December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Cypherpunks Press release
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I guess you all know how much I hate this "who will be our spokesman?" thread, but my opinion has been explicitly asked, so I will again comment. Hopefully, adding a few new points. At 6:55 AM 9/26/95, Craig Hubley wrote: >Damn fine idea, but how do a bunch of (p)anarchists choose a mouthpiece ? >Should we assign someone to be 'our' lawyer ? > >I'd volunteer to be 'spokespunk', I've certainly been interviewed for TV and >print enough, and know how to handle and present myself to the press, but if >this is considered an 'honor' rather than a 'pain in the ass and potential >legal lightning rod' then I'd like to suggest someone with a longer pedigree >who has been writing more code lately take it on. Tim ? I've turned down several recent chances for interviews, for these reasons: 1. I feel the people doing the work should be interviewed, not just someone who has some visibility (whatever mine might be). If PGP is the issue, then they should talk to those working on PGP. If anonymous remailers are the issue, etc. If, by some chance, they are interested in things I have directly worked on or written extensively about, then maybe they should interview me. (Although for other reasons I refused to have my name attached to the cover story in "Information Week" about "Internet Theft," BlackNet, etc.) 2. Location, location, location! The media foci are Washington, New York, and San Francisco, at least for our area of interest. Occasional forays into Austin, Miami, L.A., etc. This is where the taped interviews are done. Several "crews" recently in SF wanted "sound bites" and "video bites" from people like me. I refused, pointing out the wastefullness of my time in driving 100 miles over mountain roads to SF, fighting parking problems, waiting around, and ending up with a 7.89 second clip of me saying something scripted. (In February I stupidly agreed to travel to LA for a filming of a BBC show about encryption. Left at dawn, drove to San Jose, flew to LA, took shuttle to Hollywood, waited around for several hours while crew finished taping Alvin and Heidi Toffler, set up my laptop, was interviewed by show's producer, agreed at her repeated prodding to say "I am a Cypherpunk." Got back to my house at midnight. Guess what they used? The stupid line "I am a Cypherpunk" and maybe about 20 seconds of other random comments. This is what we face, as other high tech shows I see have the same disjointed, out-of-context flavor.) The point? These "journalists" are tuned to looking for catchy quotes, all the more so on video than in print. Text journalists can handle complex themes much better than video reporters can, for many and oft-discussed reasons. (Even more disgusting than this was a more recent appearance of a BBC film crew at a Cypherpunks meeting. They wanted to "stage" the news, to have the meeting discuss a 2-year-old topic, because that's what their script called for. I got up and left, as did several other people. I haven't seen this BBC show, but I gather from a URL that this is the one that has "performance art" examples of crypto....) Any "spokesman" needs to be easily accessible when they need a "filler quote," or a "reaction quote." However: 3. THERE IS NO SPOKESMAN, THERE IS NO CENTRAL OFFICE, THERE IS NO BOARD OF DIRECTORS! With no organization, no office, no coordination, we cannot "feed the media machine" the way it expects to be fed. Nor can we "elect" such folks. I didn't help start this list--not that this gives me more moral sway--in order that J. Random Volunteer will start speaking for "our beliefs" or will start explaining "our goals" and "our plans." Far better that journalists like Steven Levy and John Markoff subsribe to the list, or to condensations by people like Eric Blossom, and then deal directly with the experts in some area. Thus, on the latest Netscape flaw, they would contact Ray Cromwell directly, not deal with the press releases written by J. Random Volunteer. Anarchy is part of our charm. More importantly, part of our theme. Face it, we don't have a press office, we don't have staffing, and--most importantly--there is no one out there who speaks for me. A spokesman for the Cypherpunks is an oxymoron. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

