December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Come On
by rjc＠gnu.ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy: >Yikes, Ray, let's not give anybody ideas! In reality, though, I think the >perceptive women on this list know my heart is in the right place. Isn't >it clear to everyone what I'm making fun of? ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Channeling alt.syntax.tactical and alt.flame (Ohm!), Lefty writes: > Heh. > > It's not clear to Ray. Implying of course that it's clear to him. As I so eloquently stated: > > Well, I can certainly say that I am impressed that you've progressed >to telepathy, but humor a poor student for once. > > {long, irrelevant diatribe, elided} I'm glad you liked it. Atleast you kept the best line. Continuing my masterfully written piece: > I hope I "got it" Answering back from the astral plane: > Er, no. Not at all. In fact, I think you demonstrated what I was saying > quite clearly. Meaning that the answer I supplied to Sandy's question was the wrong one. If he knows it's wrong, then he must know the correct answer, well what is it? Otherwise, I'm waiting for a retraction. <contemplate the correct answer to the following question for 3 nights: "What is the sound of one hand clapping?"> Alert, an alt.syntax.tactical gambit move is about to be attempted: > But not to leave you hopelessly adrift, what's the fundamental difference > between the actions of the subject of your oh-so-sad story, and Sandy's > actions? Take your time. Uh oh, do I detect a change of subject? You see, my last post was directed to supply an answer to Sandy's question "Isn't it clear to everyone what I'm making fun of?" (my answer, the campiness of the show) with an added commentary on assuming a receptive audiencce. All of a sudden, we have a diversion here into how Sandy's H.E.A.T. posts on a mailing list compare to my brother-in-law's showing of vacation pictures during a break at work which is irrelevent to the original line of questioning (if you could call "Heh. It isn't clear to Ray." questioning or discussion) A well timed change of subject, and a barely subtle attempt to bait me of course. I'm not going to fall into the trap, so I won't bother responding. I'm still waiting for your answer to Sandy's question, oh great oracle. > Off by a millimeter at the arrow's point; off by a mile at the target. You shouldn't think out loud. But your reflections on your own behavior are quite on the mark. > -- > Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) > C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:. O:.H:.M: Really Lefty, isn't it about time you stopped baiting people? Scan the last twenty messages you posted to cypherpunks. At best, they were nothing but a bunch "witty" 3-liners designed to start a flame with somebody you thought you could obviously outwit. Almost zero discussion or information content. The only post of yours which contained atleast five full sentences was a forward of some Sue D. Nym message. I'm honored that you respect my intellect enough to dedicate more than your usual quota of 3 short sentences (I know it must be quite taxing on your creativity), but maybe it's time for you to take a vacation. -internet highway patrol, assault speech division.

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WWW> Cryptography/PGP/Privacy Web page (fwd)
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I had never heard of this group, so though I'd forward the notice. The page looked pretty good too at first glimpse. Forwarded message: > From: franl(a)centerline.com (Fran Litterio) > Newsgroups: comp.infosystems.announce > Subject: Cryptography/PGP/Privacy Web page (via Centerline Software) > Date: 16 Jul 1994 18:36:38 GMT > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > I've put together a World Wide Web page containing some interesting > information for PGP users (and anyone else who's interested in crypto > and privacy). Some highlights: > > o A link to the PGP FAQ (in hypertext form) maintained at > Quadralay Corp.. > > o Links to forms for looking up public keys from the public > keyserver network (and for submitting your own key). > > o PGP 2.6 and 2.3a documentation and quick reference pages. > > The URL is: > > http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~franl/crypto.html > > Let me know if you like it or have suggestions for how to improve it. > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.6 > > iQCVAgUBLfeFJneXQmAScOodAQF3WgP8D8PyrasDkpBbUmK5yiL2+vmLhsAmyzdx > LlM1cYrYmjbr9Fp7hfyvTiB5tT7mK9+wEC1PXQZNw+mV7asbd2GA9ZrbHV6wLYU7 > Hi14KMN4aPawneWRaZGGRmXNRh/kY+UaRTpCw8xNsw2dzMfD/xL5yLp9eNulHOXk > a1tWLIM+210= > =eSHm > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > -- > Fran Litterio franl(a)centerline.com (617-498-3255) > CenterLine Software http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~franl/ > Cambridge, MA, USA 02138-1110 PGP public key id: 1270EA1D > > > > >

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remail
by Anonymous User 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

