December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: TIME pathfinder registration
by ab411＠detroit.freenet.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Will Kinney <kinney(a)bogart.Colorado.EDU> writes: >> I note someone has used "cypherpunks" as a login for TIME Mag's >> WWW service. ... If so, what's the password? > >This was me. The password is "writecode", since Pathfinder didn't allow >the login and password to be the same. Perhaps in the future people might use "sknuprehpyc" in such cases? And of course, don't put the list's email address in. -- David R. Conrad, ab411(a)detroit.freenet.org, http://web.grfn.org/~conrad/ Finger conrad(a)grfn.org for PGP 2.6 public key; it's also on my home page Key fingerprint = 33 12 BC 77 48 81 99 A5 D8 9C 43 16 3C 37 0B 50 No, his mind is not for rent to any god or government.

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Stego-Rants ?
by Douglas B. Renner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just a few thoughts: 1. Use the randomness in a computer generated piece of English text to hold your real message, encrypted, and obscured. 2. Even more entertaining would be if the foreground text could somehow be contrived to be meaningful. I know this would be a "good trick" but I'd conjecture that it's possible. Imagine fractal compression of a text file, with the decompression routine adding some "randomness" which would be your message, obscured at a very abstract level. Depending on how much "randomness" was added, I'm wondering if the resulting text might possibly retain some of its original legibility (?) I am assuming that a companion fractal re-compressing routine would be required to retrieve the cypher. (I am looking at an ad for a graphics program, "Images Incorporated" by Iterated Systems which with fractal techniques can achieve 100:1 compression -- and then -- decompress to 8 times the original bitmap size with minimal added distortion.) Doug

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RE: Automatic Rant generator
by Bolivar Shagnasty 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May wrote: >That is, in this limited domain of "letters to the editor/ >Congressmen," can a letter generator be implemented which >generates letters effectively indistinguishable from letters >and fax generated by actual human beings? ("Effectively >indistinguishable" in the sense that a human reader could >not sort a set of letters into human- and machine-generated >subsets with statistically significant certainty better than >guessing). >Bart's comments about using Knuth's typographic work are interesting, to >the extent that letters need to look handwritten. In the Mac market, it's >possible to send in some handwriting samples and get back a font that >emulates the handwriting! Reading this thread it suddenly became clear: -The appearance of a letter being handwritten is a temporary factor at best. Within a very few years (2-3 I would guess) the growth in the use of email and the volume of communications to be sorted into For and Against piles will cause a sudden and dramatic shift in Congress to a strong preference for incoming email. Within 10 years they may refuse paper mail. Any month now someone in Congress will tip to the fact that email can be processed by programs that can identify the issue and the pro or con position of the writer. Constituents will be encouraged to write, but only in the form of email, and to state their position clearly and concisely, i.e. in a form suitable for successful parsing, analysis, and classification. -Political letter renderers will become common on the Web before Nov. 1996. There are already renderers of graphic images on the Web. There would be more if it were easy to pay with a 25-cent token, and it *will* be widespread and easy to do that, very very soon. Political letter renderers don't have to wait for mass participation in online payment mechanisms -- they have ready-made sponsors. Unlike the occasional effort to sponsor phone calls by making an 800 number available, sponsors of letter rendering services can be sure those services won't be seriously misused: The 2nd Amendment CongressLetter WebPage will *only* render letters *against* H-1234 or *for* S-2345, for example. The Tree Hugger CongressLetter WebPage (no trees died for this Page) will *only* render letters *against* H-9876, etc. etc. Each will return the result of the rendering to you at your email address if you don't want to copy it off the web page. *You* will send the email to your congresscritter. The process will be easy: Right now any decent programmer could write code to allow choices from Column A, B, etc. to generate a plausible letter. Generalized, this will allow the operators to create templates for each new issue, untouched by programmer hands. Enhancements will make style, grammar, spelling, punctuation variations increasingly sophisticated. -Rendering services will push email over into