December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

re: Amanda and MIME
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> I think if we only use MIME, the quality of discussion on the list >> would skyrocket. Eric, you should block all non-MIME posts to the >> list. How could we have been so blind? >Perry wrote: >The anonymous poster should feel happy he's anonymous, as his posting >is embarassingly stupid. Perhaps he'd like to make fun of ASCII next >by posting his next message as sequences of octal digits. Ah, a vintage Perry post: full of insults, little discussion. Perry is unable to handle SARCASM. Perhaps better MIME software will help.

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Re: The Thread That Wouldn't Die (Was: Re: McCoy is Right!)
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

L. McCarthy wrote: [regarding MIME] >Well it certainly is not essential for todays messages. > >Drop into alt.binaries.pictures.* > >When the news people wish to transmit pictures of naked girls, etc, >they do not use MIME > >Now maybe they should use MIME, and maybe they will use MIME in >the future, but today, MIME is still bleeding edge. I have dropped into alt.binaries.*. Thanks to my newsreader (freeware), the pictures there are a _mouseclick_ away from my harddrive. Even multi-part posts take ONE mouseclick. MIME isn't even needed here. Capable clients are. And they are avaialable today. All I am asking is that people start using them instead of complaining how difficult it is to do things on the net. --Lucky [who promisses to shut up -- for now]

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Re: The Thread That Wouldn't Die (Was: Re: McCoy is Right!)
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Lucky Green writes: > L. McCarthy wrote: > [regarding MIME] Note that James Donald actually wrote this quoted text, not I: > >Well it certainly is not essential for todays messages. > > > >Drop into alt.binaries.pictures.* > > > >When the news people wish to transmit pictures of naked girls, etc, > >they do not use MIME > > > >Now maybe they should use MIME, and maybe they will use MIME in > >the future, but today, MIME is still bleeding edge. Lucky Green writes: > I have dropped into alt.binaries.*. Thanks to my newsreader (freeware), the > pictures there are a _mouseclick_ away from my harddrive. Even multi-part > posts take ONE mouseclick. Can you recommend an ftp site for this ? I'll try to get my sysadmins to install it here. (Assuming it's a Unix app.) What is it called ? - - -L. Futplex McCarthy, who likes MIME but is unhappy that his mailer does not properly support it - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLvI9Rmf7YYibNzjpAQEGSwQAllo2RnniOUPmFBwyfqa7Y11DNpTobbJQ i7JxNQKjMmG+FvDepGITUz/8w870sRI7hTTETPcJbn4+gIQiHgqKZqZRMXnmzfQT 45Pc0FJXk3K7W/MmKvs57uJzumlfdGosi9prbA4EyUxLp/ZbUN1FBOwbg2NBe3h/ m79G8qNHqtA= =r6Ye - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLvI+cCoZzwIn1bdtAQGYPgF/S0f4wuxn+/DSE5F1PS6gSBQEvycEYhrh 7vUg+bWqi6smF0WD44DqF2okiswC3J8i =+ptW -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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VAX pgp uploaded to the cypherpunks site.