BSA Business software Alliance NEWS RELEASE FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Wednesday, July 20, 1994 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Diane Smiroldo, 202.872.5500 BSA PRESIDENT ROBERT HOLLEYMAN REACTION STATEMENT TO VICE PRESIDENT GORE'S LETTER TO REP. CANTWELL ON ENCRYPTION "On behalf of the leading American PC software companies, BSA commends Rep. Maria Cantwell for her success in convincing the administration to change its policy on encryption. Following extensive negotiations with Rep. Cantwell, today Vice President Gore announced that the administration will work with industry to develop a new key escrow encryption system. This new encryption system has the potential for wide-spread use because it will be practical, affordable, and trustworthy. "The administration has recognized that Clipper Chip will not be used for computers. It has been recognized that the information security system for personal computers must be privately developed and controlled. The administration has agreed that the new encryption system must be voluntary, software implementable, based on a non-classified encryption formula, exportable, and employ private sector agents to hold the keys. "The administration also agreed to support periodic studies assessing the availability and impact of foreign encryption programs on American companies. Recognizing the economic importance of the software industry, the administration pledged the active participation of the National Economic Council and the Department of Commerce in the studies. The Vice President agreed that the studies will lay the groundwork to reassess existing export controls. "Today's agreement is a significant victory both for U.S. software companies and the future of the global information superhighway. U.S. software companies must be permitted to compete on a level playing field with foreign vendors who already provide security on software programs. High tech industries are indebted to Rep. Cantwell for her leadership in convincing the administration to adopt a new approach and potentially end the disruptive war on encryption policy." # BSA promotes the continued growth of the software industry through its international public policy, education, and enforcement programs in the U.S. and more than 55 other countries throughout North America, Asia, Europe, and South America. BSA represents the leading U.S. publishers of PC software including Aldus, Apple Computer, Autodesk, Intergraph, Lotus Development, Microsoft, Novell, and WordPerfect. ------------ To respond to the sender of this message, send mail to remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu, starting your message with the following 7 lines: :: Response-Key: ideaclipper ====Encrypted-Sender-Begin==== MI@```%-S^P;+]AB?X9TW6\8WR:&P&2'K1RX_1#HL&P@GW&U6W_:A2N?I86=* K404T##68_(;5YO()D7.H.%@%L*"][5<DF\.P,/H9EE?>#D6V_FT>:$,!0``` ====Encrypted-Sender-End====

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True Lies
by Russell Nelson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Quite clearly, the bad guys in True Lies used a Capstone unit to do their encryption. Too bad they didn't make a point of it -- after all, catching terrorists is putatively what escrowed encryption is aimed at. -russ

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Clipper Chip retreat
by Claborne, Chris 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Congratulations! I consider the "Clipper Chip retreat" a victory for the Cypherpunks, EFF, and inhabitants of cyberspace. We have succeeded in a tactic often used by three letter agencies... Stall! The "stall" tactic lets you re-supply, regroup and plan the next attack . This event slows the government down and will provide the inhabitants of cyberspace more time to develop a defacto encryption system (PGP, RIPEM, PEM, etc) that will overshadow any scheme deployed by government. It also gives us time to continue the fight against "Key-escrow" and government back doors. This message may be a little premature but if true, we should be ready for the next offensive. (yes offensive). This bit of information also makes me wander what their next move might be. It could be... "NEWS FLASH... Drug lord goes free because he is using non-key-escrow crypto..." ... __o .. -\<, chris.claborne(a)sandiegoca.ncr.com ...(*)/(*). CI$: 76340.2422 PGP Pub Key fingerprint = A8 FA 55 92 23 20 72 69 52 AB 64 CC C7 D9 4F CA Avail on Pub Key server.

