December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: bruce s(t)erlings talk
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>can you get me a copy of bruce serlings talk given to law enforcement ^^^^^^^^ Uh, yes, well... I wonder if he's related to Rod... S>T<erling, yes? Post 'em first, and lot God sort them out... Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Smoke & Mirrors
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A friend of mine has a business setting up networks for business's in the Baltimore area. He contracts out the security end of the setup to a firm called "Smoke and Mirrors". They create firewalls and handle encryption capabilities. I think the company is in the baltimore area, and was wondering if anyone on the list has heard of this company? With a name like smoke and mirrors I guess they better be good. Anybody know? Vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLyLIZD2paOMjHHAhAQHIuwQAhMdaCsA5j7W/Z/m2VHLeaendI7/JHNGv qm1hePuz3OolJmYgaWyAODlefcLkaKNapeEh5/xRoleEI8dUWuC+njJKvw6MKkr/ b6b/UbcKpLf/qqpFVuz+BbCnBUIY8iALhCLe832o5yxzAV2GT64Sj5gfjhUa3XVy 5dR4yI51SNc= =ZvUV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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E-Mail Security - New Book
by schneier＠chinet.chinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

E-MAIL SECURITY WITH PGP AND PEM: HOW TO KEEP YOUR ELECTRONIC MESSAGES PRIVATE ...a new book by Bruce Schneier John Wiley & Sons, 1995 ISBN 0-471-05318-X $24.95 The world of e-mail is the world of postcards. Between you and your correspondents may lurk a foreign government, a business competitor, an overzealous law enforcement agency, or even just a nosy neighbor. The problem is, all of these potential eavesdroppers, given fairly simple access tools, can read your messages as easy as a postal worker can read your postcards. E-MAIL SECURITY is about protecting electronic mail fm spies, interlopers, and spoofs--people who may want to destroy, alter, or just look at your private communications. The book shows how you can protect the financial information, contract negotiations, or personal correspondence you entrust to public or private networks--and it shows how this protection is available right now, with free or inexpensive software. The book discusses PGP and PEM: how they work, how they are different, and how to choose which one is right for you. TABLE OF CONTENTS: Part I: Privacy and Electronic Mail Chapter 1: The Problem Chapter 2: Encryption Chapter 3: Key Management Chapter 4: Authentication Chapter 5: Certificates Chapter 6: Keeping Your Private Key Private Chapter 7: Odds and Ends Chapter 8: Patents, Governments, and Export Laws Part II: Achieving Electronic-Mail Privacy Chapter 9: Requirements and Features Chapter 10: Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) Chapter 11: Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Chapter 12: Comparing PGP and PEM Chapter 13: Attacks Against PGP and PEM Appendix A: Pretty Good Privacy Appendix B: Privacy Enhanced Mail ***************************************************************** If you are interested in a copy of E-MAIL SECURITY, please send a check for $25 + $5 postage (ask for rates abroad) to: Bruce Schneier 730 Fair Oaks Ave Oak Park, IL 60302 The book won't be available until at least the end of the month, so please be patient.

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Another Book By Schneier...
by werewolf＠io.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Saw this on one of the cryptography conferences..... From: schneier(a)chinet.chinet.com (Bruce Schneier) Subject: E-Mail Security - New book by Bruce Schneier Message-ID: <D2qsIJ.Dzz(a)chinet.chinet.com> Organization: Chinet - Public Access UNIX Date: Sat, 21 Jan 1995 06:25:31 GMT E-MAIL SECURITY WITH PGP AND PEM: HOW TO KEEP YOUR ELECTRONIC MESSAGES PRIVATE ...a new book by Bruce Schneier John Wiley & Sons, 1995 ISBN 0-471-05318-X $24.95 The world of e-mail is the world of postcards. Between you and your correspondents may lurk a foreign government, a business competitor, an overzealous law enforcement agency, or even just a nosy neighbor. The problem is, all of these potential eavesdroppers, given fairly simple access tools, can read your messages as easy as a postal worker can read your postcards. E-MAIL SECURITY is about protecting electronic mail fm spies, interlopers, and spoofs--people who may want to destroy, alter, or just look at your private communications. The book shows how you can protect the financial information, contract negotiations, or personal correspondence you entrust to public or private networks--and it shows how this protection is available right now, with free or inexpensive software. The book discusses PGP and PEM: how they work, how they are different, and how to choose which one is right for you. TABLE OF CONTENTS: Part I: Privacy and Electronic Mail Chapter 1: The Problem Chapter 2: Encryption Chapter 3: Key Management Chapter 4: Authentication Chapter 5: Certificates Chapter 6: Keeping Your Private Key Private Chapter 7: Odds and Ends Chapter 8: Patents, Governments, and Export Laws Part II: Achieving Electronic-Mail Privacy Chapter 9: Requirements and Features Chapter 10: Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) Chapter 11: Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Chapter 12: Comparing PGP and PEM Chapter 13: Attacks Against PGP and PEM Appendix A: Pretty Good Privacy Appendix B: Privacy Enhanced Mail ***************************************************************** If you are interested in a copy of E-MAIL SECURITY, please send a check for $25 + $5 postage (ask for rates abroad) to: Bruce Schneier 730 Fair Oaks Ave Oak Park, IL 60302 The book won't be available until at least the end of the month, so please be patient.