by Patrick J. Finerty Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

i have uploaded pgp compiled for a VAX running VAX/VMS to the cypherpunks ftp site. here is a copy of the readme file i included with it. i should note that the reason i did this was primarily to provide pgp to people who do not have access to c compilers or a PC/DOS machine. this is, of course, not meant to substitute for checking the source and compiling pgp yourself. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- VAXPGP262.TAR.Z is a compressed tar file containing the following docs. NOTE!! - this is _not_ a complete pgp distribution. only the following files are included! - ------------------------------------------------------------- APPNOTE.DOC;1 13/15 25-OCT-1994 10:30:52.79 BLURB.TXT;1 2/3 25-OCT-1994 10:30:31.21 CHANGES.DOC;1 41/42 25-OCT-1994 10:30:53.63 CONFIG.TXT;1 8/9 25-OCT-1994 10:30:23.93 KEYS.ASC;1 12/12 25-OCT-1994 10:30:56.06 KEYSERV.DOC;1 9/9 25-OCT-1994 10:30:31.52 LANGUAGE.TXT;1 135/135 25-OCT-1994 10:30:56.56 MITLICEN.TXT;1 5/6 25-OCT-1994 10:31:00.64 PGFORMAT.DOC;1 72/72 25-OCT-1994 10:30:47.91 PGP.1;1 40/42 25-OCT-1994 10:30:50.14 PGP.EXE;1 326/327 25-OCT-1994 10:58:19.24 PGP.HLP;1 8/9 25-OCT-1994 10:31:00.99 PGPDOC1.TXT;1 164/165 25-OCT-1994 10:30:41.65 PGPDOC2.TXT;1 262/264 25-OCT-1994 10:30:33.21 POLITIC.DOC;1 35/36 25-OCT-1994 10:30:51.42 PUBRING.PGP;1 28/30 5-DEC-1994 23:42:21.16 README.DOC;1 13/15 25-OCT-1994 10:31:01.51 SETUP.DOC;2 32/33 25-OCT-1994 10:30:32.07 - ------------------------------------------------------------- PGP.EXE is pgp2.6.2. compiled on a VAX running VAX/VMS 5.5-2. i compiled the program using the *build.com files that come with the standard pgp distribution BUT with TWO CHANGES. THESE CHANGES HAVE NO AFFECT ON PGP, THEY ONLY AFFECT THE CREATION OF THE RSA LIBRARY THAT IS DISTRIBUTED WITH PGP!! changes were to made to the rsabuild.com file, these were: 1) commented out: $ call compile md2c 2) commented out: $ call compile md5c other than these, no changes were made to the *.com files. i have tested this copy of pgp and it has worked perfectly with key generation and file signing as measured by generating keys on the VAX and then signing a file on the VAX followed by checking the signatures and key on a SUN using pgp2.6.2 that was compiled there. if you have a problem, please write me at: finerty(a)msscc.med.utah.edu pfinerty(a)nyx10.cs.du.edu pfinerty(a)seattleu.edu my pgp key is available via keyserver or finger. - -patrick finerty, jr. - -- patrick finerty -- finerty(a)msscc.med.utah.edu pfinerty(a)bach.seattleu.edu pfinerty(a)nyx10.cs.du.edu U of Utah biochem grad student/slave in the Bass lab easily found at (801) 585-3110 almost anytime. rm 207 wintrobe. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLvERgU3Qo/lG0AH5AQEzbwP/UItMKPKv1dZ8g39aaX6qoQWRsd1tR5ko fIQ65i73qECD0swWxKAEUBKOz1bUo1tPr4u4cEvt3v4JYaUkrKaWZ58H9HkF7v47 SlDzZDHnZytcV1NzjEFsDYLMLFjuE6uMpGK9OjDP/cH4Z+PFkfVN6TNv4g6GL+Pa obY4/vId8sM= =nMyH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- patrick finerty -- finerty(a)msscc.med.utah.edu pfinerty(a)bach.seattleu.edu pfinerty(a)nyx10.cs.du.edu U of Utah biochem grad student/slave in the Bass lab easily found at (801) 585-3110 almost anytime. rm 207 wintrobe.

