December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

New Remailer feature
by John A. Perry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello Raph, I just saw your bi-monthly posting about the remailers. I'd like to point out that jpunix supports a feature not mentioned in your message/finger mechanism. Jpunix.com also supports the ability to have messages encrypted to the recipient by the remailer itself. This will protect cleartext messages sent back to the sender via reply blocks. By adding Encrypt-Key: yourkey to the header list for jpunix.com, jpunix will encrypt anything following a ** on a line by itself with that key. John Perry - perry(a)jpunix.com - -- PGP 2.61 key for perry(a)jpunix.com is on the keyservers. PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLpATZlOTpEThrthvAQHMmQP/SLFOCbArzMbJ26lSJZz0mUXQfABstXf2 Um5TqDgiOuDnAWE3DvZkDIQcMtALJ9wI/Lj+ji4gCF0Ytk7hShizyl+zcj0huKQT npvbFC//9Yv0RJZsm1f47R4ttksqBmO+kEep4LUsWoRlqBBMwFyVkAPaFX/nclPw zdcGEpIv7JU= =+o2l -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Anarchy-X Notification
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Got about a dozen of these in the last couple of days. Should I fear or embrace Organization: Anarchy-X? Sounds good but TLA maybe? John Forwarding mail by: "ROOT"@ax.com () on Mon, 03 Oct 1:1 AM ------------------- >From ROOT(a)ax.com Mon Oct 3 04:45 EDT 1994 Received: from netcomsv.netcom.com (uucp4.netcom.com [163.179.3.4]) by pipeline.com (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id EAA02169 for <jya(a)PIPELINE.COM>; Mon, 3 Oct 1994 04:45:26 -0400 Received: from ax.com by netcomsv.netcom.com with UUCP (8.6.4/SMI-4.1) id BAA22993; Mon, 3 Oct 1994 01:37:39 -0700 Received: by ax.com (UUPU-1.42) id D1115pj Mon Oct 03, 1994 01:01:37 EDT From: "ROOT"@ax.com Message-Id: <9410030101.D1115pj(a)ax.com> X-Mailer: UUPlus Mail 1.42 To: jya(a)pipeline.com Subject: Non-Delivery Notification Organization: Anarchy-X Date: Mon, 03 Oct 94 01:01:36 EST Content-Type: text Content-Length: 377 NON-DELIVERY NOTICE ------------------- The message you sent on: Unknown to "ROOT" was undeliverable. ========================= !!! Automated Notice !!! ======================= E-mail replies to this user should have the following on the first line of message text: TO: "ROOT" ================================================================= =========

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EFFy Wiretap Win?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

EFF what say you about this? Excerpts from WSJ, September 30, 1994, p. B5 Bill Would Ensure Law Enforcement Is Able to Tap Wires By Mary Lu Carnevale Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal WASHINGTON - The House Judiciary Committee cleared a bill that would require telephone companies to ensure that their networks remain accessible to law enforcement wiretaps. But key lawmakers agreed to changes aimed at appeasing local phone companies. The modifications largely spell out that phone companies won't be forced to pay to modify their existing networks to comply with the measure. They are expected to be included in the bill before it goes to the House floor, possibly as early as Tuesday. A similar measure sailed through the Senate Judiciary Committee earlier this week on a 16-1 vote. Though little time remains in the current Congress, the legislation could squeak through. * * * The agreement, details of which are being ironed out, also aims to protect individuals' privacy rights; prevent phone companies or law-enforcement agencies from installing or ordering unnecessary upgrades; and ensure that the changes have the least possible effect on phone rates and phone-company efforts to build advanced communications networks. The legislation is separate from the Clinton administration's controversial "Clipper Chip" proposal that would have mandated an encryption standard for computer and communications equipment. That failed proposal would have let law-enforcement agencies decipher any calls or messages that had been encoded. ------------------- END

