December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Electronic Revolution and Guerilla Warfare?
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What with the governments of several nations around the world starting to get a bit heavy-handed with their populaces, I was wondering how a modern-day revolution could take place in a crypto-repressive society, and how the citizenry could sufficiently rattle/displace such a government so as to regain control over their destinies. For the purpose of discussion, I'd like to propose the following "environmental variables": > majority of the population unable/unwilling to do more than complain. > minority of the population not sure of how to fight the process, but willing to support those that do know. > some number (small) of those capable of crypto or other electronic mayhem depart the country in a short period bridging the implementation of repressive government controls and laws. > There are varying permutations of the crypto/electronic-capable, and the force-capable (ie, hackers-only to bomb-makers-only, and anything in between). > said government uses all means at it's disposal to try and apprehend those attempting to resist, as well as intercept communications, prevent damage to it's infrastructure and physical entities. > at the start of government "hostilities", all intra-national anon remailers are seized or shut down, and access to international ones is *heavily* monitored or blocked (yeah, I know, but we're gaming here!). > national identity medium (card, wristband, etc) in place and mandatory. > travel, currency, and information transfer restrictions (ie, no more "How to build a Backpack Nuke" or "How to hack the Tax Gestapo central computers" books :-) What problems would those willing to fight such government oppression be likely to face? How to deal with those problems? How to organize and exchange personnel/information? How to not get caught? How to avoid detection? What means/methods of, um, dissonance against such a government would be more/less effective? Under what various permutations of electronic/physical bushwhacking would the process be successful or not? Duration? Other than the obvious crypto/cyber/military disciplines, what other professions or specialized knowledge would be useful under what conditions? What blatantly obvious thing(s) have I left out? Dave Merriman - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints. Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender. PGP preferred. Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to *love* Big Brother.

1 0

Re: Will all codes and ciphers be broken?
by Amanda Walker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> What code and cipher breaking had occurred had generally happened > through HUMINT sources, as with the Walker spy ring (which sold old > code books, allowing earlier traffic to be reconstructed). Black bag > jobs, bugging of buildings, etc. And I have no idea what crypto > material Aldrich Ames transferred. Indeed. The situation is analogous when it comes to other areas (such as financial fraud, corporate espionage, and so forth). A modern cipher is not going to be the weak point of most cryptosystems, unless it is intentionally crippled (cf. export restrictions to <= 40 bit keys for DES & RC4). The (publically known) "codebreaking successes" (outside of contrived academic exercises) of recent decades have not involved cryptanalysis at all. This point is also lost to most people in the Clipper debate. Too many people, I feel, are focussed upon back doors in Skipjack. This seems to me to be missing the point. Skipjack could be a perfectly good block cipher, perhaps a Lucifer/DES-style product cipher with more rounds and bigger boxes. The point of Clipper is that it would institutionalize *non-cryptanalytic* intelligence gathering capabilities. It's the digital wiretap initiative wrapped in a large red herring. The actual cipher is completely incidental. At this point in history, humans are much easier to subvert than ciphers are. Amanda Walker InterCon Systems Corporation

1 0

Re: REGIONAL MEETING
by dmandl＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Not a good time for me, I'm afraid. I'm on the radio at that hour every Saturday (and I don't get back to the city till 3 or so). Actually, I'm missing my show that day anyway because I'm going away for the weekend. Would it be possible to do it some Sunday instead (though not the 9th, of course), or a weeknight? If not, I'll catch the next meeting, I guess (unless it's on a Saturday afternoon). Would Sunday the 16th be OK for this meeting, or do folks not want to wait that long? --Dave. P.S.: My apartment would also be available for future meetings if it's needed. At 7:43 AM 9/29/94 -0700, Sandy Sandfort wrote: >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > SANDY SANDFORT > . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . > >C'punks, > >I've been having Cypherpunks-physical-meetings withdrawal since >leaving the SF Bay Area. Unfortunately, I wasn't able to conjure >up a venue nor enough folks for the Cypherpunks anniversary last >month. For October, however, I've gotten a firm offer of the NYC >living room of a local Cypherpunk (Hero of the Revolution). I >also have compiled a list of a dozen and a half current C'punks >and interested fellow travellers. Unless some problem comes up, >we'll be getting together on the 8th of October at noon or so. > >If you are interested in attending, and we *haven't* communicated >already, drop we some e-mail. Also, if you know anyone who might >want to be on the Cypherpunks list, give me their contact info so >I can invite them. > >We'll have ever so much fun. > > > S a n d y > >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -- Dave Mandl dmandl(a)panix.com

