December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: DNA
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Along the lines of Big Brother and your genomic heritage: No, the few cells left on your chair are not enough to provide a genomic map. Hair does, indeed, contain cells capable of being analyzed, in the follicles. PCR (polymerase chain reaction) is capable of analyzing a variety of genetic polymorphisms (genes that vary among the general population) from only a single cell. Thus you could be typed in a limited fashion and identified but not mapped. Small comfort, however, and PCR is becoming easier every day. For escaping DNA typing tests, I suggest carrying along some HeLa cell DNA (that will really screw up the test ;->. Scott G. Morham !The First, VACCINIA(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu! Second PGP Public Keys by Request ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLfvO9j2paOMjHHAhAQElBAQA2Q+NCsYT/RxcFzIaDyWh6jRpP1672BZW MvmRccSGKUyhIz54mC19cAaS6LuB1CxyMd2L52hn3eFwaxGbg1J/G3hIrJyCJ+Da ocJGG0cmdnl1Pg7coA3vT3IWDvv58/UHeZeKYgCEbckIQEGCmvKqqMdHd6yxz+K3 TYH75tQW6bU= =HWaa -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Current Remailers
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- After testing several remailers this weekend, three have given no reply. remail(a)c2.org (does this remailer support Request-Remailing-To:?) has not gotten back to me, nor has catalyst(a)netcom.com or remailer(a)rebma.mn.org. anon(a)cyberspace.org mailed me back from its mail daemon to tell me no such account, as did nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu. The following worked: remailer(a)ds1.wu-wien.ac.at very fast remailer(a)chaos.bsu.edu very fast rperkins(a)nyx.cs.du.edu very fast hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu very fast hfinney(a)shell.portal.com very fast remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com took a couple of hrs. ghio(a)kaiwan.com very fast remail(a)vox.hacktic.nl took overnight but it's not in this country :-) Does anyone know if catalyst and rebma are still on line? Scott G. Morham !The First, VACCINIA(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu! Second PGP Public Keys by Request ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLfvT4z2paOMjHHAhAQEwiQQA1o9hj0Ip/pWYRcOnveS54Qigfx/cuSKb uLJNW/8qvBCvmWvBabnL8Y3612HCkhyqajgiziQa4cglB/ALALyIZYkJH23xNwfp dv/o/Cn22RQvcFITRxPaMCcjZJUdJZGpDdP11vP1UboNdQHPMIFN54Nq/5XdFFgL 6AE3/hkjG+E= =UBu2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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NSA technology transfer
by Dan Harmon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following was posted on the list in the middle of May. Being curious I called the number list at Ft. Meade. The person on who answered was real shaken, for lack of a better term, that I called, it seems that this was the second inquiry that day. He wanted to know various things, like where did I get the information, was my name Bruce.... After a few minutes he finally took my name and said, to call him in a week to 10 days if I did not here from him. A few day later he called and said I needed to send a letter to expressing my interest in the technology. About 10 ten days after that I called to inquire if he received my letter and what was the next step. It seems that there had been quite a few requests and that they were trying to determine whether or not they were going to allow the technology to be transferred to individuals. The person said to call back in 4 or 5 days. I called today and they said in essence that they were not going to let individuals have a shot at it. They said that they were going to charge stiff license fees, that you would need to show a plan of how you were going to develop the product..... You get the point. It is obvious that they really don't want to transfer the technology. And if they do it will be to someone with deep pockets and who they like. I wonder where the fees that they want to charge will go, to the general treasury or to their own budget? More later. Dan Harmon On Thu, 19 May 1994, Anonymous wrote: > > > Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,alt.privacy > From: schneier(a)chinet.chinet.com (Bruce Schneier) > Subject: "Interesting Stuff" Checkers at the NSA > Message-ID: <Cq2934.q0(a)chinet.chinet.com> > Organization: Chinet - Public Access UNIX > Date: Thu, 19 May 1994 17:40:15 GMT > > This is from a flyer that NSA people have been distributing: > > NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY -- TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER > > Information Sorting and Retrieval by Language or Topic > > Description: This technique is an extremely simple, fast, > completely general mathod of sorting and retrieving machine- > readable text according to language and/or topic. The > method is totally independent of the particular languages or > topics of interest, and relies for guidance solely upon > exemplars (e.g., existing documents, fragments, etc.) > provided by the user. It employs no dictionaries keywords, > stoplists, stemmings, syntax, semantics, or grammar; > nevertheless, it is capable of distinguishing among closely > related toopics (previously considered inseparable) in any > language, and it can do so even in text containing a great > many errors (typically 10 - 15% of all characters). The > technique can be quickly implemented in software on any > computer system, from microprocessor to supercomputer, and > can easily be implemented in inexpensive hardware as well. > It is directly scalable to very large data sets (millions of > documents). > > Commercial Application: > > Language and topic-independent sorting and retieval of > documents satisfying dynamic criteria defined only by > existing documents. > > Clustering of topically related documents, with no > prior knowledge of the languages or topics that may be > present. It desired, this activity can automatically > generate document selectors. > > Specializing sorting tasks, such as identification of > duuplicate or near-duplicate documents in a large set. > > National Security Agency > Research and Technology Group - R > Office of Research and Technology Applications (ORTA) > 9800 Savage Road > Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000 > (301) 688-0606 > > > If this is the stuff they're giving out to the public, I can only > imagine what they're keeping for themselves. > > Bruce > > ************************************************************************** > * Bruce Schneier > * Counterpane Systems For a good prime, call 391581 * 2^216193 - 1 > * schneier(a)chinet.com > ************************************************************************** > >

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Massive ITAR Violation!
