December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: RC4 compatibility testing
by thad＠pdi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: RC4 compatibility testing >> "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)imsi.com> writes: >> >> I'm not familiar with this term, "submarine" patent application. But >> don't they have one year from the date of first publication to apply for >> a patent? It seems that this could count as first publication, so they >> would have one year from now to get their patent application in. As I >> said before, the NSA has indicated similar plans if Clipper is ever >> reverse engineered. >> >> Hal >> >> A "submarine" patent is one that was filed long ago, but kept from being issued by various ploys. Because the patent exists for 17 years from date of being granted, there is an incentive to delay the granting of the patent. Of course, patenting the invention makes it public too, which you might want to avoid, especially if you'd like to have a world-wide market on a cryptographic product. Like RC4, for example. Once it is patented in this country, anybody from the rest of the world could copy it. Once you find somebody you'd like to go after, you can speed up the process. The patent process runs pretty slow on its own, but you can slow it down further still by delaying correspondence with the patent office, by not paying fees quickly. I think that there is one final fee that must be paid after the patent is approved, but before it is granted, that you can just hold off on for a long time. thad Thad Beier Pacific Data Images 408)745-6755 thad(a)pdi.com

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Re- PRIVACY REGULATIONS
by Ron Bardarson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mail*Linkš SMTP Re: PRIVACY REGULATIONS I've upload the text files containing a sample Writ of Habeus Corpus to wimsey. They compress down to 20 K and a 60 K post seemed inappropriate. Look in /uploads for habeus.zip at ftp.wimsey.bc.ca

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key signing
by Tom Allard 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hmmm... I requested my key from the MIT key-server and it came back with two unknown signatures. So I requested those two keys, only to find that they were Bill Clinton and Al Gore. I've never met either of them (although I have seen Al Gore jogging through Rock Creek Park). Those keys had signatures also, so I got the signator's key as well, only to find that it was "Hillary's" key. Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 384/23BDC6F9 1980/01/01 William J. Clinton <president(a)whitehouse.gov> sig CC3D9213 (Unknown signator, can't be checked) sig DE09D78D (Unknown signator, can't be checked) Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 384/DE09D78D 1980/01/01 Albert Gore <vice-president(a)whitehouse.gov> sig CC3D9213 (Unknown signator, can't be checked) sig DE09D78D Albert Gore <vice-president(a)whitehouse.gov> sig 23BDC6F9 (Unknown signator, can't be checked) Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 1024/CC3D9213 1993/12/25 Hillary Rodham Clinton <bimbo(a)whitehouse.gov> sig CC3D9213 Hillary Rodham Clinton <bimbo(a)whitehouse.gov> rgds-- TA (tallard(a)frb.gov) +-+ I don't speak for the Federal Reserve Board, it doesn't speak for me. |X| pgp fingerprint: 10 49 F5 24 F1 D9 A7 D6 DE 14 25 C8 C0 E2 57 9D +-+

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Re: [CyberCash Media hype]
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Uh, I was paraphrasing the conclusions of the article in order to convey that the authors clearly have no clue about security software. I (incorrectly) thought there was sufficient sarcasm in my post to convey that. Question - where did the below-highlighted opinion come from? Also, I do disagree with your statement "security through obscurity is no security at all." A rather high degree of security can be had through obscurity, but it is often entirely unpredictable whether or not a particlar 'obscurity method' will be secure or not (any 15 year old hiding cigarettes under the bed can attest to that). I see this as an extension of the pricipals underlying modern crypto - it could be that a factoring attack on RSA is possible but really obscure. It is simply an example of more predictable security through obscurity. Perhaps I'm pushing definitions a little too far here. At 2:45 PM 9/15/94, Chael Hall wrote: >> >>These are my favorite paragraphs. >> >>1) Proprietary == secure >> >>2) Understanding how it works == insecure > > I disagree. Proprietary is MORE secure, but security through ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >obscurity is no security at all. The only thing that does is separate >the proverbial men from the boys. It keeps the idiots who think they >can crack a system from touching it, but the people who know what they >are doing will learn it rather quickly. > > Understanding how it works is also not necessarily insecure either. >What about PGP? Would you rather use some proprietary methond that may >or may not have a backdoor or may not be as secure as it is touted to >be? I prefer to use something that has been proven and tested. > >Chael -j -- "It's a question of semantics, and I've always been rather anti- semantic." -Gene Simmons ___________________________________________________________________ Jamie Lawrence <foodie(a)netcom.com> <jamiel(a)sybase.com>