1 0

IN H.O.T. WATER
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, How exciting! My first anti-fan, Rishab Aiyer Ghosh wrote: Sandy's H.E.A.T was hard enough on my poor 'D' key; I hope ... yada, yada, yada ... While I agree that "Beach Clash" *is* too far afield (sorry, David), I have a serious and a *seemingly* not-so-serious reason for "reviewing" Acapulco H.E.A.T. MY SERIOUS REASON--The world does not see cryptography and related privacy technologies as do the Cypherpunks. Most folks "learn" about crypto from popular culture (e.g., TV and movies) and, to a lesser extent, the popular press. When we try to persuade others to support strong crypto, we have to know what *they* know (and don't know), if we are to be effective. MY REAL REASON--Cypherpunks is not just a mailing list. It is a wired community of people with strong, commonly held beliefs concerning privacy. The problem is, the intensity of our beliefs and the ultimate seriousness of what's at stake, can lead to a negative, siege mentality. I believe there is a place, in every community of fellow travelers, for humor and humanity. That's one of the reasons that physical meeting are so important. If you've been to one, you know that it isn't all strategy and tactics; there is also fellowship. After a Cypherpunks meeting, many attendees go out for dinner together. In California, we even--god forbid--"bond." (Not valid in Arizona, Kansas, Kentucky or where prohibited by law. Your mileage may differ. If pain persists, consult a physician.) Acapulco H.E.A.T., with dubious crypto and suspect technology, has become an inside joke for Cypherpunks. When we watch it, we see things the average person misses. This is something we share, and something that helps create the lighter side of Cypherpunk culture. S a n d y P.S. I'm serious. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

4 3

PGP hole
by Dr. D.C. Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FWIW, it seems that a hole has been discovered in PGP 2.6.1, 2.7, 2.6, 2.3a, and most likely earlier versions as well. Apparently, it is possible to insert cleartext within a signed message and still receive a good sig message upon verification. Interested parties are referred to alt.security. pgp for a rather lengthy thread on this subject. I haven't seen anything on the cp list yet and thought those who don't read news regularly might find this information to be useful. I can forward the entire thread via email upon request. =D.C. Williams <dcwill(a)ee.unr.edu>

1 0

Re: Cash
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:25 AM 11/18/94 PST, Dana Albrecht wrote: >Assuming this is true, it would seem that even good, old fashioned, >paper currency doesn't provide the level of anonymity that one >would think. Scary... > A couple of weeks ago, I paid a utility bill with a $50 FRN. I was amused(?) to see the clerk put the bill into the same printer they use to print a little strip of payment receipt info on the bottom of your printed bill and also on the bottom of some of their paperwork. I guess they wanted to trace the bill back to my account if it turned out to be phony. DCF ************************************************************************* ATMs, Contracting Out, Digital Switching, Downsizing, EDI, Fax, Fedex, Home Workers, Internet, Just In Time, Leasing, Mail Receiving, Phone Cards, Quants, Securitization, Temping, Voice Mail.

1 0

Crypto junkmail detector (Was: Re: pointers to IETF drafts)
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:20 PM 11/18/94, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >I have already gotten three other copies of each of the three messages >associated with Ran's new IPng drafts because every security mailing >list on earth seems to operate on the "just forward everything" >premise. More aren't needed. Hm... Maybe a procmail routine to call MD5 on each incoming message body and compare it to the hashes of the last 100 messages you recieved could solve this problem.