7 6

Re: Hack Microsoft?
by dan＠milliways.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 26 Sep 1995 00:04:08 -0400 (EDT) you wrote: > > > Microsoft recently got C2-security status approved for Windows NT by >the National Computer Security Center, a division of the NSA. They >are supposed to put systems through "laborious testing and review" before > If Cypherpunks can find flaws that the NSA can't, or won't divulge, >what does that say about their so-called COMSEC ability. > For fun ways to hack NT, check out http://www.somar.com/security.html. Some of these are really laughable. You can use NT's LogonUser API call to repeatedly guess passwords until you hit it, since NT offers no way to limit number of login attempts. There also is no way to stop remote users from modifying the registry. *Any* user with an account can remotely dump and modify the system registry. So in theory you can write a bruteforce program to keep guessing until it gets a password, then modify the registry to make the system to "interesting" things. The worst part of all this is that the Registry is very poorly documented, MSoft must consider most of that info "confidential." Fortunately, when using NT's SMB services such as drive and file sharing, passwords are never sent in the clear. Just make sure you disable that "Guest" account.:) Dan Bailey *************************************************************** #define private public dan(a)milliways.org Worcester Polytechnic Institute and The Restaurant at the End of the Universe ***************************************************************

2 1

(fwd) FBI COMPUTER FRAUD WEB SITE DIVISION
by imschira＠nyx10.cs.du.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Path: mnemosyne.cs.du.edu!uunet!in2.uu.net!noc.near.net!das-news2.harvard.edu!oitnews.harvard.edu!newsfeed.rice.edu!news.sesqui.net!news.concom.com!news From: Rick Casimir <rikkkk(a)concom.com> Newsgroups: misc.forsale.computers.pc-specific.misc Subject: FBI COMPUTER FRAUD WEB SITE DIVISION Date: 21 Sep 1995 17:47:42 GMT Organization: Connections.Com Lines: 9 Message-ID: <43s8fu$r4t(a)carbon.concom.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: dial139.concom.com Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Mailer: Mozilla 1.1PE (Windows; I; 16bit) HELLO, If you or someone you know who has been scammed or did"nt ship you products after you prepaid or for whatever reason who screwed you. REPORT THEM TO THE FBI: <http://www.fbi.gov/compcrim.htm> -- -- http://yakko.cs.wmich.edu/~frogfarm ...for the best in unapproved information To be a skeptic is to refuse to be a victim. "This is my .sig. There are many like it, but this one is mine." Freedom...yeah, right.

1 0

CHA_cha
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Worth Magazine, October, 1995, has a longish, easy-reading, supportive article on David Chaum and digital cash. Virtually alone among E-money thinkers, Chaum insists on creating anonymity for all transactions -- building a tamper-proof system that works just as "real" cash always has, from cowne shells to $100 bills. The key, he says, is this: Without the spender's say-so, no one should be able to trace who paid whom for what, whether a transaction takes place online or in a swipe of a card at a coffee shop. It's a libertarian approach in tune with Chaum's roots in freewheeling communities such as Berkeley and Amsterdam -- but it is anathema to control freaks like the FBI, the IRS, and corporate information marketers. Chaum says every digital-cash system but his has the potential to be abused or compromised -- and the math seems to bear him out. His competitors, however, insist their plans will prove plenty secure in practice. They dismiss Chaum as an incorrigible purist, a brilliant mathematician and innovator whose political views are hindering his chances of success. Like many in the digital elite, Chaum, an unabashed utopian, does want to create a new world. To him, electronic money is just the first consumer use of an arcane field he hopes will transform society: cryptology, the science of secret codes. In cyberspace, these codes can prove a powerful way of shielding a person's identity -- or of verifying an identity without giving away extra information. Armed with personal computers and good software, says Chaum, ordinary people will finally have the power to do and say things without being tracked by Big Brother. CHA_cha (31 kb in two parts)