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rehash of fbi v. weaver, or 'freeh is a jerk'
by Avi Baumstein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

i happen to be on the road in tennessee, and read this editorial in the knoxville new-sentinel. i don't remember seeing anything about this when it happened...but since freeh and the fbi seem to be disliked these days, here's some more fodder for the fire. -avi ps - hopefully this isn't a repeat, but being on the road, i'm mail-delayed at least 24 hours. The Knoxville News-Sentinel, Dec 16, 1994, pA16 DISTURBING SILENCE -FBI chief taking his time acting on report about Idaho shootout All eyes are on Louis Freeh, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as he ponders disciplinary action in the infamous shootout at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, in 1992. This being the end of 1994, one starts to wonder what is taking the director so long. Excessive use of force by the FBI is no trivial matter. Citizens might gather from the Idaho case that the government claims special license to abuse the rights of loners with extremist views. It is a year and a half already since the government made a fool of itself by trying Randy Weaver and Kevin Harris for murder inthe death of a deputy US marshal. The jury sided with the defendants, and the US district judge said 75 percent of the evidence and testimony presented by the prosecution had aided the defense. But to go back to the beginning, Weaver, a former Green Beret, was a member of the Christian Identity sect and a racial speratist. He had retreated with his wife and children to a remote mountain cabin, where they and their young friend Harris lived. Weaver's first run-in with the law was induced by undercover agents. They offered to buy two shotguns from him if he sawed off the barrels, making the weapons illegal. He did so, and they arrested him. He failed to show up for trial, though the government later was forced to admit that he was given the wrong court date. Then began 20 months' surveillance of the Weaver cabin. On Aug. 21, 1992, the Weavers' dog discovered several agents camouflaged int he woods. The agents shot the dog. In the ensuing exchange of fire, 14-year-old Sam Weaver was killed by a bullet in the back, and Harris shot the deputy -- in self-defense, he said. The next day, the agents returned, reinforced by the 50-member Hostage Rescue Team. The commander of the HRT never attempted to interview the agents who survived the first encounter. Also, the FBI's policy on use of deadly force was relaxed: Instead of firing if lives were in danger, agents were ordered to shoot any armed adult at the scene. Thus was the stage set for final tragedy. An FBI marksman fired at Weaver and Harris outside the cabin. Both men were wounded, and Weaver's wife was killed, standing inside the cabin with her baby in her arms. A 542-page Justice Department report was completed last April. It has not been released. Director Freeh's disturbing silence is compunded by his promotion last week of the agent who had overall responsibility for the Weaver operation. What conclusion would Freeh recommend the public draw, if not that a federal government willing enough to jail overzealous Los Angeles policemen will arrogently circle the wagons to protect it's own?

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Revised - Zimmermann Defense Fund Appeal
by hmiller＠orion.it.luc.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tom Bryce at Duke (thanks, Tom!) has pointed out an important erratum in my original fundraising post. I mistakenly gave out Phil Dubois's net.address as "dubois(a)csm.org". This is WRONG: the correct address is: dubois(a)csn.org I apologize for the error. Since the post was signed, and just patching it will mung the md5 hash, I have included the whole message below. If you are reposting the message to other outlets, please use this new revision (version 1.1!) instead. Also, Irving Wolfe (thanks, Irving!) wrote me to suggest that persons interested in donating to Phil's defense fund might like to see some bona fides of my (and Phil Dubois's) relation to Phil Zimmermann, to insure that the money donated is going where we say it is. I've included something which (I hope) might go some way towards addressing this concern in the revised post too. Best wishes for a Happy Holidays to all on the Net (and off)! ----------------------->% CUT HERE %<------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Phil Zimmermann Legal Defense Fund Appeal In November, 1976, Martin Hellman and Whitfield Diffie announced their discovery of public-key cryptography by beginning their paper with the sentence: "We stand today on the brink of a revolution in cryptography." We stand today on the brink of an important battle in the revolution they unleased. Philip Zimmermann, who encoded and released the most popular and successful program to flow from that discovery, Pretty Good Privacy ("PGP"), may