reality for Congress. Strangely, though the rendered letter is in large part a fabrication, it will be this ersatz form of personal communication that will finally force Congress to accept the reality of email. Even though generated by computer, the rendered letter will still be an expression of a constituent's opinion on an issue. It will rapidly become the preferred method of expression for many people who simply don't have time to make a career out of writing to politicians. -Congress will respond with automated mail tallying. Whatever chance there is that your present handwritten letter may actually be *read* will vanish completely in the age of email. Your letter will be eaten by an analyzer, acknowledged by an intelligent renderer that may even refer to passages in your letter (and may even SEEM TO AGREE WITH YOU), and then be trashed. Letters may be sidetracked if they contain certain unacceptable things, because the suits have to be kept busy, but most incoming mail will vanish after tallying. -There could be "agent" wars, but they will not be of consequence. In the beginning, the politicos may wish to commission software enhancements and intelligence gathering to enable mail scanning agents to filter out email generated by letter renderers. Developers of the analysis software may try to find vocabulary and phraseology patterns with which to arm the analysis agents to toss rendered letters aside. In the end, though, this will be a losing battle and a counterproductive one. If 50 million rendered letters come in from 50 million real voters, they had better *not* be ignored or 50 million voters will take vengeance at the polls. An expression of opinion is an expression of opinion, and the sophistication of the tools employed to generate them will be able to stay ahead of the technology for detecting them in any case. -Interaction with Congress may ultimately take the form of battling proxies. On the one side are arrayed the forces of the A party, the shining letter rendering algorithms, vocab lists, grammar rules, and the latest in provably accurate slang and misuse of the language. On the other side, the forces of the B party, with essentially similar tools. In the middle is Congress, gleaming mail analyzers polished and ready. Strangest of all is that all the effort of rendering and analyzing letters will go into the creation and consumption of communication particles that may eventually never be seen by "author" *or* "recipient." The electorate will express itself by proxy and the elected officials will divine the political winds by proxy. Voters will be hard-sold to sign up for ongoing personally authorized letter rendering, so they can go fishing. Congresscritters will be assured that the analyzers will figure out which way the winds are blowing, so they can go fishing. May the best proxy win. Maybe voter and congresscritter will meet somewhere, fishing, and actually *communicate*. Perish the thought! >>Another factor that would make it appear more authentic would be spelling >>and grammar errors. The grammar errors could be built into the rant >>generators... There has been a BBS "door" available for several years that does this convincingly... if you're a sysop and run a "sysop chat" door but want to play mind games when you're not available, SHAMPAGE will answer the user's request to page the sysop and chat with him or her. It is configurable to recognize keywords and make random selections from lists of responses to those keywords. It converses believably as if it were a somewhat distracted, tired and disjoint human being. I saw a log of a SHAMPAGE session in which a caller never realized he was conversing with a robot. It kept calling attention to the late hour and the caller kept apologizing for the intrusion and asking for a file he needed. As luck would have it, the random utterings and random selections of responses to keywords were often right on the mark. Too weird! After several hundred lines of chat the caller finally gathered that the "sysop" was really pissed at being kept up so late and logged off, somewhat offended himself. SHAMPAGE typed in real time, with humanlike varying inter-keystroke timing, and makes "typos." It "noticed" its mistakes a few keystrokes later and backspaced to correct them. It typed "hte" instead of "the" and "ign" instead of "ing." It was a riot. With some enhancement it would be completely believable even to the forewarned caller. I've also seen an incomplete attempt to bring the ELIZA concept up to date and implement it as a BBS door. Though it typed line-at-a-time like a BBS teleconference, it still managed to confuse callers into thinking it was a real person by simple tricks of inverting pronouns and such. It, like the chat door, seemed to be uncanny at randomly choosing just the right thing to say to cinch the caller's presumption that it was a human being. Bolivar

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Automatic Rant generator
