December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Anonymity in the foreign exchange markets
by eric＠remailer.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following two page spread advertisement is from the Economist Nov 12, 1994. -------------------------------------------- Wouldn't the speculators love to know where you DM2.5 billion is right now. Your government has just raised DM2.5 billion. Your task is to convert those Deutsche marks into the currency of your country. And a whole world of speculators can't wait. They know they can make money at your expense by detecting and anticipating such a large currency move. But you have a surprise for them. Your currency is moving through the international markets right now -- right under the speculator's noses -- and they haven't a clue. Because you've found a firm that is more than a leading international trader. It's a select group of professionals -- strategists, researchers and economists with their own technology, their own global network and a distinctive approach to foreign exchange. They monitor the capital markets, not just trade flows, to get a more accurate picture of currency trends. Their strategic thinking helps pinpoint when -- and when not -- to make certain currency moves. And while they deal in all currencies, all markets and all size transactions, large positions such as yours are handled with special discretion. That's why, right now, your DM2.5 billion has been divided up -- into trades small enough to be undetected but large enough to be cost-efficient -- and blended strategically into the firm's daily global business. Most importantly, when the trading becomes fast and furious, these people make sure your transactions come first. You know they'll see you through it all. MORGAN STANLEY [The picture is of a chameleon.] -------------------------------------------- Note that not only are they selling anonymization services for *huge* sizes, they're also selling traffic analysis avoidance. >From what I know about the business, a typical commission is 1%, or somewhere around $10 million for th advertised transaction. Eric

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Netscape SSL protocol URL
by ddt＠lsd.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Check out: http://home.mcom.com/info/SSL.html First few lines reproduced below. Sorry no sign on this one, must jet now! dave =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= cut here =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= The SSL Protocol The SSL protocol has been submitted to the W3O working group on security for consideration as part of a general security approach for the Web, and we are actively working within the W3O and with many of its member entities on establishing open security standards for the net. This protocol specification was last revised on November 29th, 1994. Recent changes include: a fundamental correction to the client-certificate authentication protocol, the removal of the username/password messages, corrections in some of the cryptographic terminology, the addition of a MAC to the messages [see section 1.2], the allowance for different kinds of message digest algorithms. Internet Data Security Document Experimental Kipp E.B. Hickman Request For Comments: XXXX Netscape Communications Corp. Last Update: Nov. 29th, 1994 ______________________________________________________________________________ The SSL Protocol Status of this Memo This RFC specifies a security protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Abstract This document specifies the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol, a security protocol that provides privacy over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that cannot be eavesdropped. Server's are always authenticated and clients are optionally authenticated. [elided]

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L.A. area meeting
by Agorist003＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There will be a meeting under the announced name "L.A. Cypherpunks" at the California Coffee House, 4455 Overland Avenue, Culver City, CA 90230 (310) 559-8868 to discuss privacy issues and tactics. If any of y'all want to show up and flame on about your pet projects and sell stuff, it is a free, informal gathering -- show up any time between noon and 5 P.M. BCNU! Kent - jkh(a)story.com (If wsb gets fixed again)

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Question #1 to the community regarding National...
by CRYPTO 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Question #1 to the community regarding National Cryptography Policy As many of you know, the National Research Council is undertaking a study of national cryptography policy (description available on request to CRYPTO(a)NAS.EDU) This note is the first of a number of questions that will be posted to the Internet community in our attempt to solicit input on a broad scale. Please circulate this request to anyone that you think might be able to contribute. The question of this posting is the following: How, if at all, do capabilities enabled by new and emerging technology in telecommunications (e.g., key-escrow encryption technologies, digital telephony) and electronic networking make it _easier_ for those who control that technology to compromise and/or protect the interests of individual end users? Please use as the standard of comparison the ease _today_ of compromising or protecting these interests. We are interested in scenarios in which these interests might be compromised or protected both individually and on a large scale. Please be sure to tell us the interests you believe are at stake. Please send your comments on this question to CRYPTO(a)NAS.EDU.

