December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Islands in the Net
by eric＠remailer.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Again, as a wanna-be programmer, I *try* to use binary formats only where the data or information is peculiar to a particular program; if there's a chance that it will be shared with something else, I try to use text. The thing about all data is that most all of it eventually gets shared, even the stuff that one program might think proprietary to itself. >The general issue may be quite profound. If we want to use textual >representations and general purpose text tools, then a digital >signature _qua_ authenticator loses its use, since a text tool, >because it is a general purpose text tool, cannot verify the >signature. Sorry - you lost me on this one. When I see a PGP signature on a posting, isn't that an ascii-fied digital signature? Doesn't the textual representation of that signature have value/meaning? The word "_qua_" (Latin, therefore italicized, represented by underlining) roughly means "as". The textual representation of a signature *as* text has no value *as* a signature; it's just an arbitrary collection of symbols. The value of a signature only arises when one performs a cryptographic operation on it, which by definition is not a textual operation. We all know the standard for displaying (length-limited) text. But the first characters at the top from left to right until the end-of-line. Move down one line and repeat. But how does one represent the _authentication_ information in text. Typeface? Color? A vertical bar? Enclosure? One solution might simply be to discard before viewing any text whose authentication information doesn't match, and then one can assume that all information that looks like it's authenticated actually is authenticated. The PGP cleartext signature format, for example, suffers seriously in facial readability because the signer is only implicitly identified by the Key ID, and that's inside the armor block! Eric

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Re: Fundies!
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:33 AM 11/17/94 -0800, James A. Donald wrote: >This thread is totally irrelevant to cypherpunks. I'm beginning to understand Mssrs May and Hughes' peeves about this kind of cruft. Could you folks please take this discussion offline. Thanks, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: Fundies!
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Oops. That's what I get for not finishing my mail before firing off those zingers... Tim, as usual, said it better than I could. I don't retract the following, I just apologize for it's redundance.. >At 10:33 AM 11/17/94 -0800, James A. Donald wrote: > >>This thread is totally irrelevant to cypherpunks. > >I'm beginning to understand Mssrs May and Hughes' peeves about this kind of >cruft. > >Could you folks please take this discussion offline. > >Thanks, >Bob Hettinga > ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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NSA gif/bmp/jpg...
by 'Kasey Uthurusamy' 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Seeing as how the CIA has gotten on the information 'superhighway'... (www.ic.gov) Does anyone have a gif/jpg/pcx...of the NSA logo...or possibly a collection of Fed logos...I downloaded the CIA logo and everyone at work was clammering for it... :) Kurgan -- =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- _O_ "Ah...the KURGAN...he kurgan(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu \/\ /\/=<---- is the strongest of the punisher(a)ccwf.cc.utexas.edu * immortals...." kaseyu(a)acad.stedwards.edu / \ _/ |_ "INVICTUS MANEO" -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=

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Lock & Key
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From Nat Hentoff's column in this week's Voice: In 1952, A. J. Muste--in an essay, "Of Holy Disobedience"--spoke of Georges Bernanos, the novelist, who refused to stay in France under the Nazis. One of the Bernanos passages quoted by Muste is not without contemporary relevance: "The moment, perhaps, is not far off when it will seem...natural for us to leave the front-door key in the lock at night so the police may enter, at any hour of the day or night...." (Remember the Bill Clinton-Henry Cisneros proposal last spring that people who live in public housing projects should sign an agreement allowing the police--without a warrant--to enter any time to seize drugs and perpetrators? Our wholly irrelevant attorney general, Janet Reno, did not object.)