1 0

Netscape as vehicle for cypherpunk agenda/the cypherpunk bully pulpit
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was thinking recently how the events of the past week or so have turned me into a sort of a Netscape advocate. Granted, there are bugs in Netscape, and there probably will be more bugs uncovered (someone needs to write an exploit if they want themself & Ray to get a T-shirt btw), but Netscape is interested in fixing problems and the new 2.0 is doing encrypted email, probably with a really nice interface (Haven't seen it yet, of course) and they are working to make the 128-bit version downloadable. (The 128bit version is available overseas already anyway, I hear.) The really big sticking point I see, however, is the certification authorities. There is a single point of failure here and that is at Verisign. This becomes a large problem I think if the en rypted email that Netscape does requires personal x509 certificates (I read that Versign is issuing those for $9/each.) This is a problem because for one thing I don't think Versign will want to issue certs to psudonyms, and Netscape may not talk encrypted email to non-certified people. (I am not sure) The solution to this, of course, is to allow Navigator to accept alternate certification hierarchies, so we can setup a Cypherpunks cert agency or a c2.org cert agency, which -will- sign nym's keys, etc. The question exists though, as to whether or not Netscape will allow for alternate agencies in Navigator. I haven't seen any mention of this feature in 2.0, so if the feature exists in 2.0, then great! Otherwise, unless Netscape is going to allow for alternte cert agencies on a specific timescale, I think we have to do something about it in order to force the issue. Along the same lines of what happened recently-- because of the exposed hole and the pressure put on Netscape, management was finally willing to let some of the code be available for public review. If something happened to show how relying on a single point of failure such as Verisign was bad and resulted in much press & publicity, then perhaps Netscape management would be convinced to allow for alternate cert hierarchies.. Some sort of hack which demonstrates this would be great. I am feeling uncreative and can't think of anything effective short of stealing Verisign's private key, but that would be pretty damn tough. -- sameer Voice: 510-601-9777 Community ConneXion FAX: 510-601-9734 An Internet Privacy Provider Dialin: 510-658-6376 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

4 3

Re: cypherpunks press releases/contact list: YES!! DO IT!!
by blancw＠accessone.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "Perry E. Metzger" There is this widespread and wholely misplaced affection for "cypherpunks". We aren't a company or an organization. This is a mailing list, and occassionally a seminar series in places like NoCal. It isn't a "group". .............................................. And you of all the cpunks, Perry, are the most affectionately considered. :>) Actually, those who want to become official spokewheels should consider that the cypherpunk agenda is to promote anarchic (i.e. individualistic, self-responsible) action. That is, that the individual who chooses to act in a 'cypherpunkish' mode does so at their own risk by their own motivation by their own decision and their own discretion. Not everyone on the list subscribes to this ideal of complete independence; furthermore, for anarchist types to identify with a "group" would be inconsistent with the philosophical attitude of the "members", who come-&-go as they please. However, it would be an amazing event to see VZ Nuri-logical (Cypherpunk Extraordinaire) on TV, saying something like, "Yes, I fully and completely subscribe to the Cypherpunk agenda: black markets, anarchy, overthrow of governments. National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway." <g> (It would be a *cold* day in Hell!) .. Blanc

1 0

Status of Netscape Bug Exploit (suggestions needed)
by Ray Cromwell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ok Folks, here's what I got so far... 1) a URL that can place a specific value in the program counter (gdb) select-frame 2 (gdb) info frame Stack level 2, frame at 0xefbfbc30: eip = 0xefbfbc30; saved eip 0x90909090 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ called by frame at 0x90909090, caller of frame at 0xefbfbc14 Arglist at 0xefbfbc30, args: Locals at 0xefbfbc30, Previous frame's sp is 0xefbfbc1c Saved registers: eax at 0xefbfbc2c, ecx at 0xefbfbc28, edx at 0xefbfbc24, ebx at 0xefbfbc20, ebp at 0xefbfbc18, esi at 0xefbfbc14, edi at 0xefbfbc10, eip at 0xefbfbc0c, ps at 0xefbfbc08 2) A piece of exploit code on the stack near the PC (gdb) disassemble 0xefbfbc10 0xefbfbc40 0xefbfbc27: nop 0xefbfbc28: nop 0xefbfbc29: nop 0xefbfbc2a: nop 0xefbfbc2b: nop 0xefbfbc2c: nop 0xefbfbc2d: nop 0xefbfbc2e: nop 0xefbfbc2f: nop 0xefbfbc30: nop 0xefbfbc31: nop 0xefbfbc32: nop 0xefbfbc33: nop 0xefbfbc34: nop 0xefbfbc35: nop 0xefbfbc36: nop 0xefbfbc37: nop 0xefbfbc38: nop 0xefbfbc39: nop 0xefbfbc3a: nop 0xefbfbc3b: nop 0xefbfbc3c: nop 0xefbfbc3d: nop 0xefbfbc3e: nop 0xefbfbc3f: nop 0xefbfbc40: nop 3) exploit code that calls the kernel syscall() with SYS_exit (benign exploit, causes your browser to exit) The problem? To make a syscall under BSDI2.0, I have to execute an lcall 0x7,0x0 with 1,0 on the stack. However, to exploit the netscape bug, you can not embed 0x0 in the URL. No problem I thought, I searched Netscape's executable for any kernel calls, and found an lcall 0x7,0x0 at 0x257fee. But I can't do a 32-bit direct jump without a zero, in the instruction (the 32-bit address is 0x00257fee), and I can't do a relative jump from 0xefbfbc30+ If you can come up with some 386 assembly under BSDI2.0 which can invoke syscall() in the kernel without any embeded 0x0 bytes in the code, you can share a Hack Netscape T-Shirt with me. If it turns out to be too hard under BSDI, I'll gladly assist in producing exploits for Windows or another operating system. One trick I thought up for embeding zeros in the code is to self-modify the code using XOR ADDRESS,ADDRESS where ADDRESS is a byte on the stack within the code. Anyone have any better ones? -Ray