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SHA patch
by Michael Shiplett 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello there, After some work with the SHS (or is the implementation actually the SHA?) code listed in _Applied Cryptography_, I have patched it to allow updates of buffer sizes that are not a multiple of SHS_BLOCKSIZE. The patched version works for the different groupings of the test data "abc", e.g., update(abc) update(a) + update(bc) update(ab) + update(c) Since the "abc" case tests only the logic of shsUpdate() [all the transformation invocations are actually performed by shsFinal()], I ran the original code and the modified code on several files and (fortunately) received the same hash values for the two implementations. shsUpdate() follows. You may need to define a bcopy->memcpy macro. michael =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= void shsUpdate(SHS_INFO *shsInfo, BYTE *buffer, int count) { int offset, need; /* determine if there are left over bytes in the shs data. they are handled specially below */ offset = (int) ((shsInfo->countLo >> 3) & 0x3f); need = SHS_BLOCKSIZE - offset; /* update bitcount */ if ((shsInfo->countLo + ((LONG) count << 3)) < shsInfo->countLo) shsInfo->countHi++; /* carry from low to high bitCount */ shsInfo->countLo += ((LONG) count << 3); shsInfo->countHi += ((LONG) count >> 29); /* if there were indeed left over data bytes, see if the incoming data is sufficient to fill to SHS_BLOCKSIZE. if not, copy the incoming data and return; otherwise fill the block, perform a transformation, and continue as usual */ if (offset) { if (count < need) { bcopy(buffer, (BYTE *) shsInfo->data + offset, count); return; } else { bcopy(buffer, (BYTE *) shsInfo->data + offset, need); #ifdef LITTLE_ENDIAN byteReverse(shsInfo->data, SHS_BLOCKSIZE); #endif shsTransform(shsInfo); buffer += need; count -= need; } } /* process data in SHS_BLOCKSIZE chunks */ while (count >= SHS_BLOCKSIZE) { bcopy(buffer, shsInfo->data, SHS_BLOCKSIZE); #ifdef LITTLE_ENDIAN byteReverse(shsInfo->data, SHS_BLOCKSIZE); #endif shsTransform(shsInfo); buffer += SHS_BLOCKSIZE; count -= SHS_BLOCKSIZE; } /* store the left over data */ bcopy(buffer, shsInfo->data, count); }

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DTI Pointers?
by ozymandias G desiderata 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm taking public speaking so that I can finally get out of college and into the big wide world, and have decided to educate my class on the controversy surrounding the Digital Telephony Initiative. I need hardcopy to make my TA happy, and after an (admittedly quick) browsing of the archives, I wasn't able to find much in the way of hard information. Are there any good pointers, especially to the recent Lehman version of the bill and the controversy that now surrounds the EFF? Thanks in advance for your help, ozymandias G desiderata

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RE: Chomsky quote (thread from hell)
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: James A. Donald The intended effect is to make us feel that such "extreme" freedom of speech is a bit excessive and not really necessary or desirable. . . . Thus he is actually making a misleading and spurious argument *against* freedom of speech at the same time as he is piously declaring himself to be in favor of freedom of speech. ............................................................... James, couldn't he simply be taken at his word - his explicit expression, rather than the implied "catty nastiness". If it was not what he really meant, he would eventually be irritated enough by the full acceptance of his apparent support for liberty to come out and say more precisely what he really wants people to think, so they don't go on allowing freedoms which he is really trying to prevent. Blanc

