December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

intelligent discovery agents
by x 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 6 Jan 1995 Nesta Stubbs <nesta(a)nesta.pr.mcs.net> wrote: >> There was some recent talk about network agent technology on this list. >> > does anynoe have any information about intelligent agents? I mean I know > about filter and stuff, but they arent intelligent agents. I assume one > would be something like the WWW worm and other searching scripts that > have a database of information to cross-reference their finds and decide > what to send back to you. You might want to check out Brian LaMacchia's Ph.D. proposal to create a new class of knowbot, to be termed "Internet Fish". It is posted on http://www.swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/bal-home.html LaMacchia's proposal is interesting in that his 'fish' seem to have limited autonomy, thus moving us closer to a content-addressable model of net info retrieval. Also of interest is RFC 1728: Resource Transponders, by C. Weider. The idea is that there should be meta-information (information about information) available for use by info retrieval programs like 'archie'. >From ftp://nic.ddn.mil/rfc/rfc1728.txt The following is extracted from LaMacchia's abstract: > We will design, implement and deploy a system for constructing > ``Internet Fish,'' a new type of resource discovery tool. Internet > Fish attempt to discover new sources of information related to a > particular topic; characteristics that describe the topic of interest > may be specified by the user or deduced by the Fish over the course of > time. As part of the information-gathering process Fish conduct > long-term conversations with users; these conversations permit Fish to > ask for human assistance when necessary and allow humans to > dynamically reallocate Fish resources. In addition, Fish facilitate > *serendipitous* resource discovery; that is, the act of finding > interesting information in an unexpected place or manner, information > that we were ``lucky'' to have discovered.

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NYT on Survivalists
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Philip Weiss writes in tomorrow's Magazine a very long (52K) cover story on Idaho survivalists Bo Gritz, Randy Weaver and the burgeoning anti-government population. The longest story I've seen in there in years. Mentions societal threats of cashless economy, tax nix, and more c'punk tonics. Is The Times getting antsy, seeding a L&O crackdown? Or huffing luridities? See for yerself by sending blank message with subject: SUR_huf

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TEMPEST Questions...
by Derek.Zeanah＠f903.n102.z1.fidonet.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm writing an article on TEMPEST technology. The focus is on what TEMPEST is and how to defeat it, if possible. So far I've gotten some insightful information, but I'm looking for all I can get. Has anyone ever heard of TEMPEST being used in the continental US? Can anyone tell me what measures offer some level of protection, or steps that can be taken to reduce the likelihood of being successfully targeted? Has anyone ever seen TEMPEST in action? Any and all information will be greatly appreciated. I prefer responses via e-mail to dzeanah@holonet, but I also read this newsgroup pretty frequently. Thanks a lot. - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAi34pIYAAAEEALUNlIECc/SWho25DYEMwSAB0pEZsVro086ocA1eFmqfPUdb Mziw9z4lclX0DCznLzcYXzRBHQXYHclcSsPCn6lXYugmPdT8t5OkoqzN8mdU1iuH /YQZ79q1Iv+kufa0A8ZJn+9R/QmQnbxiOPJPOJzHYivd/hui70wIwf2qjF2hAAUR tCVEZXJlayBTLiBaZWFuYWggPGR6ZWFuYWhAaG9sb25ldC5uZXQ+iQCVAwUQLw3z i0wIwf2qjF2hAQGvawP/RSkJ0YSZX0MpeBMjo2BS9Qbsxs9iIS7/J1UesbNmR4ST 686EwPcpIMjiERJ425gXthOC7Jb7+39epkJkgoeuQqzj5FpnklpaGgG/2oyNbMKt EdysgkcufQm7lYMx4r/EOdW/PvLPL7cFBkCbdYRxOGmhy+iLnYrVRLqVNLteluI= =VD2n - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLw4n/EwIwf2qjF2hAQGcuQP/UtKXz0w3icEf3j094LpkOmr7t+miBcT4 9T0rsZ8UNz/Md7l4iY0sA929vU5IiZs58dTH0qiIVrFLf5qh0hzV+7edX6ARxccP ZSsdchd6g6LdRJn+s4QvOQT19TgcAGfW1p0lbVvDKGsh2+KmpQ4jHiLC3ugYq2x3 nqL4aY8dC4c= =L/Fy -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ~~~ PGPBLUE 3.0 <NR> ... I don't see my signature anywhere on this "social contract" -- | Fidonet: Derek Zeanah 1:102/903 | Internet: Derek.Zeanah(a)f903.n102.z1.fidonet.org | via Borderline! uucp<->Fido{ftn}gate Project +1-818-893-1899