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Re: IRC & HTTP proxy servers (fwd)
by Deanne Morgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a copy of my reply to Jonathan Cooper's request for legitimate uses of anonymous services... DHM. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 16 Nov 1994 18:47:58 -0400 (EDT) On Wed, 16 Nov 1994, Jonathan Cooper wrote: > Is there any interest in IRC and HTTP anonymizing proxy servers? Yes. > My question (which I have about most anonymized services) is what the > legitimate uses would be. I'm currently in a code-till-I-drop mindset, > but I really don't want people using these services just to sling > porn-o-the-day or to irritate people on irc. An example of use of anonymous servers: There is a newsgroup called alt.sexual.abuse.recovery [among others], a healing forum for survivors of sexual abuse/assault [often childhood sexual abuse], their significant others, and other support people. For obvious reasons, for many there is a need for anonymity [many of those who post would be killed VERY quickly if their true location/identity were discovered]. There is also an irc channel, #**** <name deleted> which is used by "asarians" for "live" discussions of many issues, ranging from very serious survivor issues to having electronic snowball fights. Again, for many, anonymity is VERY important. So yes, there ARE some very legitimate uses for anonymous servers, whether irc or email or netnews posting... If you want any further info, please ask. DHM.

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CEB6 1 of 2
by Gary Jeffers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CYPHER-REBELS ELECTRONIC BOOK (CEB) NOVEMBER 17, 1994 ISSUE 6 Publisher Gary Lee Jeffers ccgary(a)mizzou1.missouri.edu THE ORIGINAL, FIRST, & OTHER "OFFICIAL" "ORGAN" OF THE CYPHERPUNKS LIST (That is still in existence.) NOTE: Items bounded by /* & */ are new text - Differ from last issue. IS YOUR SOFTWARE TYRANNICIDAL? If so, Cypherpunks & the CEB want to hear about it! A compendium of the best software & info for today's electronic privacy Freedom Fighters. This text may be distributed in part or in full anywhere you want. It may be given away freely or copies may be sold. CEB wants to be free & valuable. If, as Chairman Mao says: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.", then what is democracy? /* Currently, we have Fortress Cryptography & State Sufferance remailers, mailing lists & newsgroups. We must have Fortress: remailers, mailing lists & newsgroups! */ This file may or may not be found on ftp.csua.berkeley.edu pub/cypherpunks/ ? with filename CEB5. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1. PGP Section 1. PGP general Section 2. Michael Johnson's PGP FAQ contribution Section 3. Stealth PGP. /* Section 4. PGP2.6.2 from Sameer. */ Chapter 2. Steganography. "A picture is worth a thousand words." Chapter 3. Shells for PGP Section 1. Christopher W. Geib's WinPGP26.ZIP Section 2. Ross Barclay's WinFront 3.0 /* ftp information added. */ /* Section 3. Ed Carp's PGPWIND ver 0.1.g */ Chapter 4. Generally cool things. Section 1. Loompanics sources. Section 2. Viruses sources. Chapter 5A. Getting the Cypherpunks' archived & indexed list. /* ITS GONE! ITS GONE! */ /* Chapter 5B. Secure Drive download location from Raph. */ Chapter 6. Remailers & chained remailers. /* text correction for anon.penet.fi */ Chapter 7. Current problems in Crypt. Chapter 8. Text sources. Section 1. Books Part 1. Simson Garfinkel's PGP book. Part 2. Bruce Schneier's cryptography book. Part 3. William Stallings PGP book. Section 2. Rants Section 3. CYPHERNOMICON - Tim May's "official" Cypherpunks' FAQ. Chapter 9. Cypherpunks' mailing list. getting on etc.. Chapter 10. IRC chat strong encryption? Section 1. prig(cryptical)'s offering. /* Section 2. Ed Carp's offer. */ CCCCCCCCCC YYYY YYYY PPPPPP HH HH EEEEEEE RRRRRRRRR CCCCCCCCCC YY YY PP PP HH HH EEEEEEE RRRRRRRRR CCC YY YY PP PP HH HH EE RR RR CCC YY YY PPPPPP HHHHHHHH EE RR RR CCC YYY PP HHHHHHHH EEEEEEE RR RR CCC YYY PP HH HH EEEEEEE RRRRRRRR CCC YYY PP HH HH EE RRRRRRR CCC YYY PP HH HH EE RRRRRR CCCCCCCCCC YYY PP HH HH EE RR RR CCCCCCCCCCC YYY PP HH HH EEEEEEE RR RR PP HH HH EEEEEEE RR RR RRRRRRRRRRR RR RR