by Jonathon Blake 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Date: Mon Jul 17, 1995 5:22 pm GMT From: Timothy C. May Subject: Automated Rant Generators and Letter Generators At 7:35 AM 7/17/95, Martin Hamilton wrote: >MONTY HARDER writes: > >| Anyone who has read MAD Magazine could put such together. As an added >| bonus, use variable margin settings, and none of the letters would be >| exactly the same. Appropriate Imail => FAX software on a puter in DC >| (local call that way) with the phone number of the sender filled in on >| the top line for ID (izzat legal?) so it doesn't look like a form letter >| at all. > >Plus - choose the fonts & point sizes at random too ? :-) Tim May > Cypherpunks could probably have an effect on Tim May > hastening this "denial of service" attack on the Tim May > efficacy of letter-writing by releasing an easy-to- Tim May > use package that does all this letter writing at Tim May > the click of a button....just type in some key Tim May > words, for the topics, and it does the rest. Tim May > An interesting project, actually. Actually, your little project could cause some major problems in a area you may not anticipate --- personnel selection. Specifically, the use of Handwriting Analysis as a tool for personnel profiling. Date: Mon Jul 17, 1995 11:48 pm GMT From: Harry Bartholomew Subject: Re: Automated Rant Generators and Letter Generators Harry > A final step might be to interface the output to old Harry > pen plotters like my HP7470A with an ascii-to- Harry > handwriting program. Akin to the White House Harry > souvenir signature generator, but with a set of Harry > parameters to mimic different "hands". Knuth's Harry > Metafont tricks come to mind. Making the little problem Tim presents, a major headache for somebody else --- handwriting analysts. Date: Tue Jul 18, 1995 1:18 am GMT From: Timothy C. May Subject: Re: Automated Rant Generators and Letter Generators Tim May > Bart's comments about using Knuth's typographic Tim May > work are interesting, to the extent that letters Tim May > need to look handwritten. In the Mac market, it's Tim May > possible to send in some handwriting samples and Tim May > get back a font that emulates the handwriting! Actually, True Type fonts of your handwriting are available, for any platform that accepts that font type. I don't have the URL for them, but there is a pointer to it at HTTP://www.ntu.ac.sg/~tjlow/gclub.html Tim May > I don't think the pen plotter is actually needed- Tim May > - and few people would use it--as most fax can Using it would play hell for handwriting analysts, though. And if it was programmed to change the pen pressure as well --- the possibilities are staggering. Can a pen plotter change pressure? Tim May > be emulated with laser printers (due of course to Tim May > the limited dots per inch resolution). In fact, Tim May > most fax modems can directly fax from any screen Tim May > that can produce printed output. So, the Tim May > combination of handwriting fonts, automated rant Tim May > generators (of varying rabidities), and fax Tim May > capabilities gives a pretty good start. Using lots Tim May > of handwriting samples, various other fonts, and a Tim May > mix of styles in the letters will help. Tim May > Anyway, where this all gets interesting is the Tim May > following: * Can a kind of Turing Test be tried Tim May > here? But of course. Tim May > That is, in this limited domain of "letters to the Tim May > editor/Congressmen," can a letter generator be Tim May > implemented which generates letters effectively Tim May > indistinguishable from letters and fax generated Tim May > by actual human beings? ("Effectively Tim May > indistinguishable" in the sense that a human reader Tim May > could not sort a set of letters into human- and Tim May > machine-generated subsets with statistically Tim May > significant certainty better than guessing). I don't remember the title, but at least one french novel was rumored to have been entirely generated by computer. Tim May > Of course this is also similar to the "style Tim May > detectors" we so often talk about. I don't remember the program name, but there is software available now, that analyzes a document, and figures out who wrote it --- based on the frequency count of the letters of the alphabet. Secondary measures are frequency counts of letter pairs. Words, phrases, sentences etc are totally ignored. So what you'd need to do here, to pass your pseudo- Turing Test is a program that generates different statistical results, for allegedly different people. Tim May > The crypto relevance has to do with detecting Tim May > patterns in letters and rants, in emulating these Tim May > patterns, and (perhaps) in speeding up lobbying. Tim May > (Though I agree that widespread adoption of Tim May > automated letter-writing, such as the direct mail Tim May > folks are already doing, will eventually just kill Tim May > off letter writing as a means