December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Collection of persona
by damion.furi＠the-matrix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DM|Depends on the counter people. The local RS here the clerks don't care |much about it and will enter a random number. I wish they would do that here. I've just about yanked a manager over the counter over it. |A local Service Merchandise |does the same thing, but they're pesky, so I make up silly names to test |the wits of impatient teenage mutant cashiers. (They also used to have |a computer where you enter your telno. and place orders to pick up at |the desk... I don't think the system bills you automatically but the |employees probably won't like it when you have them get 10 wieght sets |out...) <chuckle> I love it when the system has a flaw I can take a crowbar to. :----------:----------:----------:----------:----------:----------:----- : furi(a)the-matrix.com | pgp-public-key(a)demon.co.uk | LIVE LION ALERT : 2.6.2 1024/C1225CE1 | 38 11 7C 59 FB F3 7C C0 F7 E9 67 1F AF B8 2D 94 PGP: When it's none of their damned business. -- SPEED 1.40 [NR]: Evaluation day 134...

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Diskreet Disk Help Needed
by msprague＠owens.ridgecrest.ca.us 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One of my Diskreet Disks has refused to open but will change size and password. Any suggestions??

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SF Bay Area D-H patent party?
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Who in the SF Bay Area plans to throw a party in honor of the upcoming expiration of the Diffie-Hellman patent? Several people had mentioned in the past they might do so. [Some of your are bcc'ed]. The patent will expire just a few weeks from now. Anybody? Thanks, --Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. DES is dead! Please join in breaking RC5-56. http://rc5.distributed.net/

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Re: Are booby-trapped computers legal?
by alt＠iquest.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:38 PM 9/6/95 -0400, hallam(a)w3.org wrote: >People who go round drawing parallels to gun ownership and cryptography >ownership are simply playing into the governments hands. Which of our rights would you have us surrender so as to not play into the government's hands? >Cryptography has net benefits to society. You would have a hard time proving that cryptography has more, or different "net benefits to society" than gun ownership does. >Most advocates of gun ownership tend to convince me of >little more than they are a danger to society. Regardless of their case they are >the biggest argument for gun control, and therfore poor advocates of their >cause. Statists say the same thing about crypto-advocates. Talking about keeping secrets, and discussing which methods are uncrackable by the government is not what a statist wants to hear - and neither is talk about the real reason behind the 2nd Amendment.

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Another Son of Clipper discussion paper
by Jim Gillogly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I sent along two discussion papers for tomorrow's NIST session on the revised plans for GAK last week. Here's the third. Jim Gillogly Hevensday, 14 Halimath S.R. 1995, 20:49 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Key Escrow Issues Meeting, September 6-7, 1995 Discussion Paper #3 Export Criteria Discussion Draft -- 64-bit Software Key Escrow Encryption As discussed at the SPA/AEA meeting on August 17, 1995, the Administration is willing to allow the export of software encryption provided that the products use algorithms with key space that does not exceed 64 bits and the key(s) required to decrypt messages/files are escrowed with approved escrow agents. On the same date, the September 6-7 key escrow issues meeting at NIST was also announced. The two principal topics at the meeting will be: discussion of issues of exportability of 64-bit software key escrow encryption and 2) desirable characteristics for key escrow agents. In order to help make most productive use of the limited time available at the upcoming meeting and to better focus deliberation, the following criteria are being distributed for discussion purposes. Since it is important that final criteria be clear, straightforward, consistent, and implementable, please review these draft criteria and be prepared to discuss how they may be refined and made more specific. --- Draft Export Criteria --- for Software Key Escrow Encryption Software key escrow encryption products meeting the following criteria will be granted special export licensing treatment similar to that afforded other mass-market software products with encryption. 1. The product will use an unclassified encryption algorithm (e.g., DES, RC4) with a key length not to exceed 64 bits. 2. The product shall be designed to prevent multiple encryption (e.g., triple-DES). 3. The key required to decrypt each message or file shall be accessible through a key escrow mechanism in the product, and such keys will be escrowed during manufacture in accordance with #10. If such keys are not escrowed during manufacture, the product shall be inoperable until the key is escrowed in accordance with #10. 4. The key escrow mechanism shall be designed to include with each encrypted message or file, in a format accessible by authorized entities, the identity of the key escrow agent(s), and information sufficient for the escrow agent(s) to identify the key or key components required to decrypt that message. 5. The product shall be resistant to any alteration that would disable or circumvent the key escrow mechanism, to include being designed so that the key escrow mechanism cannot be disabled by a static patch, (i.e., the replacement of a block of code by a modified block). 6. The product shall not decrypt messages or files encrypted by non-escrowed products, including products whose key escrow mechanisms have been altered or disabled. 7. The key escrow mechanism allows access to a user's encrypted information regardless of whether that user is the sender or the intended recipient of the encrypted information. 8. The key escrow mechanism shall not require repeated involvement by the escrow agents for the recovery of multiple decryption keys during the period of authorized access. 9. In the event any such product is or may be available in the United States, each production copy of the software shall either have a unique key required for decrypting messages or files that is escrowed in accordance with #10, or have the capability for its escrow mechanism to be rekeyed and any new key to be escrowed in accordance with #10. 10. The product shall accept escrow of its key(s) only with escrow agents certified by the U.S. Government or by foreign governments with which the U.S. Government has formal agreements consistent with U.S. law enforcement and national security requirements. Note: Software products incorporating additional encryption methods other than key escrow encryption methods will be evaluated for export on the basis of each encryption method included, as is already the case with existing products. Accordingly, these criteria apply only to the key escrow encryption method incorporated by a software product, and not to other non-escrowed encryption methods it may incorporate. For instance, non-escrowed encryption using a key length of 40 bits or less will continue to be exportable under existing export regulations. - - - Please also review discussion paper #1 (distributed earlier), which raises a number of issues involving exportability criteria and how exportable products could be designed. Discussion paper #2 (also previously distributed) presents questions involving key escrow agents. Note: These issues will be discussed at the Key Escrow Issues Meeting to be held September 6-7, 1995 (9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (Gaithersburg, Maryland). The meeting will be open to the public, although seating is limited. Advance registration is requested, please contact Arlene Carlton on 301/975-3240, fax: 301/948-1784 or e- mail: carlton(a)micf.nist.gov. 9/1/95 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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No. 8 / Re: Top 10 Ways to Make a Grouchy Old CypherPunk Smile
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Top 10 Ways to Make a Grouchy Old CypherPunk Smile -------------------------------------------------- #10) Find his shoes for him. #9) Buy Kent Crispin a Dr. Kevorkian gift-certificate. #8) Lock. #7) #6) #5) #4) #3) #2) #1) [This space reserved for T.C. May]