RRRRRRRRRRRRRR RRRRRRRRRRR EEEEEEEEEEE BBBBBBBBBBB SSSSSSS RRRRRRRR EEEEEEEEE BBB BBBBBBB SSSSSSSSS RR RRRR EEEEEEEEEE BB BBBBBB SSSSSSSSS RRR RRRR EEEEEEEE BBB BBBBB SSSSSSSSS RRR RRRRR EEEEEE BBBBBBBBB SSSSSSSSS RRRRRRRRRRRRRR EEEEEEE BBBBBB SSSSSSSSSS RRRRRRRRRRRRRR EEEEEEEEEE BBBBB SSSSSSS RRRRRRR RRRR EEEEEEEEEE BBBBBB SSSSSSSSSSSSS RRR RRRRR EEEEEEEEEEEE BBBBBBBB SSSSSSSSSSSS RRRRR RR EEEEEEEE BBBBBBBBBB SSSSSSSSSS RR RRRRR EEEEEE BBB BBBBBBB SSSSSSSSSS RR RRRRR EEEEEE BB BBBBBB SSSSSSSSSS RRR RRRRRR EEEEEEEEEEE BB BBBBBBB SSSSSSSSSSS RRRR RRRRRRR EEEEEEEEEEEEE BBBBBBBBBB SSSSSSSSSSSS PPPPPPPPPPP GGGGGGGGG PPPPPPPPPPP PPPPPPPPPPP GGGGGGGGG PPPPPPPPPPP PPP PP GGG PPP PP PPPPPPPPPPPP GGG GGGGGGG PPPPPPPPPPP PPPPPPPPPP GGG GGGGGGG PPPPPPPP PPP GGG GG PPP PPP GGGGGGGGGGGGG PPP PPP GGGGGGGGGGGG PPP Chapter 1. PGP general. PGP is Pretty Good Privacy from Phil Zimmermann. It is currently the best available encryption available to civilians at large. Zimmermann is the programmer on the original PGP versions but now, apparently, just guides other programmers in making improved versions. PGP uses two encryption algorithms: RSA for its Public Key powers & IDEA for its bulk encryption. The advantages of PGP over other crypt/decrypt systems are: 1. RSA algorithm. Allows users to communicate without needing a secure channel to exchange keys. - PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION. 2. The program system has been very well done & has huge development support. 3. It has huge popularity. 4. Security is guaranteed with distribution of source code & public investigation. 5. Its free. 6. Both RSA & IDEA are "STRONG" algorithms. Section 2: Michael Johnson's PGP FAQ contribution Michael Paul Johnson <mpj(a)netcom.com> has an excellent faq on Subject: Where to Get the Latest PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) FAQ /* (Last modified: 31 October 1994 by Mike Johnson) */ You can get this faq by anonymous ftp to: ftp.csn.net /mpj/getpgp.asc It is also posted monthly on alt.security.pgp The latest versions of PGP are VIACRYPT PGP 2.7 , MIT PGP 2.6.2 & PGP 2.6ui & the new PGP 2.6.i . Which is best? I would say MIT PGP 2.6.2 although PGP 2.6.i is a close contender. MIT's has source code, Phil Zimmerman's blessing & is US legal. For a further discussion of variations, consult Michael Johnson's FAQ. Section 3: Michael Johnson's PGP bomb contribution. From: Michael Johnson <mpj(a)csn.org> Subject: PGP Time Bomb FAQ PGP TIME BOMB FAQ Michael Johnson writes: "There has been some confusion about the annoying "Time Bomb" in MIT PGP2.6, as well as some other PGP version compatibility issues. This is an attempt to clear up some of that confusion." You can get this faq by anonymous ftp to: ftp.csn.net /mpj/pgpbomb.asc /* Section 4. PGP2.6.2 from Sameer. From: sameer <sameer(a)c2.org> Subject: PGP 2.6.2 on ftp.csua.berkeley.edu Date: Thu, 27 Oct 1994 03:19:19 -0700 (PDT) PGP 2.6.2 is now available on ftp.csua.berkeley.edu in /pub/cypherpunks/pgp/pgp262 Not for export outside of the United States in violation of ITAR restrictions. -- sameer Voice: 510-841-2014 Network Administrator Pager: 510-321-1014 Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley Dialin: 510-549-1383 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org */ Section 3. Stealth PGP 37 Stealth PGP refers to a PGP file that does not have the RSA prefix tag on the beginning of a PGP encrypted file or to PGP utility software that disguises this tag. Possibly, a later version of PGP with have this as an option. The advantages of "Stealthy" PGP are that its files cannot be found by Internet search programs that hunt for the PGP/RSA tag & that a "Stealthy" file may be more securely hidden by a good steganography program. From: Mark Grant <mark(a)unicorn.com> Subject: Stealth PGP Responding to my question "Has Stealth PGP been done yet?" Mark Grant says: Kind of, there's a 'stealth' filter available that strips and attaches headers to PGP messages after encryption. It's available from various places, and the documentation is available on my 'other people's PGP addons' WWW page : http://www.c2.org/~mark/pgp/other.html There's also information about Privtool, my PGP-aware mail program for Sun workstations at : http://www.c2.org/~mark/privtool/privtool.html Mark EMAIL: mark(a)unicorn.com URL : http://www.c2.org/~mark/ Chapter 2. Steganography "A picture is worth a thousand words." ============================================= %% = !I = %% %%% = !!! BB = %%%* *%%%% = **!!