of lobbying.) Tim May > This may also hasten the adoption, someday, of Tim May > digital signatures. Congressmen and their aides Tim May > may check incoming letters against databases of Tim May > their constituents who have "registered" with them Tim May > (lots of issues here). Or might just subject all mail to various automations, which accept/reject mail, based on what it looks for. << If it passes the congress person's Turing Test, it is read, as being authentic --- although I doubt half the people in the capital could actually pass a Turing Test to begin with. >> Tim May > Merely counting the "yes" and "no" letters has long Tim May > been problematic, as the Republicans have been Tim May > leading in direct mail campaigns since at least the Tim May > mid-70s (recall Richard Viguerie...). Increased Tim May > automation will just make it even more obvious. Date: Tue Jul 18, 1995 5:23 pm GMT From: Timothy C. May Subject: Re: Automated Rant Generators and Letter Generators Tim May > David Conrad told me he meant for this to go to the Tim May > whole list, but only sent it to me by mistake. So Tim May > here is his post. At 4:14 PM 7/18/95, David R. Conrad wrote: >Tim May <tcmay(a)sensemedia.net> writes: >>Bart's comments about using Knuth's typographic work are interesting, to >>the extent that letters need to look handwritten. In the Mac market, it's >>possible to send in some handwriting samples and get back a font that >>emulates the handwriting! > >I suppose the resulting font has only one form for each letter? (Although >I understand that when you send them a sample, you send several instances >of each letter; a friend was showing me an add for this.) The fact that >each letter is the same every time would be a giveaway. We need something >like Metafont, or at least choose from a number of different shapes. > >> ... So, the combination of >>handwriting fonts, automated rant generators (of varying rabidities), and >>fax capabilities gives a pretty good start. Using lots of handwriting >>samples, various other fonts, and a mix of styles in the letters will help. > >Another factor that would make it appear more authentic would be spelling >and grammar errors. The grammar errors could be built into the rant >generators (an occasional dangling modifier, an incomplete sentence or two); >spelling errors could be done by post-processing the output of the rantgens. >It's important to take into account the different types of spellos that >occur: commonly misspelled words (aquired, beleive); wrong homophone (their, >they're, there; two, to, too); transposed letters (transpoesd); near-misses >on qwerty keyboards (nesr-mosses); and words left out. > >-- >David R. Conrad, ab411(a)detroit.freenet.org, http://web.grfn.org/~conrad/ >Finger conrad(a)grfn.org for PGP 2.6 public key; it's also on my home page >Key fingerprint = 33 12 BC 77 48 81 99 A5 D8 9C 43 16 3C 37 0B 50 >No, his mind is not for rent to any god or government. Actually, the usual give away, is in letter and letter pair frequencies --- not spelling mistakes, grammatical errors, etc. However, there a technique called _Scientific Content ANalysis_ that looks at how things are said, to judge their "truthfulness." A good program will not show that the text was randomly generated, nor show that the author is off-the- wall, so to speak. You may have bitten off a bit more than you can chew here. OTOH, a group that tries to crack keys, knowing that the possibility of success is slim to non-existent, can probably pull this one off --- if only because the possibility of success is pretty good. Er, how did the cracking of the key go? Last I read 60+%, and no hints of it being broken. << I almost want to participate, but with a dx25, running NovellDos, I'm not sure what that platform could do. << I''ll graduate to Linux, after I buy some more memory, and a new hard drive for that sytem. >> >> xan jonathon -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCzAwUBMAyFtaVRQvz57IB1AQF25wTvQD+eQVxvKOwin+Izb4d5c0u7i6JWWSZR BoY9T3b7BEhiU6EfKgP4BZabi8gHTM742ROCXAvCZQusWAxLfXSOKwjmUs5ieaD7 f6cEB8/D+EZu395qa0bCu28/hLmKslQvXvsWoMpxcHzhjEHJhYs/0BQxHZoZMsrM PrfFLqrhdJzhPYn5iy83nhBB54GlKnCIBgfEqaZnHjjC2hzZJJo= =GyP/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Govt mandated key
by hoz＠univel.telescan.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If I have to pay for each key that I use, then I have a particular key in mind for my one time pad. It's a single (trancendental) number that starts with a decimal point. It's the binary equivalent of the decimal number: .012345678910111213141516171819202122...... I promise to only use this one key, and I'll just select a random offset into it for each message. Rick F. Hoselton (who doesn't claim to present opinions for others)

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Re: bi-directional dining cryptographers