1 0

Time Keys, Some Secure Ideas (by Alias: Jay Hyden)
by Anonymous Remailing Service 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> Time Keys, Some Secure Ideas << The weakest attack on a time key based system is to spoof the computer that keeps track of time into releasing encryption keys i.e. change the clock. Perhaps this could be avoided by hardware inaccessability, say a computer system taken to, and setup on the Moon by those corporation that are already planning to place VR rovers on the lunar surface. Any Earth bound system would be vulnerable to physical attack. Here are some ideas for such a system: o 7 clocks with absolutely no way of reseting them. Perhaps a system that will only let you tell it which clock is the most accurate, and only if you prove you are the proper authority and only if 4 other clocks are on the same minute. o Redundant hardware and power collection and data transmit /receive systems, flash ROM hard drives for storing secret keys and neccesary programs and files. Built to last several centuries if possible. o Key pairs could be generated on Earth, a time of release instruction and perhaps an optional other public key a (return at future date encrypted with this key option.) The package is then encrypted with one of the lunar systems keys, then transmited to the Moon. A verification could be encypted and sent back to insure data integrity. o Other security checks in place would insure that the data was transmited to the Moon by the proper authority, i.e. the Corp. charging for this service. Additional backup logic that would insure that proper power and protocol exist for transmitions from the lunar system. o The key pairs are witness generated, then sent to the lunar system, then the secret key is destroyed on Earth. The public keys become a one way hash to the future until the time designated by the key's owner has elapsed. Then the lunar system would transmit the owners secret key to Earth. o Upon time released instructions the lunar system would transmit the secret key, (encrypted if optioned) upon demand by a known packet radio method. So if the Corp. authority did not exist in say, 100 years, the data could still be retrieved by standard packet radio. People who want to write to ONLY their great great grand- children or the future world in general would have a forum. Jay /"""""\ ~~ ,--------------------------------------------, ~~ /"""""\ /__ - _-\ ~~ ( End HEMP Prohibition! This is an open chal- ) ~~ /-_ - __\ :@ (*)~(*) ~ ( lenge to Historians. Name examples of where ) ~ (*)~(*) @: :%/--~ ))~: ~ (& when the cultivation of legal hemp was harm-) ~ :~(( ~--/%: \__"-==-===* ( ful or destructive to a society in any way! ) *===-==-"__/ (:"\_)_/ (<jay.hyden(a)alpha.c2.com> PublicKey on Servers) \_(_/":) .//:%:%:\. '---------------------------------------------' ./:%:%:\\. =000o====o000===================================================000o====o000= | | | | | | | | | | | - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | | | | | | | | - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMGiLha7iRhcfEZiZAQEn0QP6A8cUmI0MHs866Mu/Ao4mFqr89F8tT3oP KeafNdSWJt8/pOlVZzQxV8P8S8dCkXwBgJJQaQ6tigqtD2+9fK1HEaWi3ZBAVgB+ CwLhqouwds2A5+l9riQfqAT+4yrSbeNR+bH3xyYa8zZSTzp5DB1tJEbWls6Kjr/w hxmFYrf6oSk= =oHrR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