** & = *** @** = u \ x! ) < = * *** + m ) c $ = ** = # k } º = º = $%- & u = = ------- = @!p +e$ ~ # = º = h 6& ; | = º = =,# {{ = º = = º º = = º º = = º º ============================================= º º STILL LIFE WITH CRYPT +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Steganography is the craft of hiding messages in pictures. The text is, of course, encrypted text rather than plain text. The current best steganography program has been done by Arsen Arachelian Below, follows his text contribution: From: rarachel(a)prism.poly.edu (Arsen Ray Arachelian) WNSTORM is available from: ftp.wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto/software/dist/US_or_Canada_only_XXXXXXX/Steg Usual routine to get it. i.e. cd /pub/crypto/software, get the README file, and if you agree to the terms then follow the instructions. Short description off the top of my head (I wrote the beastie) Another info scrap should be in the same directory as WNSTORM. WNSTORM is a data encryption/steganography utility which is pretty secure for most uses. Unlike some stego systems WNSTORM is expandible, all you have to do is write your own LSB injector/extractor for whatever data format you wish to hide information into. WNSTORM doesn't require the recipient of the host picture, sound, movie, etc. to have the original un-stormed picture. Unlike primitive stego programs, WNSTORM doesn't compare an stormed picture with an unstormed picture. WNSTORM will cover its tracks statistically. If it changes a 0 bit in the LSB data stream to a zero, or a 1 bit to a 1, it does nothing. If it changes a 1 bit to a zero, it will balance itself by changing an unused adjacent 0 bit to a 1. Ditto for a 0->1 transform. WNSTORM will NOT change every bit of the LSB in order to prevent detection. It will use a passkey along with a probabilistic algorithm to decide which bits it will change. The algorithm for picking bits depends on the previous succesfully encoded/decoded cyphertext AND the passkey. Internally WNSTORM works by picking "windows" or "packets" of bytes out of either a random number stream or an LSB stream extracted from a picture, sound, movie, etc. It then injects eight bits of cyphertext into this window. Each window is of variable size. The bit locations where the bits are inserted are randomly exchanged for each pass. The bit values are also randomly exchanged for each pass. WNSTORM includes an injector/extractor for PCX images, however I will write more injecotr/extractor programs for it in the future, and OTHERS can do so as well. Chapter 3. Shells for PGP. Section 1. Christopher W. Geib's WinPGP26.ZIP From: "David K. Merriman" <merriman(a)metronet.com> Subject: Christopher W. Geib's Windows PGP shell I've just finished making an ftp deposit to soda in the cypherpunks/ incoming directory of WinPGP26.ZIP; it's the latest version of the Windows PGP shell Shareware, and understands 2.6/2.6ui/2.7. Dave Merriman Section 2. Ross Barclay's WinFront 3.0 From: Ross Barclay <RBARCLAY(a)TrentU.ca> Subject: PGP WinFront 3.0 Now Available! (New Windows front end for PGP) To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com, ~rbarclay(a)TrentU.ca -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- /* signature wrecked due to included text from another contributor. Gary Jeffers */ Announcing PGP WinFront 3.0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A freeware Windows front end for PGP 2.3a and 2.6 Copyright 1994 Ross Barclay (rbarclay(a)trentu.ca) WHAT IT IS: - PGP WinFront is the most fully featured free (or otherwise) Windows front end available. It will make using PGP easy for beginners, and it will drastically increase the speed at which experts use it too. PGP WinFront is now into is third revision and I have tried to implement as many of the suggestions that I received as possible. PGP WinFront was designed by its users, but was coded by me. Features: - Supports secret key ring placement on floppy drive - Support en/decryption to/from clipboard - Move / Copy / Delete files - Online hypertext help - Online hypertext PGP help - Keyring reader to pick names, view key characteristics - Keyring reader supports less-often used "huge" keyrings - Signature Checker - Very configurable - over 25 user-definable settings - more . . . This program does too much to list here. And it's free! This version is a complete rewrite of the popular PGP WinFront 2.0. The feature-set has largely been set by users who sent in suggestions. Please read the file README.TXT and peruse the help files. Please send me your comments. HOW TO GET IT: At the moment, there are 2 ways to get this program: 1) Via FTP - The PGP WinFront 3.0 filename is called PWF30.ZIP. - It has been uploaded to the incoming directories of the following FTP sites: ftp.cica.indiana.edu ftp.eff.org ftp.wimsey.bc.ca /* from Gary Jeffers. There has been a problem getting pwf30 from these sites. However, it CAN ACTUALLY be ftp'ed with the following info.: ftp.wimsey.bc.ca: /pub/crypto/software/dist/US_or_Canada_only_XXXXXXXX/PGP/Misc/pwf30.zip */ -- Mark Henderson -- markh(a)wimsey.bc.ca, henderso(a)netcom.com (personal accounts) RIPEM 1.1 MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433 ViaCrypt PGP Key Fingerprint: 21 F6 AF 2B 6A 8A 0B E1 A1 2A 2A 06 4A D5 92 46 cryptography archive maintainer -- anon ftp to ftp.wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto */ black.ox.ac.uk soda.berkeley.edu ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de ftp.ee.und.ac.za ftp.demon.co.uk - Hopefully, they will be slotted into the PGP directories soon. On CICA, it will be placed into \pub\pc\win3\utils. That is where PWF20.ZIP was placed. - Once you get the program, please upload it to other FTP sites! 2) From Colorado Catacombs BBS - dial (303)772-1062. The file is called PWF30.ZIP - once you get the program, please upload it to other BBSs. *** The mail access system I had was discontinued. This is because the file was too big to fit into my account. However, you can still register PWF and request certain PGP and PWF related items using my mail access system. Details of these are on the "About" screen of PWF 30. - --Ross Barclay - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ross Barclay (rbarclay(a)trentu.ca) Assistant Editor | To receive my PGP | public key, send PC NEWS Review: Windows Edition | me e-mail with the Bellevue, WA (206) 399-8700 | subject: GET KEY - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To receive PC NEWS Review, send me e-mail with the subject: GET PNR. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQBVAwUBLmZ7fdgpRteEZ9JhAQFeXgIAxIpvJQeMsx7YecNgtusBDMqL662XFeX2 qL0qF8HcN4ReZ9MYjtn9t8N1zWGxkPOXQEI3KfM7uk8JTzxjZ5LG2g== =gSYT -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- /* Section 3. Ed Carp's PGPWIND version 0.1.g */ From: ecarp(a)netcom.com (Ed Carp) Subject: PGP For Windows 0.1.g release Date: Thu, 17 Nov 1994 01:44:41 -0800 (PST) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The latest release of PGP For Windows is in ftp.netcom.com:/pub/ecarp/pgpwind.zip Several bug fixes, and an occasional feature or two :) Now you can set the font for the program if you don't like the default. ;) Thanks to Dave Merriman and D. Morgan for beta testing. The next release will hopefully have online help for the program itself, even though it's pretty straightforward. Comments, bug reports to me. Thanks! - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp(a)linux.org, ecarp(a)netcom.com Finger ecarp(a)netcom.com for PGP public key an88744(a)anon.penet.fi If you want magic, let go of your armor. Magic is so much stronger than steel! -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLssmBSS9AwzY9LDxAQHa/QP/YjxnZJWlK4VWrolr1fe75m/0YjGhHyEN dLsLOUbiR0riz6oO0WaExQUaSh4mefpgniHc9tSkCreL6dBG+hdA6qwNlUVMCANV dxAXw0E9SQUxoLDPY1pbbEcyoDmu7Im2qg52WTMvKELbKWOyiIdtbc+BupCjfhw3 g6YPzIAXaB4= =vYWD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Chapter 4. Generally cool things. Section 1. Loompanics sources. Something cool from Vincent: Most of the Loompanics Unlimited catalog is online as: gopher://gopher.well.sf.ca.us/00/Business/catalog.asc And you can send mail to them at: loompanx(a)pt.olympus.net You can also get their catalog at: Loompanics