be about to go to court. It has been over fourteen months now since Phil was first informed that he was the subject of a grand jury investigation being mounted by the San Jose, CA, office of US Customs into the international distribution, over the Internet, of the original version of the program. On January 12th, Phil's legal team will meet for the first time with William Keane, Assistant US Attorney for the Northern District of California, who is in charge of the grand jury investigation, in San Jose. An indictment, if one is pursued by the government after this meeting, could be handed down very shortly thereafter. If indicted, Phil would likely be charged with violating statute 22 USC 2778 of the US Code, "Control of arms exports and imports." This is the federal statute behind the regulation known as ITAR, "International Traffic in Arms Regulations," 22 CFR 120.1 et seq. of the Code of Federal Regulations. Specifically, the indictment would allege that Phil violated 22 USC 2778 by exporting an item listed as a "munition" in 22 CFR 120.1 et seq. without having a license to do so. That item is cryptographic software -- PGP. At stake, of course, is far more than establishing whether Phil violated federal law or not. The case presents significant issues and will establish legal precedent, a fact known to everyone involved. According to his lead counsel, Phil Dubois, the US government hopes to establish the proposition that anyone having anything at all to do with an illegal export -- even someone like Phil, whose only involvement was writing the program and making it available to US citizens and who has no idea who actually exported it -- has committed a federal felony offense. The government also hopes to establish the proposition that posting a "munition" on a BBS or on the Internet is exportation. If the government wins its case, the judgment will have a profound chilling effect on the US software industry, on the free flow of information on the emerging global networks, and in particular upon the grassroots movement to put effective cryptography in the hands of ordinary citizens. The US government will, in effect, resurrect Checkpoint Charlie -- on the Information Superhighway. By now, most of us who are reading this know about Phil and the case, whether by having the program and reading the doc files or by seeing reports in the Wall Steet Journal, Time, Scientific American, the New York Times, Wired, US News and World Report, and hundreds of other news outlets; on Usenet groups like talk.crypto.politics or alt.security.pgp; or by listening to Phil give talks such as the one he gave at CFP '94 in Chicago. We know that PGP has made great strides since version 1.0, and is now a sophisticated encryption and key-management package which has become the de facto standard in both micro and mainframe environments. We know that Phil and the PGP development team successfully negotiated a commercial license with Viacrypt, and, through the efforts of MIT, a noncommercial license for PGP with RSA Data Security, the holders of the patent on the RSA algorithm on which PGP is based, thus freeing the program from the shadow of allegations of patent infringement. We know that programs such as PGP represent one of our best bulwarks in the Information Age against the intrusions of public and private information gatherers. We know that PGP is a key tool in insuring that the "Information Superhighway" will open the world to us, without opening us to the world. What we may not all know is the price Phil has had to pay for his courage and willingness to challenge the crypto status quo. For years now Phil has been the point man in the ongoing campaign for freely available effective cryptography for the everyday computer user. The costs, personal and professional, to him have been great. He wrote the original code for PGP 1.0 by sacrificing months of valuable time from his consulting career and exhausting his savings. He continues to devote large amounts of his time to testifying before Congress, doing public speaking engagements around the world, and agitating for "cryptography for the masses," largely at his own expense. He is now working, still for free, on the next step in PGP technology, PGP Phone, which will turn every PC with a sound card and a modem into a secure telephone. And we know that, just last month, he was searched and interrogated in the absence of counsel by US Customs officials upon his return from a speaking tour in Europe. Phil's legal team consists of his lead counsel, Philip Dubois of Boulder, CO; Kenneth Bass of Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti, in Washington, DC, first counsel for intelligence policy for the Justice Department under President Carter; Eben Moglen, professor of law at Columbia and Harvard Universities; Curt Karnow, a former assistant US attorney and intellectual property law specialist at Landels, Ripley & Diamond in San Francisco; and Thomas Nolan, noted criminal defense attorney