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I mailed this about 5 minutes before the news of list death arrived, so it didn't make it. Conspiracy! Anyway, I posted this to comp.org.eff.talk and so far it has generated no interest. The Cypherpunks have been mentioned in various articles in the mass media as a group that would at least toy with the idea of civil disobedience concerning ITAR violation. Imagine yourselves trying to topple ITAR by publically exporting PGP to many countries, every day, for over a year. Yet do any of us really want to push our luck this way? Phil Zimmermann is out a lot of cash paying for a legal team. He can hardly afford taking his family out for dinner. That's why discovering this, I feel it should make *news*. As it turns out, the internet's largest Macintosh ftp archive has been exporting MacPGP2.2 every day for the last year! This to Singapore and China and God knows where else. Every country on Earth with an internet connection, likely. Here is a satirical essay, explaining what anyone who takes ITAR at face value might do if they discovered this situation.... -----BEGIN ROT13 SIGNED MESSAGE----- Fellow citizens of the United States of America, I wish to inform you of a great and ongoing catastrophe of most serious consequence. It is organized crime, by definition. Below is the header for the MacPGP2.2 file on sumex-aim.stanford.edu, archived with dozens of other utilities, as /info-mac/util/pgp.hqx, which has been there for *over a year*, many times a week being *exported* onto info-mac mirrors around the world. This is the most massive and organized absolute violation of the USA's ITAR munitions export laws (regulations) we have ever witnessed. For an entire year, weekly if not daily, the notorious encryptor PGP, right under our eyes, exported! I hope this is cleared up as soon as humanly possible, but we are all of us left with the guilt of not having noticed this before. All this talk of ITAR and there you are, your largest communal Mac ftp site pumping out PGP across the border like a huge demonic machine bent on destroying our beloved society. If the moderators cannot be contacted immediately, I suggest military force be used. Or cooperative shutdown of the US internet connections. Please begin this at once, as it *must* be stressed that PGP is classified as a MUNITION, right along with rocket launchers and tanks!!!!!!!! This is as serious as it gets. I didn't even know what the internet *was* back in April of '93, and I am but one in a million (literally) who has access to sumex-aim.stanford.edu and all its mirror sites. It must have been my destiny to save the world, for none of *you* seem interested in doing so. It has only been an hour since I discovered this NATIONAL SECURITY DISASTER, and I immediately set myself in action to save my country from destruction. *I*YoU*mE*We*OiwIE*wE*yOU*Me*I* P.S. Here is the evidence: >From: macmod(a)SUMEX-AIM.Stanford.EDU (Info-Mac Moderator) >Date: Sun, 25 Apr 1993 23:22:58 PDT > >PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) ver 2.2 - RSA public-key encryption freeware >for MSDOS, protects E-mail. Lets you communicate securely with people >you've never met, with no secure channels needed for prior exchange of >keys. Well featured and fast! Excellent user documentation. > >PGP has sophisticated key management, an RSA/conventional hybrid >encryption scheme, message digests for digital signatures, data >compression before encryption, and good ergonomic design. Source >code is free. > >Keywords: PGP, Pretty Good Privacy, RSA, public key, encryption, > privacy, authentication, signatures, email > >(This file must be converted with BinHex 4.0) > >:$8eKBe"(8$)Z-LjcC@%!39"36'&eFh3J!!!$@3X!!%DFIea6593K!!%!!eN,FNa .... And upon downloading it and starting it up, the console window faithfully displays: >Pretty Good Privacy 2.2 - Public-key encryption for the masses. >(c) 1990-1993 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Mar 93 >Date: 1994/06/12 16:10 GMT I further suggest that all of the following sites (but a sample) immediately remove this file from their archives and stop mirroring sumex-aim till they too remove the file. To keep this from happening again, I suggest *all of us* in the USA delete our copies of PGP from our hard disks, lest our children export it into the hands of such enemy nations as these. It is time we put an end to this scourge, for look what will happen if we do not. Pornographers and terrorists are coming for our children if we do not act. Death to PGP users!