December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Broadcasts - addressing
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I have been contemplating how to mark broadcast messages as being > 'for' someone. To foil traffic analysis, you don't want to include > their nym or key-id, for the sake of the your poor CPU, you want to > avoid the need to attempt decryption on everything that passes through. The main problem is how to avoid decrypting _most_ of the traffic, without giving away significant information about the recipient. One approach is to do something some political users have been asking for - implement support for very short keyids (e.g. 4 bits instead of 24-32), so that the keyid isn't a good identifier for the user. Another approach is to include a tag in the Subject: with either a hash of the key (substantially reducing the number of bits), or simply the last hex or two of the keyid - that lets you ignore 15/16th or 255/256th of the traffic, without giving away much.

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Re: Real-time surveillance of the police
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim wrote: >(The longer-than-I'd-planned section above is meant to show that even >a cop-disliking skeptic like me can be convinced that some good is >done is by them, and that not all cops are bad. Perhaps my on-day >exposure co-opted me the way certain folks in D.C. got co-opted?) Yup! -- Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Standard Packet size.
by lcottrell＠popmail.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I am about to release Mixmaster as a beta test. Before I do, I would like some input on what size message packet to standardize on. Each message includes twenty 1k headers, and a block with the message text. Right now I have the text block size set to 4k. That seems small, but I am worried about mail systems choking on big messages. Messages over the minimum size are sent separately (through the same chain), and only recombined by the last remailer in the chain. Previous remailers do not know that the message parts are associated. This is quite secure, but not as good as a single packet, so the fewer messages that get split up, the better. Mixmaster compresses the contents of the text block. So, any thoughts on what size the text block should be? BTW Mixmaster still only runs on Sun. Several people are working on porting it to linux. Help with porting to PC and Mac would be appreciated. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLu1Ml1Vkk3dax7hlAQHWfAP+Kj2LyWBySVHfI0QTBBhEvF3b+ru/hywm kALdnXWUkbcSgRHQAMdSpwYza44M7Tc6sX++kDASSjwWyV80cTPHqFEPFmoEcbRV 1BPJB7SAkhwHGpRB5e0daLe0LAuS9KRHbTQcN//n0pUrbqMS2sVJCrDQ7kwrFC8L 3QEzCjWHsAQ= =Dc4G -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD loki(a)nately.ucsd.edu PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Encrypted mail welcome. Home page http://nately.ucsd.edu/~loki/ Home of "chain" the remailer chaining script. For anon remailer info, mail remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu Subject: remailer-help "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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Re: James vs. Eric
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Eric # Perhaps you don't know the meaning of whitespace and paragraph breaks. James > And then he contradicts himself: # I did claim you were arguing from libertarian correctness. Now that's # just an insult, which I do not retract. [...] # Oh, please. Go back and read what I originally wrote. Perhaps I # overestimate your ability to ascertain relevance, though. > You do not demonstrate much ability to think rationally > in this posting. A self contradiction in three lines, > above, and some interesting logic to follow: [...] # This is not an argument. This is a premise. > I see: So you start off with the assumption that what > I was arguing was false, and because that is a premise > not an argument, you do not have to defend it or support it. "I do not need to PROVE these FACTS because they are INCORRECT and because I do not NEED to PROVE them they must be TRUE!!!" --James `Kibo' Parry, 2/22/94 > Nice piece of logic there. > I accused you of flaming before reading. Now you claim > that you did read it, but the laws of logic exempt you > from having to make rational criticism of what I wrote. > I think your defense denigrates you more than my original > accusation did. > Now back to some slight crypto relevance: [...] *heavy sigh* Eric & James, how about taking the "You're flaming me !" "No, I'm just insulting you !" portion of this debate to private email ? I sincerely doubt that very many people on the list give a damn about any of the above jousting. > Each posting I made was about the standards making process. Sticking to flaming about Internet standards, rather than flaming about who didn't read whose argument carefully, would be much more productive IMHO. - - -L. Futplex McCarthy; PGP key by finger or server "We've got computers, we're tapping phone lines; I know that that ain't allowed" --Talking Heads - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLu1NHmf7YYibNzjpAQFJgwQAy/kPXuCrUb8mQSviXXJJC1USTuJqRhfS gHKtIjveZne4JRdkjzjK6O/hNcNwuKQrMefvgeTlVu4w7HE6geSTMrTogH8r2fF0 VjNe3XN90ad9QrO4Zk0y9NGKYEd5/LOnN5tlcM5ij2yjbVDDZMgWzj0pY1JTrtFJ /uvUSdsHHxU= =4lge - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLu1OZSoZzwIn1bdtAQE5XgGAnqIZqNarnXwzvKkJfy3WPmNW6nwJOJjb nliPNeRmomtgeI27HJqrIYhzUXn40voS =K3HK -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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New zealand meetings?
by Tony.Gurnick＠nzdairy.co.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does any of the kiwis on the list want to start some sort of informal meeting, (at georgie pie?) as going to the states for there meetings is a tad difficult. (all 5 of us that is) T