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HR 3937 now a dead end; House Rules Comm results
by Shabbir J. Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[updated July 21, 1994 shabbir] ********************************************************************* DISTRIBUTE WIDELY ********************************************************************* Table of contents: Introduction Result of House Rules committee vote Status of the bill 1994 Voters Guide ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- INTRODUCTION Voters Telecomm Watch keeps scorecards on legislators' positions on legislation that affects telecommunications and civil liberties. If you have updates to a legislator's positions, from either: -public testimony, -reply letters from the legislator, -stated positions from their office, please contact vtw(a)vtw.org so they can be added to this list. General questions: vtw(a)vtw.org Mailing List Requests: vtw-list-request(a)vtw.org Press Contact: stc(a)vtw.org Gopher URL: gopher://gopher.panix.com:70/11/vtw WWW URL: We're working on it. :-) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RESULT OF THE HOUSE RULES COMMITTEE VOTE ON HR 3937 Based on information gathered by volunteers, we've been able to piece together some of the positions of the House Rules Committee as to how they voted for/against opening up HR 3937 to amendments on the House floor. [This is now somewhat moot, as is explained in the next section.] Extensive kudos go to Joe Thomas <jthomas(a)pawpaw.mitre.org> gaj(a)portman.com (Gordon Jacobson) who both did extensive work to help find this information. Here are the results we were able to obtain: [The committee voted 5-4 to open the bill] HOUSE RULES COMMITTEE MEMBERS Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone ==== == ======================== ============== 9 MA Moakley, John Joseph (D) 1-202-225-8273 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 3 SC Derrick, Butler (D) 1-202-225-5301 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 24 CA Beilenson, Anthony (D) 1-202-225-5911 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 24 TX Frost, Martin (D) 1-202-225-3605 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 10 MI Bonior, David E. (D) 1-202-225-2106 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 3 OH Hall, Tony P. (D) 1-202-225-6465 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 5 MO Wheat, Alan (D) 1-202-225-4535 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 6 TN Gordon, Bart (R) 1-202-225-4231 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 28 NY Slaughter, Louise M. (D) 1-202-225-3615 Voted "open" 22 NY Solomon, Gerald B. (R) 1-202-225-5614 Voted "open" 1 TN Quillen, James H. (R) 1-202-225-6356 Told a constituent he would vote for "open". 28 CA Dreier, David (R) 1-202-225-2305 UNSPECIFIED POSITION 14 FL Goss, Porter J. (R) 1-202-225-2536 UNSPECIFIED POSITION It is probably not worth the trouble to ask the remaining legislators how they voted unless you happen to chat with their staff often. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS OF THE BILL (updated 7/21/94) If you read the appropriate newsgroups (or any major newspaper) you've seen the news about the Gore/Cantwell compromise. Since everyone has reprinted it already, we'll not reprint it again, though we'll happily send you a copy should you have missed it. The upshot of this is that Rep. Maria Cantwell will not be offering her amendment and therefore HR 3937 is a dead end this year for liberalizing cryptography exports. Since VTW is an organization dedicated to working on legislation, and there is no longer a piece of relevant legislation, we will be concentrating on other projects. The "cantwell" section of our archive will be reworked, and the records of legislators that voted will be kept there for future reference. [NOTE: these voting records will also be rolled into our 1994 Voters Guide] Here is the final schedule/chronology of the bill Jul 21, 94 Rep. Cantwell and Vice Pres. Al Gore compromise on seven principles, retreating on the Clipper chip; Rep. Cantwell chooses not continue to press the legislation or the amendment (see relevant articles in today's NY Times and Washington Post) Jul 20, 94 HR3937 comes to House floor; a "good" amendement will be offered Jul 11, 94 House Rules Committee marks HR3937 "open"; allowing amendments Jun 30, 94 [*** vote postponed, perhaps till the week of 7/11/94] House Rules Comm. decides whether to allow amendments on the bill when it reaches the House floor Jun 14, 94 Gutted by the House Select Committee on Intelligence May 20, 94 Referred to the House Select Committee on Intelligence May 18, 94 Passed out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 18 attached to HR 3937, the General Export Administration Act Dec 6, 93 Referred to the Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and Nov 22, 93 Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1994 VOTERS GUIDE Voters Telecomm Watch believes that you should be informed about your legislators' positions on key issues. We will be developing a survey to give to current legislators and their challengers that will gauge their positions on key issues involving telecommunications and civil liberties. These results will be made publicly available on the net for you to use in casting your vote in November. We'll be depending on you to help get legislative candidates to fill out and return their surveys. Please watch this space for the announcement of survey availability in the coming weeks. If you wish to participate in the development of the survey, feel free to join the working list by mailing a note to that effect to vtw(a)vtw.org -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: "Key Escrow" --- the very idea
by Rick Busdiecker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Thu, 21 Jul 1994 16:49:01 PDT From: Mike_Spreitzer.PARC(a)xerox.com I accept the terms of the 4th ammendment [sic]: search and siezure allowed when due process followed. The 4th amendment: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. One problem with what you've said is that the fourth amendment is not phrased in the sense in which you refer to it. Specifically, it proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures. It does not require the people to actively facilitate the government in `reasonable' searches and seizures. Essentially, you've turned the 4th amendment on its head in your effort to rationalize key escrow. In any case, it's a purely academic question given the dissociation of the `Bill of Rights' from reality. Rick

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Re: Who Detweiler is *really* posting as
by Peter Murphy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have deleted most of the blather from "Nobody" on this subject. However, this line was _very_ interesting... > BTW, I don't like what has been going on the list where there are anonymous > attacks on people in the list. This, of course, comes after about 60-80 lines of insinuations that Perry Metzger is really L. Detweiler. Isn't the world a funny place? Peter.