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Where is our government in all of this? Our tax dollars are not being used to protect us from the EXPORT OF MUNITIONS TO ENEMY NATIONS!!!!! I suggest full prosecution of all users and maintainers of sumex-aim, as they have all obviously conspired to maintain this treachery. I suggest they all be searched for other weapons as well including land mines, automatic machine guns, poison gases, biological weaponry and mind control devices of all sorts, as it is my firm belief that the only reason they are interested in PGP is to forward their agenda to export other munitions, drugs pushed on *our* children to pay for them!!! This will culminate in the obvious acquisition of *nuclear bombs* by every Tom Dick and Harry gangster. Little boys and girls in the getto with *neutron bombs* and *poison gas missiles*! I shutter to think we could have stopped it but, alas, we may have failed ourselves. Here are the target sites. I suggest immediate offensive attacks to destroy these evil ports of death and destruction.... Australia (Melbourne): archie.au//micros/mac/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Austria (Vienna): ftp.univie.ac.at//mac/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Canada (Vancouver): ftp.ucs.ubc.ca//pub/mac/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Finland (Espoo): ftp.funet.fi// pub/mac/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Finland (Jyvaskyla): ftp.jyu.fi//info-mac/util/MacPGP2.2.sea Germany (Hannover): ftp.rrzn.uni-hannover.de//pub/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Japan (Tokyo): ftp.center.osaka-u.ac.jp//info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Japan (Tokyo): ftp.iij.ad.jp//pub/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Japan (Tokyo): ftp.u-tokyo.ac.jp//pub/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Netherlands (Wageningen): ftp.fenk.wau.nl//pub/mac/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Republic of Singapore (Singapore): ftp.nus.sg//pub/mac/util/pgp.hqx Sweden (Lund): ftp.lth.se//mac/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx.Z Sweden (Uppsala): ftp.sunet.se//pub/mac/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Switzerland (Zurich): nic.switch.ch//mirror/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx Taiwan (Hsinchu): ftp.edu.tw//Macintosh/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx UK (London): src.doc.ic.ac.uk//packages/info-mac/util/pgp.hqx.gz -----END ROT13 SIGNED MESSAGE----- -----BEGIN ROT13 SIGNATURE----- Whar fvkgu avargrra uhaqerq avargl sbhe. Sbhegubhfnaqgra punenpgref va frirauhaqerqrvtuglrvtug jbeqf bs baruhaqerq yvarf. -----END ROT13 SIGNATURE-----

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(None)
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

hughes(a)ah.com (Eric Hughes) writes: > One has already been created: alt.numbers.random > You may post factorizations of peoples public keys to > alt.numbers.prime, as well. I can't seem to find any newsgroups on Netcom containing "numbers" in the name. Should I complain? -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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The NEXUS-Berkeley is now on-line
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Note: you haven't been subscribed to nexus-berkeley(a)c2.org without your permission.. you're on a list that this message has been Bcc`d to, if you are not subbed to nexus-berkeley(a)c2.org] -- Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley is now on-line -- -- Please distribute widely. After many months of planning, thinking, frustration, and hard work, Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley is now on-line and ready to begin its work. We've been thinking and dreaming about this for the past two years. Finally we've made it into a reality. Community ConneXion (c2, c^2, or c-squared) has been founded in order to build up a strong community in the internet both locally and globally. We are linked into the