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Re: thoughts on RC4
by m5＠vail.tivoli.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Carl Ellison writes: > >Can anyone see any reason why one could not change RC4 to > >being a word oriented stream cipher, call it "ERC4"? > > (1) You could conceivably go to an array of 65K short values and retain the > permutation but I wouldn't try to go to an array of longs. I don't have > 32GB of RAM on my workstation. Perhaps some improvement on RISC architectures could be achieved by using four arrays, 32 bits wide by 256 entries long. The arrays would mirror the single array in the original code, except that the "interesting" byte would be at a different position in each. Then, the main encryption loop could be unwound so that you'd do four operations to each word, one from each array to hit the four bytes. (You'd do the increment/swap between each one.) This *might* be worthwhile. (On an Alpha, you'd have 8 arrays...) | GOOD TIME FOR MOVIE - GOING ||| Mike McNally <m5(a)tivoli.com> | | TAKE TWA TO CAIRO. ||| Tivoli Systems, Austin, TX: | | (actual fortune cookie) ||| "Like A Little Bit of Semi-Heaven" |

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RC4 compatibility testing
by ekr＠eit.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One data point: I can't say anything about the internals of RC4 versus the algorithm that Bill Sommerfeld is rightly calling 'Alleged RC4', since I don't know anything about RC4's internals. However, I do have a (legitimately acquired) copy of BSAFE2 and so I'm able to compare the output of this algorithm to the output of genuine RC4 as found in BSAFE. I chose a set of test vectors and ran them through both algorithms. The algorithms appear to give identical results, at least with these key/plaintext pairs. I note that this is the algorithm _without_ Hal Finney's proposed modification (see <199409130605.XAA24133(a)jobe.shell.portal.com>). The vectors I used (together with the ciphertext they produce) follow at the end of this message. -Ekr Disclaimer: This posting does not reflect the opinions of EIT. --------------------results follow-------------- Test vector 0 Key: 0x01 0x23 0x45 0x67 0x89 0xab 0xcd 0xef Input: 0x01 0x23 0x45 0x67 0x89 0xab 0xcd 0xef 0 Output: 0x75 0xb7 0x87 0x80 0x99 0xe0 0xc5 0x96 Test vector 1 Key: 0x01 0x23 0x45 0x67 0x89 0xab 0xcd 0xef Input: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0 Output: 0x74 0x94 0xc2 0xe7 0x10 0x4b 0x08 0x79 Test vector 2 Key: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 Input: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0 Output: 0xde 0x18 0x89 0x41 0xa3 0x37 0x5d 0x3a Test vector 3 Key: 0xef 0x01 0x23 0x45 Input: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0 