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Re: HTTP authentication efforts
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:05 PM 9/20/94 -0500, Paul Ferguson wrote: >Howdy guys 'n gals. > >As much as I'd love to rant about Detweiler getting an account on Colorado >Supernet, I must put aside my insidious remarks for the time being. > >Does anyone know, on the off-chance, who is currently working on >HTTP authentication processes for web browsing and Mosiac? > >Pointers appreciated. One pointer, coming up! >Date: Sun, 28 Aug 94 04:30:02 EDT >From: www-buyinfo-request(a)allegra.att.com >To: www-buyinfo(a)allegra.att.com >Subject: weekly www-buyinfo reminder >X-UIDL: 778077798.009 > >Weekly reminder for the www-buyinfo mailing list. > >Please note that the mailing address for subscribe/unsubscribe is > www-buyinfo-request > ******* >To subscribe: > Send mail to www-buyinfo-request(a)allegra.att.com > Body of message (NOT Subject:) subscribe www-buyinfo >To unsubscribe: > Send mail to www-buyinfo-request(a)allegra.att.com > Body of message (NOT Subject:) unsubscribe www-buyinfo >To contribute to the mailing list: > Send mail to www-buyinfo(a)allegra.att.com > >Mail archives will be located in: > ftp.research.att.com:/dist/www-buyinfo-archive/ >Hypermail archives are located at: > http://www.research.att.com/www-buyinfo/archive/ > ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Manufacturing quantum computers
by Sherry Mayo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi all, Regarding the quantum cryptography thread: Some people expressed the view that although the idea may be workable, the manufacturing technology was a long way of being able to produce quantum computers. The quantum dot design proposed by Eckert et al for a quantum "factorisation engine" requires 100000 quantum dots (to factorise RSA-129 or similar) which are each about 10nm across to be fairly densly packed onto a chip. I'm not so sure about this being 'a long way off' in terms of materials technology, and I found the following article on WWW which describes some relevant research into this kind of manufacturing at a US army research centre. I found this on the FedWorld (US Govt, http://www.fedworld.gov/ ) pages.... ============================================================ Part of the "unique ARL (Army Research Lab) facilities" page http://info.arl.army.mil/UAFD/uafd.html ============================================================ Ultralithography Center. This facility provides the Army and DoD with a capability that significantly impacts the development of novel ultra-submicron electronic device technology required by next-generation and future military systems. A multi-million-dollar Leica (Philips) EBPG-5HR electron-beam lithography system, which represents the state of the art in ultra-high-resolution device patterning, is housed in a newly constructed clean room. The Leica EBPG-5HR accomplishes lithography by scanning a finely focused beam of high-energy electrons over an electron-sensitive polymer coating applied to the substrate surface. With an electron beam spot size approaching 10 nm, the Leica EBPG-5HR provides an effective solution to the most demanding lithographic applications, including ultra-small (250 angstrom [= 25nm]) electronic and photonic devices. These devices will provide an enabling foundation for next-generation Army electronic and optoelectronic systems. Devices such as sub-100-nm gate length millimeter-wave high-electron- mobility transistors (HEMTs), novel quantum-effect and mesoscopic (phase-preserving) devices, and quantum-well infrared photo-detectors are patterned with this system. The instrument's high acceleration voltage (100kV) provides a unique capability to pattern closely spaced nanometer-scale device features without feature or sample- related distortion. Automated calibration permits the writing of undistorted patterns over the large sample areas required to fabricate many photonic devices and optoelectronic circuits. ======================================================= Well there you go. Perhaps the technology is nearer than we think. Of course this still doesn't answer the noise problem that critics of the proposed technique think will render it all but useless. However I wanted to make the point that we shouldn't be complacent about the materials technology side of things. Tim May makes the point that he is not selling his shares in intel, and that conventional chip technology is not about to be supplanted. The problem with this IMHO is that these are not two completely different technologies we are talking about. The constantly improving techniques being used to cram more and more onto conventional chips are directly applicable to the manufacture of these proposed quantum dot devices. Just my 2 cents Sherry Sheridan C. Mayo | WWW pages include caving, sci fi and RSC, ANU, Australia | crypto pages. NEW: X-files has its own scmayo(a)rschp2.anu.edu.au | page with gifs/sounds/fanfic etc. Finger for PGP key | http://rschp2.anu.edu.au:8080/local.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLo+G9uFu4n6w1qeBAQGVMgP+Kechf44WUe11qnQG5cD3Ybf+NuNc9jjr ajI7ZXYmZgQb1xdhS7ruy+UOo39zBCPxgKOaCahAniKV9vlNOmHB2pqAr8aYoMWt olhDdZdEWSGrLPAvfh4gVa/T8GI9C2NPc7kusIZujlVHnemBbSSz6FW+dJedR/FE oRKvzzW0IHs= =Ub7K -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Humorous / Chilling FOIA Requests
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by ogd(a)selway.umt.edu (ozymandias G desiderata) on Mon, 03 Oct 11:49 AM > On the same note, do any of you have any humorous / >chilling stories about what you found out when you got >your file? The best I heard is that of a fairly noteworthy 60s radical who asked for his FBI file and was completely demoralized to learn that his FOIA request was the first and only item in his brand new file. No one there cared about him until then -- or so he was told. Since then I have heard that this was a technique used by the LEAs to blow people away and discourage them from getting their real files. Quite illegal, to be sure, but well within approved procedures of the time. Probably still done. John

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Re: Mandatory Email verification
by macorp!moonlight!ken＠uu4.psi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been vaguely following the thread, which seems to be attempting to close a loophole in port 25. Assuming you succeeded, wouldn't a clever demon hacker simply find another way to forge messages? I have seen that any system a human can devise, another human can eventually break. This leads me to believe that eventually we will have to begin acting on our honor, and provide severe consequences for dishonorable behavior. I haven't finished working out what "honor" means in this social context. Ken

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