worldwide NEXUS-Gaia movement which is building up a worldwide community of like-minded network-oriented individuals. We've realized that the internet is not about the protocols nor the universities nor the corporations nor the politics which form the basic infrastructure. All these things are merely the facilitators, the parts which come together to produce the whole; the internet is about people communicating and making connections with each other-- forming the social infrastructure. We've appeared in order to facilitate these connections. We've setup shop here in the SF Bay Area and we will integrate virtuality and reality. It is possible for virtual communities to merge into, supplement, and sometimes even create "real" flesh communities. In order to build up this community we've put some computers on the internet and have started offering services. These are quality services provided at a low cost, with an emphasis on community involvement. We emphasize privacy because there can be no strong community where people fear their neighbors. By allowing people to selective reveal themselves, we make easier for them to break down the walls of prejudice which come between people in social interactions. We're offering mailboxes, shell accounts, anonymous remailing services, ftp space, domain names, mail exchanging, strong psuedonymous identities, and more as time goes on. We're building up a barter-coupon system so that volunteers who help our community can earn credits to use to buy more services from our system or, as the NEXUS-Gaia project grows, from Nexi around the world. The barter-coupon system is implemented using a secure and private anonymous digital cash scheme. We're asking for help from people to build our community. It can't be done with only a few people. Everyone involved can help out to build the system. A community is a group effort. As we build the community we improve our lives. For more information and to sign up, use your favorite World-Wide-Web browser to look at http://www.c2.org or, if you don't have access to a WWW browser, telnet to c2.org and login as "guest". Most services are offered with an initial two week free trial period. In order to subscribe to our mailing list, send the message "subscribe nexus-berkeley" to majordomo(a)c2.org. (From a UNIX prompt: "echo subscribe nexus-berkeley | mail majordomo(a)c2.org") If you have any questions, send mail to info(a)c2.org. -sameer Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley Voice: 510-841-2014 (not yet active) Pager: 510-321-1014 Email: info(a)c2.org

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Re: (None)
by Ben.Goren＠asu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:50 PM 6/13/94 -0500, Jeff Gostin wrote: >dfloyd(a)runner.utsa.edu (Douglas R. Floyd) writes: > >> How rude is it for people to post (or mail to a mailing list) anon messages >> encrypted with someone's PGP key? It makes it easy for the receiver to >> obtain it, but how irritating is it to people? > Fairly. In fact, it's considered downright rude. It's like sitting >around a table of, say, 3 people, and whispering with someone next to you. >The first person is you -- you're sending the message. The second person >is your friend -- he's recieving it. The third is me -- I'm just watching >two people whispering. Further, newsgroups are a very inappropriate place >to send private mail for propogation. Might it be appropriate, though, to create an alt group for that purpose? Sort of the digital equivalent of putting "coded" messages in the personals section of your favorite newspaper's classified section. You know--"John, you have five days to pay up" means to meet at the Ritz for dinner next Thursday, and "I love you, Sally" means to run for the border. But far, far more effective digitally. Could be especailly useful for people "in the field," considering how many universities and other places permit Usenet posting without an account, so long as your IP is considered local--easier to get access. > --Jeff b& -- Ben.Goren(a)asu.edu, Arizona State University School of Music net.proselytizing (write for info): Protect your privacy; oppose Clipper. Voice concern over proposed Internet pricing schemes. Stamp out spamming. Finger ben(a)tux.music.asu.edu for PGP 2.3a public key.