in Menlo Park. While this is a stellar legal team, what makes it even more extraordinary is that several of its members have given their time for free to Phil's case. Still, while their time has been donated so far, other expenses -- travel, lodging, telephone, and other costs -- have fallen to Phil. If the indictment is handed down, time and costs will soar, and the members of the team currently working pro bono may no longer be able to. Justice does not come cheap in this country, but Phil deserves the best justice money can buy him. This is where you and I come in. Phil Dubois estimates that the costs of the case, leaving aside the lawyers' fees, will run from US$100,000 - $150,000. If Phil's team must charge for their services, the total cost of the litigation may range as high as US$300,000. The legal defense fund is already several thousand dollars in the red and the airline tickets to San Jose haven't even been purchased yet. In September, 1993 I wrote a letter urging us all to support Phil, shortly after the first subpoenas were issued by Customs. Today the need is greater than ever, and I'm repeating the call. Phil has assumed the burden and risk of being the first to develop truly effective tools with which we all might secure our communications against prying eyes, in a political environment increasingly hostile to such an idea -- an environment in which Clipper chips and digital telephony bills are our own government's answer to our concerns. Now is the time for us all to step forward and help shoulder that burden with him. It is time more than ever. I call on all of us, both here in the US and abroad, to help defend Phil and perhaps establish a groundbreaking legal precedent. PGP now has an installed base of hundreds of thousands of users. PGP works. It must -- no other "crypto" package, of the hundreds available on the Internet and BBS's worldwide, has ever been subjected to the governmental attention PGP has. How much is PGP worth to you? How much is the complete security of your thoughts, writings, ideas, communications, your life's work, worth to you? The price of a retail application package?i Send it. More? Send it. Whatever you can spare: send it. A legal trust fund, the Philip Zimmermann Defense Fund (PZDF), has been established with Phil Dubois in Boulder. Donations will be accepted in any reliable form, check, money order, or wire transfer, and in any currency, as well as by credit card. You may give anonymously or not, but PLEASE - give generously. If you admire PGP, what it was intended to do and the ideals which animated its creation, express your support with a contribution to this fund. * * * Here are the details: To send a check or money order by mail, make it payable, NOT to Phil Zimmermann, but to "Philip L. Dubois, Attorney Trust Account." Mail the check or money order to the following address: Philip Dubois 2305 Broadway Boulder, CO USA 80304 (Phone #: 303-444-3885) To send a wire transfer, your bank will need the following information: Bank: VectraBank Routing #: 107004365 Account #: 0113830 Account Name: "Philip L. Dubois, Attorney Trust Account" Now here's the neat bit. You can make a donation to the PZDF by Internet mail on your VISA or MasterCard. Worried about snoopers intercepting your e-mail? Don't worry -- use PGP. Simply compose a message in plain ASCII text giving the following: the recipient ("Philip L. Dubois, Attorney Trust Account"); the bank name of your VISA or MasterCard; the name which appears on it; a tele- phone number at which you can be reached in case of problems; the card number; date of expiry; and, most important, the amount you wish to do- nate. (Make this last item as large as possible.) Then use PGP to en- crypt and ASCII-armor the message using Phil Dubois's public key, en- closed below. (You can also sign the message if you like.) E-mail the output file to Phil Dubois (dubois(a)csn.org) Please be sure to use a "Subject:" line reading something like "Phil Zimmermann Defense Fund" so he'll know to decrypt it right away. Bona fides: My relation to Phil Z. is that of a long-time user and advocate of PGP and a personal friend. For over a year I moderated the (no longer published) digest, Info-PGP, on the old lucpul.it.luc.edu site here at Loyola. I am in no way involved with the administration of the PZDF. I volunteer my time on its behalf. Phil Dubois is Phil Z.'s lawyer and lead counsel in the Customs case. He administers the PZDF. To obtain a copy of my public key (with which you can verify the signature on this doc), you have a number of options: - Use the copy which I will append below. - Send mail to me at hmiller(a)luc.edu with the "Subject:" line reading "send pubkey" - Get it by anon ftp at ftp://ftp.math.luc.edu/pub/hmiller/pubkey.hm - Obtain it from an Internet PGP keyserver machine such as pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.ai.mit.edu. Just send a mail message to this address with the "Subject:" field "GET hmiller". Other keyserver