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Ben Goren Eyes Only
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 23 Jan 1995 Ben Goren <ben(a)Music.ASU.Edu> said: Mr. Goren, Mail to <ben(a)Music.ASU.Edu> ricochets. Hep.

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Re: T.A.Z. on Disk
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On Fri, 20 Jan 1995, Angus Patterson wrote: >> >> > I also saw another e-book site that had some more of [Bey's] stuff, can't >> > remember what it was though. > >On Fri, 20 Jan 1995, Mark Grant wrote: >> There's some more on the WWW at http://www.uio.no/~mwatz/bey/index.html. > >Bey sings the line that good is no different from evil, feeling >is better than thinking, and truth indistinguishable from lies. > >Sounds like a pile of crap to me. Still, I suppose that feelings >and lies are a poets job. Hm. Can we maybe head off the Ideology War before it becomes unstoppable? Cypherpunks write code, and do lots of other stuff too, but I'm hoping that endless political wars is something cypherpunks don't do, or at least try not to do on the cypherpunks list. [It's possible that the ideology of the list is as homogenously anarcho-capitalist as it seems, but I'd bet there's enough anarcho-others to sustain several never-ending political 'discussions' of the sort that will make the list even less useful then when we spent dozens of messages a day talking about logos.]

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RE: syrinx remailer up and running
by Johnathan Corgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Well folks, the syrinx remailer is up and running now. The particulars: > >Address: syrinx(a)c2.org Could you post the capabilities of this remailer, like cpunk, hash, pgp, ksub, latent, etc.? == Johnathan Corgan "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent." jcorgan(a)scruznet.com -Isaac Asimov

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Re: traffic analyzing Chaum's digital mix
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > From: Hal <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> > > I know that the Eurocrypt 89 proceedings had some articles on > cryptanalyzing Chaum's mixes. My library has an excellent crypto > selection but is missing this volume. Can anyone who has read this say > whether there is anything in those papers that isn't obvious? I found a copy of these proceedings in the library today. There is a paper titled "How to break the direct RSA-implementation of MIXes" by Birgit Pfitzmann and Andreas Pfitzmann. Here is its abstract: MIXes are a means of untraceable communication based on a public key cryptosystem as published by David Chaum in 1981 (CACM 24/2 84-88). In the case where RSA is used as this cryptosystem directly i.e. without composition with other functions (e.g. destroying the multiplicative structure) we show how the resulting MIXes can be broken by an active attack which is perfectly feasible in a typical MIX-environment. The attack does not affect the idea of MIXes as a whole: if the security requirements of [Chaum's paper] are concretized suitably and if a cryptosystem fulfills them one can implement secure MIXes directly. However it shows that present security notions for public key cryptosystems, which do not allow active attacks do not suffice for a cryptosystem which is used to implement MIXes directly. We also warn of the same attack and others on further possible implementations of MIXes and we mention several implementations which are not broken by any attack we know. My interpretation is that PGP-based remailers are not susceptible to the attack described by this paper. (Of course, they are currently vulnerable to much more trivial ones.) Wei Dai -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLyMeCTl0sXKgdnV5AQFoggP/XzBFSyChFgNMrX3gCQSNfOiwHrAEKgpD a0TGYX9KBRqRd6cdDIdauDzFtPST1XjU/1RpYvlGjKIhOSd60JZwO+7185SJGBM9 q/4cqE/hOiHzB2gaoHiQFySDIkfFTeJdlIiTiS/OjbR5awkMCF+zU8cxPrgWTrxr /sM1C39O8Cc= =J20K -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: port 25 forgeries
by pstemari＠erinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:35 PM 1/21/95 PST, santa(a)northpole.toad.com, org(a)toad.com wrote: > ... >Received: from relay2.UU.NET by eri.erinet.com (4.1/SMI-4.1.1) > id AA16848; Sun, 22 Jan 95 02:56:29 EST >Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP > id QQxztg01780; Sun, 22 Jan 1995 03:01:32 -0500 >Received: by toad.com id AA23166; Sat, 21 Jan 95 23:55:03 PST >Received: from northpole.org (tower.stc.housing.washington.edu) by toad.com id AA22783; Sat, 21 Jan 95 23:36:47 PST > ... Presumeably the (tower.stc.housing.washington.edu) comes from a PTR DNS lookup. What happens if the IP address of the remailer isn't available from DNS, or the in-addr.arpa entry is wrong? (I don't know who exactly is responsible for the in-addr.arpa entry--is it the same as for the others?) --Paul J. Ste. Marie pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com

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Re: Locksmith's Guild wants limit on free speech
by pstemari＠erinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:42 PM 1/22/95 -0500, John Young wrote: > ... >Both fear that they do not know the code well enough to take the risk of >being found at fault by random municipal inspections of construction. >A-E's dread the liability and blame by owners for well-known construction >corner-cutting, and owners suspect their professionals competency and >ethics -- afraid that the pros will certify in ignorance or cupidity and >that the owners will face costly corrections without having the traditional >scapegoat of over-weening government to justify cheating in the field. A classic example of people being unwilling to accept responsibility for the outcome of their own actions. That said, building inspection serve much the same function as code reviews, and are a "good thing" for exactly the same reason. I suspect that the A-E's will lobby for liability exemptions, and if they fail to get them, they will wind up going to private building inspectors/"code consultants" just like in-house accountants bring in outside auditors. --Paul J. Ste. Marie pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com

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