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cut & choose
by Alex Strasheim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In Applied Cryptography, Schneier describes digital cash protocols that depend on the cut and choose method: Alice prepares 100 anonymous money orders for $100, sends them all to the bank, which opens all the envelopes except one picked at random. If the 99 envelopes checked have money orders for $100, then the bank is confident that the one they sign blindly will be for $100 as well. Chaum's system uses different keys for different denominations. Alice only sends one envelope, and the bank uses its $100 key to sign it. I don't understand why anyone would use the cut and choose protocol over denominated keys. Chaum's method seems a lot cleaner to me and more secure. It obviously uses less bandwidth. What am I missing here? == Alex Strasheim | finger astrashe(a)nyx.cs.du.edu alex(a)omaha.com | for my PGP 2.6.1. public key -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLudoHxEpP7+baaPtAQFIiwQAsCc/TYI/cgJyGf6AtykBGgu+qJJ+peM6 /IYXnUzrIeFLx54nRjsUOUFYJs6Uu3vu6s2BRbd2/YIJVaY6/kP4HO0zuMhqFn2z 4eddRverUeH59IZgZ+4Va4/rgfn5hRdNSOgNinIyk0aRsa8ulR+cmJdUYqggHgd5 w2dxkAtDSGM= =fzJT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: BofA+Netscape
by JEFF LICQUIA (CEI) 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > It my personal feeling that Netscape doesn't have the right >talent mix to develop secure software. For example, they may well get >the RSA parts right, and then store the passphrase in a text file, >'for ease of use.' The RSA is secure, but the system is not secure if >usnauthorized people using your machine is a possibility. > > Writing secure software is a difficult and tricky buisness >that requires a lot of effort; early versions of Mosaic had problems. > > Netscape really needs to develop a threat model that allows >them to assess the severity of potential problems. It is my guess >that they have not done so, although, I'd be pleased to hear I'm >wrong. > > Everyone's favorite company, First Virtual, seems to have >developed a threat model that allows them to offload allmost all risk >and security problems to their customers. It may not be a good >solution, but at least they have considered how the security of their >system intersects the real world. Just integrating RSA does not do >that. This intrigued me, so I checked it out. I didn't see anything about a threat model, but they did have some extensive discussion about their security, including things I found interesting... They call their system "Secure Sockets Layer" (SSL), which appears to be a kind of link-level encryption which they layer below HTTP. This is opposed to SHTTP, which is more MIME-like. They don't seem to think much of SHTTP; their FAQ answers the question "Are there other secure browsers available?" with "Nope; no one else uses SSL at this time." (paraphrased) What's interesting is that they're planning to put NNTP, FTP, etc. on top of SSL as well, allowing for "secure FTP" and "secure news", etc. SSL is supposedly an open standard, and Netscape is pressing for it to become a true standard. Apparently, they've even issued an RFC for it. The full text of the SSL protocol is on their Web site. As for technical issues, they aren't very satisfactory concerning the kind of questions Adam raised; it's mostly about RC4 layered on top of RSA and MD5 hashes sent at this time, etc... The SSL spec contains a section on attacks which seems elementary even to my novice mind. Is there interest in posting the spec? It's in RFC format, but hasn't even been assigned a number yet, so it doesn't appear to be uncopyable, as it were. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLuiwnjER5KvPRd0NAQGBNAP+PpTRHhzVq+ogPkCUP4vBSYG9ooOnSVOi tOaG+4zQYJa7iPBP11/aODYM9JjlNr8zGBDfKr1SzOI7ntg59C8/aGscc5XvJh5I wE2TxHOqA+OE+AtSy4jDE09yVG/TUZuO69Ig5+v/xJy+XU1nspUoJ02mi5EQo/59 Qq1nDoeKpoE= =vBg6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Saturday weekly L.A. gatherings
by Agorist003＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

TAKE 2!: It's always something. Saturday, December 10, 1994, and weekly henceforth (on a trial basis, excluding vacations and holidays unless someone else wants to host it): There will be a meeting under the announced name "L.A. Cypherpunks" at the California Coffee House, 4455 Overland Avenue, Culver City, CA 90230 (310) 559-8868 to discuss privacy issues and tactics. If any of y'all want to show up and flame on about your pet projects and sell stuff, it is a free, informal gathering -- show up any time between noon and 5 P.M. The first logical order of business after introductions, is "is this the time and the place?" The California Coffee House is close to my home, and it is a compromise between the extremes of a restaurant and a meeting hall without food. They serve sandwiches and coffee. They are open 9 a.m. - 5 p.m. on Saturday. The meeting will start if anyone shows up besides myself and continue until closing time. And you'll even get a little brochure! Gosh, golly, gee whiz!! BCNU! Kent - jkh(a)story.com (consarn it all, skippy)

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Re: How to Destroy the Internet (was Info about Linux)
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is /etc/utmp still world-writeable on most machines these days? Hell, even CERT put out an advisory about this years ago.

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Re: crypto email to France
by farr＠evtech.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Rebecca Farr said: > > Does anyone here know any details or where I might find out more about > > what, if anything, needs to be done to legally exchange encrypted email > > with our office in Paris? > > It would be great if you could post a summary of the practical > procedure, once you find out. It's nice to have (an approximation of) > the legal text, but that's usually quite removed from the actual > paperwork. > > Thanks, > Pierre. > pierre(a)shell.portal.com > Thank you, Pierre, and everyone else who has responded both privately and through the cypherpunks mailing list. I will post a summary of the procedure and any other relevant information when I (finally!) find out what that is. Thanks also for the translation of the french law you posted. Someone from France had sent me the original, and while I can read it, this will save me some work writing up a translation for our lawyer. Best wishes to all, Rebecca Farr farr(a)evtech.com

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Secure DAC?
by SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I was looking through the PMI analog IC databook from 1988. Specifically, I was looking at the "DAC-08 8-bit high-speed multiplying D/A converter". The chip is interesting in that it has two outputs. One is the current corresponding to the digital value on the input lines, and the other is the current corresponding to NOT the digital values. Thus, the two currents sum to a constant. The book says: "Power consuption may be calculated as follows: Pd = (I+) (V+) + (I-) (V-). A useful feature of the DAC-08 design is that supply current is constand and independent of input logic states; this is useful in cryptographic applications and further serves to ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ reduce the size of the power supply bypass capacitors." -- Page 11-34. All typos mine. I fail to see how this would increase cryptographic potential. However, it would seem to mask the device's EMR. The application notes state that it is useful in CRT display drivers, audio encoders, &c. These are all devices that are succeptable to TEMPEST monitoring (or whatever the correct name is). If one output goes to the desired next stage (the electron gun in a CRT for example) and the other goes to a matched dummy load, it would seem that the overall EMR is constant. This approach would obliviate the need for bulky shielding, though it might not be as secure. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLuhtmcyi36CIyUXVAQHPOgQAtfWIF40YQU+pYhYok734qzePhkDmmaaR 8WLXVB9UvZBi7psIuXRsXoKkODaQIJecQZ6UsIrEfBr1Lor+ZBe7e7fOpWiO5jkE gMC+/a62z4xOyr4ukrEsZPG4WfHLR1SSob+CFla/JjiL2Hp3+I2wgtieY7KHTn0m 13Zpr/eayLM= =F8pd -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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