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Re: Broadcasts - addressing
by lcottrell＠popmail.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> I have been contemplating how to mark broadcast messages as being >> 'for' someone. To foil traffic analysis, you don't want to include >> their nym or key-id, for the sake of the your poor CPU, you want to >> avoid the need to attempt decryption on everything that passes through. > >The main problem is how to avoid decrypting _most_ of the traffic, >without giving away significant information about the recipient. >One approach is to do something some political users have been asking for - >implement support for very short keyids (e.g. 4 bits instead of 24-32), >so that the keyid isn't a good identifier for the user. >Another approach is to include a tag in the Subject: with either a hash >of the key (substantially reducing the number of bits), >or simply the last hex or two of the keyid - that lets you ignore >15/16th or 255/256th of the traffic, without giving away much. I am not completely clear on what sort of communication you are trying to protect, and what your threat model is. Are you worried about an attacker noticing that an anonymous ID is getting a lot of messages? If you are using PGP and a message pool, any attacker can decrypt all the messages, and see which correspond to which key, and therefor to which anonymous ID. The only way around this is to use private key crypto. If you are doing that, then you can also use a shared secret to generate a stream of one use message IDs. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLu09tlVkk3dax7hlAQHLkAP+L8j+9eLcwC7oPpq+OPxDb+C6QJ/H0OX5 3O7uQnU8OZY9YgHsMETh6AY7aTMZYrm9+p3wJu9znFYOwXRIzF+spfyxDDzLVuE1 kQBwGKQt/5YQd6i/jc1Jias6rb/GOBvckYcHKERjSBL638Gi65cC4OFEff5k6ujQ YkkQXkh3JWg= =o5nF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD loki(a)nately.ucsd.edu PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Encrypted mail welcome. Home page http://nately.ucsd.edu/~loki/ Home of "chain" the remailer chaining script. For anon remailer info, mail remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu Subject: remailer-help "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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L.A. cpunx meeting
by Agorist003＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Yep, still hosting the weekly L.A. Cypherpunks gathering at the: California Coffee House 4455 Overland Avenue Culver City, CA 90230 (310) 559-8868 Defend Your Privacy! from: "Big Brother" Government and "Dark Side" Hackers - ---------------- L.A. Cypherpunks Help create an "Infotopia," don't support an "Automatic Gestapo." Fight the Clipper "Snitch Chip." Drop in any time between 12 & 5PM Saturdays (excluding holidays). Let's plot and conspire, or at least exchange PGP key fingerprints. Tune Out (media lies), Turn Off (freeway), and Drop In (for coffee). Share information and sell stuff if you wish. I'm trying to get political types to show up, in addition to us computer geekazoids. Show up and get the latest brochure! I'll be there this Saturday, but not the 24th and possibly not in early January (I did say "excluding holidays"). But don't let that stop you unless the coffee house is closed. Kent - jkh(a)story.com (not yet) or agorist003(a)aol.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLuzgeA4ciVn87Ra9AQHHtQP/dTcF9HG+eB6RLqv9F0Q1/aTfRBMIC0i7 8S5/LxUlv9JiKEOqtLuN7cYMLaEKnVUJbrJU8EH2IJH4VecUk+nDCiMOLC6cNIKj FAGJl6CXDRbaA18Ibuye8u1kNpZckxfOBDhlYCArBHiCvRN3hfqHQzgnMpom1Zba 4Gq+nu7c3Zk= =E2Hr -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: HTTP security
by ekr＠eit.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I sent a slightly less polished version of this to Perry, and then realized he'd cc'ed Cypherpunks.. but it was gone by then... Perry Metzger sez: >Eric Rescorla says: >> In the email world, you don't necessarily have any sort of prior >> relationship with the person you're communicating with and that public >> key cryptography is relatively cheap. (When it takes minutes to >> ship mail across the net, who's going to notice a second or two >> of signature verification?) However, in the case of the Web, >> things are very different. >Since one can sign pages just once (they are written once and read >often) and one can pick one's signature algorithm to speed up >verifications relative to the signatures (using small exponents is the >usual trick fo this), I'm not sure its that big a problem. You are of course correct. I should have chosen the example of encryption, where you can't preenhance. >I'd like these algorithms to support the serving of signed pages from >hosts that do not know the keys that the pages have been signed with >-- offline signature schemes like the one I just described will >support that nicely. Yes. Conveniently, we've anticipated this requirement. The content type of an SHTTP message can be set to indicate that the enhanced content is actually an enhanced document rather than an enhanced HTTP request/reply. So, you just cons up some headers and drop in the presigned page... But this is a very good point. I'm glad I'm not the only person who thinks this is an important requirement. Details on this can be found in the current SHTTP spec (Section 2.3.3) <http://www.commerce.net/information/standards/drafts/shttp.txt> -Ekr