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Govt seeking emergency stay in Bernstein case
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Wed, 27 Aug 1997 13:43:36 -0700 From: Cindy Cohn <Cindy(a)mcglashan.com> Hi all, Just talked to Mr. Coppolino at the Justice Department. They are filing ex parte emergency stay papers tonight or tomorrow morning to try to stay the impact of Judge Patel's ruling pending appeal. He'll be faxing me the documents when they are ready. He said yesterday that they would seek to stay the "export" of crypto source code, although not the teaching or discussion (whatever that means). Cindy ************************ Cindy A. Cohn McGlashan & Sarrail, P. C. 177 Bovet Road, 6th Floor San Mateo, CA 94402 (415) 341-2585 (tel) (415)341-1395 (fax) Cindy(a)McGlashan.com http://www.McGlashan.com

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subscripe
by Saitmacher, Klaus, Dr., DyStar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

subscripe

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Re: University logging mail to anon.penet
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Jeff Simmons writes: > This just came up locally, and I'd like to have some comments on it, > especially from people who understand the law a lot better than I do: > > Our local University apparently has been logging ALL mail to anon.penet, > including faculty, students, and off-campus users. With respect to logging of student traffic, I'd look at the Family Education Rights Privacy Act ("Buckley Amendment", 20 USC 1232g) and the California analog to it (assuming one exists; Oregon's is located at OAR 571-20-005, et seq.). The release of information about individual students beyond "directory information" (e.g., name, dates of attendance, degrees granted, etc) is sharply limited without the consent of the student. Information about mail traffic sent and received is, IMHO, arguably (but not clearly) within "educational records" for FERPA purposes. To establish a Buckley Amendment violation (and I'm not saying there was one here) you'll still need to find a University employee to pin the disclosure on. If it's a University employee who posted them to the newsgroup, it's easy. If the University employee merely maintained those records in a place where an outsider was able to easily gain access to them, it seems like a bigger stretch. I had occasion to talk with a relatively high-level administrator in the University of Oregon's computer center some time ago and he explained that they've had to go to some trouble to make sure that gopher/WWW directories and other contemporary university computing practices don't fall afoul of the Buckley Amendment. Perhaps the powers that be at other places aren't quite so forward-thinking (or don't have the questionable benefit of being next door to a building full of law students with time on their hands). Perhaps an even longer stretch would be an argument that the practice of logging (and of keeping those logs in an insecure place) violates students (and others') right to privacy. Federal protection for a "right of privacy" is fickle, but California protects its citizens' right to privacy in its constitution. (I'm not an attorney (yet), don't live in California (right now) and consequently don't know much about CA law. So please think about this message as maybe a hint in (I hope) a useful direction, not necessarily the right answer. Feh.) This concrete issue seems like a good reminder of the implications of the way that we think about "cyberspace" and the things that happen when we use computers. If one thinks about a machine or a network as "public space", logging or reporting activities which happen there (e.g., Alice walks over to visit Bob, leaving footprints everyone can see in /var/adm/syslog) seems reasonable or at least not offensive, and it seems silly to talk about being angry because someone wrote down what everyone could see. But if we think about machines and networks as being private space, reporting on what Alice and Bob do seems tacky and rude at best, and horrifying (and likely to create liability) at the other end of the spectrum. As much as I dislike the "cyberspace" metaphor, its use or misuse has serious consequences. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBME6qJH3YhjZY3fMNAQHiQgP9HjqkwOzMabzXXbUKp0W7c2MAn4na5X1X UPVY8p70abNVpPoVFGQTUpgBnv3hBy40n5RFD9pNM7c2UPwq0C8Tcir9TBr+xEH7 L7iQCjsqIK5F1lv66C5yMFu8wfiRF10hMhTJYthOa04dyP10HovT2QameGw+DZHJ og1t7owgcco= =D5PV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Le Monde: "Militant Cypherpunks liberate crypto software"
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am not making this up. Le Monde, a major French newspaper, discovered that "militant" Cypherpunks aid in the spread of crypto :-) In all fairness, the article is rather favorable. [Available in French only]. http://www.lemonde.fr/multimedia/sem3397/textes/act33971.html --Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. DES is dead! Please join in breaking RC5-56. http://rc5.distributed.net/

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