Output: 0xd6 0xa1 0x41 0xa7 0xec 0x3c 0x38 0xdf 0xbd 0x61 Test vector 4 Key: 0x01 0x23 0x45 0x67 0x89 0xab 0xcd 0xef Input: 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x01 0 Output: 0x75 0x95 0xc3 0xe6 0x11 0x4a 0x09 0x78 0x0c 0x4a 0xd4 0x52 0x33 0x8e 0x1f 0xfd 0x9a 0x1b 0xe9 0x49 0x8f 0x81 0x3d 0x76 0x53 0x34 0x49 0xb6 0x77 0x8d 0xca 0xd8 0xc7 0x8a 0x8d 0x2b 0xa9 0xac 0x66 0x08 0x5d 0x0e 0x53 0xd5 0x9c 0x26 0xc2 0xd1 0xc4 0x90 0xc1 0xeb 0xbe 0x0c 0xe6 0x6d 0x1b 0x6b 0x1b 0x13 0xb6 0xb9 0x19 0xb8 0x47 0xc2 0x5a 0x91 0x44 0x7a 0x95 0xe7 0x5e 0x4e 0xf1 0x67 0x79 0xcd 0xe8 0xbf 0x0a 0x95 0x85 0x0e 0x32 0xaf 0x96 0x89 0x44 0x4f 0xd3 0x77 0x10 0x8f 0x98 0xfd 0xcb 0xd4 0xe7 0x26 0x56 0x75 0x00 0x99 0x0b 0xcc 0x7e 0x0c 0xa3 0xc4 0xaa 0xa3 0x04 0xa3 0x87 0xd2 0x0f 0x3b 0x8f 0xbb 0xcd 0x42 0xa1 0xbd 0x31 0x1d 0x7a 0x43 0x03 0xdd 0xa5 0xab 0x07 0x88 0x96 0xae 0x80 0xc1 0x8b 0x0a 0xf6 0x6d 0xff 0x31 0x96 0x16 0xeb 0x78 0x4e 0x49 0x5a 0xd2 0xce 0x90 0xd7 0xf7 0x72 0xa8 0x17 0x47 0xb6 0x5f 0x62 0x09 0x3b 0x1e 0x0d 0xb9 0xe5 0xba 0x53 0x2f 0xaf 0xec 0x47 0x50 0x83 0x23 0xe6 0x71 0x32 0x7d 0xf9 0x44 0x44 0x32 0xcb 0x73 0x67 0xce 0xc8 0x2f 0x5d 0x44 0xc0 0xd0 0x0b 0x67 0xd6 0x50 0xa0 0x75 0xcd 0x4b 0x70 0xde 0xdd 0x77 0xeb 0x9b 0x10 0x23 0x1b 0x6b 0x5b 0x74 0x13 0x47 0x39 0x6d 0x62 0x89 0x74 0x21 0xd4 0x3d 0xf9 0xb4 0x2e 0x44 0x6e 0x35 0x8e 0x9c 0x11 0xa9 0xb2 0x18 0x4e 0xcb 0xef 0x0c 0xd8 0xe7 0xa8 0x77 0xef 0x96 0x8f 0x13 0x90 0xec 0x9b 0x3d 0x35 0xa5 0x58 0x5c 0xb0 0x09 0x29 0x0e 0x2f 0xcd 0xe7 0xb5 0xec 0x66 0xd9 0x08 0x4b 0xe4 0x40 0x55 0xa6 0x19 0xd9 0xdd 0x7f 0xc3 0x16 0x6f 0x94 0x87 0xf7 0xcb 0x27 0x29 0x12 0x42 0x64 0x45 0x99 0x85 0x14 0xc1 0x5d 0x53 0xa1 0x8c 0x86 0x4c 0xe3 0xa2 0xb7 0x55 0x57 0x93 0x98 0x81 0x26 0x52 0x0e 0xac 0xf2 0xe3 0x06 0x6e 0x23 0x0c 0x91 0xbe 0xe4 0xdd 0x53 0x04 0xf5 0xfd 0x04 0x05 0xb3 0x5b 0xd9 0x9c 0x73 0x13 0x5d 0x3d 0x9b 0xc3 0x35 0xee 0x04 0x9e 0xf6 0x9b 0x38 0x67 0xbf 0x2d 0x7b 0xd1 0xea 0xa5 0x95 0xd8 0xbf 0xc0 0x06 0x6f 0xf8 0xd3 0x15 0x09 0xeb 0x0c 0x6c 0xaa 0x00 0x6c 0x80 0x7a 0x62 0x3e 0xf8 0x4c 0x3d 0x33 0xc1 0x95 0xd2 0x3e 0xe3 0x20 0xc4 0x0d 0xe0 0x55 0x81 0x57 0xc8 0x22 0xd4 0xb8 0xc5 0x69 0xd8 0x49 0xae 0xd5 0x9d 0x4e 0x0f 0xd7 0xf3 0x79 0x58 0x6b 0x4b 0x7f 0xf6 0x84 0xed 0x6a 0x18 0x9f 0x74 0x86 0xd4 0x9b 0x9c 0x4b 0xad 0x9b 0xa2 0x4b 0x96 0xab 0xf9 0x24 0x37 0x2c 0x8a 0x8f 0xff 0xb1 0x0d 0x55 0x35 0x49 0x00 0xa7 0x7a 0x3d 0xb5 0xf2 0x05 0xe1 0xb9 0x9f 0xcd 0x86 0x60 0x86 0x3a 0x15 0x9a 0xd4 0xab 0xe4 0x0f 0xa4 0x89 0x34 0x16 0x3d 0xdd 0xe5 0x42 0xa6 0x58 0x55 0x40 0xfd 0x68 0x3c 0xbf 0xd8 0xc0 0x0f 0x12 0x12 0x9a 0x28 0x4d 0xea 0xcc 0x4c 0xde 0xfe 0x58 0xbe 0x71 0x37 0x54 0x1c 0x04 0x71 0x26 0xc8 0xd4 0x9e 0x27 0x55 0xab 0x18 0x1a 0xb7 0xe9 0x40 0xb0 0xc0