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Re: Clarification of my remarks about Netscape
by marca＠mcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <9412121811.AA55359(a)amanda.dial.intercon.com>, amanda(a)intercon.com (Amanda Walker) wrote: > > As for the IETF standards process, we are pushing the > > document into the RFC process. > > Precisely. Rather than working with others in the industry and research > communities, you are trying to push your proposal into the standards track. Amanda, we're not trying to push anything into the standards track. We're publishing SSL as an informational RFC, and we have separately submitted SSL as a proposal to the W3O working group on security (in parallel with SHTTP and a handful of other proposals). Nothing is being pushed into the standards track. We are trying to work with others in the industry and research communities, via the above actions, by publishing SSL on our server, by participating in this forum and others, etc., and we are generally succeeding, judging from the overall high level of feedback we're getting from people genuinely interesting in discussing the issues. Marc -- Marc Andreessen Netscape Communications Corp. Mountain View, CA marca(a)mcom.com

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Re: Clarification of my remarks about Netscape
by marca＠mcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <199412130318.TAA00912(a)largo.remailer.net>, eric(a)remailer.net (Eric Hughes) wrote: > From: "Kipp E.B. Hickman" <kipp(a)warp.mcom.com> > > If this hadn't been made clear already, then hopefully this will: > > Our intention is to support any development effort attempting > to implement an SSL conformant implementation. We will work with > you to repair the spec as needed to eliminate any errors or > ommisions, and help you test your implementation to ensure that > it interoperates with ours. > > It's clear to me. "We're going to use some security, as long as it's > called SSL and our authorship is on the document." No, he didn't say that -- you're jumping to conclusions based on a statement he's making on a separate topic. We're going to support security mechanisms as they are required and accepted by the market -- functionality, protocols, formats, etc. -- whether or not they are called SSL and whether or not our authorship is on the document. Marc -- Marc Andreessen Netscape Communications Corp. Mountain View, CA marca(a)mcom.com

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