically Incorrect Bits: ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [006/713] ------------------- MPTGLPBHDHSW<(,<O,D$XB'2TA`HQ4D'H@R#<)[Z3*D$P80%N*8D1:Q6"T`\J M/*/<G_$-/L9&%#L)P@HD82`ZHPG4$%#L*`A7D8M#F(/>"($GRAT$8246(Q:3 M$0`]G'"*AMF#]4C$1,S5"$(O!.%!+4$XAV/8@*7PAP>>J`6A$&>Q%W/1#,Z0 ------------------------------------------------------------- Alan Westrope <awestrop(a)nyx10.cs.du.edu> __________/|-, <adwestro(a)ouray.cudenver.edu> (_) \|-' 2.6.2 public key: finger / servers PGP 0xB8359639: D6 89 74 03 77 C8 2D 43 7C CA 6D 57 29 25 69 23

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Re: A more sophisticated form of moderation.
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:45 PM 7/11/95 -0500, Michael James Gebis wrote: >Specifically, I was thinking along the lines of a newsgroup where only >selected individuals are able to post, but anybody who wants to can read >the group. However, the "selected individuals" could fall into several >categories. Not hard to implement things like this. With the current non-cryptoized moderation system, anybody can post to a moderated group by putting an "Approved:" header line on their article. And articles can be cancelled by anyone who wants to forge an cancel, so articles with forged approvals can be cancelmoosed away if people want. You could set up a cancelbot that trashes any article that doesn't have the magic words from the FAQ Approved: Squeamish Ossifrage in the header, or doesn't have the right digital signature in the approvals, where you've only given teh keys to the Moderation Cabal. Or, for a system where mail has to go to a moderator first, similar to the current mail-to-moderator posting method, you could set up a mail-pool for the moderator's address, that sends each article out to 1..N of the moderators (e.g. to whoever's on duty today, or everybody, or a random k of the moderators for load-sharing), who could then post them. If you want a mailing-list approach, they're easier - just send your mailing list through procmail on the mailhost, and set it up to accept/reject/etc. whoever your list policy wants. If somebody comes out with D News, the crypto-cancel-based system, it can use a digital signature system like RIPEM-SIG (which is exportable) or some equivalent we can build out of PGP after the PGP 3.0 toolkit becomes available. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com

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Re: RACIST MILITIA: ATF
by liberty＠gate.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm sure that this will be widely covered in the media. _NOT_! [Prediction: *Gentle* wrist slaps, *nobody* fired, promotions.] Also, are there any C-punks in south Florida right now (besides me)? If so, please respond by private e-mail. Thanks. Regards, JMR - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMANHyG1lp8bpvW01AQFUBgP/cNxu8ead5MBGtggEwR/80a0DmA1fUgmy X2xJpXCu7NUGT2rPZR9jni1guBOVHKypC6ZsaW3jDpaENX/l/2YxrE6nakVKR9qm ae46QZC23Lm155ieOOBT8V50MglkWuYhgDf9+w/JxmS11R26pYNezgzuqNsLCGdg 6hq7WK6+t8c= =S2pc - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMANJJioZzwIn1bdtAQE53QGAoOMNWiua7qQp7OD5g8Ok8WsX4EnPtjL3 jU6ONKYHJrhBnNAMPn7z67B/NeGevq5Q =/U9Z -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: PGP Anti- ITAR sig
by alano＠teleport.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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