Unlimited PO box 1197 33 Port Townsend, Wa. 98368 P id Send $5.00 for their general catalog - free with any order. Section 2. Viruses sources. AMERICAN EAGLE PUBLICATIONS Cypherpunks, I have found a source of info. that I just must share! American Eagle Publications, Inc. P. O. Box 41401 Tucson, AZ 85717 I'm sure they will send you a catalog just for the asking. So, what are they about? They are about VIRUSES! They don't just carry a couple of virus things - they are the VIRUSES-ARE-US of the virus world! They have a journal: Computer Virus Developments Quarterly. They have books on viruses, virus protection, cryptanalysis, the science fiction book "Heiland", a CD-ROM for $99.95 of several thousand live viruses, disks of viruses with source code, executable & utilities, programs & cards for boot protection, & even a virus IDEA computer system protector. Copy follows for two items of particular interest to Cypherpunks: POTASSIUM HYDROXIDE, KOH By the "King of Hearts" A sophisticated piece of software which uses ideas first developed by computer virus writers to secure your computer system against those who would like to get their hands on the information in it. You give KOH a pass phrase, & it uses state of the art IDEA data encryption algorithm to encrypt all of the information on your hard disk & your floppies. It is, for all intents & purposes, unbreakable, & works well with DOS & Windows. Many encryption programs offered commercially are easily cracked, but this one is not. Some people call this program a virus, come say it is not. In ways, it acts like a virus to do some of your security housekeeping for you. Yet at worst it is a friendly virus that lets you choose when & how it will replicate. program & manual on disk, $10 program, full source, & manual on disk, $20 (Overseas customers add $12: KOH cannot be exported from the US, but since it was not developed in the US, we will forward your order to the overseas distributor. Please allow 6 weeks for delivery) HEILAND By Franklin Sanders 276 pages, Paperback, 1986 Here's an entertaining book about America in the year 2020. If you wonder if it's proper to use viruses in wartime or if such a virus could be termed "good", this book will give you some food for thought. Sanders makes use of computer "worms" when the oppressed people of the US attack the federal government in an all-out war against tyranny. Sanders uses his worms right too - not as some all-powerful monster. Rather, they are deployed as part of a larger military strategy. For a book written in 1986, that's not bad! And if you're fed up with the government, this book is sure to give you a vision for the future. Sanders has been part of the mounting tax protest in this country. He's fought the IRS in court for years & won some important battles. Unfortunately the government seems to be con- firming some of his worst suspensions about them. Now you can get a good dose of his philosophy & his ideas about remedying our problems. And if you work for the government, don't be offended - this book is doubly recommended for you! Book, $8.00 for shipping add $2 per book. 5% sales tax for AZ. residents. It is my belief that in the next few years more uses for viruses than just being a vandal will be found. Also, they may find a place in protecting our electronic freedom. - for instance virus remailers. Also see my previous post - The FREEDOM DEAMON. Also, they have a place in my CHATTERBOX concept(a remailer for chat mode or commands). "Viruses aren't just for Sociopaths anymore!" Also, I suspect the state may start cracking down on virus tech- nology. Incidentally, did you all know that crypt has a place in modern viruses? Encryption is used to hide "nasty" code & virus signatures until they get into the system & decrypt. Yours Truly, Gary Jeffers PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWAAAYYY BBBAAACCCKK! BBBEEEAAATTTTT STATE ! Chapter 5A. Getting the Cypherpunks' archived & indexed list. Vincent also tells us about the complete Cypherpunk's text on line & indexed with fast access times: Eric Johnson has put one together as: /*ERIC JOHNSON HAS CONTACTED ME & SAYS THAT IT NO LONGER EXISTS! *That's too bad. Well, I guess I'll finally stop embarassing Eric * by referring to it.*/ /* LOTS OF BADLY EDITED & NOW OBSOLETE TEXT DELETED. */ /* Chapter 5B. Secure Drive download location from Raph. ftp to ftp.netcom.com mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto??????