machines on the Net which accept the same message format (and automatically synchronize keyrings with each other every 10 minutes or so) include: pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.mit.edu pgp-public-keys(a)demon.co.uk pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.ox.ac.uk pgp-public-keys(a)ext221.sra.co.jp pgp-public-keys(a)kub.nl pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.iastate.edu pgp-public-keys(a)dsi.unimi.it pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.dhp.com You can verify my public key by calling me at 312-338-2689 (home) or 312-508-2727 (office) and letting me read you my key fingerprint ("pgp -kvc hmiller" after you have put my key on your pubring.pgp keyring). I include it also in my .sig, below, if that's good enough for you. You might also note that Phil Zimmermann has signed my public key. Hopefully he is Node #1 in your Web-of-Trust! His key is available on the net keyservers and in the 'keys.asc' file in the PGP distribution packages. Phil Dubois's pubkey can also be obtained from the keyservers, if you prefer that source to the text below, and from 'keys.asc'. Phil Z. has signed his key as well. Here is Phil Dubois's public key: - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.7 mQCNAiyaTboAAAEEAL3DOizygcxAe6OyfcuMZh2XnyfqmLKFDAoX0/FJ4+d2frw8 5TuXc/k5qfDWi+AQCdJaNVT8jlg6bS0HD55gLoV+b6VZxzIpHWKqXncA9iudfZmR rtx4Es82n8pTBtxa7vcQPhCXfjfl+lOMrICkRuD/xB/9X1/XRbZ7C+AHeDONAAUR tCFQaGlsaXAgTC4gRHVib2lzIDxkdWJvaXNAY3NuLm9yZz6JAJUCBRAsw4TxZXmE uMepZt0BAT0OA/9IoCBZLFpF9lhV1+epBi49hykiHefRdQwbHmLa9kO0guepdkyF i8kqJLEqPEUIrRtiZVHiOLLwkTRrFHV7q9lAuETJMDIDifeV1O/TGVjMiIFGKOuN dzByyidjqdlPFtPZtFbzffi9BomTb8O3xm2cBomxxqsV82U3HDdAXaY5Xw== =5uit - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Here is my (Hugh Miller's) public key: - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAy7frrEAAAEEALzOAQt+eWHzXSDLRgJaQMQ7Uju1xrD9mXAZGAG1GmiTNjKl wK68qOXrwJvnH1BmGtg8GGv53nTeabltpn5crsQVFm+0623M56/T7SOeUBWxxoa0 vvqAA8sJ6ac1/MXY9KIgqxu8Mu6Qwf68C4OnwCbE7T71bi+fjdEdYC5Hk8UpAAUR tB1IdWdoIE1pbGxlciA8aG1pbGxlckBsdWMuZWR1PokAlQMFEC7ryVNleYS4x6lm 3QEBW6YD/2IOIZX9FOggNyemvPwM/EN86KW74ZGuYuTIfPCrvOMy8pFqfE33Bw93 UkyIDj1Yh/nDlclEOO/J0tyngPn2BD2vMtaKIGRhVjnoxQc3BfzdjJ2nnHoFzAjz 0MBxYthysmWYsyF8cQxST6LZLITKkf41dti8SVKYVRWIgkyub02HiQCVAwUQLt/F oNEdYC5Hk8UpAQHD1wP9GdN9OHAKkIRsHeHy0wsEkI4Emb/bHiU+W59Zw7NPWsWF 3WTT1z8GKNToQLUdysbbJuSSk3rD3F4SNGJ+KPjR4674pmEfCVVP8cQPXEl4a3Zs xSLWNI6rG3muUAfLdyZiFP08NthOVlP2h1aOLCqIgkjEYMfQNEgkefBRJd6JywI= =hWCA - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- * * * This campaign letter will be posted in a number of Usenet groups. I will also be turning it into a FAQ-formatted document, which will be posted monthly in the relevant groups and which will be available by anonymous ftp from ftp://ftp.math.luc.edu/pub/hmiller/PGP/pzdf.FAQ. If you come upon, or up with, any other ways in which we can help raise funds for Phil, drop me a line at hmiller(a)luc.edu and let me know, so that I can put it in the FAQ. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLvFO3tEdYC5Hk8UpAQF6IwQAp3Ig71gGRj/dDGXDBdqj55uMQQsywhi2 pEzh0arfrRonqMX0UleysqYqjcUtm0rvbrXoYUy8a9vJzj4Wuyf1dQ6WyqBkcmOX z7RGtoLVxsfTjNNTrY0810SXx/yOMYtBW7mq+zNmqEykGFZTdfsVKFEyFw6AJ//B Ah+LQNb01Xo= =aW2m -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Hugh Miller, Ph.D. Voice: 312-508-2727 Asst. Professor of Philosophy FAX: 312-508-2292 Loyola University Chicago Home: 312-338-2689 6525 N. Sheridan Rd. E-mail: hmiller(a)luc.edu Chicago, IL 60626 WWW: http://www.luc.edu/~hmiller PGP Public Key 4793C529: FC D2 08 BB 0C 6D CB C8 0B F9 BA 55 62 19 40 21

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Re: FV & PGP (was Re: First Virtual email security)
by Nathaniel Borenstein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Excerpts from fv: 16-Dec-94 Re: FV & PGP (was Re: First.. Mike Ellsworth@firewall. (1283*) > >Without cryptography how exactly are you going to protect my credit card > >numbers from sniffer-snoopers and crackers? Either you will send the > >credit card text in the clear, or it will be encrypted somehow. Or perhaps > >you will have customers call you over the phone to give you their credit > >card info? > I would also like to be convinced on this point. It seems that it's an > either/or. Either the info is in the clear, and thus vulnerable, or it's > encrypted, and safer. Once more, with feeling: It is NOT an either/or. In the First Virtual system, the credit card number NEVER GOES OVER THE NET AT ALL, which means that it doesn't go over the net in the clear AND it doesn't go over the net encrypted. Please check out info(a)fv.com or URL http://www.fv.com for more information. -- Nathaniel - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLvL6qyoZzwIn1bdtAQHSsgGAnwFwtMriI+Ln2qOBGGj6qaOW8e9hdodB fR+SE5cjajZxS4n3QVS5gbI6R6KZkqu5 =KQOY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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MACPGP: developers?