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Opportunity to Earn NexusBucks (a MagicMoney currency)
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There are a few user interfaces and client programs I'd like to have written, but I lack the time, so I am making an offering of NexusBucks for those who would like to write the user interfaces and put them into the public domain (or GPL-- any freely redistributable liscence will do.) Terms: Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley will pay a negotiated sum of NexusBucks to identities who write software for the NEXUS-Berkeley. The author of the software may retain full copyright of the software as long as the software is made freely redistributable under the GPL (GNU Public License) or a similar system. For more details about NexusBucks, look at http://www.c2.org/nexbucks What I'd like written: 1) A client program for the blind anonymous server. I've already written a very rudimentary client program but it lacks dynamic checks to see which remailers are up (I'd imagine it could do this by fingering one of the "active-remailers" lists and parsing that output-- one such list is running on remail(a)c2.org) and error checking. It's very possible that someone might just want to take my work and improve upon it. 2) A front-end to the MagicMoney client and server. Again, I've written a rudimentary user interface to work with the perl wrapper that I've put around Pr0duct Cypher's server, but it is still a rather clunky interface. It could use improvement. If you have any other ways you might be able to help out, by writing code or in some other fashion, please send mail to volunteer(a)c2.org. Also look at http://www.c2.org/nexbucks/earn.html -- sameer Voice: 510-841-2014 Network Administrator Pager: 510-321-1014 Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley sameer(a)c2.org

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How irritating are anon encrypted pgp messages
by dfloyd＠runner.utsa.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This is something I have been wondering about for a while: How rude is it for people to post (or mail to a mailing list) anon messages encrypted with someone's PGP key? It makes it easy for the receiver to obtain it, but how irritating is it to people? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLfx6cXDkimqwdwa5AQE5PgQAr7vFwaMiKhAcdUqQW1B85W+nehSYUp47 iyL1cREjD2yypC9XnAkzucCAAie9so1fY74KQwQhWS99h9oMn/QWEUT50OBhVX8+ Mt98Tpr2/9pf2ovlvmqTtkyEC7DY38tsBmbYcRvwyZ1/6Dlvs4gJtmwtwwhW3UDj +pQFp+GSv+4= =jGCF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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DNA
by Mats Bergstrom 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Databases of fingerprints and retina-images might still have a future for specialized applications but DNA-typing (why not on a simple blood sample at birth) combined with a fixed social security number valid for life will probably become a widely used method for governments to control the identity of their serfs. Even without legislation stating compulsory testing of all citizens there are great possibilities with this method. Serologic tests for various reasons (i.e. HIV, rubella in pregnancy etc) are routinely performed on a majority of the population in developed countries. These samples are usually frozen and saved for decades (for the purpose of comparison if the individual should fall ill; and for research if something might get interesting) at most laboratries. DNA- analysis efter thawing is no big deal with modern techniques. So if one is planning to commit hideous crimes in the future, or if one has other reasons to maintain DNA privacy, one should demand that blood samples taken from oneself are destroyed after testing (alternatively take the tests under a pseudonym). Unfortunately there is no known method of encrypting one's DNA code in situ but hopefully they will safely (in escrow?) encrypt it in the databanks. For most purposes a cheapish imprint (sort of a hash function) of an individual's DNA code will suffice, i.e. for secure identification. Longer strains of code will give additional information on the person's genetic dispositions of course (until now only for physical diseases and risk factors but coding relating to schizophrenia and psychopathy are expected Real Soon - the science of molecular biology is in an exponential phase). For such an extended analysis it is, at least for some more years, not enough with a frozen blood sample for serologic testing or a blood/semen-stain from the clothes of a victim but culturable cell-lines are necessary. These observations were provoked by the following forwarded letter: //mb Date: Thu, 09 Jun 94 05:06:29 MST From: mednews (HICNet Medical News) To: hicnews Subject: Course: DNA Databanks and Repositories Message-ID: <iHJNNc7w165w(a)stat.com> DNA DATABANKS & REPOSITORIES will be presented 4-5 November 1994 at the Sheraton Inn Midway, St Paul Minnesota, USA. SPONSORS: Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and the American Registry of Pathology. GENERAL INFORMATION: AFIP Education Dept. (INT), 14th & Alaska Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20306-6000 USA; (301)427-5231; FAX (301)427-5001; or INTERNET: LOWTHER(a)email.afip.osd.mil CONTENT: DNA typing of biologic tissues and fluids has revolutionized criminalistics. This technology is so powerful that over one half of all states have legislatively mandated the creation of DNA databanks and repositories for law enforcement purposes with other states considerating the same. The passage of the federal DNA Identification Act will bolster the growth of these databanks. DNA repositories also have been established for military remains identification, for scientific human geneic diversity studies, and for numerous public health reasons. This is the third national conference devoted strictly to the establishment of DNA databanks and repositories. This conference is designed to be a practical discussion on the creation and the set-up of DNA databanks/repositories, focusing on forensic identification. It is intended for DNA repository directors, policy makers, and administrators considerating establishment of a DNA collections program, and other interested persons. Lectures will be presented on current state sex offender databanks, the FBI's National DNA Index, the DNA Identification Act, practical aspects of databank setup and administration, and the associated legal and ethical issues. Convictions based on the Minnesota State DNA Database will be featured and a tour of the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension's facility will be conducted. (English) COURSE DIRECTOR: Victor W. Weedn, LTC, MC, USC TUITION: $220.

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