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: Anon III - RFM
by Tomaz Borstnar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Key for user ID: Tomaz Borstnar <tomaz.borstnar(a)arnes.si> 1024-bit key, Key ID BC52F895, created 1993/12/06 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello! This is one of proposals for anonymous irc on IRC network called Undernet (servers: undernet.org, us.undernet.org, eu.undernet.org) Author is Denis Holmes (dholmes(a)rahul.net) - ------- Forwarded Message date: Wed, 16 Nov 1994 22:22:58 -0800 (Note, non-list mail) Hmm, I wasn't gonna just send ya the proposal again, but on second thought, I guess I will. I've put the test servers back up so you can see it if you want. My recommendation is that if there is a user desire for anonymity, having them post to the newsgroup or wastelanders would probably have the strongest impact. A statement of why they feel it is necessary and/or beneficial would be heard best I expect. I can give a couple reasons offhand why I didn't pursue this further: - - - Very few people expressed support for the idea. - - - It looked like I would be expected to upgrade it to the latest server level, yet I have not been provided with details of code changes despite my requests. And my suggestions to consult with others prior to any non-trivial code change (basically) have not been well-received. - - - Arguing about it became a waste of too much time. Well, that's not entirely true; one of the goals I was after has started to happen. Maybe that's a more legitimate reason than any of the others for laying off a bit. Subject: Anon III - RFM Revised summary of ideas for an anonymous IRC service. This proposal is dated 2 October 1994 (version III). Proposal: (n.) something put forth for consideration. RFM: Request For Mail. If you realize a way the service described below can be abused by users, please mail dholmes(a)rahul.net with the information, and be as specific as possible. Thoughts on how the service might be improved are also welcome. If needed, additional mail discussion will be used to try to determine the least intrusive solutions to problems received. A new revision or status will be posted to wastelanders when appropriate. Please do not send me your wonderful ideas on registering users, restricting mode changes, or other "problemless solutions" (unless requested or it concerns one of the particular points below). While these ideas may have merit, if they do not address specific abuses peculiar to this service, then they will most likely not fall into the category of "least intrusive solutions" being sought as described above. An implementation of Anon III is currently available for testing at jive.rahul.net port 5853. A standard Undernet server is connected to it and runs on port 5854. Please send me your observations, bug reports, and results (good and bad) from using various clients. The following points describe features of the proposed service, or restrictions to be placed on its users. "Registration" as used below refers to the normal process of a client signing onto a server and having its presence propagated across the net. * Use a special server to provide a high level of service, so that users are able to operate in the environment to which they are accustomed. After connecting to this server and registering in the normal fashion, a client becomes anonymous by sending a specific command to the server, upon which the server performs any checking, signs the user off the net, and reregisters the user. * Insure that each anonymous client is registered with a unique user@host combination so that individual users can still be banned from channels, ignored, etc. (User appears as anon376@<servername>, and must disconnect from the server (signoff) in order to change this. Also provides for banning of all anonymous users from a channel.) * Furthermore, a user becoming anonymous more than once within a certain period (let's say a day, for now, but this may vary at the admin's discretion) will receive the same