chaos cryptography
by Sherry Mayo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all - saw this in New Scientist and thought you might be interested (I guess it's more stenography than cryptography): ========== "Secret signals hidden in chaos ...John Hogan of the Engineering Mathematics department at Bristol showed the BA how such unpredictable systems can be used to protect sensitive information. His team mixed the information with chaotic electrical signals, transmitted the result, and then extracted the hidden message. Hogan and his team modified simple electrical circuits to generate unpredictable signals and hid within them a recording of "Land of Hope and Glory". When the two identical circuits are connected, said Hogan, the outputs instantly synchronise so that anything added to the transmission stands out. "It's like magic." he said. If anyone intercepted the signal and fed it through a loudspeaker all they would hear is a loud hiss. This makes the system suitable for hiding confidential information - once, that is, the system is perfected. At present, a decoded message sounds like a scratchy 78 recording although it is still recognisable, said Hogan. So far the researchers have succeeded only when the two circuits are connected by wire a few cm long. They are now trying to replicate the results in circuits that are seperated by long distances and connected by a radio link. They also want to see if it can be modified for use with digital equipment." ============ Sherry ps I wonder how close to real noise the "hiss" is.

1 0

Fax encryption software
by Jonathan Blake 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I saw this article in alt.privacy. Anybody think the described encryption actually is worth looking at. Xref: netcom.com alt.privacy:29325 Path: netcom.com!ix.netcom.com!howland.reston.ans.net!EU.net!uunet!in2.uu.net!news.deltanet.com!lkf0166 From: clav(a)deltanet.com Newsgroups: alt.privacy Subject: Re: FAX Encryption Software Date: Mon, 18 Sep 95 12:39:53 GMT Organization: Delta Internet Services, Anaheim, CA Lines: 59 Message-ID: <43k3nv$m9(a)news1.deltanet.com> References: <43hvft$n2b(a)news1.deltanet.com> <43ii1t$210(a)nntp.crl.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: lkf0166.deltanet.com X-Newsreader: News Xpress Version 1.0 Beta #3 Dear Mr. Chaos, We are talking about a 72 bit engine that is more than sufficiently strong for time sensitive general business purposes. In addition it does not rely merely on simple factoring but a process called graphical encryption that adds additional difficulty to an attack. I would like to see if your cracking abilities are anywhere near your abilities to return an uninformed answer. I invite you to try your skill. David _________________________________________________________________ _____________ In article <43ii1t$210(a)nntp.crl.com>, acollier(a)crl.com wrote: >clav(a)deltanet.com wrote: > >>ANYONE FOR A CRYPTO-STRONG, YET EASY TO USE FAX/EMAIL SECURITY >>SOFTWARE PACKAGE FOR BUSINESS OR OTHER USE??? > >>Aliroo Ltd. has developed a Windows, eye-to-eye fax/email >>encryption package called PrivaSoft. > >>Unlike any previously devised system, this method protects, with >>only 4 mouse clicks, fax and email transmissions in electronic >>and even paper form - FROM THE TIME YOU CREATE A MESSAGE UNTIL IT >>IS READ - NOT JUST WHEN YOUR FAX IS BEING TRANSMITTED. > >>You can encrypt a message, and then fax or email it (via plain >>old standard fax machine or fax modem), print it to paper or save >>to a disk file. > >>It is fully licensed, without restriction for export, by the U.S. >>Department of Commerce. NO PGP WORRIES. > >Also no worries about security - if DOC says you can have it, you can bet >that NSA has seen to it that it is cryptographically weak, or else uses a >key escrow system (where sombody else can get to the keys), and as insecure >as any other non-published method. For all we know, they may be using a >cereal box decoder ring set up. > >>Email me for a free copy which will be sent to you via email or >>snail mail post. It is fully functional (not crippleware) and >>enables you to try our system out before purchase with 8 free >>page scrambles. It retails for $130 per installed computer. >>Looking for end users and distributors. > >>Thanks, >>David > > -- To subscribe to Graphology-L send e-mail to: listserv(a)netcom.com / subject: leave blank message: subscribe graphology-l(a)netcom.com <your internet address> To get the Graphology-L FAQ send e-mail to grafolog(a)netcom.com / subject: hwafaq / no message ^

1 0