by ddt＠lsd.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could the folks currently working on the (new?) MacPGP implementation (any version, any country) please identify themselves to me in private email? I have some brief questions, and have not been able to raise Zig (nor do I want to bother Phil). Thanks! dave -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAitfCt4AAAEEANk+zWV0Z1tnxsJm25BAvH2NI68RbNOaumDofJgVUL9BePQI HNNbOdu4gAmhcEXMvFVwu3vju4nh9qnzz7lYpw5Yh6TcgVI+vb9OsljfAR+ibhDN j5ParKfwZ+mexOCAfrgdt1z71XLY588qxs70ha6u76dvxUsdw6HBOF9KrwDlAAUT tB1EYXZpZCBEZWwgVG9ydG8gPGRkdEBsc2QuY29tPg== =U20R -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: FV & PGP (was Re: First Virtual email security)
by Mike Ellsworth 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- James D. Wilson said: > >On Thu, 15 Dec 1994 nsb(a)nsb.fv.com wrote: > >> Moreover, if we supported PGP today, we might indirectly lend >> credibility to what we perceive as the incorrect belief that >> cryptography is NECESSARY for commerce. Because we see cryptography as >> helpful, but not necessary, we aren't going to support PGP right away, >> but will probably add such support when a large enough portion of our >> customer base wants it and can make use of it. > >Without cryptography how exactly are you going to protect my credit card >numbers from sniffer-snoopers and crackers? Either you will send the >credit card text in the clear, or it will be encrypted somehow. Or perhaps >you will have customers call you over the phone to give you their credit >card info? I would also like to be convinced on this point. It seems that it's an either/or. Either the info is in the clear, and thus vulnerable, or it's encrypted, and safer. - ------------------------------------- Mike Ellsworth mellswor(a)firewall.nielsen.com I find television very educating. Every time somebody turns on the set, I go into the other room and read a book. Groucho Marx (1890-1977) I'd be foolish to speak for my employer, now, wouldn't I? - ------------------------------------- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLvJI7yoZzwIn1bdtAQEQHwGAxhCYdPFxK1leSvHJJB6uipGm1wJDPzTF h95k/mp0umUkc92T6hVccPnaKF1x47nI =PQWe -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Decrypting PGP 1.0 files
by jcorgan＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have recently uncovered some old conventionally encrypted files from back in '91, using PGP 1.0. I remember the passphrase; however, they won't decrypt and state that the passphrase is bad (this is using PGP 2.6.2.) It occurred to me that PGP used some different algorithm (Bass-O-Matic?) back then, and I don't think the current versions are backwardly compatible (but perhaps they should detect and warn the user that this is the case.) So, where could I get PGP 1.0? ======================================================================= Johnathan Corgan "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent" jcorgan(a)netcom.com -Isaac Asimov PGP Public Key: http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html Or send email to: pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.ai.mit.edu Subj: GET jcorgan ======================================================================= -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLvMdrk1Diok8GKihAQGG0AQAoSGnMZP8kwPlBEfAuvPy0HKC2eXCOW2S RMCV8o9RBD2a7vH5BHVt0f4XWiAUyZ0aEpr+DF7/OCy7KaqFf+5GYZdD0TX8eeHN Zw2NcMF6SztjqQ85b0BshyEfXaOBiEjqszSpMCQ1V5FbEuETYhiTm94uJLChFjCx e7I5Zwklmq0= =Ipmy -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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