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:24 PM 7/17/95 -0500, Phil Fraering wrote: >I'd also like to point out that this system indicates that during >an attack/disruption on a traditional dc-net, the disruptor can >tell what the original person was trying to send, even though noone >else can. > >And then perhaps XOR the data with something offensive, and if the >original sender tries to re-send, broadcast the result of the XOR, >resulting in a total net output of the offensive material. That's difficult - you have to identify that the sender is sending the same message while the message is being sent, rather than one or two bit-times later, and you can't fake encryption with an unknown keyid or digital signatures. (Digital signatures aren't something everybody would use very often on a DC-net, since the purpose of the net is to be anonymous, but since you can do anonymous broadcasts, you can anonymously post a signature key for your nym if you want to.) Also, there's no need to combine jamming and posting an offensive message; they both work well separately. I suppose you could do that if you only want to harass the net a bit (e.g. replace all trafic to remailer X with new remail to whitehouse.gov, or replace all postings from Cancelmoose with complaints about censorship), but basically DCnets degrade rapidly if the social structure of the net members does. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com

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Re: Zimmerman legal fund
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Anon writes: > Could someone in the know talk about the relationship between FV and > the ZLDF? I don't like to spread misinformation, so I won't answer > based on conjectures. I'd be interested to hear this too, but what I am concerned about is that the whole thing is too strongly tied to first virtual. I mean there was the Yellow Ribbon Campaign but all URLs out of that page point to FV, no mention of the at least two other (more convenient for most people, and hence in Phil Zs interests) methods: a) PGPed email CC no. to Phil Dubois (Phil Zs chief legal counsel) b) similar PGPed email CC no. to some guy in Europe who was offering to collect up all of the European donations, and send them to Dubois in lump sums to save on currency exchange costs. Both of these I believe have been signed by people who directly have their keys signed by Phil Z himself, I have a copy of PGP signed a) saved from the original post made by Hugh Miller <hmiller(a)orion.it.luc.edu> and this is what I show to people who ask. (copy of the bank details from Hugh's post pasted below as [1] original PGP signed post by Hugh by email). Geoffrey Kidd <kalothi1(a)violet.berkeley.edu> has the details from Hugh's post in his Phil Z Blood Bank which he posts to alt.security.pgp periodically, the idea being that enough folks give money to the Phil Z legal defense fund on a regular small donation basis, if enough people did this he could be supported indefinately. What I would like to know is why neither of these [a) or b)], and especially why a) has not been mentioned on any of the widely advertised yellow ribbon campaign pages... is it for Phil Z ... or is it for Phil Z with the provision that you start a FV account something which not everyone who wants to contribute to Phil Z is likely to want to be bothered doing. No slur on FV, just it adds unnecesary complications to donations, through what now must be _the_ most widely publisized USENET based effort to raise funds for Phil. Adam [1] ====================================================================== [...] To send a check or money order by mail, make it payable, NOT to Phil Zimmermann, but to "Philip L. Dubois, Attorney Trust Account." Mail the check or money order to the following address: Philip Dubois 2305 Broadway Boulder, CO USA 80304 (Phone #: 303-444-3885) To send a wire transfer, your bank will need the following information: Bank: VectraBank Routing #: 107004365 Account #: 0113830 Account Name: "Philip L. Dubois, Attorney Trust Account" Now here's the neat bit. You can make a donation to the PZDF by Internet mail on your VISA or MasterCard. Worried about snoopers intercepting your e-mail? Don't worry -- use PGP. Simply compose a message in plain ASCII text giving the following: the recipient ("Philip L. Dubois, Attorney Trust Account"); the bank name of your VISA or MasterCard; the name which appears on it (yours, hopefully :-)); a telephone number at which you can be reached in case of problems; the card number; date of expiry; and, most important, the amount you wish to donate. (Make this last item as large as possible.) Then use PGP to encrypt and ASCII-armor the message using Phil Dubois's public key, enclosed below. (You can also sign the message if you like.)i E-mail the output file to Phil Dubois (dubois(a)csm.org) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ [this is a mistake Hugh made Dubois' address is dubois(a)csn.org as can be easily verified from his PGP key, which