1 0

Re: Imminent death of Corporations Predicted
by sdw＠lig.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

... > L. McCarthy writes > > True, but it happened to Wozniak & Jobs. John Sculley came from Pepsi. > > Of course, you may wish to argue against Apple being considered successful > > under Sculley ;) Details have finally started to fade, but Atari was done in partially by being purchased and a manager from Pepsi, I think. Tramiel was too late. Also via poor contracts with Amiga's design company I would expect. sdw -- Stephen D. Williams Local Internet Gateway Co.; SDW Systems 510 503-9227APager LIG dev./sales Internet: sdw(a)lig.net In Bay Area Aug94-Feb95!!! OO R&D Source Dist. By Horse: 2464 Rosina Dr., Miamisburg, OH 45342-6430 Internet Consulting ICBM: 39 38 34N 84 17 12W home, 37 58 41N 122 01 48W work Newbie Notice: I speak for LIGCo., CCI, myself, and no one else, regardless of where it is convenient to post from or thru.

1 0

Re: Cash
by nobody＠nately.UCSD.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fri, 18 Nov 94 11:25:55 PST Dana Albrecht writes: >In article oh9(a)crl2.crl.com, eric(a)crl.com (Eric Fredricksen) writes: >> Anarch (anarch(a)cse.ucsc.edu) wrote: >> : They're in tens, too (don't know about ones and fives). I've never been >> : able to remove one completely, but I've exposed the ends. Do you know >> : how many there are in each bill, and where? I know in tens there's at >> : least one, about a fifth of the way in from the left side (looking at >> : the front). >> >> They're easy to remove. Just rip the bill diagonally from the edge to >> the strip on either side of it, and pull the little triangle you just >> made. The strip comes with it. Show it to your friends. >> > >Assuming this is true, it would seem that even good, old fashioned, >paper currency doesn't provide the level of anonymity that one >would think. Scary... > >Dana W. Albrecht >dwa(a)mirage.svl.trw.com The plastic strips are not in fives or ones, but are in tens and higher. All the strip says is USA and give the dollar amount in metallic ink. Fri, 18 Nov 1994 11:55:46 -0700, Jamie Lawrence writes: >Also, realize that some places to look for that strip and if you >pull it it might not be accepted (most places that check only look >at $50s and $100s, though). > >-j What would be interesting to note is whether it is *illegal* to remove the strips. I don't think that banks, et al. would seriously refuse to accept this money as a deposit (or for change, etc.) simply because at the moment there is too much pre-1991 money floating about, and it would be cumbersome to check each and every piece of currency. Then again, I've often tried to get pre-1991 money simply because I do not wish to deal in post-1991 dollars with strips (humor me) and have been told by tellers that they have no pre-1991 money. _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ All men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to, and to resist the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable. From Thoreau's "Civil Disobedience"

1 0

Re: Cash
by adam.philipp＠ties.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At 12:25 PM 11/18/94, Dana Albrecht wrote: >>>From alt.2600... >>> bill's top edge and gently pulling it out. I've heard that airports will >>> soon have "Money Detectors" that will count total cash carried per >>> person. I'd like to figure out how the system works. It does not work. >This one has been flying around ever since the strips were >put in place. It has been refuted as techically infeasable. >(I don't remember the exact arguement, it had to do with the >strips being mostly nonreactive and there being no real way to >count how many/what denomination is in a stack.) Correct. A number of people have run tests on the strips (no, I didn't archive the articles, they were about 5-6 months back) and they are just what they appear to be, inert plastic strips put in there to make faking money more difficult. Many paper currencies arounf the world use plastic or metal foil strips in their money to make the bills more difficult to reproduce. I am familiar with the Israeli shekel (NIS) that has had foil strips in it for years... The main problem with detecting the strips is that it is faily trivial to have a detector that will determine if some strips have gone through, but having one that detects with any accuracy would be difficult to manufacture and still keep paper currency proportionately cheap. I suppose mini-transmitters in the 400 or so $10,000 bills might not be too far fetched, but it seems ridiculous. >>Assuming this is true, it would seem that even good, old fashioned, >>paper currency doesn't provide the level of anonymity that one >>would think. Scary... Assuming many falsehoods is scary... Now if only I could finish my mind reading aparatus... Chalk this up with the FCC licensing modems and MAKE.MONEY.FAST Adam -- PGP Key available on the keyservers. Encrypted E-mail welcome. Sub rosa: Confidential, secret, not for publication. -Black's Law Dictionary

2 1