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Re: (fwd) A new PGP
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > This posting is a call for participation in a complete rehash of PGP to > > parallel the existing PGP effort in the US. All contributions are welcome, > > although any cryptographic material from the US won't be usable by anyone else, > > so it'd be best if all crypto work was done outside the US. I am working on a crypto package. It will be able to read and write Selane, PEM and PGP messages and to handle (and convert where possible) all keys. I am writing in C++. And I am sitting in Germany. ;-) Who is interested in discussing the design of such a program? BTW: Who defines new tags in the PGP format? Phil Zimmermann? Hadmut Danisch E.I.S.S. (European Institute for System Security, University of Karlsruhe)

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Re: [CyberCash Media hype]
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:24 PM 9/14/94, nobody(a)shell.portal.com wrote: > Private on-line services use proprietary software to move >funds, which reduces the risk of thieves breaking into the >system. But only subscribers are permitted to make on-line >purchases, and then only from participating merchants. For >example, fewer than 3% of the people who frequent the CompuServe >"mall" each month buy anything. > The Internet, by contrast, is an unsecured free-for-all that >uses "open" software to let tens of thousands of computers link >up. That means more computer jocks know how it really works, >increasing the chances of a break-in. These are my favorite paragraphs. 1) Proprietary == secure 2) Understanding how it works == insecure -j -- "Blah Blah Blah" ___________________________________________________________________ Jamie Lawrence <jamiel(a)sybase.com>

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Re: PRIVACY REGULATIONS (A Matter of Form)
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Duncan Frissell >> Can't you free yourself from jail with a writ of habeas corpus ad >> subjiciendum from John Doe? > >But you have to know how to write one. > >brad > But if you proceed "in forma pauperis" you don't need to know how to write one. ............................................................................. Must a person carry around a legal dictionary in order to have all the right terms to use just in case they are put in jail and to need to select the proper procedure? (What shall it be: habeas corpus? subjuciendum? forma pauperis? I'm so confused.) "Don't leave home without it." Blanc

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Wiretap Emergency
by Nathan Zook 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just spoke with Joe Barton (R) from Texas about the FBI wiretap bill. He is on a subcommittee that is hearing the bill. He has heard _no_ citizen opposition to it. I was not prepared, but he did invite me to send him my concerns :-D Congressman Joe Barton 1514 Longworth Building Washington, D.C. 20515 p:202-225-2002 f:202-225-3052 Folks, if we can generate a few hundred calls and well-thought-out faxes tommorrow, we might have some effect. I don't know a lot about him, but he seemed to be of the opinion that he didn't really know that much about the bill. It's up to us to educate him. Nathan

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