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Re: Who Detweiler is *really* posting as
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

aNdOm0Zre suggests that Perry Metzger is really a tentacle for L:.D:., and that Perry isn't one of the alifornia Cypherpunks so who knows him. Well, I've known Perry since beforre the Cypherpunks group started, and he was at one of the first couple Cypherpunks meetings I'd been at after I moved out here,as well as being out here fairly often for Extropians gatherings and computer conferences. He's real. (I can't vouch for certain that he's not Detweiler, since I haven't met the Detweilers, but he's real.) At one of those meetings, it was noticed that most of the major tentacles were there, including Jamie Dinkelacker (one of the first to be accused of being a Tim May tentacle), and I even sw California Drivers Licenses from the 8 or so who were there. Personally, I think if he hadn't existed,we would at some point hasve had to invent him to discover some of the practical difficuties with anonymity techniques, but we would probably have invented a less verbose, less paranoid version who can be turned off when we do't need him :-) Bill

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Double DES calculations
by DAVESPARKS＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

norm(a)netcom.com (Norman Hardy) wrote: > >Anyone care to estimate what the cost of the RAM alone for the > >"MITM interface" machine would be? Let's see, for two 56 bit beys, you'd > >need storage for 2^57 blocks of 8 bytes each, or 2^60 bytes. At $40 per > >Mb, or so, that would come to ... let's see ... $4 * 10^51 for memory > >alone. And once the list of blocks started growing as the attack > >progressed, could the interface processor keep up with the other two, in > >real time? Massively parallel processors might speed both ends of the > >attack, but the "database comparison phase" would be the real bottleneck, > >IMHO. > ... > DAT tape, not RAM, I think. At $5 per GB I get $5*10^11 to hold the info. > MITM requires a sort of this which requires roughly log(10^20) passes with > a favorable constant. This will wear out a bunch of DAT drives but that is > relatively minor. This is about an order of magnitude bigger than a > project that I considered once to find the optimal solution to the Rubics > cube. "Only" $500 Billion, huh (for tapes and drives alone)? Let's see how the logistics work out on that. If each tape drive measured 2"X4"X6", and if they were mounted in racks, back-to-back, five feet high, with three feet wide aisleways between them, they would require 3.2 million square feet of floor space. (How big is the entire Pentagon, BTW?) Assuming each of the 300 million tape drives consumed 25 watts of power, the total power consumption would be 7500 megawatts! At $0.10 per kwh., it would cost $1 million/hour in power costs alone, assuming a 33% overhead for removing all they heat they generated. Assuming it took an average of five seconds to load a tape into a drive, loading 300 million tapes would take 16,680 man hours, or roughly 10 man-years assuming a normal 40 hr./week work schedule. A set of replacement tapes alone would cost $3 Billion. It has been estimated that breaking single-DES would take 1.35 hours on a hypothetical "super-DES-breaker" machine, searching half the total keyspace, with a 50% probability of finding the key in that time. You yield the same probability on double-DES would require searching 71% of the keyspace, which would take roughly two hours, using TWO such machines. During that two hours, each of the 300 million tapes would be filled with data, but no actual MITM comparisons would have occurred yet. Thus far, we've spent $2 million on electricity alone. Now let's assume that each block of data generated was at least pre-sorted onto one of the 150 million available drives during the initial phase, according to its MSBs, or whatever. Now it remains to check for matches for the data on each of the 150 million drives on the ENcryption side with the corresponding drive on the DEcryption side. Let's further assume 150 million processors each assigned to handle a pair of drives, one on each side. Assume that a complete pass through the tape would require the same two hours as it took to write the data there in the first place, with buffered I/O so that at least half of the drives are running at full speed, and ignoring any rewind time between passes. Assuming a fast enough processor, the number of passes required would vary according to the ratio of the total data on each tape, divided by the total RAM, with the available RAM available for searching equalling four times the search block size to allow double buffering on both sides. With that in mind, the number of passes required would equal to ( 4 * 4 Gb / RAM ). If 64 Mb of RAM is available per processor, then a total of 256 passes would be required, for a total search time of 512 hours. The sum total of all the RAM on all 150 million processors would be 2 * 10^16 bytes. At $40/Mb, the RAM alone would cost $800 Billion, bringing the total cost of this machine to $1.3 TRILLION! The time required to crack a double-DES key is over 200 times that of a single-DES key, at a cost in excess of half a BILLION dollars per 112 bit key. While that *MIGHT* be technologically feasible, it probably wouldn't be politically feasible. That is probably more than the sum total of all US defense spending in out 120 year history, and probably more than "Star Wars" was projected to cost. That'd be a bit hard to hide in a "black" budget. Of course, there are various ways of trading dollars for time in designing such a system. Speed is virtually proportional to cost. Nevertheless ... if you've got the time to do TRIPLE-DES, it's probably still wise, "Justin Case"... /--------------+------------------------------------\ | | Internet: davesparks(a)delphi.com | | Dave Sparks | Fidonet: Dave Sparks @ 1:207/212 | | | BBS: (909) 353-9821 - 14.4K | \--------------+------------------------------------/-/

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