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Re: TEMPEST Questions...
by peb＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Grady Ward wrote an article on implementing something like TEMPEST ("something like" means that it was not derived from classified documents). I can't seem to find my copy of his text and it doesn't appear anymore at netcom:/ftp/pub/gr/grady...Anyyone have a pointer to this? This article is definitely the most practical and comprehensive that I've seen on this subject. Paul E. Baclace peb(a)netcom.com peb(a)eng.sun.com

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Let's NOT talk about Netcom
by doumakes＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- If I wanted to read flamage about Netcom, I'd check out netcom.general, which is 150 messages a day of, mostly, garbage. I earnestly request that we not duplicate that clutter on the cpunks list. - -- ______________________________________________________________________ Don Doumakes Finger doumakes(a)netcom.com for PGP public key Foxpro databases built to your specifications. Email me for details. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLw6RQxtumcu2AjihAQHKTwP/fMxLVjDp/9yO2hFkCJQ+Vo5PGQvEAakt KiCrs3nTsbZwkwxjyzgwgnuJkOVcIWgIndkO+AViI4zmOTT+9lp2FlK3gdv1qIWl +pI/rkcegd9jyzRxz+HybONLtppAft8RZ6UlPmzS2w2Il+oHIPK9OtxRH5bGXj2D YHzBctPXYt0= =msXo -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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cel fraud
by an172607＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fighting Cellular Fraud, New York To Washington BEDMINSTER, NEW JERSEY, U.S.A., 1995 JAN 6 (NB) -- Bell Atlantic Mobile (BAM, parent NYSE:BEL) and NYNEX Mobile Communications (parent NYSE:NYN), two large US cellular phone carriers, are about to block automatic "roaming" service in New York City and surrounding areas. Starting January 9, BAM customers who place calls in the city will need to enter a personal identification number (PIN) issued by BAM in order to complete the call. The new policy is an antifraud measure to combat criminals who steal cellular service, BAM said. The PIN system was developed by NYNEX and is in use inside the City now, NYNEX sources said. Both firms emphasized that the new policy is no magic wand to do away with cellular fraud. However, as a BAM spokesperson told Newsbytes, the combination of restricted roaming and PIN numbers will "raise the bar again" where cellular fraud is concerned. Under the new system, the two cellular carriers will restrict calls in the greater NYC area by roaming customers from a "Fraud Protection Zone" that includes Washington, D.C.; Baltimore; Pittsburgh; and greater Philadelphia, including Delaware and southern New Jersey. BAM adopted the new measures because of increasing problems with cloning, in which a criminal picks off a cellular customer's automated phone IDs during a legitimate call and uses them to make a "clone phone." The cloned phone can be used to make calls for which the legitimate customers, not the cloners, are billed. AT&T's Steve Fleischer, speaking to Newsbytes, said such cloning operations have become such a successful criminal industry that some criminals sell the phones with 30-day guarantees. "If a number is cut off, you can bring it back to the cellular bandits and have it reprogrammed for no additional charge," he explained. "It costs the carriers around $1 million a day." He paused, then added: "It just shows how big a demand there is for wireless communications." Under the new policy, customers from inside the protected zone who want to use their phones at standard "roaming" rates in New York City must first contact BAM by dialing 211 from their cellular phone. After they provide proper identification and select a PIN code, the company deactivates the fraud zone lock-out. NYNEX spokesperson Kim Ancin told Newsbytes that customers with PIN numbers place calls as much usual by dialing the destination number and pressing the Send button. However, on protected phones, the customer then punches in the PIN number and presses Send again. Ancin explained that the PIN number goes out on a frequency different from the initial send. Cellular bandits use special equipment to pick up a legitimate phone's mobile identification number (MIN) and electronic serial number (ESN), which until now have been enough to clone a phone. However, she said, adding a PIN number on a second frequency makes cloning much more difficult. BAM said it would not activate the fraud protection lock-out in northern New Jersey, where calls to New York City are local calls. However, since customers who travel frequently into the city are at risk from cloning, the firm strongly recommended that northern New Jersey customers sign up for a PIN. Eventually, the firm said, all new customers will be required to select PINs. BAM said if a bandit does succeed in cloning a PIN-equipped phone, a customer can simply change the PIN number. Customers without PIN numbers must bring their phones back to a carrier or dealer to install a new phone number, notify business associates and friends of the number change, and modify business cards and stationery. There is no extra charge for PIN numbers, which are implemented by software at the carrier's switch, BAM's Fleischer told Newsbytes. The feature will not affect commonly used cellular services like voice mail or call waiting. Calls to 911, 611 and 411 will not require a PIN. (Craig Menefee/19950106/Press Contact: Steve Fleischer, 908-306-7539 or Brian Wood, 908-306-7508, both of BAM; Kim Ancin, 914-365-7573, or Jim Gerace, 914- 365-7712, both of NYNEX) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Re: pgp shells for windows....
by RopeGun＠calvino.alaska.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