anonymous identification on subsequent invokations after the first. This provides further protection against ban and ignore evasion. * Users of the service will be logged. (It should be noted, however, that, in general, this information will not be released except as required by law. The purpose here is to assist the administrator in assuring appropriate use of the service.) * Disallow anonymous oper (IRC/server operator) status. (This means that opers becoming anonymous will also be de-opered.) This prevents unidentifiable discontent operators from disrupting the net. * Block CTCP CLIENTINFO and USERINFO requests. This protects against users deliberately attempting to cause other users to flood or overload their connections without being identified. * Block CTCP FINGER and USERINFO replies, to protect client anonymity. * Lower the flood detection threshhold for anonymous users, so they're killed more quickly upon trying to flood. * Detect reconnecting users who were anonymous (users connecting who disconnected less than [60] seconds ago and were anonymous) and prevent them from joining channels or sending messages/notices for [30] seconds. This will stop queued messages within the client (from a would-be flooder) while still protecting the user's anonymity. * Ability to allow or deny anonymity based on address. This allows the administrator to deny known abusers the privelege of using the service. * Disallow multi-mode changes (i.e. allow only one channel mode change per MODE command). Also allow mode change or kick only once every "few" seconds. This provides channel operators time to react if an anonymous user attempts to take over a channel. Ensor. +----------------+-------------------+------------------------------------+ | Dennis Holmes | dholmes(a)rahul.net | "We demand rigidly defined | | San Jose, CA +-------------------+ areas of doubt and uncertainty!" | +------=>{ Meanwhile, as Ford said: "Where are my potato chips?" }<=------+ - ------- End of Forwarded Message -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.i iQCVAgUBLsv+dlheSYu8UviVAQEzdAP7BHVj0RjYWrlTuTRdMfpCLTCuiKMW3PQf cj9t2x811Z1E1LLXl+45i7KTCjcygmdh8OdyTU0B/xCvivzwSTq+OeXhlUZ6+AdN TjPz1hUt+s/TDT1n2RRgKFHhKCTCw/UuI3yPVnRy+/+2Bkpai6byVBSXRqJiGa6X HiM4L4BdrBY= =WIGV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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re: changes to remailer@jpunix.com
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I read about some changes that John Perry made to his remailer, since it is being abused. (Sorry to hear it!) I thought he said he is doing source blocking (I deleted the message and can't check.) Is this true? Were there no hops between the abuser and the remailer? How can you prevent the abuser from just chaining through different paths to reach your remailer and continuing to use it? Or am I remembering incorrectly ;) Random Factor suggested (among other things) > * require encryption for incoming messages. Requiring encryption is OK, as long as you don't require the remailing header and message body to be encrypted together. If you do, like the extropia remailer does, then you can't form reply blocks that include such a remailer (since the reply block is created by a sender who obviously doesn't have the message body that his recipient will use the reply block to respond to).

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Remailer Blocking and Negative Reputations
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just a quick note: Blocking the sources of messages deemed offensive is a "negative reputation" approach, easily bypassed by creating a new source name. (And this can be done easily by using another remailer first.) I'm not arguing for a positive rep system here, as I'm not sure how it would work. I just wanted to the note that the solution of blocking offending sources has limited use. (Unless the blocking propagates back to the first-non-remailer use...require remailers to cooperate on maintaining a black list.) --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Cypherpunks list: majordomo(a)toad.com with body message of only: subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay

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