is signed by Phil Z also] Please be sure to use a "Subject:" line reading something like "Phil Zimmermann Defense Fund" so he'll know to decrypt it right away. Here is Phil Dubois's public key: - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.7 mQCNAiyaTboAAAEEAL3DOizygcxAe6OyfcuMZh2XnyfqmLKFDAoX0/FJ4+d2frw8 5TuXc/k5qfDWi+AQCdJaNVT8jlg6bS0HD55gLoV+b6VZxzIpHWKqXncA9iudfZmR rtx4Es82n8pTBtxa7vcQPhCXfjfl+lOMrICkRuD/xB/9X1/XRbZ7C+AHeDONAAUR tCFQaGlsaXAgTC4gRHVib2lzIDxkdWJvaXNAY3NuLm9yZz6JAJUCBRAsw4TxZXmE uMepZt0BAT0OA/9IoCBZLFpF9lhV1+epBi49hykiHefRdQwbHmLa9kO0guepdkyF i8kqJLEqPEUIrRtiZVHiOLLwkTRrFHV7q9lAuETJMDIDifeV1O/TGVjMiIFGKOuN dzByyidjqdlPFtPZtFbzffi9BomTb8O3xm2cBomxxqsV82U3HDdAXaY5Xw== =5uit - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- * * * This campaign letter will be posted in a number of Usenet groups. I will also be turning it into a FAQ-formatted document, which will be posted monthly in the relevant groups and which will be available by anonymous ftp from ftp://ftp.math.luc.edu/pub/hmiller/PGP/pzdf.FAQ. If you come upon, or up with, any other ways in which we can help raise funds for Phil, drop me a line at hmiller(a)luc.edu and let me know, so that I can put it in the FAQ. [...] ====================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQCVAwUBMAvXCSnIuJ1VakpnAQEicgP7Bn6ryN540LbdneN4PXyrODCzjy4fgW9b XP5PG8ledoro374I/ZuOJvL8HLcSNBRRrJE1MpIRykEHi8cXlpINLdsxqVlat+OI TxsEPntsH5WJJsaFb+xFdcAj681IEGFLJWdfx44SlH0eHVcsmQLmj5P3e/XUeIYr 1W3pyym0a0E= =bzs2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: speeding detected by civilians
by btmoore＠iquest.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 02:01 PM 7/13/95 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >hate to start another endless thread on speeding limits, but >this is an interesting privacy anecdote... hope this hasn't >been posted here. > > >=== > >From: "Steven M. Horvath" <horvath(a)comm.mot.com> >Subject: Speeder's Beware of Vernon Hills, IL. >To: snet-l <snet-l(a)world.std.com> > >- - -------- FYI------------------FYI--------------------FYI----------------- > >Vernon Hills, IL. > >Vernon Hills, Illinois, a Chicago suburb, has passed legislation allowing >citizens to check out radar guns from the local police department to >catch speeders in their community. The radar guns are combined with >cameras in order to instantaneously capture the car, license number, and the >rate of speed. The citizens can check out the units for a week at a time. The >police have stated that they, at this time, will use the data to issue >warning letters to the violaters. > > > > > > >- ------- End of Forwarded Message Actually... this sounds like a GREAT IDEA!!! Do you know how many cops you could catch with one of those??? I cannot count the times I've had cops go by me at speeds in excess of 80 mph without lights or sirens! Everyone ought to check one of those things out, catch the cops and turn it in to your local media establisment! Benjamin T. Moore, Jr. btmoore(a)iquest.net (Jian #AJF - IRChat) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMBMV/4SAJOVFNaChAQEO0wf/W8Nudez5Xu6+VqomN6jlE5aKixkNz59M UTh9y57zRMuYr1sE1abqr90kmANwo6bG8CmOmn1CS9vnGjvhzO4MeJJGfsc3elwT EMXTJy4Er5DPoswqUehNKghKvoNEvxL0+CUcTVjkMNCrOt6O5oetUq4hzPBKwC8a G98Mk8uTZ64YpU1IIZQmHaZrUgA0DpV2tDFA3vX4dSxpeKYP0EHmEIeV1jL8kax+ /DQqYYzYaQYGjfA7bAo6d9jBJkjlPqSYiJVnjTKSScqF7ke31nPfNMCC1B+XdhpQ G7+rDEcyFubj0awwV8liYE7dnM3j0wxAy9hb0fzNINUv5xNjbj3KTA== =sx7M -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: big word listing
by monty.harder＠famend.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

AS> > <process-ID.clock@hostname>password AS> > AS> >and sends it to the server as "APOP username 58349485whatever89583449". AS> Of course, this requires the user password to be stored unencrypted on the AS> server; which you may not want to do. Here's a variation, then: Instead of using process-id.clock to generate the random stuff for the challenge, have your own (P)RNG make up a bunch of them ahead of time, calculate the hashes, and store the challenges and hashes on the server. The password file is kept encrypted, and only decrypted to run the above. You could even do the whole thing by remote access, making up a batch of id: pairs of challenge/repsonse on one machine, encrypt the thing and send it to the server via remailer chain. The reason for the "stealth" bit is because the locus of control is moved to the remote machine, which may itself fall prey to attack. So, the supervisor needs to login as a Mere User (could have several accounts like this, and/or change them frequently) so as to not leave a trail of bread crumbs back to the cottage. * Long, long ago, in a tagline far far away... --- * Monster(a)FAmend.Com *

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About your online business.
by 05551984＠turboma.dyn.ml.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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