winpgp2.6 was the most succesfull pgp shell I could find but the interface was stale and non descript. including the fact that when it executed the commands it opened a window and I was interfacing with the dos pgp interface, I found that a little redundant for a shell program; but then again I'm not sure if an interface with pgp can be done any other way. \\|||||||// | o o | Oren Tanay | J | RopeGun(a)alaska.net \--- www.alaska.net/~RopeGun/RopeGun.html "My Cat Can Eat A Whole WaterMelon" >From owner-cypherpunks Fri Jan 6 23:59:11 1995

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Killfiles 101
by Carol Anne Braddock 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1. The best and only way you can be sure you're killing a file is to turn your machine off. Only then can you be sure it is dead. 2. If you must resort to using killfiles, (great marketer trick, make you use it again and again, and again, like a gun) kill "classes" of files, as opposed to individuals, you'll get better kill ratio. A good example is anon or wizvax users. 3. Note: Killfiles are a censor's best friend! And you'll become what you swore you wouldn't. does your signature tell the truth nesta? Can't know everything with a killfile! Eventually you'll kill the file that'd get you sex. Signature withdrawn at the request (pretty rightfully so) of my dear friends on the Cypherpunk List Coming Soon: The Internet Debut of CENSORED.COM

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Chinese EBS
by jsled＠free.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I've been reading through "Applied Cryptography," as every good boy and girl should :) and one of the concepts struck out at me recently. The idea of the Chinese Lottery seemed to be rather far fetched in my first few readings, but then I came across the discussion of the new Emergency Broadcast System. This may just be an unfair helping of paranoia, but the system seems to be a perfect distribution system for a Chinese Lottery-like keychecking or cracking system. Even though the public can turn off the broadcast, the signal will still be sent. The chips may even be government-regulated... available only from the government so no one can tamper with the signal and use this system for their own information-disemination needs (*ahem* Political agendas *ahem* re-election ads). They might even encrypt the signals, for a touch of irony. Anyone find fault in this? - -Joshua M. Sled <jsled@ctp.org/jsled@free.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLw3WJqTT29daLBKRAQFbRgP/RAhGdEmxMe4zOuLORY9rKu7VhapXen7S 6+cVOvrlOxJ2ohCmxZpXbwKY9oR6ggF1jURwb9LZEiHPfzaOOsftURxcmJUsC2db 1vkSRuBarkm6vOK+JIlLMwKzRdk9omt+TmJPD7/wI5M1jhMfLRNS+fkbEpDFtisn 0s1H2nvXdDs= =kGbJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --- þ KWQ/2 1.2g NR þ "MTV get off the air!" - DKs

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The first reply came 3 days later.
by Carol Anne Braddock 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

These groups are important to me. It is why I posted them there. I use PGP extensively in my usenet postings, and I am not the only one in those groups that posts with PGP. Yes, suffice to say, I endorse this letter. I dream of a day when we do not have to deal with this issue, yet it is something that affects any one who uses the program. All that was really asked was not to go to the meeting with the D.A., and make a protest. MOST CYPHERPUNKS I KNOW OF COULDN'T HAVE MADE IT ANYWAY, THIS TIME, BECAUSE THE STAKES IN THE REMAILER GAME ARE HIGH, AND WITHIN A MONTH OR TWO, THERE WILL BE SYSTEM SO THAT WE CAN GET SOME MONEY TO EAT WITH AND BUY EQUIPMENT. But on the user level, I do my best to TEACH GOOD FUNDAMENTAL COMPUTER SAFETY. Rumors are no good for this. There was PRZ's letter to us, and Dubois's letter to alt.security pgp. Those are facts. Those I can teach with, and so can even a one month PGP Cypherpunk Novice. So can you. Now, the first reply,

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